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 How does the Communist Party of China (CPC) use emotion in its environmental 
governance rhetoric? This thesis explores the application of emotion in the CPC’s 
rhetoric on ecological civilisation (Shengtai Wenming, 生态文明); identifies patterns in 
the CPC’s use of emotion within that rhetoric; and analyses the relationship between 
these patterns and the CPC’s strategic objectives regarding environmental governance, 
their domestic political agenda, and their wider international ambitions. This thesis 
contributes to emotion research within International Relations (IR) by developing an 
intuitive, thematic, Emotions Discourse Analysis (EDA). The constructed EDA builds 
upon Koschut, Hall, Wolf, Solomon, Hutchison and Bleiker’s (2017) EDA, to identify, 
contextualise and interpret the use of emotion in the CPC’s ecological civilisation 
rhetoric. The thematic approach is closely based upon Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) 
Chosenness-Myth-Trauma Complex, in which myths and memories substantiate 
emotions of chosenness, glory and trauma in political rhetoric.  
By approaching the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric via this new and intuitive 
framework, this thesis concludes that the CPC’s use of emotion helps to continue their 
nation building through: constructing identity; asserting party power; and vying for 
increased global status for the PRC. Ecological civilisation is a discursive tool created by 
the CPC to: encourage the citizens of the PRC to engage with their environmental 
governance; justify their leadership and assert themselves as the authority (of 
environmentalism) within the PRC, and to an extent globally; and to elevate the strategic 
importance of the PRC, as a “big responsible country”, by presenting ecological 
civilisation as a Chinese-led environmental governance, for mankind. 
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The planet today is facing huge environmental challenges. A combination of 
dramatic economic expansion following the Industrial Revolution alongside an 
exponentially increasing population has placed enormous pressure on the natural 
environment. The past fifty years has seen mass extinctions of animal species, 
overfishing has led to the collapse of approximately thirty percent of fisheries worldwide, 
severe drought and degradation is being experienced on over eighty percent of 
agricultural land in the world’s more arid regions and eighty percent of the planet’s 
forests are threatened by deforestation (World Bank, 2014). These developments have 
had a deleterious impact on global ecosystems and also carry severe and negative 
implications for human societies. Waste products, hazardous materials and heavy 
metals, which are the byproducts of mass production and consumption processes, are 
seeping into surface soils and waterways, triggering irreversible damage to living 
environments. Each year thousands of people die worldwide from industrial pollution 
(World Bank, 2014). 
The severity of environmental degradation requires cooperation across numerous 
boundaries: spatial, national, temporal, ontological and epistemological (Geall and Ely, 
2018; Hulme, 2010; and Urry, 2011). The transboundary nature of environmental 
degradation exposes deeper ecological, social and political concerns, which are 
themselves complex and uncertain (Geall, 2014). Consequently, the “politics of the 
earth” is becoming an increasingly important item on the international agenda and is 
central to many debates and disputes (Dryzek, 2013; and Geall and Ely, 2018). Our 
current understanding, both of the processes of environmental degradation and the most 
effective means of environmental protection and ecological modernisation, is limited. 
Despite this lack of knowledge, a consensus has emerged focused on a singular, 
universal approach to these ecological, social and political concerns. This approach is 
currently labeled “sustainable development” and is frequently found as a catchall phrase 
within environmental policy, such as in, the United Nations’ (UN’s) 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda (Jasanoff, 2010).  
However, the Communist Party of China (CPC), since 2007, has been 
constructing a Chinese complement, which they have labeled “ecological civilisation” 
12 
(Shengtai Wenming, 生態文明). Under the premiership of Hu Jintao and now Xi Jinping, 
ecological civilisation has become a key political slogan (Geall, 2012; Geall and Hilton, 
2014; Goron, 2018; Hansen, Li and Svarverud, 2018; Marinelli, 2018; and Wang, He and 
Fan, 2014). Initially introduced as a prominent element of working towards becoming a 
“moderately prosperous society” (Xiaokang shehui, 小康社会; referred to as Xiaokang 
throughout this thesis); since 2012, ecological civilisation has become the CPC’s 
dominant frame for their environmental governance. To what extent ecological 
civilisation actually offers an alternative to sustainable development is widely debated. 
By examining how the CPC uses emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric, this 
thesis furthers these debates, by unpacking and empirically presenting how the 
ecological civilisation slogan is a new discursive tool constructing identity, power and 
status whilst being embedded within environmental governance. Appendix 2 consists of 
a timeline documenting the key political and environmental events leading up to, and 
then following on from, the introduction of ecological civilisation; this acts as a reminder 
of the broader political context surrounding the implementation and then use of 
ecological civilisation throughout this thesis.  
While the World Bank (2014) analysis cited above provides a global perspective 
on current ecological crises, the PRC’s experience of environmental problems is 
particularly acute (Wang, et al., 2014). The PRC accounts for twenty percent of the 
world’s population, whilst having access to only seven percent of fresh water globally 
and below ten percent of the world’s arable land (Geall and Ely, 2018). In 2014, the CPC 
found that over sixty-two percent of groundwater they investigated was rated “extremely 
bad” or “bad” and thirty percent of the PRC’s main river-ways were also polluted (China 
Water Risk, 2015). Forty percent of the arable land available to the PRC was reported as 
degraded by state media (Patton, 2014). In 2016, Air in 145 out of 161 cities monitored 
by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) had unacceptable air-quality 
standards (MEP Report, 2016). These statistics show how the PRC has been facing 
potential water shortages, choking air and toxic produce from degraded land (Zhang, 
Wang, Yang, He and Liu, 2009; and Wang, et al., 2014).  
The PRC’s large population and continuing economic growth, albeit decelerated, 
contribute to rising resource and energy requirements that place a huge strain on the 
PRC’s, already limited, natural environment (Pan, 2006a). The environmental 
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degradation experienced, and the pressures this creates, demands for a more effective 
environmental policy, especially if continued development is to be achieved. How the 
CPC addresses these demands will be central not only to developing Xiaokang: a vision 
of a stable, safe, clean, green and beautiful environment throughout the PRC; but also to 
achieving internationally set standards, such as the greenhouse gas emission reductions 
agreed in Paris at the UN’s Climate Change Conference (COP21) (Geall and Ely, 2018; 
Tyfield, Ely, Urban, Geall, Zuev and Urry, 2014; Urban, Benders and Moll, 2009; Urban 
and Geall 2014; and Wang and Watson 2009). 
With the PRC’s domestic and international national interests at stake through 
worsening environmental conditions, it is not surprising that the CPC have begun to 
deploy a new slogan entrenched within these environmental, political, social and 
economic concerns. That the CPC would look to utilise emotion within their rhetoric to 
disseminate how they intend to meet these challenges is a natural development. Perry 
(2015) has shown how mobilising emotions has been a core methodology of the CPC 
since the Party was founded; this thesis shows that the emotions deployed through the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric do much more than exist as a go-to methodology. Both 
Callahan’s (2012) work on “pessoptimism” within CPC politics, and Wang’s (2014) work 
on historical memory and the CPC’s humiliation narrative, show how emotion – or what 
Callahan (2012) calls a “structure of feeling” – is a key component within the CPC’s 
development narratives. This thesis highlights how by focusing on the emotional 
elements of a political text, strong political messages can be identified and unpacked; 
within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, emotion is used to forge both national 
and international interests, especially through identity construction, asserting the CPC’s 
leadership and power, and vying to improve the PRC’s global status.  
The CPC’s ecological civilisation slogan appears frequently throughout the PRC 
as posters, advertisements and banners (Geall, 2014). Accompanying the slogans is a 
raft of ambitious policy directives setting out what an ecological civilisation is and how it 
is to be achieved. Table 1 shows some examples of the ambitious policies set out within 
the 12th Five-Year-Plan (FYP) (table adapted from Maske, (2011:3); see also, Geall and 
Pellissery, 2012; and Hilton, Geall, Boyd, Copsey, Liu, Hu, Feng, Yang, Ellis and Shin, 
2011). Given the nature and scope of these policies, scholars have endeavoured to 
ascertain not only the likelihood of the CPC committing to this ambitious transformation, 
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and what kind of PRC we will see if they do follow their directives, but also the extent to 
which ecological civilisation differs practically from sustainable development. The 
conclusions made regarding the CPC’s ecological civilisation in these literatures are 
based on theoretical debates of what an ecological civilisation is and empirical studies of 
whether the CPC’s latest set of environmental policies produce different results to 
sustainable development policies. Some of these debates will be outlined in Chapter 1. 
 
Target 2010 2015 
Change over 
5 years (%) 
Farmland reserves (billion mu) 1.818 1.818 0 
Decrease in water consumption per unit of value-added 
industrial output (%) 
    30 
Increase of water efficiency coefficient in agricultural 
irrigation 
0.5 0.53 0.03 
Increase of non-fossil fuel usage in primary energy 
consumption (%) 
8.3 11.4 3.1 
Decrease in energy consumption per unit of GDP (%)     16 
Decrease in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%)     17 
Total decrease in 
emissions of major 
pollutants (%) 
Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD)     8 
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)     8 
Ammonia Nitrogen     10 
Nitrous Oxides     10 
Forest Increase 
Forest coverage rate (%) 20.36 21.66 1.3 
Forest stock (m³) 137 143 6 
Table 1: Table to Show Examples of Policy Directives Set out in the 12th Five Year Plan 
Source: Table adapted from Maske (2011:3). 
 However, rather than examining possible environmental outcomes attributed to 
ecological civilisation and/or sustainable development, this study explores how emotion, 
as a discursive tool, carries political messages throughout the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric. As discussed, environmental conditions within the PRC are interconnected 
within a nexus of social, political and economic development. Therefore, by studying 
emotion, the deeper political motives behind the CPC’s current environmental 
governance and ecological civilisation slogan will be the focus of enquiry, as opposed to 
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the political and environmental results, thus approaching the analysis of ecological 
civilisation from a different perspective. 
The CPC recognises that the degeneration of the PRC’s natural environment has 
consequences for national development. They are becoming increasingly sensitive to 
the opinions of Chinese citizens with respect to their poor environmental record. While 
the CPC began introducing the concept of ecological civilisation in 2007, since 2012, the 
slogan has become far more prominent under Xi Jinping (Goron 2018; see Figure 1). 
Studies conducted by the Pew Research Centre (2013) correspondingly point to a sharp 
rise in environmental concerns among Chinese citizens since Xi’s increased uptake of 
the slogan: in 2013, forty-seven percent considered air pollution a “very big problem”, up 
from thirty-six percent in 2012; and thirty-eight percent considered food safety was now 
a major concern, a twenty-six percent increase on data from 2008. 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of English-Language News Articles Published with "Ecological 
Civilization" or "Ecological Civilisation" in the Text. 
Source: Data gathered from Access World News Database. 
 
In addition to these domestic events, President Donald Trump announced on the 
1st of June 2017 that he would withdraw the United States of America (U.S.) from the 
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Paris Agreement (Geall and Ely, 2018; and Goron, 2018). This has dramatically altered 
the international context in which the PRC pursues its environmental governance. Not 
only did President Trump’s decision spark widespread criticism from big businesses and 
governments worldwide (Ward, 2017; and Watts and Connolly, 2017), it also raised 
questions about how the PRC would respond as the largest greenhouse-gas emitter. Xi 
Jinping, responded at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2018, calling the 
UN climate accord a “hard-won achievement” that “signatories should stick to” 
(Shankleman, 2017:1). Xi received “almost universal” praise (Geall and Ely, 2018:4). To 
many, Trump’s decision created an easy diplomatic victory for the PRC. Klare (2017:1), 
for instance, argued Trump had “opened the door for China to emerge both as the 
world’s leader in green technology (while creating millions of new jobs for Chinese 
workers) and in international efforts to slow global warming.” Similarly, Green (2017:1) 
suggested we ought to “expect China to strengthen its commitments under the Paris 
Agreement, expand its dominance in clean energy, and hence strengthen its 
international claims to climate leadership over the medium term, at least.” Commentators 
increasingly turned their attention to the CPC to consider whether they would use 
environmental governance as a vehicle to assert global leadership (see Figure 1).  
However, there were also those who expressed skepticism about Xi Jinping’s 
announcement. Hilton (2017:1), for example, claimed that the PRC were being thrust 
into this leadership role “prematurely and by default”, adding, the CPC are “unlikely to 
welcome the scrutiny that global leadership entails”. Likewise, Economy (2017) 
contended that the PRC neither merit nor desire the leadership role being thrust upon 
them, citing as evidence the PRC’s over-reliance on coal. Elsewhere, Xi’s 
announcement was criticised as “purely face. It’s talk” (Vanderklippe, 2017:1). By 
focusing on the use of emotion within the CPC’s political rhetoric, this thesis highlights 
how the ecological civilisation concept speaks directly to such concerns over the PRC’s 
leadership ability within (global) environmental governance; the PRC’s identity, power 
and status are systematically constructed, via emotion, throughout the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. 
Thus it can be seen how there is disagreement amongst commentators about the 
extent to which the PRC is likely to succeed in reaching its environmental goals or step-
up into the role of global environmental leadership. Answers to these disagreements are 
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unlikely to emerge in the near future. However, in looking at the CPC’s use of emotion, 
deeper understandings in the importance of Xi Jinping’s “talk”, in earlier CPC 
environmental rhetoric, as well as in their political sympathies and declared directions 
begin to provide answers as to the political intentions emotionally embedded within the 
ecological civilisation concept.  
Geall and Ely (2018), in discussing the importance of ecological civilisation, 
argue that a discursive shift can be seen in the CPC’s statements, especially after 2016, 
which have tended to create a more proactive rhetoric with regards to environmental 
reform domestically and international environmental diplomacy. They note, however, that 
a discursive shift need not result in practical policy and activity. Geall and Ely (2018) 
explain how inaction may be the desired outcome. This thesis, in focusing on emotion 
within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, explores how ecological civilisation is a 
discursive tool, for both action and inaction, for the CPC’s desired environmental 
governance. The ecological civilisation rhetoric is embedded within, and is an extension 
of, a number of the CPC’s political narratives – in particular, narratives of Chinese 
identity, the party’s authority, and the PRC’s global status – thus providing 
complementary understandings of the CPC’s broader political intentions.  
 
 
Influencing Perceptions: Sovereignty, Authority and Principles 
 
The rapid economic growth and development experienced by the PRC since 
“reform and opening up” from 1978 onwards produced monumental ecological burdens 
on the PRC’s natural environments (Lin, Cai and Li, 1998). These ecological burdens 
are not contained within the PRC’s State borders; ecological destruction suffered in the 
PRC has an impact globally (Shapiro, 2012). For example, the construction of dams 
along the Mekong River directly impacts the local economies and environments in 
Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia (Urban, Siciliano and Nordensvard, 
2017). Similarly, the air quality over the PRC’s cities, such as the “Asian Dust” dispersing 
to Korea and Mongolia, affects all people regardless of State boundaries or nationalities 
(Park, 2019). The PRC’s environmental issues are interconnected with those of the rest 
of the world and to this extent the development pathway adopted by the CPC influences 
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the environment both domestically and internationally (Economy, 2010; and Ma, 2007).  
Likewise, international actors and their actions also have an impact on the PRC 
and CPC’s decisions domestically. One example is the pressure placed on the CPC by 
the international community in the run up to the 2008 Olympics (Heurtebise, 2017; and 
Sze, 2014). In the weeks before the games began, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing started 
to release hourly updates monitoring the levels of air pollution within its vicinity. 
According to the Embassy, the updates were intended to inform American visitors 
attending the Olympics of the dangers presented by Beijing’s air quality. The Embassy 
decided to publish its data via Twitter. Since 2008, the U.S. Embassy’s publication of 
particulate data has repeatedly elicited strong reactions from the CPC.  
In 2012, the MEP demanded the U.S. Embassy to stop publishing their air 
pollution data on Twitter, stating (Global Times, 2012; and Schmitt, 2016:9): 
 
The data released to the public by the American Embassy is only related 
to the air quality in the vicinity of the Embassy. Moreover, it is not a 
professional monitoring system, its “lack of rigor and standards” is 
certainly a fact. To conduct air quality monitoring and release relevant 
data is definitely the public authority of the Chinese government. 
Standing on valid legal principles, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection demands that the American Embassy stop releasing this 
data.  
 
In this statement, we see an emotion-laden assertion of Chinese authority over the 
management of the environment within the PRC. An “Us” versus “Them” is created, 
where the U.S., as the “Them”, is belittled as lacking and not rigorous. The short 
statement informs Chinese citizens not to trust the U.S. data, insisting that the 
Embassy’s equipment is inaccurate, that these actions infringe Chinese sovereignty, and 
that the only legitimate authority on environmental matters within the PRC is the CPC. 
The CPC appears eager to stamp their own authority and power on the PRC’s 
environmental approach and conditions. 
  By the 12th of January 2013, the U.S. Embassy recorded their highest air 
pollution reading to date for Beijing. The PM2.5 readings measured a record-breaking 
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755 on the Air Quality Index (AQI), far in excess of the upper limit even of the MEP’s 
relatively conservative AQI (Wong, 2013). The PRC’s AQI has six levels, indicating 
increasing severity in pollution: a PM2.5 density of 1-50 is “excellent” and is represented 
by green; 51-100 is “good” and yellow; 101-150 is “lightly polluted” and orange; 151-200 
is “moderately polluted” and red; 201-300 is “heavily polluted” and purple; finally, 300-
500 is “severely polluted” and a deep crimson. The WHO considers as dangerous – 
denoting potential ill-effects for human health – any AQI of 70 and above; within the 
PRC, AQI readings with ill-effects on human health sits with “good”. How the CPC 
classifies and frames air pollution levels – the “lightly polluted” levels are in excess of 
twice the WHO’s safety limit – perhaps preconditions the Chinese public into accepting 
poorer qualities of their air. The CPC’s AQI readings are framed to distract the PRC from 
how unsafe their air is. However, the CPC’s AQI readings have since catastrophically 
surpassed the U.S. Embassy’s data from 2012, producing an AQI reading of 755 for 
PM2.5. The 755 recorded on the 12th of January 2013 became known as the 
“Airpocalypse” (kongqi mori, 空气末日 ) and created a cyber-storm of comments 
domestically and internationally (Wang, et al., 2014). Following this incident, the CPC 
blocked access to the U.S. Embassy’s data altogether.  
The use of emotional language found within the CPC’s response begins to show 
how an identity, one of authority, is being constructed; the response reiterates the CPC’s 
power claims on leadership and authority, especially when concerning the sovereignty of 
the PRC’s environment, and positioned the PRC as superior to the U.S. with regards to 
their professionalism, monitoring capabilities, rigour, standards, validity, legality and 
principles, ultimately positioning the PRC’s environmental governance status above that 
of the U.S.. By July 2013, six months after Airpocalypse, there was a significant increase 
in the number of essays being written by numerous CPC departments on the topics of 
the “mass line” (qunzhong luxian, 群众路线 ) and ecological civilisation. Ecological 
civilisation had become a well-established subject in public discourse, elevating the role 
of the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric within their environmental governance, thus 
simultaneously also highlighting the importance of research unpacking the concept 
(Geall and Ely, 2018; and Goron, 2018). 
Most studies of the CPC’s environmental politics and the environmental 
challenges within the PRC have focused on the negative implications of pollution 
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economically, socially and politically, as well as on the increasing levels of public 
engagement (especially domestic protests) with environmental issues (i.e. Economy, 
2010; Orlik, 2012; Shapiro, 2012; Xie, 2009; and Zhang and Barr, 2013). How the CPC 
frame their environmental governance – with regards to identity, power and status, as 
seen above – and what these framings reveal, has received far less attention. The next 
section will look further into some of the reasons for the importance of ecological 




The “Awakening” of Ecological Civilisation  
 
Hu Jintao initially introduced ecological civilisation as a CPC concept in his 17th 
National Congress report in 2007 (Oswald, 2014). Since then, Xi Jinping elevated 
ecological civilisation to the position of a “paramount objective” in 2012, and again to a 
“constitutional principle of the PRC” in 2018 (Goran, 2018). With each elevation in 
importance, additional rhetoric has been developed, producing a narrative of the spaces 
and futures of Chinese environmental governance. Geall and Ely (2018) have argued 
how under Xi Jinping, there appears to be both an ideological shift, changing the course 
of the CPC’s environmental governance, and an increase in the amount of ecological 
civilisation rhetoric being produced.  
On the 22nd of July 2013, six months after the “Airpocalypse”, ecological 
civilisation made its debut on the front page of the People’s Daily. The article, by “Ren 
Zhongping,”1 was titled The Chinese Awakening of an Ecological Civilisation. The title 
alone suggests a sense of the PRC’s special, selected or preferred responsibility: the 
chosenness of the Chinese to be the creators and guardians of this ecological 
civilisation. There is also a degree of unintended irony, inasmuch as critics of the CPC, 
especially in the context of heated public exchanges such as those following the U.S. 
Embassy’s publication of its AQI data, could, justifiably, reframe the title as An 
                                                
1Of note is how “Ren Zhongping” is not a person, but is a pseudonym for the People’s Daily’s 
commentary department. Ren Zhongping is a homophone for “People’s Daily Important 
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International Awakening for a Chinese Ecological Civilisation. Notwithstanding the 
implications of its title, the article contained a clear message: that ecological civilisation 
is central to every element of CPC policy; that there was to be shared responsibility 
between the CPC and the Chinese people for realising an ecological civilisation; but that 
such a realisation would be under the guidance of the canon’s ideology with the CPC as 
the authority.  
In the article, “Ren” (2013) eschews any suggestion of a causal relationship 
between the PRC’s miraculous economic drive, the core theory of economic growth 
underpinning it, or any of the policies of previous CPC canons and the levels of pollution 
and environmental degradation across the PRC. Instead, the commentator suggests that 
the “backward development concept of a few leading cadres [emphasis added]” is 
responsible for the PRC’s environmental degradation. Likewise, “Ren” (2013:1) handled 
delicately the relationship between environmental protest in the PRC and the evolution 
of ecological civilisation, observing that the concept was driven by an “awareness of the 
need for an ecological environmental protection among the Masses”. While passing over 
domestic and international criticism of the CPC’s environmental governance to date, 
“Ren” nonetheless acknowledges the collective environmental traumas experienced by 
both the CPC and “the Masses”. “Ren” (2013) insists, however, that it is not the CPC 
who are to be blamed for these collective environmental traumas. The article reveres the 
unity of “the Masses”, glorifies the CPC’s environmental governance, and acknowledges 
the PRC’s shared environmental traumas.  
This brief analysis of the debut of ecological civilisation by the People’s Daily is a 
prime example of what this thesis will show. Written into the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric are strong political messages with regards to why and how the CPC’s elevation 
in environmental governance carries important political intentions: “Ren” explicitly and 
implicitly highlights the importance of: togetherness and unity in environmental 
governance; the correct leadership of the CPC and their guiding authority on 
environmental governance; and subtly places the PRC within the broader context of a 
global environmental crisis thus suggesting how the CPC alone are not responsible for 
environmental degradation. 
The importance of the ecological civilisation rhetoric increased further with the 
momentous change in the CPC’s strategic direction following Xi’s inclusion of the 
22 
concept within the new principal contradiction, at the 18th CPC Congress in 2017. Since 
the 1970’s, development has been the CPC’s priority. Until 2017 this meant, expressly, 
economic development, with the CPC stressing the PRC’s developing country status. 
Prior to 2017 the CPC subordinated its environmental governance and diplomacy to the 
needs of economic development, insisting that, as a developing country, the PRC was 
unable to carry the burden of global climate action. This argument had been advanced 
as far back as 1972, at the UN Conference on the Human Environment, when the PRC 
delegate said, “we must not give up eating for fear of choking, nor refrain from building 
our own industry for fear of pollution and damage to the environment” (cited in Sternfeld, 
2017:1). Xi’s reformulation of the principal contradiction facing the PRC as “the 
contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-
growing needs for a better life” has brought ecological civilisation to the forefront, not 
only of CPC rhetoric, but of their future governance more broadly (Xinhua, 2017a:1). 
Environmental protection is now understood as necessary for continued economic 
development, not as something that stands in opposition to it. Furthermore, there 
appears to be a notable shift away from the (over)reliance on emphasising the PRC to 
be a developing country. 
The tension between environmental protection and (economic) development, 
however, is not easily resolved. Xi’s speech promised “a moderately prosperous society” 
(Xiaokang, 小康) by 2021, and a “modernized socialist strong country [sic]” by 2049. The 
difficulty therefore exists in the CPC’s ability to promote environmental protection without 
being suspected of jeopardising or impeding economic growth. There is a balance to be 
found, an idea that echoes Callahan’s (2012) concept of pessopitmism, the dualism of 
something positive alongside something negative, throughout the CPC’s politics. 
Controlling perceptions is not new, neither is an attempt to direct peoples’ perception(s) 
by injecting emotion into rhetoric (Koschut, et al., 2017). What is new, however, is a 
study that explicitly explores how CPC is applying this technique within their 
environmental governance rhetoric: this thesis therefore adds to our understanding of 
ecological civilisation by exploring how the CPC uses of emotion within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. 
In the work of Andrews (2008), and Ghanem and Zhang (2014), they identified 
how the CPC had used positive emotion within their environmental rhetoric to cover up 
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air-pollution catastrophes. The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric is replete with 
glorifying elements and positive, future-orientated ideals, as highlighted by Andrews 
(2008), Geall and Ely (2018), Ghanem and Zhang (2014) and Marinelli (2018). In using 
such techniques as metaphor and a “green-washing” of everything from economic 
growth, production and consumerism, the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric creates a 
directional understanding of the environment and one in which the PRC’s environmental 
degradation is often understated (Schmitt, 2016).  
This thesis contends that there are deeper reasons for this positively framed 
rhetoric that need to be explored. The CPC’s political rhetoric is well documented on 
how it is designed to unite the PRC via a constructed (and an often imagined) sense of 
shared pride, such as that found in “Ren’s” essay on the “mass line” and the CPC’s 
broader concept of a singular civilised State (Wenming Guojia, 文名郭家). Ecological 
civilisation, as a continuation of the CPC’s civilising discourse, can be seen as discourse 
aimed at constructing a State with a shared, timeless and uniquely Chinese 
understanding of environmentalism (Marinelli, 2018). Cartier (2013:1) argues, “the 
language used in these slogans harks back to the Spiritual Civilisation campaigns of the 
1980s,” where all of the keywords used within the slogans stipulate ideas on the role of 
the individual in striving to build their vision of a singular civilised State. Cartier (2013:1) 
goes on to add how this kind of Mao-era ‘red’ practice “is a central, and highly visible, 
feature of party-led socialist modernisation”, which brings us back to how ecological 
civilisation was initially introduced by the CPC as a means to reach Xioakang.  
One of the key ways in which a sense of pride and unity is achieved in political 
rhetoric, is through the use of emotion to frame the rhetoric (Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 1985; 
Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; and Wang, 2014). The National Patriotic Education 
Campaign (NPEC) and its narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation woven throughout 
CPC discourse, especially since the early 1990s, has been widely studied and acts as a 
good example of the CPC injecting emotion into their political discourse (Callahan, 2012; 
and Wang, 2014). This thesis believes that a similar deployment of emotion will also be 
seen in the ecological civilisation rhetoric and as more than a tool to glorify and cover-up 
air-pollution catastrophes; this introduction has already begun to demonstrate that it 
does. The natural next step is therefore to consider the most appropriate methodology 
and research design to explore the use of emotion within the CPC’s ecological 
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civilisation rhetoric.  
 
 
Developing a Thematic Emotion Discourse Analysis For International 
Relations  
 
 Beyond the PRC, current events from around the world are highlighting the 
significance of emotion in and through political discourse. Across the U.S. and Europe, a 
variety of actors are playing with fear and shaping political discourse. Within Europe, the 
arrival of Syrian refugees and migrants elicited sympathy from some and resentment 
from others, creating new, emotionally charged political fault-lines (Koschut, et al., 
2017). Similarly, invocations of fear and nostalgia underpinned public discourse in the 
United Kingdom (UK) during the Brexit campaigns and general elections (Iakhnis, 
Rathbun, Reifler and Scotto, 2018). Elsewhere, in literature exploring emotion and 
climate change, Norgaard (2011:400) argues that emotion is used in political discourse 
to manipulate and to avoid “emotions of fear, guilt, and helplessness, [and to] follow 
cultural norms, and maintain positive conceptions of individual and national identity.” 
There is scope therefore, for the study of emotion, in and through political discourse; to 
help IR scholars better understand contemporary political and discursive landscapes. 
Accordingly, since the 1980s, the discipline of IR has been developing an array of 
methodologies for investigating the many ways emotions work in and through discourse 
(for recent developments, see: Ahmed, 2015; Bially-Mattern, 2011; De Rivera, 1992; 
Edkins, 2003; Elias, 1985; Fattah and Fierke, 2009; Hall, 2015; Hutchison, 2010; 
Koschut, et al., 2017; Leep, 2010; Risse and Ropp, 2013; Ross, 2014; and Solomon 
2014). Both academic research and political events demonstrate the centrality of 
emotions in conflicts and the decision-making process; emotions are central to both the 
doing and making of politics (Galtung, 1996a and 2001). At the heart of this so-called 
“emotional turn” are two main questions: why and how we should study emotions 
through discourse. With regards to why, Koschut, et al., (2017:2) provide the simple 
answer, “because emotions matter”. The aforementioned examples further justify why it 
is increasingly important to be studying emotions through discourse; the use of emotion 
in political discourse is repeatedly at the forefront of daily political issues, impacting 
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public opinion and political decision-making. The question of how has yielded an array of 
methodological approaches for analysing emotions in and through discourse with a 
particular focus on verbal and textual rhetoric, which provides an empirically accessible 
platform for emotions to be studied within IR and a good starting point for this thesis.  
Both questions require further consideration and, in particular, require greater 
amounts of empirical evidence to substantiate the importance of Emotions Discourse 
Analysis (EDA). This thesis will empirically demonstrate, within the context of the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, why emotions matter whilst developing a methodological 
approach for studying them. By developing an EDA, the ways in which the rhetoric 
advanced by the CPC engages emotion, and the role of emotion in furthering and 
realising their proposed environmental governance, can be explored (Koschut, et al., 
2017). The EDA will be developed within a constructivist methodology. The social 
constructivist perspective places emphasis on the importance of the intersubjective and 
social as well as the historical and cultural characteristics behind emotions, without 
denying their phenomenological expression and physical perception (Averill 1980; and 
Harré 1986). This approach not only informs the methodology of this thesis, but also the 
broader field of emotion research within IR (for example, see Campbell, 1998; Der-
Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Epstein, 2008; Hansen, 2006; and Milliken, 1999). For the 
sake of analytical clarity and rigour, this thesis focuses on the textual dimension of the 
CPC’s political rhetoric, in the form of transcribed CPC speeches (those officially 
translated into English by the CPC), and is referred to throughout as the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric. Therefore, it is also pertinent to add that this thesis takes 
the concept of emotion, as socio-cultural phenomena within discourse, that transcend 
individuals and groups. The social constructivist perspective of emotion, which is 
discussed at length within Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design, takes emotion 
to be certain words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives, which are 
purposefully constructed and written into discourse to achieve certain understandings 
and categorisations; Hutchison and Bleiker (2017) argue emotion is discourse is used to 
foster support for specific understandings and categories of values and ideals, whilst 
concealing and degrading others. This thesis will not be considering the 
phenomenological or physical experience of emotions, the reasons for which will be 
discussed in Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design. 
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Beyond the acknowledgement of an emotional turn within IR, there has been little 
agreement, yet, regarding theoretical approaches to the study of emotion within IR, other 
than a general focus on an analysis of emotion in and through discourse (Koschut, et al., 
2017). Generally, it has been agreed that appropriate methods and criteria for studying 
emotion discourses should focus upon words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings 
and narratives, which refer symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) (Koschut, et al., 2017). 
There are, however, critical agreements on what should not be done in future research. 
These are as follows. 
Solomon (2014), Koschut (2017) and Koschut, et al. (2017:483) have argued that 
a considerable proportion of contemporary research into emotion within IR “take[s] 
affective dynamics for granted within making them explicit”. That is to say, researchers 
make causal relationships explicit between discourse(s) and resulting actioned affects 
within their discourse analyses. Harré (1986:4) argued that emotions constitute an 
“ontological illusion,” whereby there is a misleading notion that “there is an abstract and 
detachable ‘it’ upon which research can be directed.” IR scholars have come to accept 
the importance of affect from emotion in political discourse and any resulting actions or 
other effects, but there has been an underlying ontological assumption with regards to 
which words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives merit study and are 
relevant versus those that are erroneously given meaning. Moreover, a lack of clarity in 
definition with regards to what emotions warrant meaningful study within IR has also 
been problematic. Finally, it is agreed that there has been a lack of empirical data thus 
far within the field; in making affects explicit, researchers have not always empirically 
supported their arguments. 
This raises the question of how IR researchers might theorise and analytically 
extract emotion from discourse, and the emotionalising effect(s) achieved through 
political discourse, without succumbing to ontological illusions. Koschut, et al. (2017) 
suggest that the study of emotion in and through discourse is best designed around an 
EDA of three parts: 1) theory (what is an emotion?); 2) expression (how are emotions 
communicated?); and 3) effects (what do emotions do?) These ideas are discussed in 
Chapter 2. Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA has been applied to speech acts within their 
emotionality research showing reliability, repeatability and accuracy in this approach. 
Only one analysis of CPC discourse has been conducted using Koschut, et al.’s (2017) 
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EDA to date, and this was conducted by Hall (2017) on the Sino-Japanese Zhuhai 
incident.  
Hall’s (2017) research applied three approaches to analyse the emotional 
discourse that resulted from a multiple-day orgy, where a Japanese tourist group, 
staying at a five-star hotel in Zhuhai, hired several hundred local prostitutes in mid-
September, 2004. The timing of the incident overlapped with the 18th September 
anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and invoked allusions to the 
behaviours of the Japanese Imperial Army sixty years prior. The incident caused public 
outrage, to the extent that the Foreign Minister of the PRC, Li Zhaoxing, requested the 
Japanese ambassador to convey back to Japan “the Chinese public’s strong indignation 
(愤慨)” (cited in Hall, 2017:487). The three ways Hall (2017) analysed the emotion in the 
discourse resulting from this incident, included the notions that: 1) discourse can be 
indicative of emotion by offering insight and evidence of the emotional state of the 
author; 2) discourse can be provocative of emotion, through the use of: narratives, 
symbols and themes; and 3) discourse can be invocative of emotion. However, despite 
Hall’s (2017) informative analysis demonstrating the importance of conducting an EDA 
on discourse within the PRC, these three approaches rely on further phenomenological 
understandings and biological expressions of emotion to be able to conduct such an 
analysis and present the risk of making causal relationships between discourse and 
actioned effects as discussed by Koschut, et al. (2017).  
The EDA adapted and applied within this thesis will also apply a three-tired 
analysis: 1) identifying the emotion: that is identifying emotion words, phrases, 
metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives within a speech; 2) contextualising the 
emotion: finding patterns whereby words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and 
narratives of emotion repeat throughout the data set across a number of speeches; and 
3) interpreting the emotion: applying social constructivism to consider what this use of 
emotion may be doing within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. 
Wang Gungwu (2007:65) claims the CPC “have always been keen to use 
historical analogies in their policy analyses… Chinese practice shows that their 
‘‘timeless’’ approach, which sought the most helpful and relevant examples to support 
their current cause or guide their choice of policy, has been used with care, and often 
with practiced skill.” Wang’s (2007) claim highlights the importance of interpreting how 
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the CPC use emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric from the perspective of 
social constructivism. Both historical and cultural analogies are likely to frequently occur 
within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Analogies are understood here as socially 
shared categories and experiences of the world, which in turn engender deeper 
meanings that exist within the CPC’s use of emotion within their ecological civilisation 
rhetoric; for example, myths and memories of Chinese history and culture written into 
rhetoric in the form of analogies create a sense of unity and pride. The EDA is designed 
to unpack such socially constructed emotional categories found within rhetoric and will 
therefore develop a unique understanding of the ecological civilisation concept. 
The EDA utilised within the thesis will also apply Johan Galtung’s (1996a and 
2001) Chosenness-Myth-Trauma (CMT) Complex as a means of systematically 
approaching the identification, contextualisation and interpretation of emotion, through 
the three themes of Chosenness, Glory and Trauma (CGT). Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) 
chosenness refers to a collective group’s sharing of social and historical experiences; 
Myth refers to the myths of a glorious past, present and future; and traumas refer to 
shared historical memories of traumatic experiences, which in turn bring people together 
and support the myth-building of shared glories. 
Initially developed within the field of peace-studies, Galtung (1996a and 2001) 
identified the three elements of Chosenness, Myth and Trauma of his CMT-Complex 
theory as the necessary components of political narratives when intending to stimulate 
political change. Laced with emotion, Galtung (1996a and 2001) identifies the themes of 
chosenness, glories and trauma to be present in political narratives from Nazi Germany, 
The American Civil War and Ghandi’s Independence Movement. Moreover, the 
application of Galtung’s CMT-Complex to the CPC’s rejuvenation from humiliation 
development narrative by Wang (2014) provides rare empirical data on the application 
and presence of these themes in CPC discourse, as well as acting as a useful 
demonstration of how emotion may be identified and analysed within CPC rhetoric. The 
three themes of CGT will direct the identification of emotion within the rhetoric in order to 
mitigate researcher-bias in selecting which emotion should be focused upon.  
This thesis, therefore, deploys Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA in conjunction with a 
thematic framework drawing upon the works of Galtung (1996a and 2001) to advance a 
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rigorous analytical approach to demonstrating why emotions matter and how to study the 
use of emotion within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric. 
 
 
Research Question and Thesis Roadmap 
  
This thesis considers the following research question: How does the CPC use 
emotion in its ecological civilisation rhetoric? To answer this question this thesis will: 1) 
identify emotion present in the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric; 2) discover patterns 
in the CPC’s use of emotion within that rhetoric; and 3) analyse the relationship between 
these patterns and the CPC’s strategic objectives regarding environmental governance, 
their domestic political agenda, and their wider international ambitions. In the process, 
this thesis aims to contribute to emotion research within IR by developing an intuitive 
thematic EDA. 
The analysis is confined to the uses of emotion expressed in and effected 
through CPC speech acts. While emotion can be expressed through a number of 
mediums, the most advanced methods for data collection and analysis, producing 
accurate, reliable and repeatable results, lie firmly within the area of EDA. Furthermore, 
Koschut, et al. (2017) argue that speech acts represent one of the best forms of 
available empirical data for the study of governments’ uses of emotion. For this reason, 
this thesis focuses on the rhetoric produced by the CPC’s top leaders, MEP and the 
Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC) in the form of transcribed 
(and, where relevant, translated) speeches. For the CPC to construct the concept of an 
ecological civilisation they must deploy rhetoric. Not only is the development of rhetoric 
integral to the articulation of ecological civilisation, there exists an abundance of suitable 
data for study.  
Following this Introduction is a Literature Review, which explores in greater detail 
research conducted so far on the ecological civilisation concept. The Literature Review 
reconstructs the debates that have come to define ecological civilisation, establishes a 
timeline relating to the CPC’s political ecologies, and finally, assesses the PRC’s ability 
to become an ecological civilisation. Chapter 2 explains in detail the methodological 
underpinnings of this thesis, outlining the EDA and thematic analysis employed in this 
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research. Chapter 3 presents the data, the key themes and patterns, and begins to 
analyse them having identified and contextualised the uses of emotion in and through 
the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric.  
Chapter 4 considers the notion of a spirit of ecological civilisation, exploring how 
emotion is used in the rhetoric to create a national identity of Chinese environmentalism, 
through creating a uniquely Chinese response to environmental governance. Chapter 5 
interprets how characteristics of mythology can be found throughout the rhetoric, and 
examines how the rhetoric construes the CPC as heroic leaders taking the PRC on a 
journey to betterment, where ecological civilisation is (symbolically, ideally and actually) 
the place of betterment. This chapter reflects on the CPC’s constructions of power 
relations between the CPC, Chinese citizens and governments worldwide. Chapter 6 
explores how emotions are also used to support the CPC’s changeable notions of 
responsibility, which are entwined within their construction of the PRC’s status and place 
in the world. The conclusion considers the implications of the thesis’s findings, and 
suggests further avenues of research. 
This thesis can thus be understood as contributing to the discipline’s wider 
understanding in three respects. First, inasmuch as ecological civilisation is a concept 
with far-reaching international consequences, the CPC’s use of rhetoric should give us a 
sense of how they intend to present the PRC on the world stage. Analysing the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric can serve as a proxy or an index for how the CPC are 
choosing to articulate and explain the future of the PRC’s environmental governance. 
Second, the changing way that the CPC use language to describe and explain 
ecological civilisation provides insight into how they propose, strategically, to deal with 
their own ecological crisis in the coming years, which in the PRC’s particular case 
represents a major obstacle to its national development. The way that the CPC use 
language reveals both their vision regarding the PRC’s environmental management and 
how they are likely to go about realising that vision, even if concrete programmes are yet 
to implemented. Third, since ecological civilisation is something of a flagship concept for 
the current CPC leadership, the way that concept is developed and communicated 
reveals how the CPC is coming to position the PRC as a thought leader on what they 
regard as one of the most pressing issues of the early twenty-first century. The 
articulation of ecological civilisation is part of a wider effort to delineate the CPC’s 
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alternative to the liberal intellectual-economic order, to assert the PRC’s status as a 
leader in contemporary moral and political thinking. Overall, this thesis therefore aims to 
unpack the emotional messages carried within the ecological civilisation rhetoric of the 
CPC’s construction of identity, CPC-power and global status creation via their latest 




Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
There are many meanings and definitions behind the concept of an ecological 
civilisation, especially when comparing theoretical ecological civilisation(s) to the CPC’s 
concept of an ecological civilisation. This literature review will first consider existing 
English-language works addressing what an ecological civilisation is, what ecological 
civilisation is not and how ecological civilisation will come to exist. Chinese scholarship 
and ecological civilisation within the context of the PRC will then be explored, providing a 
chronology of how ecological civilisation rose to prominence within the CPC’s political 
ecologies. The remainder of the literature review considers Ahearne’s Gramscian 
critique of whether the PRC can become an ecological civilisation and what this 
suggests about possible environmental governance.  
This literature review shows that there are two very different ontologies and 
epistemologies of ecological civilisation: those who consider ecological civilisation as a 
new political ecology versus those who see ecological civilisation as continuation of 
sustainable development, or sustainable development with “Chinese characteristics”. 
The two separate ontologies look to different evidence bases to come to their 
conclusions about ecological civilisation: philosophical and ecological theory versus 
policy decision-making and legislature. The former sees ecological civilisation as 
something to be developed with time, a long-term goal, whilst the latter sees ecological 
civilisation as unable to deliver its promise of a new development paradigm. 
Within the context of a Chinese ecological civilisation the concept is argued as 
being based within Chinese wisdom and culture, and as able to overcome the conflict 
between humanity and nature found in Western practices of environmental governance. 
Chinese scholarship questions previous political ecologies and resulting environmental 
governance purported by the CPC, as well as the ideologies on capitalism, 
anthropocentric worldviews, Western modernity and sustainable development. However, 
the literature also argues how for the CPC’s ecological civilisation to overcome these 
tensions between humanity and nature that they would have to change their direction of 
governance away from the prioritising of economic growth; otherwise what is labelled 
ecological civilisation would be akin to the sustainable development already in practice. 
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The literature highlights a clear correlation between prioritising economic growth 
within the CPC’s previous political ecologies and the resulting failings from these 
understandings within their environmental governance. Despite environmental protection 
receiving an increasingly higher position in both CPC rhetoric and through the gradual 
promotion of the administrative body responsible, new environmental laws and 
regulations, ultimately what remained unchanged was the attitude towards economic 
growth. However, Xi’s update to the principal contradiction represents a shift in thinking 
and to what extent this will help in creating a new pathway for ecological civilisation to 
emerge as a new development paradigm is yet to be understood. Applying a Gramscian 
critique, the literature argued the transformation of the PRC from the current leading 
global hegemony of capitalism to an alternative hegemony of ecological civilisation is 
theoretically possible, although will be a timely and complex process. However, it is 
unclear to what extent the CPC are practically creating ecological civilisation as an 
alternative hegemony and this challenge of turning theory into practice remains. 
 
 
Introducing, Defining and Positioning Ecological Civilisation 
 
English-language literature exploring ecological civilisation spans many 
disciplines, the most relevant being: China Studies, Environmental Studies, Philosophy 
and IR. Broadly, these works have addressed three questions: what an ecological 
civilisation is, what ecological civilisation is not and how an ecological civilisation may 
come to exist. First a broad understanding of ecological civilisation will be presented, 
before then working towards a more specific understanding of ecological civilisation 
within the Chinese literature and finally within the CPC’s use via their chronology of 
political ecologies.  
 
 
What is Ecological Civilisation?  
 
The phrase “ecological civilisation” first appeared in an English publication in 
Morrison’s (1995) Ecological Democracy. Morrison (1995:11) described ecological 
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civilisation as a civilisation based on “diverse lifeways sustaining linked natural and 
social ecologies”; thus ecological civilisation, in the Anglophone literature, began as a 
political ecology capturing the relationship between the social and natural. Following on 
from Morrison, Gare (2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2014 and 2017) has created a considerable 
collection of works ruminating on ecological civilisation and describes ecological 
civilisation as a new political ecology, where a political ecology is defined as a synthesis 
of the political (economic and social) and environmental, which in turn leads to reforms 
in environmental governance. Gare extrapolates his notions of ecological civilisation 
from both contemporary and historical, Eastern and Western philosophical thinking to 
provide us with an understanding of what ecological civilisation is and how it will come to 
exist.  
To define ecological civilisation Gare (2017) divides the concept into two parts: 
ecology and civilisation. He defines ecology as the study of biotic communities and the 
collective transformations by these biotic communities in creating habitats, augmenting 
their environments and adjusting to the conditions of their existence(s) (Gare, 2017:141, 
see also, Magdoff, 2011). Gare (2017) then identifies civilisation as a noun of process, 
which implies an on-going process of civilising. He stipulates how civilisation has come 
to be defined as a dichotomy between the notions of barbarity and decadence (Gare, 
2010b): barbarity describing peoples not yet civilised and decadence standing for the 
corruption or decay of civilisation. Gare (2017) argues that decadence is worse than 
barbarity as peoples who are decadent have become void of all virtues other than the 
manipulation of their habitats and environments for their own benefit, whereas 
barbarians can be lauded as still possessing environmentally aware virtues, through 
living a life still embedded within the natural world (Gare, 2017). Finally, Gare (2014) 
reunites the two parts, adding that the notion of ecological civilisation requires ecology, 
that is all biotic communities, to be considered equal and to strive for harmonious co-
existence; in doing so we should replace current ideals of human decadence, hence no 
longer considering human communities as above other biotic communities and thus 
advance as an alternative ecological civilisation. 
 Kovel (2011:4), an eco-socialist, instead writes: “the phrase, ‘‘ecological 
civilization,’’ means civilization restored to sanity in its relations with nature [sic].” Kovel 
(2011:9) describes ecology as the ecological relations that are manifested and take 
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place, between humans and non-humans, living and non-living elements; ecology is thus 
based on the interrelation of all things within nature: nature must be regarded as the 
integral whole of all ecosystems. Kovel (2011:4) stresses the importance of 
understanding that although humanity is part of nature, we have become “radically 
estranged”, thus destabilising our ecosystems. Often expressed as pollution, extinction, 
environmental degradation and climate change, these ecological crises signify the 
greatest challenge to humankind and require creative resolutions based on social 
transformation towards ecological integrity (Kovel, 2007). Whereas Gare approaches 
ecological civilisation with a hopefulness of a solution to the current ecological crises, 
Kovel approaches the concept as a necessary end-result of bad environmental 
governance. 
The works of eco-socialists (such as Kovel, 2007 and 2011; and Lakoff, 2004) 
can trace their inspiration back to the works of: Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring, which 
describes a world devoid of butterflies, bees and birds resulting from large-scale 
application of pesticides and chemicals; and Boulding’s (1966) suggestion of the earth 
being like a spacecraft with finite resources constrained within its boundaries. Eco-
socialism merges the ideas from green politics, ecology and anti-globalisation with 
socialism (Kovel and Löwy, 2001). Accumulating through the 1970’s as ecological 
Marxism, the domination of nature through science and technology of the capitalist 
system was considered the root cause of the current ecological crises (Pan, 2015). 
Building on these ideas are two of the most prominent eco-socialists, John Bellamy 
Foster (2000) and Paul Burkett (1999), who describe Karl Marx as “a main originator of 
the ecological world view” (Kovel, 2014:8).  
Burkett and Foster highlight the importance of Marx’s “irreparable rift”, or as 
Foster (2000) coined, the “metabolic rift”, between man and nature, citing Marx as 
saying how “private ownership of the globe by single individuals will appear quite absurd 
as private ownership of one man by another” (Marx, 1894:757). Foster (1999) argues the 
concept of a metabolic rift offers "a more solid—and scientific—way in which to depict 
the complex, dynamic interchange between human beings and nature, resulting from 
human labor [sic].” Eco-socialists therefore argue that the current experiences of 
environmental degradation are a product of the global expansion of the capitalist system, 
globalisation and imperialism, which have been instrumented by repressive States and 
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transnational bodies (Kovel and Löwy, 2001). Eco-socialists are often referred to as 
“Red Greens”, due to their adherence to Green politics embedded within anti-capitalist 
views that tends to draw upon Marxism.  
According to Burkett (2014) and Foster (2014), Marx (1887:638) highlighted how: 
capitalism undermines “the original sources of all wealth – the soil and the worker”; 
humans are themselves a part of nature; and socialism as a rational regulation of the 
metabolism between humanity and nature (Marx and Engels, 1988). Building on these 
works, Kovel (2011:7) argues ecological civilisation is the eco-socialist answer to 
neoliberal capitalism, by arguing that capitalism has dissolved time and space, 
manipulating humans as “slaves of quantity and cold calculation…addicted to sensation, 
narcissistic, isolated, and disconnected from nature.”  
In perspectives from IR and China Studies, Pan Jiahua (2015) summarises that 
ecological civilisation is a new development paradigm, offering a new political ecology 
and a style of governance directed by environmental priorities; ecological civilisation is 
thus not a negation of industrial civilisation or neoliberal capitalism (these ideas will be 
revisited in the Gramscian (1971) critique below). According to Ahearne (2013:318), 
ecological civilisation is an alternative vision to the “narcissistic and nihilistic consumer 
capitalist ‘civilization’ we are currently caught in [sic].” In following ecological civilisation 
as a new political ecology, where equilibrium is achieved between all biotic communities, 
some scholars argue that a transformation will depart humanity from the current 
ideological hegemony of neoliberal capitalism to become an ecological civilisation (Gare, 
2010; Magdoff, 2011; and Zhang, li and An, 2011). Thus overcoming the domination and 
exploitation experienced under the confines of the neoliberal capitalist hegemony. 
Continuing on from this argument Sanbonmatsu (2004) contends ecological civilisation 
resembles the concept of metahumanism, deepening the understanding that our realities 
are an unquantifiable field of relational bodies, always in constitutive and changing 
relationships with one another.  
Marinelli (2018) argues that the concept of ecological civilisation is intertwined 
within the Anthropocene debates that discredit the current development model based on 
prioritising economic growth despite the impacts it has on the environment. The 
Anthropocene relates to the current geological period defined by the human effect on 
global eco-systems (Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill, 2007). Crutzen and Stoermer 
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(2000:17) define the Anthropecene as the: “human dominance of biological, chemical 
and geological processes on Earth”, arguing the process began with the Industrial 
Revolution during the late eighteenth century in Europe. The ideological and ontological 
standpoint of the Anthropocene debate considers: the role of human activities and our 
impact on the planet, as well as the impacts from economic growth and the relationship 
between knowledge, culture and politics. The Anthropocene debates capture how 
human activity is changing the planet: Marinelli (2018) argues this is also at the heart of 
the debate on what the CPC mean by their ecological civilisation concept. 
Hence, ecological civilisation is broadly argued to be an ideology creating a 
civilisation where the fundamentals of ecology are not misunderstood and equilibrium is 
achieved with a balance between human progress and the progress of all biotic 
communities creating a sound ecological environment. 
 
 
What Ecological Civilisation Is Not  
 
Having identified ecological civilisation as a new political ecology, generally 
applied as a critique of neoliberal capitalism, many scholars then consider to what extent 
ecological civilisation negates sustainable development. Sustainable development within 
the ecological civilisation literature is often summarised as the current globally dominant 
discourse on environmentalism embedded within the confines of neoliberal capitalist 
ideology (Chen, 2012; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord, 2018). Geall and Ely (2018) argue that 
the vast majority of literary and policy retorts to ecological destruction have 
predominantly focused on the notion of sustainable development, therefore it is natural 
to consider to what extent ecological civilisation differs from this globally embedded 
approach. In defining sustainable development, Redclift (1987) observed, perhaps 
cynically, that the term ‘sustainable’ implies a notion of “holding out” or “making do”, until 
relief or a better alternative is attainable. Whereas, development generally implies 
improvement (Gare, 2017), although this is often assumed a priori to any assessment of 
whether the change is an improvement. Development, even with negative effects, such 
as resource depletion, tends to be assumed positive when economic growth is achieved 
(Gare, 2017). Thus sustainable development is rather ambiguous: holding out and yet 
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simultaneously changing, assumedly to something better. Yet, what is frequently 
referenced as the official definition of sustainable development is found in the Brundtland 
(1987:43) report Our Common Future and is unsurprisingly of stark contrast: 
“[D]evelopment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.” Noticeably, there is no mention, in either 
definition of sustainable development, of the concepts of ecology or a reduced 
decadence within human existence. 
Ho and Ulanowicz (2005) argue that the decadence and barbarism of human 
existence are cancers in the current global ecosystem representative of our present 
industrial civilisation state. Ho and Ulanowicz (2005:47) criticise our current ideological 
state of neoliberal capitalism as: removing all barriers to trade, finance and procurement 
thus destroying the neoliberal capitalist system’s intricate space-time structure; over-
exploiting the poor, especially in developing countries, thus impoverishing the whole 
economic system; using natural resources at unsustainable rates, thus preventing the 
global ecosystem from regenerating; and diminishing the available input into the 
economic system resulting in an increasingly large harvest of resources, thus creating a 
vicious cycle that is simultaneously destroying the ecosystem and global economy.  
Luxemberg (1968:369) argued how economic capital would never achieve 
equilibrium and would have to constantly expand, thus fighting “a battle of annihilation 
[against the] natural economy.” Continuing the war metaphor, Salleh (2008:126) 
discusses how “poverty” and “development” have become weapons in the ideological 
armoury of global capital accumulation and its financial institutions. Coffman and 
Mikulecky (2012) argue that the current industrial civilisation has a fundamentally 
misconstrued understanding of ecology and consequently operates with defective 
models of nature and the place of humanity within nature. Kovel (2007) neatly captures 
such critiques documenting the failings and shortcomings of sustainable developmental 
as a “greening” of neoliberal capitalism.  
Gare (2017) concurs with Kovel (2007) arguing that sustainable development 
distracts people from the true audacity faced by humanity, preventing necessary 
transformations in economic, social and political organisation needed to change the 
ways of living and interacting within our environments; also undermining ecosystems 
and framing debates on ecological destruction placing them second to continued 
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economic development (see also, Lakoff, 2004). Kovel (2011) writes that our current 
status of ecological crises cannot be resolved merely through the administrative, 
legislative or technological means of sustainable development. Our ecological crises are 
not an economic problem, but rather a “kind of cancer on the earth” led by our current 
civilisation ideology creating a pathological economy; to continue under the guidance of 
neoliberal capitalism or its sustainable development, is to “go along with a manifestly 
suicidal status quo” (Kovel, 2011:5; see also the Gramscian critique at the end of this 
chapter).  
Built into sustainable development is a bifurcation, whereby the development of 
the economy is the priority; the biotic communities of ecology, including human 
communities, are sustainable if they manage to adapt to the continued development of 
the economy (Gare, 2017). Thus, in the context of a growing economy nothing is 
sustainable. The literature, which considers ecological civilisation as different to 
sustainable development, does so by demonstrating the inability of sustainable 
development to develop sound ecology due to its inherent continuation of neoliberal 
capitalism. This literature supports the notion that ecological civilisation will no longer 
prioritise economic growth and thus presents as a new development paradigm (Pan, 
2015). 
Norgaard (2009:1) writes: “Historically, there were many cultures and hence 
many life stories. The stories were always evolving, cross-breeding with other life stories, 
or dying out with the people they sometimes led astray. Now we have one dominant 
story – the development story of economic growth without limits, the story of unending 
happiness from the possession of more and more things.” Norgaard (2009) argues how 
industrial civilisation is spreading to become a global civilisation, which can be seen 
echoed through the work of Gare (2010). However, for Gare (2010 and 2017) the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation is a potential alternative “life story” or “narrative of identity”, and to 
what extent the CPC’s ecological civilisation differs from sustainable development will be 





How Ecological Civilisation May Come to Exist  
 
 In accepting ecological civilisation as a new political ecology or development 
ideology, scholars including Gare (2014) and Marinelli (2018) face a dilemma in thinking 
about how ecological civilisation can come to exist. In particular is how to make 
ecological civilisation attractive and achievable to the populace. Gare (2014) states most 
people in developed economies are unlikely to revert to simple agrarian subsistence 
farming, which Gare (2014) amongst others, such as Wen, Lau, Cheng, He and Qiu 
(2012), refer to as a potential ecological civilisation set-up. Gare (2010) argues scholars 
and politicians alike are struggling to redefine development in a way that considers 
ecology alongside post-mechanistic sciences whilst still being attractive to the populace: 
ecological civilisation is considered backwards or unattractive. Salleh (2008) highlights 
how we are presented a choice between free market globalisation, economic growth and 
the possession of things or environmental protection.  
However, developed economies – with their possessions and things – are not the 
only economies impacted by climate change or environmental degradation. Ecological 
civilisation needs to span developed, developing and underdeveloped economies in a 
way that succeeds and combines traditional subsistence agrarian civilisation, industrial 
civilisation and ecological civilisation in an appealing manner (Pan, 2006c). Wen, et al. 
(2012) consider how there appears to be a general pattern where the greater the 
reliance on agriculture for employment, the poorer the country tends to be. However, 
they argue that such a causal relationship creates false impressions: the real cost of 
industrialisation and modernisation has not been considered, especially not 
environmental costs. Within the context of the PRC, Wen, et al. (2012) argue how the 
pressure to accumulate capital, to self-propel and participate within global competition, 
creates a resource deficit, whereby land, labour and money is taken from the agricultural 
and rural areas, leaving behind an aging population and women raising children, which 
creates an economic vacuum. Wen, et al. (2012) state how this historical pattern of 
modernisation is destroying both nature and community, but most importantly, it destroys 
the diverse array of specialised indigenous and traditional knowledge on how best to 
utilise local resources (see also Liang Shuming’s arguments on modernisation that 
avoids dehumanisation; Zhang, 2016). Wen Tiejun and Liang Shuming, both stipulate 
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that indigenous and traditional knowledge is essential for best practice with regards to 
environmental governance: essential for the construction of ecological civilisation. 
Returning to Gare’s (2010) notion of civilisation as a noun of process, in 
considering the CPC’s ecological civilisation concept, he proposes a method for how to 
transition to an ecological civilisation. Firstly, Gare (2010) also identifies the overlapping 
indigenous and traditional knowledge of European civilisations (such as, Greek, Roman, 
Medieval and Modern civilisations) and characterises them as in opposition to that of 
Chinese civilisations (in which Gare includes the numerous different dynasties, as well 
as the more recent differences between the economic, political, spiritual and material 
civilisations heralded by the CPC (also see Goron, 2018)). For Gare (2010) these 
differing civilisations provide us with an array of unique “narratives of identity” with 
different assumptions of the world and the place of humanity within nature. Gare (2010) 
argues that through co-extensive contribution making across the array of narratives of 
identity, we will reach an ultimate end worth striving for: where ecology and harmony 
between nature and man will permeate across all domains of culture, practices and 
institutions and thus transform society into an ecological civilisation.  
Gare (2010) furthers that this all-encompassing narrative of identity will take a 
significantly long time to be produced. However, Gare (2010) does state that this 
process is currently taking place, but with the ideals of the European industrial civilisation 
thus transforming all civilisations throughout the world into an industrial civilisation via 
neoliberal capitalism (see also, Ahearne, 2013; and Norgaard, 2009). Gare (2017) 
contends that the conversion into a neoliberal capitalist order is necessary and needed 
before being able to progress to ecological civilisation (see also, Pan, 2006c). Gare 
(2010) argues a global ecological civilisation can only come into existence from a world-
order united through industrial civilisation first with a shared level of development before 
transcending to become an ecological civilisation, which is pertinent for the PRC. 
This notion of liminal or dialectical progression is also supported in the Chinese 
literature on development, especially by Pan Yue (2007) and Wu Shaoxia; Wu contends 
that ecological civilisation is an inevitable process of progress and will be “seen as [an] 
irreversible global trend, as much as it was with the transition to agricultural civilization, 
and industrial civilization of human society [sic]” (cited in Balchindorzhieva and 
Tsyrendorzhieva, 2016:3). Pan (2006c) argued that the world has gone through three 
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phases of civilisation so far: primitive, agricultural and industrial; he stresses that the 
global ecological crises demonstrates the necessity to move onto a new civilisation 
mode and that ecological civilisation represents that transcendence beyond industrial 
civilisation to a more advanced human state. Goron (2018) similarly argues that the CPC 
have specifically chosen to promote ecological civilisation with liminality in mind, playing 
on the political meaning behind “civilising” in the CPC’s rhetoric, such as in Deng’s 
spiritual civilisation (Jingshen wenming, 精神文明 ) and material civilisation (Wuzhi 
wenming, 物质文明) and the aforementioned Wenming guojia concept of constructing a 
“singular civilised State” (Cartier, 2013). 
Gare (2010:12) argues ecological civilisation will be founded on a transformation 
of aspirations, deep assumptions, the reorganisation of society, ways of thinking and 
ways of living, “and yet it will preserve and sometimes revive all that was best in these 
and other civilizations, allowing for diversity and difference and the preservation of the 
identities of previous civilizations [sic].” Kovel (2011) argues that Marx had opened this 
pathway, but rather than develop an eco-socialism, Marx focused on the process of 
labour. Kovel (2011) thus suggests the prefiguration for transforming into an ecological 
civilisation is to break the “chains of generalized commodity production [sic]”: to reduce 
our want of things. Kovel (2011) furthers that ecological civilisation would have to 
represent an alternative ideology where instead of capital, nature is the integral; rather 
than valuing nature for how we can manipulate it for human use, nature should be 
“valued for its ‘suchness’” (Kovel, 2011:14). 
Similarly, Zhang and Wang (2013) contend that the construction of ecological 
civilisation must conform to nature, but in doing so must also support civilised 
development, pursue social reproduction via ecological economics, protect natural 
ecosystems and gradually change the traditional high-carbon and linear production 
mode of industrialisation into a low-carbon circular economy via scientific development 
(also see, Pan, 2015). To do so Zhang and Wang (2013) argue that human labour, as a 
productive force is the key to these changes. Alternatively, in a much more simplistic 
sense, Zhang and Wang (2013) also identify protecting and restoring clean water and 
healthy forests as key starting points of natural ecosystems to transform into an 
ecological civilisation. However, there is still no clarity as to whether the ecological 
civilisation described by Wang and Zhang (2013) differs from sustainable development. 
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Ecological principles and the collaboration between narratives of identity have 
been identified as the means for a shared and liminal progression towards ecological 
civilisation: a political ecology where an alternative relationship between nature and 
humanity, between individuals and all biotic communities and the overall nature of 
civilisation is encapsulated (Gare, 2017; Kovel, 2011; and Zhang and Wang, 2013). Yet 
there appears to still be a lack of a concrete understanding on how to adopt ecological 
civilisation as a new political ecology, ideology and approach. Rhetoric and emotion is 
therefore crucial, as any attempt to create a change in direction towards environmental 
governance captured within the political ecology of an ecological civilisation is still only 
taking place within the political discourse, as opposed to in practice. How the CPC’s 
production, and use, of emotion within their rhetoric is instrumental in attempting to 




Chinese Concept(s) of Ecological Civilisation 
 
Many have attributed the coining of ecological civilisation to Lipitsky (1984) an 
environmental expert in the former Soviet Union (USSR) who published an article on 
“ecological culture” (экологической культуры) this article was then translated into 
Chinese as “ecological civilisation” by Wong a year later in the Guangming Daily (Goron, 
2018; Huan, 2008; Marinelli, 2018; and Morrison, 1995). Alternatively, Pan Jiahua 
(2015:54) attributes the concept of ecological civilisation to the Chinese scholar Ye 
Qianji (1984). Pan (2015) argues that Ye’s concept was based on the ancient Chinese 
philosophy of “nature and man as one” (Tianren heyi, 天人合一; referred to as Tianren 
heyi throughout the remainder of this thesis), and defined ecological civilisation as a 
philosophy on the relationship between nature and humanity. 
Ye’s (1982) conception of ecological civilisation related to sustainable agriculture 
and was developed in his dissertation: Ecological Agriculture – A Green Revolution in my 
Country’s Agriculture. Important to note is Ye’s opening speech from 1987 at the 
National Conference on Eco-Agriculture, where he called for “vigorously promoting the 
construction of eco-civilization [sic]” throughout the PRC (Marinelli, 2018). Ye (1984) 
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conceptualised that an ecological civilisation would be a civilisation where both nature 
and society would benefit through harmony as a form of environmental protection. Ye 
(1988) also aspired for the twenty-first century to be the century of ecological civilisation 
construction. Although Ye has made a multitude of contributions to the Chinese 
conception of ecological civilisation, not all can be discussed here.  
However, a noteworthy contribution from Ye is his ecological catastrophe theory, 
which was presented (aged 90) at the Beijing Xiangshan Scientific Conference in 1999. 
His theory proclaims that modern economics was leading to environmental turmoil, 
arguing we now exist as a human ecosystem, rather than a natural ecosystem; human 
activities have upset the natural “fluctuation” of natural ecologies leading us towards a 
collapse of nature; and human activities are causing a “death zone” in destroying natural 
forest, through farmland, desertification and thus depleting the land entirely (Marinelli, 
2018). These ideas can be seen in the later works of Kovel (2007 and 2011) discussed 
above. Ye summarised by claiming ecology is the science of survival, with the answers 
to prevent the anthropogenic destruction of all eco-systems through creating the 
harmonious development of ecological civilisation or Tianren heyi: harmony between 
man and nature. 
Pan (2015) maintains traditional Chinese philosophies are the crux of the 
Chinese ecological civilisation and refers to the seminal works of Laozi, the founder of 
Taosim 2500 years ago, and the influential philosopher Zhuang Zhou. Laozi argued in 
Tao Te Ching that the people live in accordance with the ways of the land and 
everything must follow the laws of nature. Zhuang Zhou further developed the 
philosophical thoughts of “nature and man as one”, which has been described by Ji 
Xianlin as a friendship between humanity and nature (Pan, 2015). For Pan (2015) these 
traditional Chinese philosophical beginnings elevate ecological civilisation as a new 
development paradigm for the CPC’s environmental governance. Somewhat similar is 
the influential work by Liang Shuming, who tried to revitalise historical Chinese 
philosophical traditions, especially that of self-cultivation, in order to find parallels in 
Western styles of academic learning (Zhang, 2016). Liang believed the PRC was best 
advised to follow a route of “Westernisation”, but needed to avoid the risk of 
dehumanisation. Zhang (2016) argues that in Liang’s view the PRC need a development 
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model that draws upon the individuality and social organisation of the West, alongside 
the Chinese tradition of self-cultivation of their life’s purpose. 
Pan Yue (2006c) argued that every dynasty from Chinese history had 
environmental protection laws, arguing this is because ecological conservation is an 
indispensable part of Chinese culture. Pan Yue (2001:1) summarises how “From the 
Taoist view of Tao respecting nature, to the Confucian idea of humans and nature 
becoming one, to the Buddhist belief that all living things are equal”, Chinese culture 
provides the necessary spirit to solve the current ecological crises and construct an 
ecological civilisation. Both Pan Yue and Pan Jiahua focus on how traditional Chinese 
culture holds the answers to contemporary environmental problems. From this, 
Heurtebise (2017) argues that the CPC’s ecological civilisation discourse cultivates a 
“cultural chauvinism” based on such traditional Chinese philosophical thinking and it is 
this that captures the Chinese definition of an ecological civilisation (Goron, 2018:40). 
Yet, Kovel (2011) discusses how every traditional culture shares a recognition 
and wonder of the natural world and humanity’s place within nature. Kovel (2011) 
contends all contemporary societies now assume humanity is above nature, rendering 
ecological civilisation necessary. However, Kovel (2011:15) does also argue that Taoist 
principles are key to ecological civilisation. Salleh (2008) similarly argues that the 
humanity-nature dialectic found in traditional Taoist philosophy is at the centre of 
ecological civilisation. Salleh (2008) discusses how a holistic ecological ideology 
grounded in the “internal relations” of Taoist belief could provide a fresh intellectual 
leadership for future environmental governance. Thus we see in the context of a 
Chinese ecological civilisation that the concept is argued as based within the wisdom of 
Chinese characteristics of their philosophies and culture. 
However, traditional Chinese philosophies had been treated as “smelling 
dreadfully musty” since the May Fourth movement of 1919 (also referred to as “China’s 
First Enlightenment”) (Wang, et al., 2014:54). A nihilistic attitude abandoned traditional 
concepts of respecting heaven, having awe of the Dao, believing in the oneness of 
humanity and nature, as well as traditions of thrift and the wisdom of cherishing all living 
things (Wang, et al., 2014:54). According to Pan Jiahua (2015) harmony between 
humanity and nature, which had successfully governed China’s great historical 
civilisation(s), could not prevent the takeover of the industrial civilisation with advanced 
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science and productivity levels. Pan (2015) describes the Great Leap Forward of the 
1950’s and the reckless agricultural campaigns of the 1970’s as the beginnings of the 
PRC’s environmental devastation.  
Huan (2009:3) argues how: “The crux of China’s environmental problem is the 
one-dimensional economic ideology of modernization development [sic]”: arguing how 
the PRC is a political and social servant of economic growth logic and capital. Both the 
CPC and the populace have embraced environmentally damaging economic growth and 
vastly strayed away from ideas of human-nature oneness. For example, although 
environmentalists protested, for almost a decade, against the building of dams on the Nu 
River, many indigenous residents supported the project to see their region develop and 
benefit from the economic growth the dams would bring (Orlik, 2012; and Wang, et al., 
2014:40). Wang, et al. (2014:41) similarly contend that the PRC has become “deeply 
influence by Western modernity, China has predominantly accepted an anthropocentric 
world view and values” regarding humans as separate from nature, which has become a 
world of objects for our manipulation. The departure from traditional Chinese values 
seen in the popular folk ballads that emanated from Mao’s regime, instilled anti-nature 
principles: “In heaven there is no jade emperor [the supreme deity of Daoism],  On earth 
there is no dragon king [the rain god in Chinese mythology], I am the jade emperor,  I am 
the dragon king.  Let the mountains make way, I am coming” (Wang et al., 2014:41).  
However, scholars such as Zheng Zhen, try to question how the PRC could be 
suffering from such terrible environmental destruction arguing it is the capitalist approach 
of the West that is to blame for ecological crises. Zheng (2013) argues that the PRC, as 
a socialist country, should not suffer maladies of environmental degradation as he insists 
the PRC is not a capitalist country. Despite Zheng’s attempts, even Pan Yue (2007:1), 
whilst working extensively on eco-socialism (Shengtai shehuizhuyi, 生态社会主义) has 
argued that the development mode of the CPC had become non-socialist and that 
environmental disasters had been “because our mode of economic modernization has 
been copied from western, developed nations [sic].”  Wen, et al. (2012) purport how the 
political and ideological exports of global capitalism have caused a century of conflicts 
manifested within chronic over-accumulation, going on to add that such conflicts are 
evident at both the global level and in the PRC itself.  
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Pan (2007) contends that development under ecological civilisation should be 
sustained by focusing on environmental protection and social justice, not economic 
growth (Ansfield, 2013; Geall and Ely, 2018; Huan, 2008; and Yu, 2010). Pan’s (2007:1) 
focus on social justice was important, he argued, because “in theory, socialism is more 
suited to the realisation of sustainable development than capitalism”. Although Pan’s 
(2007) argument agrees with those of Zheng in socialism being a more suitable 
approach for environmentalism, Pan (2007) accepts that the CPC had not been pursuing 
a socialist environmental approach. 
These arguments thus purport that sustainable development, as an approach 
embedded within a neo-liberal mind-set, is destined to fail, due it emanating from the 
same ideology causing the environmental destruction. Pan Yue (2006c) contends that 
only Chinese culture is able to highlight the flaws in capitalist development and provide 
answers for more harmonious and socialist development: allowing the PRC to use 
Western logic in their modernisation as Chinese understanding can be applied to 
modernise and update Western ideas (see also Liang Shuming). Pan (2006c:19) argues 
it is necessary for the PRC to look inwards at Chinese culture again for “correct 
guideline[s]” and ecological wisdom to prevent the serious conflict between humanity 
and nature experienced from following the capitalist development mode. Pan (2006c) 
emphasises the complementary nature of Chinese culture and eco-socialism, arguing 
that the West have missed their opportunity to develop a new civilisation; according to 
Pan (2006c:18) this is the PRC’s opportunity to “realize a leap-forward in this regard 
[sic].”  
The notion here of Western logic mixing with Chinese culture signifies Gare’s 
(2010) ideas on the merging of differing “narratives of identity”, but for Pan (2006c) it is 
the superiority of Chinese culture that allows the Chinese to use Western logic and 
decipher it differently to the PRC’s advantage. Kovel (2011) in his discussion of Marx as 
a precursor to ideas of an ecological civilisation identifies how Marx’s early eco-socialist 
ideas represent a merging of his Western thought on capital with Buddhist philosophy2. 
Hence, ecological civilisation is again considered as different to the Western capitalist 
                                                
2 This followed Marx’s receiving of a two-volume biography of Buddha, which he called “an 
important work” (Sheasby, 2004:55). 
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principles; ecological civilisation provides the “correct” guidelines from Chinese culture 
highlighting flaws in Western logic. 
In considering how the PRC is to become an ecological civilisation Pan Jiahua 
(2015) argues for green, healthy and rational ways of life, rather than extravagance, 
possession and waste. Pan (2015) contends that this will be done through the CPC’s 
construction of an ecological civilisation that will represent harmony between humanity 
and nature by applying modern scientific knowledge and technological innovation gained 
through the industrial civilisation and regulated through the traditional Chinese 
philosophies on nature. To Pan (2015) the central elements of ecological civilisation, as 
a new development paradigm, are: harmony, cultural development, justice and 
efficiency. Harmony is the mutual benefit and tolerance between humanity and nature, 
and is the external reflection of ecological civilisation. Cultural development means high 
quality of life, and is the ultimate objective. Justice is safeguarding the rights of humanity 
and nature, and is the foundation of ecological civilisation. Efficiency is equilibrium 
between input and output of resources, and is the realisation of ecological civilisation 
(Pan, 2015). Yet, Pan (2015) still stresses that an ecological civilisation does not lead to 
the dwindling of society or economy, but rather it supports economic prosperity and 
social stability. Whereas with Gare, and the eco-socialist movement, ecological 
civilisation focuses on diminishing human decadence and concentrates on ecological 
equilibrium, here the Chinese conception of ecological civilisation furthers economic 
prosperity raises the question of its variance from sustainable development. 
Alternatively, Zhang and Wang (2013:184-185) contend that education and mass 
propaganda by the CPC is “crucially important” to educate children on the new 
ideological paradigm. They further that new consumption activities must be “guided by 
the scientific point of view in accordance with eco-economic laws, and low-carbon and 
circular development must be promoted” (Zhang and Wang, 2013:190). Yet conversely, 
Wang, et al., (2014) insist that environmental law in the PRC has failed to protect the 
environment since the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) was passed in 1979. Wang 
Canfa (2014), a distinguished environmental lawyer, highlights how many new 
environmental laws have been passed since the EPL, including: nine environmental 
protection laws (e.g. the Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law, the Water 
Pollution Prevention Law and the Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control Law); 
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seventeen resource efficiency laws (e.g. the Cleaner Production Promotion Law and the 
Renewable Energy Law); fifty administrative laws and regulations as well as 660 local 
government regulations and 800 national standards have also been enacted (Wang, et 
al., 2014). There is no lack of environmental protection laws in the PRC suggesting that 
enacting environmental laws alone cannot construct an ecological civilisation (Wang, 
2010; and Wang, et al., 2014). To an extent, this also questions how affective historical 
environmental laws were in protecting China’s environment. Yet, Pan Yua (2006a) and 
Pan Jiahua (2015) use historical analogies of the past successes of environmental 
protection laws in China as evidences of Chinese wisdom and culture as previously 
successfully protecting the environment. 
Alternatively, Zhang and Wang (2013) focus on a trinity of solutions: low carbon 
development (conservation of fossil fuels, protecting and creating forests and general 
reduction of carbon within the atmosphere); circular development (reduction, reusing and 
recycling of resources); and the scientific point of view (technological innovation, market 
dynamism and government policies) (see also, Pan, 2015). Zhang and Wang (2013) 
also argue that ecological civilisation is a higher stage of human evolution than the 
current industrial civilisation due to ecological civilisation respecting the natural 
environment that humans rely upon. However, other than labelling ecological civilisation 
as a Chinese approach to environmental protection, especially in using Chinese wisdom 
and culture to stipulate the difference of Chineseness to the West and in claiming 
historical analogies of successful environmental laws as demonstrating past successes, 
there is no clear indication as to how, or even if, ecological civilisation departs from 
sustainable development. 
The literature exploring the Chinese concept of ecological civilisation can be seen 
as providing a means through which “the Chinese people revalue their own traditional 
ecological wisdom”; it questions previous political ecologies and environmental 
governance, as well as the entire set of ideologies on capitalism, anthropocentric 
worldviews, Western modernity and sustainable development (Foster, 2002; Geall and 
Ely, 2018; Pan, 2006c; Wang, He and Fan, 2014:54; Wang, et al., 2015; and Zhou, 
2006). However, the biggest obstacle highlighted from this literature has been whether 
ecological civilisation will help re-focus the PRC’s ideals of development away from the 
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reliance on economic growth (Wang, et al., 2014); and thus from the concept and 
practice of (Western) sustainable development. 
 
 
Prioritising Economic Growth: An Obstacle to Ecological Civilisation 
 
 Salleh (2008) argues that ecological civilisation is not always interpreted 
throughout the PRC in an eco-socialist way, furthering that some see a new opportunity 
for economic growth under the rubric of a “socialist” ecological civilisation. Lu, Dong and 
Lian (2016:32) summarise the goals of the CPC’s construction of an ecological 
civilisation as being to reverse environmental deterioration, create a liveable 
environment, lay the foundations of an “ecologically sustainable development of China” 
and to contribute to global ecological enhancement. However, Lu, et al. (2016) stress 
that whereas in post-industrial countries (developed economies) ecological civilisation is 
akin to environmental protection and conservation practices, in the PRC (which they 
class as a developing economy) ecological civilisation is a means to achieve greater 
economic development without compromising the environment (further).  
Thus, if what Lu, et al. (2016) argues is true, ecological civilisation is akin to 
sustainable development within the PRC due to the continued focus on economic 
development as a necessity before environmental protection. Lu, et al. (2016) conclude 
that going on to develop a socialist ecological civilisation would be better for the CPC, 
arguing the PRC just need to reach higher levels of development first. Similarly, Goron 
(2018), in her analysis of the layers of political and theoretical meaning(s) invested in the 
ecological civilisation discourse by scholars and politicians alike, argues that this 
process has limited the scope of ecological civilisation, reducing its ability to critically 
engage with capitalism, democracy and green political theories and instead focuses on 
being a contribution to the global scientific endeavour of sustainable development. Gare 
(2010) argues the same by stipulating that a certain (shared) level of development would 
need to be reached (via industrial civilisation) before advancing to become an ecological 
civilisation. Kovel (2011) similarly questioned to what extent the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation is anything more than continued sustainable development within the context 
of a developing nation. There therefore appears to be a discrepancy in what an 
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ecological civilisation can be, how it begins and that this is dependent upon the level of 
development already attained. 
 Huan (2008) meticulously considered what an ecological civilisation may look 
like and how it may arise when interwoven within the CPC’s goals for economic growth. 
Huan (2008) argues that the real environmental threat facing the PRC was the CPC’s 
increasing dependence on economic growth with the only solution to prevent economic 
and environmental collapse being the construction of a socialist ecological civilisation. 
Huan (2008) distinguishes a growing economy (developing nation) from a growth 
economy (developed nation), where a growing economy may undergo rapid stages of 
economic growth, but that this is aligned with development progression, it is socially 
controlled and can be reversed. A growth economy, however, is growth-orientated and 
growth-dependent and continues to pursue economic growth regardless of 
developmental requirements, it is market controlled and is difficult to reverse. During the 
late twentieth century the PRC’s development and ability to meet the basic needs of the 
people (such as food, housing, healthcare, etc.) initially relied upon an emerging and 
growing economy. However, during the early twenty-first century the economy has been 
increasingly subject to maximising profits and proliferating capital opposed to meeting 
basic needs (Cutler and Doyle, 2019; Huan, 2008; and Raiklin, 2013).  
Huan (2008) acknowledges that a “clear-cut” distinction between the two 
economies can be hard to distinguish, however, he argues that when an economy 
switches from pursuing people’s basic needs to people’s wants that the transition to 
become a growth economy has begun. Huan (2008) argues that in many ways the PRC 
has started to become a growth economy, and that although not all of the citizens’ basic 
needs have yet been met, a vast majority of urban dwelling citizens are now enjoying a 
life supported by a growth economy attempting to supply and meet the demand of 
wants.  
The CPC are standing at a political crossroad: one direction chases continued 
economic growth regardless of the environment; the second pursues economic growth in 
line with sustainable development creating notions of greener economic growth; and the 
third offers an alternative; a socialist ecological civilisation where economic growth is no 
longer a priority (Gare, 2012 and 2014; Huan, 2008; and Goron, 2018). Huan (2008) 
illustrates how the CPC over a period of four decades have pursued economic growth 
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under the guise of environmental policies: transforming the PRC into a growth economy. 
This could not be clearer than when Qu Geping (2005), the former head of the State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) said: “The fundamental reason why economic 
indicators can be easily achieved every year while environmental protection indicators 
can not is that economic development is still dominated by the conventional model of 
development characterized as “high investment, high consumption, high pollution”, and 
the decisions for many large-scale developing projects are made through unscientific 
and undemocratic procedures [sic].” Kovel (2011) writes how Marx had argued that 
capital’s dominion had a clear priority: the accumulation of wealth over all other values, 
thus sacrificing humanity and nature to gain profit. Qu’s statement echoes the concern of 
Marx whereby economic growth dominates all other values.  
When considering the CPC's desire of creating an ecological civilisation 
alongside the PRC's features of an emerging growth economy it highlights the high 
likelihood of continued ecological destruction in favour of continued economic growth 
(Huan, 2008). Huan (2008) clearly states that the main challenge facing the PRC 
regarding ecological destruction comes back to which path the CPC choose to take at 
their metaphorical crossroad: the challenge is not the creation of pollution, but rather the 
increasing dependence upon economic growth (Sarkar, 1999). Economic growth is 
impossible without the exploitation and consumption of natural resources, which in turn 
becomes responsible for the environmental degradation regardless of any high-tech 
innovation or green technology (Gare, 2012 and 2014; and Huan, 2008).  
A “greening” of industry and consumerism, although potentially reducing the level 
or type of ecological destruction, is an illogical path to take if intending to create an 
ecological civilisation as defined above as a new development paradigm. Other growth 
economies, such as Western European States, have only achieved economic growth 
and environmental protection by transferring a majority of their poisonous wastes and 
dirty economic sectors to other growing economies, thus it has been achieved at the 
expense of others (Huan, 2008). Huan’s (2008) analysis therefore suggests the CPC 
would have to change their direction of governance away from the priority of economic 
growth in order to pursue a transition to become an ecological civilisation, otherwise 
what is labelled ecological civilisation would be akin to the sustainable development 
already in practice. Despite Huan’s (2008) study being over a decade old, the arguments 
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are still pertinent when considering how the CPC prioritises economic growth and to 
what extent their ecological civilisation differs from prior political ecologies in this regard. 
If a glorification of economic growth is found within the ecological civilisation rhetoric 
then it would seem the imagined future for the PRC is unlikely to be one of a green, 
clean and beautiful ecological civilisation after all.   
The literature review will now present the CPC’s changing political ecologies, 
chronologically, starting with Deng Xiaoping’s Environmental Protection National Policy. 
This literature will be explored in order to ascertain what, if anything, appears to be 




The Communist Party of China’s Political Ecologies, 1983-2007 
 
According to the State Council, starting in the 1980’s, the CPC have produced 
three major political ecologies; ecological civilisation is understood within this thesis to 
now be the fourth as the State Council White Paper was published in 2006. The State 
Council identified these political ecologies by describing a political ecology and resulting 
environmental governance as being the successfully proposed, formulated and 
dominating political thinking of the CPC responding to the growing environmental 
problems experienced within the PRC (White Paper on China’s Environmental 
Protection, 1996 and 2006). First was Deng Xiaoping’s Environmental Protection 
National Policy (1983-1991); second, was Jiang Zemin’s Sustainable Development 
Strategy (1992-2001); and third, Hu Jintao’s Scientific Development (2002-2012). This 
thesis recognises ecological civilisation as the fourth of the CPC’s political ecologies 
(2007-present) (Huan, 2008). Each of these eras has been well documented within the 
literature; the key elements from each will be presented below. 
However, before noting the key elements of each of the four political ecologies 
adopted by the CPC to date, as both Chinese and non-Chinese authors have observed, 
Mao’s leadership also merits a brief comment. Far from the ancient Chinese 
philosophical concepts such as harmony between man and nature, the beginning of the 
CPC and Mao’s era saw a plethora of slogans with very anti-environmental ideals. Mao’s 
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“man must conquer nature” (ren ding sheng tian, 人定胜天), is in many ways a direct 
opposite of “nature and man as one” (Tianren heyi) (Pan, 2015; Wang, et al., 2014). 
Mao’s political ecology was thus one of proactive environmental destruction in favour of 
nation building. For Shapiro (2001) the slogans of Mao’s period reflected a militarised 
discourse, with the hallmarks of “utopian urgency” and “dogmatic uniformity”, seen in the 
large-scale reclamation and relocation projects. Nothing demonstrates this anti-nature 
disposition of Mao’s leadership more clearly than the images created by Jung Chang 
(1991) in her (auto)biography Wild Swans with her memories of schools closing so that 
the pupils could tear out the grass to prevent it from growing.  
This extreme anti-environment stance – where destruction was promoted down to 
the individual level – which left vast scars on the PRC’s landscape thankfully began to 
come to an end as Deng’s leadership developed an increasingly environmentally aware 
political ecology. The somewhat more environmentally friendly steps that began to take 
place under the pretext of the Environmental Protection National Policy will now be 
presented below. It is unsurprising that the State Council’s White Papers (1996 and 
2006) fail to include Mao’s environmental record within their list of the successfully 
proposed, formulated and dominating political thinking of the CPC in responding to the 
growing environmental problems of the PRC; rather than responding to environmental 
destruction, Mao was responsible for it (Shapiro, 2001). 
 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s Environmental Protection National Policy (1983 – 1991) 
 
The CPC’s beginnings of an environmentally friendly political ecology are 
attributed to have begun in the 1970s: Geall and Ely (2018) highlight three important 
events of 1972 that allow them to identify this year as a turning point in the CPC’s 
environmental governance, narratives and actions. Firstly, due in part to the U.S.-China 
rapprochement, the PRC now occupied a seat in the United Nations and thus the PRC 
participated in the influential 1972 Stockholm conference on Human Development 
(Edmonds, 2011). Concurrently, the PRC suffered a red tide or toxic algal bloom, which 
caused a devastating die-off of shellfish in Dalian, and thirdly, in Beijing it was 
discovered that fish being sold in the markets had high levels of toxins and chemicals 
55 
poisoning those eating the fish (Geall and Ely, 2018; and Muldavin, 2008). Seemingly as 
a result the State Council decided to establish the first Investigation and Treatment 
Committee on Environmental Issues, which was headed by the Premier, Zhou Enlai 
(Geall and Ely, 2018).  
1973 saw the PRC’s first national conference on environmental protection, which 
was held in Beijing (Muldavin, 2008). The conference called for the “overall and rational 
planning, reduction of harm, a reliance on the masses and both the protection of the 
environment and the enriching of the people” (Geall and Ely, 2018:7) and created a 
series of “end-of-pipe” pollution control targets and regulatory decrees (Weng, Dong, Wu 
and Ying, 2015:7). The CPC also produced its first environmental publication: 
Environmental Protection	  (Huanjing Baohu,	  环境保护)	  (Chinese Council on International 
Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), 2013; and Geall and Ely, 
2018). The rhetoric that came from this first environmental protection conference 
became the benchmark of the CPC’s environmental governance and has barely 
changed in five decades.  
This environmental awareness (of sorts) and the CPC’s first political ecology did 
not gain national policy status until 1983 and when it did, the Environmental Protection 
National Policy came into existence as a reaction to Deng’s Reform and Opening Up 
from 1978 (Huan, 2008). According to Huan (2008), since the founding of the PRC in 
1949 environmental degradation and pollution had not been greatly acknowledged as a 
problem to be on the agenda of a socialist regime. Huan (2008) earmarks the PRC’s 
participation in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Development as a result of 
the political insight of Zhou Enlai, rather than an overall awareness of environmental 
politics throughout the CPC. Despite these apparent momentous changes in the CPC’s 
environmental governance throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s little happened to protect 
the PRC’s environment. In 1986, three years after the introduction of the Environmental 
Protection National Policy, Deng updated the constitution and principal contradiction 
creating a political shift away from Marxism and class struggle and towards 
understanding the PRC’s backwards production mode and thus beginning the CPC’s 
“worship” and “addiction” of economic development and growth (Wang, et al., 2014:39-
40). 
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 With the impetus of the Environmental Protection National Policy originating 
alongside the political shift towards economic growth a national administrative and legal 
system was eventually developed for environmental protection. This process culminated 
in the production of the EPL, passed by the National People’s Congress in 1989. The 
administrative system responsible for constructing the EPL was also enhanced from the 
National Environmental Protection Bureau (affiliated with the Ministry for City and 
Country Construction) to the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), which 
was now directly accountable to the State Council (Huan, 2008). However, the 
fundamental objective of the Environmental Protection National Policy was that 
economic modernisation was to be the priority. Ultimately, it was hoped that the goal of 
environmental protection would be achieved whilst furthering economic development; 
environmental protection had officially been made second, politically and legally, to 
economic growth (Huan, 2008). 
 It was Deng’s Reform and Opening Up that started the process of transferring the 
PRC from a centralised planning system to a market-orientated system, resulting in a 
decade-long period of high-speed growth (Huan, 2008). At this stage in the PRC’s 
development Huan (2008) clearly classifies the PRC as a growing economy. Huan 
(2008) argues a reasonable explanation for this dominance of economic modernisation 
is that the PRC was in the early stages of initiation and development; accordingly, the 
basic needs of the people were not yet being met. Similarly, environmental pollution and 
degradation was not yet as severe as the levels experienced today: compared to the 
levels of noticeable poverty, the levels of negative environmental outcomes for the 
upsurge in economic development most likely seemed “bearable and/or forgivable” 
(Huan, 2008:1).  
 
 
Jiang Zemin’s Sustainable Development Strategy (1992- 2001) 
 
 In 1992 the PRC participated in the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro. What is frequently cited as one of the most 
influential outcomes of this conference is the popularity it attached to the phrase 
“sustainable development”. Working on Brundtland’s (1987:43) sustainable development 
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definition, the Rio conference adapted the definition so that sustainable development 
would become: “the capability of maintaining over indefinite periods of time specified 
values of human wellbeing, social equity and environmental quality” (Leach, Scoones 
and Stirling, 2010:xiv). Concomitantly, Jiang Zemin had begun to initiate the second of 
the CPC’s political ecologies: the Sustainable Development Strategy (1992-2002). Our 
Common Future (1987) influenced, to some extent, the development of Jiang’s 
Sustainable Development Strategy, which had predominantly been developed to 
participate in the Rio Summit in 1992, and went on to receive high popularity and public 
support (Huan, 2008).   
The CPC’s translation was “development that can be sustained” (kechixu fazhan,	  
可 持 续发展 ); there was no suggestion of environmental protection undermining 
economic development (Goron, 2018). The changing dynamics of sustainable 
development experienced at Rio, of “human wellbeing, social equity and environmental 
quality” did not upstage the CPC’s priority on economic growth (Leach, et al. 2010:18. 
Hence, the CPC’s Sustainable Development Strategy continued supporting economic 
development opposed to developing a means of improving and protecting environmental 
and social conditions (Huan, 2008). Throughout the 1990’s, sustainable development 
became a key phrase in the CPC’s environmental literature, but specifically for furthering 
economic growth (Meng, 2012).  
In 1994, the CPC broke new ground by becoming one of the first governments to 
write a national strategic sustainable development plan: China’s Agenda 21 (Weng, 
Dong, Wu and Qin, 2015). Moreover, the Ninth Five Year Plan (FYP) written in 1996 for 
the period up until 2000 was the first FYP to include environmental governance 
(Edmonds, 2011). 1997 also saw the CPC’s first National Sustainable Development 
Report published, as well as the 15th Party Congress, where the “huge environmental 
and resource pressures caused by population growth and economic development” were 
identified as major difficulties faced throughout the PRC (Geall and Ely, 2018:8; and 
Meng, 2012). The report summarised the foremost achievements, as well as challenges, 
within environmental protection over the past and coming decades.  
Under the guise of the Sustainable Development Strategy a number of policy 
realisations were attained: work towards international treaties on global environmental 
degradation issues caused by greenhouse gas emissions, as well as greater protection 
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for bio-diversity were achieved (Huan, 2008). Consequently, in 1998 the NEPA was 
again elevated to become the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). The 
SEPA now had increased governmental status working towards furthering environmental 
protection across the PRC demonstrating intent towards increasing the importance of 
environmental policy within the PRC (Huan, 2008). The importance attached to the 
environment for political means is clear to see, however, the environment was still being 
used as a tool to ensure sustainable economic development. 
Five years later, in 2002, Jiang Zemin made an important step to officially include 
sustainable development as a part of Xiaokang; a “moderately prosperous” society that 
characterised Jiang’s leadership (Tilt, 2010:11). Jiang called for: “The continual 
strengthening of sustainable development ability, improvement of the environment, clear 
increases in resource efficiency, the promotion of harmony between humanity and 
nature and putting society as a whole onto a development path of production, wealth and 
environmental-friendliness” (Meng, 2012:1). Here Jiang started to introduce the rhetoric 
associated with ecological civilisation; we specifically see the introduction of “harmony 
between humanity and nature”, but we also see the contradiction of prioritised 
production and wealth coming before environmental-friendliness (Huan, 2008; and Ye, 
1984). 
The deteriorating ecological reality being lived was far different from the 
propagated political ecology of the CPC (Huan, 2008). There was – and still is – a clear-
cut gap between the rhetorical green fantasies of the CPC and the daily-lived experience 
of the citizens of the PRC (Schmitt, 2016). However, again, as with Deng’s 
Environmental Protection National Policy, the aim of the Sustainable Development 
Strategy was to ensure continued economic development with the recognition of 
environmental protection needs (Huan, 2009). Ultimately, following a paradigm of 
sustainable development could, at best, introduce new dimensions of environmental 
awareness into economic growth. However, continued prioritisation of economic growth 
degenerated the status of the environment into a tool for creating maintainable economic 
growth (Huan, 2009).  
The CPC slogan “development is the top priority” (fa zhan shi ying dao li, 发展是
硬道理) highlights how the Sustainable Development Strategy continued the diminishing 
of the environment in favour of economic development. As with Deng’s Environmental 
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Protection National Policy, many explanations can be considered as to why the CPC 
continued to promote economic growth over environmental protection; the PRC was still 
a growing economy meeting the basic needs of most citizens. This weak version of 
sustainable development did very little to curb the environmental degradation 
experienced within the PRC (Huan, 2008). 
 
 
Hu Jintao’s Scientific Development (2002 – 2012) 
 
 2002 saw Hu Jintao take over the leadership of the CPC, and with Hu came the 
“scientific view of development” (kexue de fazhan guan,	   科学发展观 ), or scientific 
development. Hu intended for this political ecology to approach development in a way 
that helped to conserve resources and be more environmentally-friendly (Geall and Ely, 
2018). Although Hu did not officially introduce the phrase until 2004, the ideas and 
changes in conception can be seen in the CPC’s 16th National Congress in 2002 (Huan, 
2008). Fundamentally, scientific development represented an alternative attempt to re-
conceptualise the relationship between environmental protection and economic 
development (Huan, 2008). This re-conceptualisation became necessary as a product of 
the three-decades long high economic growth that was beginning to change the 
development status of the PRC: the PRC was increasingly transforming into a growth 
economy rather than existing solely as a growing economy meeting the basic needs of 
all citizens (Huan, 2009). 
The PRC’s economy had grown to be the third largest economy globally, 
however, the PRC’s competitive rates were very low. This low competitiveness 
prevented the CPC and PRC from being, or feeling, powerful on the world stage (Huan, 
2008). Moreover, the continued high rates of growth had become unmanageable and 
unsustainable, especially with regards to the environment and natural resources. Thus, a 
rational decision had to be made that would consider how to systematically transform the 
concept of development within the PRC without preventing a continued high-rate of 
development: Hu’s response was scientific development, with the three key features of: 
competitiveness, quality and environmentally-friendliness (Huan, 2008; and Pan, 2007). 
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Huan (2008) argues how in some regards, Hu’s scientific development can be 
seen as an improvement on Jiang’s Sustainable Development Strategy. Scientific 
development, for the first time, highlighted that there was more than one way of pursuing 
development. Scientific development acknowledged the limitations of development 
through environmental exploitation and destruction labelling this behaviour as “un-
scientific” and unsustainable; Hu ultimately recognised the need of a healthy 
environment for further growth (Huan, 2008). However, it is here that scientific 
development again falls short of environmental protection: continued economic growth 
(for increased competitiveness) was still the priority regardless of the realisation that this 
was not sustainable.  
The approaches to achieve scientific development were described as more 
resource efficient and environmentally friendly, but economic growth was still the CPC’s 
political priority. Scientific development, as a political ecology, was unable to provide a 
new development paradigm any more than the Environmental Protection National Policy 
or the Sustainable Development Strategy: they all fall into the same environmental 
protection faux pas of championing economic growth. Moreover, Huan (2008) argues 
how the addition of scientific method to regulation and policy allowed for the 
manipulation of reasoning and justifications of unsustainable and environmentally 
unfriendly practice by polluting industries.  
The defining characteristics of competitiveness, quality and environmentally-
friendliness have been compared with, and found to be very similar to, the concept of 
ecological modernisation, a theory more popular across the growth economies of 
Western Europe (Chen, 2012; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord, 2018). Both scientific 
development and ecological modernisation are aware of the environmental issues 
caused by urbanisation and industrialisation. However, neither compromise on economic 
growth, both arguing that economic growth can be achieved and maintained through 
environmentally-friendly approaches, such as developing a healthy market system, 
partaking in insightful technological investments and making “piecemeal” adjustments to 
the economic structure. Both approaches see a “win-win” resolution whereby there is 
continued economic growth without further environmental degradation (He, 2007; and 
Huan, 2008:1 and 2009). The literature above demonstrated how sustainable 
development is inept with regards to environmental protection; there is no shift from what 
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can be understood as a capitalist ideology. Unsurprisingly, Hu’s Scientific Development 
was therefore short lived as a standalone political ecology; it was soon to be absorbed 
into the CPC’s next political ecology: ecological civilisation.  
 
 
Ecological Civilisation: The CPC’s Current Political Ecology (2007 – ) 
 
Ecological civilisation made its CPC debut in 2003, in an official policy document 
on reforestation (Huan, 2007). However, it was not until Hu introduced the phrase at the 
17th National Congress that ecological civilisation began to emerge politically (Goron, 
2018). Hu stated how: “The construction of an ecological civilization will be given a 
prominent place and included in all aspects and processes in economic, political, cultural 
and social development [sic]” (cited in Meng, 2012:1). However, the main focus of Hu’s 
17th National Congress report when regarding environmental governance was the 
sanctification of his scientific development by adding it to the constitution (Goron, 2018), 
further to this, Marinelli (2018) highlights how although the report was delivered by Hu 
Jintao, that it was allegedly prepared by Premier Wen Jiabao suggesting that Hu’s focus 
was not on transferring towards ecological civilisation.  
Following the Congress, China Daily (2007:1) published an editorial further 
defining ecological civilisation, they wrote how: “It [ecological civilisation] is not a term 
the Party has coined just to fill a theoretical vacancy in its socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, but rather a future-orientated guiding principle based on the perception 
of the extremely high price we have paid for our economic miracle.”  During Hu’s final five 
years of leadership, ecological civilisation sat alongside scientific development, thus the 
goals, aims and methods of becoming an ecological civilisation remained hazy with 
scientific development remaining Hu’s leading political ecology (Oswald, 2014). 
Ecological civilisation existed as a “site for negotiation among different actors, 
institutions and discourses” and was not codified or implementable. Despite the China 
Daily article, ecological civilisation was open to fill any political, social or ecological 
“space” the CPC saw fit (Geall and Ely, 2018:10). 
However, towards the end of Hu’s leadership he began to embrace the concept 
of ecological civilisation. In Hu’s report at the 18th National Congress, ecological 
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civilisation was repeated sixteen times and now appeared as an emblematic title: Making 
Great Efforts to Advance Ecological Civilisation; symbolising the passing of the 
environmental governance baton from Hu to Xi with the enduring task of building an 
ecological civilisation (Marinelli, 2018). As Hu’s leadership transitioned to Xi, ecological 
civilisation became embedded within Xi’s metanarrative of his Chinese Dream (Zhong 
Guomeng, 中国梦) of national rejuvenation (Marinelli, 2018). Marinelli (2018:378) argues 
that “Advance Ecological Civilization and Build a Beautiful China [sic]” became a mantra. 
Irrespective of this shift in rhetoric trope towards supporting the construction of 
ecological civilisation, Marinelli (2018) highlights that this did not necessarily mean a 
substantial uptake of effective environmental protection policies. 
As ecological civilisation became increasingly embedded within Xi’s Chinese 
Dream trope, Marinelli (2018:230) highlights how Xi showed increasing concern of the 
people’s needs by outlining the CPC’s responsibilities: “We must take a responsible 
attitude towards our people and future generations, be resolute in controlling 
environmental pollution, strive to usher in a new era of ecological progress and improve 
the environment for our people to live and work in.” However, the most stark contrast 
between the previous political ecologies and ecological civilisation is found in Xi’s 
rhetoric when he makes direct claims about environmental governance at the global 
level, such as: “Protecting the environment, addressing climate change and securing 
energy and resources is a common challenge for the whole world” (Marinelli, 2018:379). 
Geall and Ely (2018) also argue that a change is noticeable in the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric produced by Xi, highlighting how ecological civilisation became 
prominent in the CPC’s rhetoric from 2016 onwards. Geall and Ely (2018) argue this 
resulted in the slogan being codified and increasingly implementable. Xi can be seen 
promoting ecological civilisation as an alternative development theory, capable of 
revolutionising not just the PRC, but also the whole global economic order to bring about 
a global ecological transformation (Foster, 2017; Gare, 2016; Goron, 2018; and Pan, 
2016). Geall and Ely (2018:10) argue that Xi had closed down “a period of debate and 
negotiation in order to articulate a slogan as an implementable narrative” and that this 
“presents a novel insight into processes of environmental decision-making and 
governance” within the CPC. They argue Xi did this by “greening” institutions of the 
CPC, creating the first CPC task force for the “Promotion of Economic Development and 
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Ecological Civilisation” in 2013, publishing the landmark “Central Opinion Document on 
Ecological Civilisation Construction” in 2015; and the “Ecological Civilisation 
Construction Action Plan” in 2016 (Goron, 2018:41).  
Furthermore, Xi stated that: “Ecological civilisation was key to China’s overall 
development strategy, and government at all levels should remember that "clear waters 
and green mountains" are invaluable assets” (Xinhua, 2017b:1). Li Keqiang furthered 
that ecological civilisation would have a key role in achieving sustainable growth, and 
that the country will continue to optimise its industrial structure, cut excess capacity, 
reduce pollution and improve air, water and soil quality (China Daily, 2017). However, 
what could be seen in Li’s statements, and in the 2013 task force, is a level of confusion 
where ecological civilisation still appears to be prioritising economic development and 
growth. 
2017 saw ecological civilisation increase its prominence in both Xi’s and Li’s 19th 
National Congress reports, and in 2018 the prominence of ecological civilisation was 
secured by including it in the constitution (Goron, 2018). From Hu’s conclusion of the 
17th National Congress to Xi’s conclusion at the 19th National Congress, the 
significance and production of ecological civilisation as the latest political ecology had 
increased substantially (Geall and Ely, 2018). Xi’s concluding message was strong and 
clear; the CPC had entered a new era and central to this was a new principal 
contradiction, where ecological civilisation was now playing an important part. Xinhua 
(2017c:1) outlined Xi’s proclamation, that the PRC had entered a new era, demonstrates 
a shift, which “affects the whole landscape”; the landscape metaphor not only referred to 
a change in development path, but also the direct importance of improving the 
environment. 
Xi’s new principal contradiction marked the CPC’s fourth principal contradiction. 
The first two had been introduced by Mao, and were: 1) the people versus imperialism, 
feudalism and the remnants of the Kuomintang; and 2) the proletariat versus the 
bourgeoisie (Xinhua, 2017c). Deng’s leadership introduced the third principal 
contradiction: the increasing material and cultural needs of the PRC citizens versus 
backward social production. However, the PRC of today no longer has backward social 
production – from computer chips to high-speed trains – the CPC has transformed the 
PRC from being the world’s factory to also being the world’s laboratory and marketplace: 
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the era of backward social production had become no more (Huan, 2008). In his 
concluding report to the 19th National Congress, Xi (2017:3) professed: "What we now 
face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the 
people's ever-growing needs for a better life.”  
 Huan (2008) argued that for the CPC to be able to transition to an ecological 
civilisation, the priority on economic growth had to change. Xi (2017) went on to say: 
“The needs to be met for the people to live a better life are increasingly broad. Not only 
have their material and cultural needs grown; their demands for democracy, rule of law, 
fairness and justice, security, and a better environment are increasing.” Despite the 
environment’s position at the end of this list, it is undeniable that the CPC have identified 
the environment as a crucial element in improving the lives of their citizens. According to 
Xi, only a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful 
PRC will be ready to advance to the next stage of socialism. Despite economy being the 
first concern, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful do follow as three important 
elements involved in constructing the CPC’s concept of an ecological civilisation. 
However, whether they are just tokenistic additions existing merely within the rhetoric 
are yet to be seen.  
 
 
Summary of the CPC’s Political Ecologies 
 
A clear correlation between the prioritising of economic growth and the failings of 
the CPC’s previous political ecologies to protect the environment is apparent. The 
Environmental Protection National Policy, Sustainable Development Strategy and 
scientific development have all been very weak approaches to environmental protection 
through their prioritising of economic growth and the lack of restraints or barriers to 
environmental destruction. Despite environmental protection increasingly receiving a 
higher position in both CPC rhetoric and through the continual promotion of the 
administrative body responsible, as well as the new environmental laws and regulations, 
ultimately what remained unchanged was the attitude towards economic growth. 
However, Xi’s update to the principal contradiction represents a shift in thinking about 
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how to improve the living conditions of the people through other means, including 
environmental protection. 
The CPC have supported a “growth ideology”, which has always portrayed 
economic growth as necessary for societal development and has resulted in the PRC 
beginning to transform from a growing economy into a growth economy, where the 
environment plays a supporting role to continued economic development (Fotopoulos, 
2005; and Huan, 2008). This unquestioned and unchanged “growth ideology” has 
dominated all previous political ecologies preventing any real environmental protection 
within the PRC. For the CPC to transform the PRC into an ecological civilisation, a 
change from a capital-focused ideology to an ecology-focused ideology is required. To 
what extent Xi’s update to the principal contradiction provides this shift towards an 
ecological ideology cannot yet be known. However, with such a momentous change to 
the principal contradiction, both dedicated rhetoric and a new political narrative from the 
CPC is to be expected. By conducting a thematic EDA on the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric it will allow for new interpretations of ecological civilisation producing 
new understandings of the spaces and future(s) of the CPC’s latest environmental 
governance. However, before moving on to discuss the methodology and research 
design of the thematic EDA, a final debate found in the literature, one concerning a 
Gramscian critique of whether it is possible for the CPC to transition to become an 
ecological civilisation, will be considered.  
 
 
Gramscian Critique: Can the PRC Become an Ecological Civilisation? 
 
Ahearne (2013), Gare (2012 and 2017), Huan (2008) and Kovel (2011) all 
discuss how the CPC are, or are not, transitioning towards becoming an ecological 
civilisation. What has been common throughout the literature is the idea that ecological 
civilisation theoretically represents, in varying degrees, a different way of doing 
(environmental) politics. Amongst the different critiques of ecological civilisation and 
whether the CPC are taking the necessary steps to transform the PRC into an ecological 
civilisation is the critique developed by Ahearne (2013), which applies ecological 
civilisation to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Ahearne (2013:17) argues that ecological 
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civilisation could offer the “foundation for the moral leadership required in a war of 
position to genuinely overcome and replace existing socio-economic forms” (these 
concepts will be considered below). There is a clear divide between scholars who see 
potential in the CPC’s ecological civilisation to become an alternative hegemony placing 
ecological equilibrium at the centre, and scholars who doubt the CPC’s ecological 
concept is anything but sustainable development with “Chinese characteristics”.  
Ahearne (2013), Gare (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2017), Huan (2008) and Kovel 
(2007 and 2011) all conclude that the hegemonic ideology behind neoliberal capitalism 
is to blame for the environmental destruction faced today and that a new hegemonic 
ideology is required to advance beyond neoliberal capitalism and re-introduce 
equilibrium in nature. Gramsci’s (1971) work on hegemony provides a theory for 
assessing the ability of an ideology to overthrow the current hegemony. Hence, Ahearne 
(2013) considers how Gramsci’s theory could be used to ascertain the likely 
relationships between neoliberal capitalism, sustainable development and ecological 
civilisation.  
Gramsci developed his theory as he became increasingly disillusioned with the 
USSR, whose alternatives began to mirror the ways of thinking, practices and 
organisations they were said to be opposing in the capitalist approach utilised elsewhere 
(Ahearne, 2013). In this sense, the Soviet’s ideology had become an opposing ideology 
to the capitalist hegemony. Gramsci argued that an alternative hegemony was needed 
with entirely alternative ways of thinking, practices and organisations; indeed, as Albert 
Einstein said, “we can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when 
we created them.” Sustainable development is referred to as an opposing hegemony to 
neoliberal capitalism and ecological civilisation is hoped to be a new alternative 
hegemony. What is understood thus far from the literature is how the CPC’s latest 
political ecology tends to clash and contradict, falling between ideas and practices of a 
new alternative ideology of ecological civilisation and the opposing ideology of 
sustainable development. Gramsci’s theory is based upon three concepts: 1) hegemony, 




Hegemony: Can the CPC Create Ecological Civilisation as an Alternative Hegemony? 
 
 Gramsci’s “hegemony” is a concept built around an attempt to theorise how the 
ruling class maintains a dominant ideology within a society (Ahearne, 2013). Hegemony 
operates at numerous levels, which are accounted for by Gramsci’s distinction between 
the State and civil society as separate “terrains”. Gramsci made direct references 
between his own ruling class concept and Marx’s concept of the bourgeoisie: the 
bourgeoisie or the State maintains dominance and legitimacy through such structures as 
legislation, the judiciary, police and military (Aheane, 2013). Gramsci argued that the 
civil society reproduced the State’s hegemony through cultural practices, due to the 
inherent presentation of the order as “natural” by the State; thus perpetually 
(re)endorsing the State’s dominance (Gramsci, 1971). The CPC can disseminate their 
choice of ideology, through both dominance and legitimacy through legislation, judiciary, 
police and military and via cultural practices; presenting the ideology as the natural order 
of things and thus have the means to produce a new hegemony. The nature of the CPC 
existing within a One Party State with State run media provides the CPC with a political 
monopoly. 
However, to produce a successful hegemony, Gramsci’s concept requires more 
than an overarching ideology reflecting the preferences of the State. First the CPC must 
establish ethical and moral leadership and from here present ecological civilisation as a 
new concept not only to the PRC, but also to the world. This is no simple task, but a 
large proportion of the literature exploring the CPC’s ecological civilisation concept 
supports this as the intended purpose of the CPC constructing their ecological 
civilisation concept (Ahearne, 2013; Gare, 2017; Heurtebise, 2017; Marinelli, 2018; and 
Pan, 2015). However, to complicate the concept of hegemony further, Gramsci 
(1971:57-58) also insisted that leadership must be won prior to taking government and 
then disseminating the new ideology, he warned that: “A social group can, and indeed 
must, already exercise “leadership” before winning government power (this indeed is 
one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes 
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must 
continue to lead as well.”  
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Gramsci argued that the leader must have the personal traits of dominance in 
order to go on to produce a successful campaign for a new ideology. Within the context 
of the CPC, this requirement of leadership prior to winning governmental leadership 
currently concerns Xi Jinping. Unsurprisingly, there are numerous examples across the 
IR literature demonstrating Xi’s strong track record of leadership in various positions 
throughout his earlier ranks within the CPC (Auslin, 2018; Callahan, 2013; Shambaugh, 
2018; and Wang, 2018; see also Chapter 5 where Xi’s leadership is mythologised as 
heroic). Likewise, often citing his seven years agricultural service in Shaanxi province, Xi 
repeatedly argues in favour of the natural environment, equality in access to services as 
well as heralding the merits of ancient Chinese philosophy, including Daoism, which 
appears inherent in the CPC’s definition of ecological civilisation (Pan, 2006c; and Pan, 
2015). Thus there is some agreement that Xi Jinping provides the strong leadership 
required, with the access to disseminate his choice of ideology, for the CPC to create 
ecological civilisation as an alternative hegemony.   
 
 
Conception of the World: Can the CPC Construct Ecological Civilisation as a new 
Conception of Environmental Governance? 
 
With a strong leader advocating for an alternative hegemony, the CPC are said to 
be in a position to begin considering how to move towards creating a new conception of 
the world, Gramsci’s second theoretical concept (Ahearne, 2013). As a Marxist and 
dialectician, Gramsci perceived history as an on-going rational process that dialectically 
unfolds (Ahearne, 2013). Pusey (1991:33) describes the process in the following way: 
“[T]he society that exists (society 1) calls up a negating image of the better alternative 
(society 2) and if the contradiction is sufficiently fundamental, there is the possibility of a 
synthesis (society 3), in which humankind advances one step further in a history that 
leads to the rational self-fulfillment of the species.” This explanation also demonstrates 
why Gramsci specifically refers to an alternative hegemony rather than an opposing 
hegemony and echoes the arguments of Gare (2010), Pan (2006c) and Wu Shaoxia 
who all argue for a liminal process of development via a synthesis of Chinese culture 
and Western logic in pursuing development within the PRC. 
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The distinction between opposing hegemony and alternative hegemony is 
important for creating a new conception of the world and highlights the distinctions 
between sustainable development and ecological civilisation as potential hegemonies. 
An opposing hegemony finds itself adopting a strategy directly shaped by the framework 
of the original hegemony: sustainable development is the “ecologicalisation” or 
“greening” of neoliberal capitalism. Slowing down the production of factories to limit the 
emissions does not change the substances being emitted nor solve their issues of 
pollution. Encouraging the growth of artificial intelligence to encourage more productive 
farming practices does not curb the demand for unnecessary and overindulgent diets of 
increasingly prosperous citizens. Industry is not the effective cause per se, but rather an 
instrumental means of manipulating and ruining nature (Kovel, 2011). The concept of 
sustainable development does not bring new ideological assumptions to the conception 
of the world (Gare, 2010; 2012 and 2017).  
Gramsci (1971:109) spoke of “transcendence” in conception of the world in order 
to produce an alternative hegemony. Gramsci (1971:232) specifically refers to the innate 
failure of an opposing hegemony when he argues that: “in political struggles one should 
not ape the methods of the ruling classes, or one will fall into easy ambushes.” Gramsci 
(1971) believed that an opposing hegemony would never be strong enough to overrule 
the ways of thinking, practices and organisation of the existing hegemony. Ahearne 
(2013:320) furthers Gramsci’s argument in saying that the opposing hegemony “does 
not merely display back to the hegemonic power an image of itself, rather it reflects that 
image, a distortion, a corruption of the actually existing conditions. This new corrupted 
image now replaces any prefigured vision and should the oppositional force prevail, it is 
doomed to realise its corrupted vision [italics in the original].”  
If the negating image for the opposing hegemony is just a corrupted version of 
the existing society (society 1), then the opposing hegemony is merely a deformed copy 
(society 2), the contradictory message to lived experiences can still produce a synthesis 
(society 3), but society 3 becomes one that is doomed to catastrophe and future failings 
(Ahearne, 2013). This is pertinent when considering the concept of sustainable 
development as an oppositional hegemony in contrast to ecological civilisation as an 
assumed alternative hegemony; sustainable development is doomed, whereas 
ecological civilisation is (intended as) a new image. If ecological civilisation represents a 
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new alternative ideology then it must depart from the current conception of the world, 
which fosters (neoliberal) capitalism and the opposing hegemony of sustainable 
development.  
With regards to the CPC’s political ecologies, Deng’s Environmental Protection 
National Policy, Jiang’s Sustainable Development Strategy and Hu’s scientific 
development, all were aligned within the ways of thinking, practices and organisations of 
economic growth, with environmental protection helping to sustain growth. Whereas, 
ecological civilisation, with the new principal contradiction, has been argued to be 
moving away from the old standalone priority of economic growth (Gare, 2017; and 
Goron, 2018). However, simultaneously, Lu, et al. (2016) argued how, in developing 
economies, ecological civilisation is a way of continuing and sustaining economic 
development: indeed, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have both spoken about the need to 
continue promoting wealth and development. Thus ecological civilisation is also argued 
to repeat elements of the same corrupted image, it is potentially no different from the 
rubric of sustainable development. 
Even if it is accepted that there is the advocacy for ecological civilisation as an 
alternative hegemony - with Xi, as a strong leader, a proven leadership record and the 
beginnings of the dissemination of this alternative conception of the world - this still does 
not provide a complete answer on how the alternative hegemony can be formed 
(Ahearne, 2013). According to Gramsci the “principal condition for overthrowing the 
hegemony of the politics of privilege and replacing it with the new politics of 
inclusiveness is the diffusion of a homogeneous mode of thinking from a homogeneous, 
or organic, center... Those who spread the new conception of the world must understand 
the society in which they work in all its diversity and complexity...” (Gramsci, cited in 
Germino, 1990:249). This centrality of a singular clear vision for the purposes of 
transforming a society is undeniably problematic, however the CPC do appear to try and 
do this, as previously discussed within the CPC’s concept of forming a singular civilised 
State (Wenming guojia, 文名郭家; Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013; also see Chapter 4 
on the Spirit of Ecological Civilisation). Furthermore, Gramsci’s hegemony and 
conception of world rely on unity between the civil society and the State (Gramsci, 
1977). If the PRC is to transition to an ecological civilisation a unified conception of the 
world is vital (Ahearne, 2013).  
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Ecological civilisation then cannot be realised by the CPC, or anybody else, 
whilst there is a multiplicity of competing conceptions of the world, regardless of how 
valid each conception is to their respective holders (Gramsci, 1971); what we have seen 
thus far from the literature is how ecological civilisation and sustainable development 
have the potential to be competing hegemonies or to be representing two versions of 
opposing hegemony. Yet, this brings the argument back to the role of the dialectic 
unfolding of history: conceptions of the world evolve dialectically, through negation and 
being negated (Ahearne, 2013). Ultimately, only one conception of the world can be 
hegemonic at a given time. The CPC negate sustainable development as failed Western 
logic and ecological civilisation is championed as an alternative approach based on 
Chinese culture and wisdom. Thus, ecological civilisation still theoretically has the 




War of Position: Can the CPC Transform Ecological Civilisation from Theory into 
Practice? 
 
War of position refers to the approaches of resisting against the domination of the 
original hegemony, through the means of culture, or soft power, rather than physical 
might and violence (Gramsci, 2007). Cox (1983) furthers Gramsci’s concept by 
describing a war of position as a process by which the strength of social foundations are 
slowly built up, by creating alternative institutions and intellectual resources within the 
existing society. The centrality of culture within Gramsci’s war of position concept is due 
to his assumptions that culture lies at the heart of any revolutionary project, “it shapes 
their [any persons] ability to imagine how it [the hegemony] might be changed, and 
whether they see such changes as feasible or desirable” (Crehan, 2002:71).  
Gramsci argued that (cited in Germino, 1990:249-250): “The work of infusing 
society with the vision of a new politics will not be easy. Very rarely do changes in 
modes of thinking, in beliefs, in opinions come about rapidly through cultural explosions 
that affect the whole society at once. Patient, detailed work over a long period of time is 
needed to win the war of position.” It is thus inconceivable to expect Xi Jinping’s uptake 
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of an ecological civilisation as a central leadership slogan to result in an alternative 
hegemony within his leadership timeframe across the whole of the CPC, PRC and the 
world (Gare, 2012 and 2014). However, what is conceivable is to see the beginnings of 
the formation and propagation of an alternative hegemony and conception of the world, 
which must be based on lived experiences, and then disseminated through political 
discourse (Ahearne, 2013).  
With regards to the context of the PRC, public concern with the environment is 
often borne out of the lived experiences of pollution, which in turn produce public 
protests (Balchindorzhieva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016; Orlik, 2012; and Pew, 2013). An 
example, which occurred towards the end of October 2012, involved thousands of 
Ningbo’s residents coming out to the streets to protest against the expansion of a 
petrochemical plant. This demonstration resulted in the local government delaying the 
project and introducing a change in local environment protection laws (Balchindorzhieva 
and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016). Here lived experiences resulted in a war of position 
creating new legal practices; Balchindorzhieva and Tsyrendorzheiva (2016) argue that 
only when war of position is supported by an organic combination of morality and law will 
the transition of the PRC to an ecological civilisation be achievable. The Ningbo protests 
example does demonstrate that when a war of position is intrinsically embedded with an 
emerging alternative ecological conception of the world, it is possible to disseminate this 
alternative conception of the world throughout society, thus theoretically allowing an 
alternative hegemony to emerge: “[t]he new political subject is thus armed with its praxis” 
(Ahearne, 2013:323; and Gramsci, 1971). 
This section has argued that a transformation of the PRC, one that negates the 
current leading global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism to an alternative hegemony of 
ecological civilisation is theoretically possible, although is a timely and complex process. 
To what extent the CPC are creating ecological civilisation, as an alternative hegemony, 
is not yet known. The CPC, through Xi Jinping’s leadership, is demonstrating 
domestically and globally the necessity for such a transformation and if properly applied 
over time can be feasible. However, the challenge of turning theory into practice 
remains. Many of the leadership, educational and lived experiences required are already 
in place within the PRC to help negate neoliberal capitalism in favour of an alternative 
hegemony, as well as a shared alternative conception of the world (disseminated, for 
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example, through rhetoric) and the institutions and actors necessary (such as the MEE, 
as well as the 2013 task force for the “Promotion of Economic Development and 
Ecological Civilisation”, the Central Opinion Document on Ecological Civilisation 
Construction (2015) and Ecological Civilisation Construction Action Plan (2016)) to 
successfully conduct a war of position. This renders the spaces and futures attainable 
through ecological civilisation, as the CPC’s latest political ecology informing their 
environmental governance, as limitless: the CPC are free to construct their vision of an 
ecological civilisation and what this may come to be is, at this point, largely unknown. It 
is the intention of this thesis to analyse the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric so as to 
unpack their political intentions in constructing an alternative hegemony and what this 





This literature review has shown how there is an uncertainty, or even skepticism, 
over the future direction of the CPC’s ecological civilisation (Goron, 2018). There are two 
very different ontologies and epistemologies of ecological civilisation: those who 
consider ecological civilisation as a new political ecology (such as Gare, 2010, 2012, 
2014 and 2017; Kovel, 2011; Lakoff, 2004; Pan Jiahua, 2015 and 2016; and Pan Yue, 
2006a, 2006b and 2006c) versus those who see ecological civilisation as continuation of 
sustainable development, or sustainable development with “Chinese characteristics” 
(Chen, 2012; Economy, 2017; Goron, 2018; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord, 2018). The two 
separate ontologies are looking at different evidence to come to their conclusions about 
ecological civilisation: philosophical and ecological theory versus policy decision-making 
and legislature. The former sees ecological civilisation as a long-term goal and the latter 
sees ecological civilisation as currently failing to deliver a new development paradigm.  
Geall and Ely (2018) and Marinelli (2018) argue that the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation is a narrative skilfully tapping into the CPC’s institutional strengths to promote 
a transition in development style. Heurtebise (2017) argues that the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation discourse engenders a “cultural chauvinism”, which contradicts with the 
atrocities of international environmental destruction. Heurtebise (2017) insists this 
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attitude makes global collaboration incompatible (Goron, 2018). However, others argue 
that the CPC’s ecological civilisation is the same as the globally dominant discourses of 
sustainable development, thus operates as a continuation of these principles within the 
context of the PRC (Chen, 2012; Hubbert, 2015; and Lord 2018).  
With ecological civilisation, as a product of the CPC’s latest political ecology, 
environmental governance has gone from embodying the crisis of the PRC’s 
environmental destruction through their development model under Deng, Jiang and Hu 
into a confident narrative of ecological rejuvenation under Xi’s current leadership (Goron, 
2018; and Marinelli, 2018). Xi is proposing a conceptual basis for a new course of 
development for the PRC. Xi Jinping Thought, as of the 19th national congress, has been 
enshrined within the constitution (Balchindorzhieva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016; and 
Goron, 2018). What is clear is how Xi’s rhetoric suggests the CPC’s new course of 
development will be increasingly based around solving environmental pollution issues 
and achieving social harmony (Balchindorzhieva and Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016).  
The literature suggests that Xi’s use of the ecological civilisation slogan is 
partially intended to direct, or codify, the thoughts of the populace and of the CPC’s 
towards his intentions and policy directions. However, there is still no singular agreement 
on what ecological civilisation is or does. Ecological civilisation may just be another CPC 
slogan or ideograph with no clear meaning (Lu, 1999). There is also confusion within the 
broadly defined explanations of ecological civilisation over the (re)emergence of Chinese 
philosophy as directing the desire for an ecologically orientated society; the narratives 
appear to be equally influenced by Western anthropocentrism views on development as 
well as the revival of traditional Chinese cultural ideals (Balchindorzhieva and 
Tsyrendorzheiva, 2016).  
The very nature of ecological civilisation and what makes it appealing to the CPC 
(as a pathway for rejuvenation), is the idea of harmony between man and nature, which 
depends upon a fundamental rethinking of policy approaches and creates an alternative 
image for the future of environmental governance. This appeal demands time, energy 
and unity: to “inspire people and provide the cultural foundations for the cultural, social 
and economic transformations necessary to create a new world order, a world order in 
which humans augment rather than undermine the ecosystems of which they are part”; 
this is a task that cannot be completed within a single leadership campaign (Gare, 
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2017:130). By developing a thematic EDA, to analyse the CPC’s ecological civilisation 
rhetoric, the unpacked aims and intentions for their future environmental governance 
should bring clarity to the confusion, contradictions and uncertainties presented 




Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design: Constructing 
the Thematic Emotion Discourse Analysis 
 
This chapter will present the methodological, ontological and theoretical 
conceptualisations of the emotion research that has informed the construction of the 
thematic EDA applied within this thesis. In doing so, this chapter explains how the 
researcher has adapted Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA and Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) 
CMT-Complex, to produce the thematic EDA, which: captures the most relevant and 
frequent uses of emotion by the CPC within their ecological civilisation rhetoric; avoids 
systematically generating knowledge on emotions to maintain as authentic an account of 
the use of emotion by the CPC as possible; avoids reproducing Anglo-European 
perspectives and understandings of the emotion used by the CPC; and avoids 
unrealistically homogenising the categorisation, understanding and interpretation of the 
use of emotion (Clément and Sangar, 2017). After presenting these methodological 
considerations, the chapter outlines the research design, which considers the steps 
taken to conduct this research. 
The Introduction and Literature Review have highlighted how politicians and 
scholars alike have been intrigued to know what ecological civilisation is and how it will 
come to be. Despite this interest, understanding(s) of ecological civilisation remain 
contested. Regardless of whether ecological civilisation is to become a new 
development paradigm, creating a shift towards a new alternative hegemony - or indeed 
whether ecological civilisation is to remain confined to the parameters of sustainable 
development - as the latest political ecology guiding the CPC’s environmental 
governance, abundant rhetoric on the concept has been created. This thesis therefore 
focuses on this abundant resource for further study to clarify and deepen our 
understandings of the CPC’s ecological civilisation concept. 
 To instill favour for and justify this new environmental governance the CPC’s 
rhetoric is likely to: reflect their governance motives domestically and internationally; 
show recognition of the audience’s needs, as a means of better connecting with the 
Chinese citizens; construct a power relationship to make a claim over leadership; and 
stimulate a desired understanding of the future of the CPC’s environmental governance. 
Each of these listed features relies on the use of emotion within rhetoric (Koschut, 
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2017b). This chapter will therefore also consider methodological literature across IR, 
where discursive uses of emotion have been understood to be an expression of identity, 
power and status through rhetoric. The methodology utilised within this thesis builds 
upon this emotion research to further our understanding of the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. 
Thus, to ascertain whether the CPC are deploying emotion within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric, and if so, what possible effects this deployment has on their latest 
approach to environmental governance, a research method devoted to the analysis of 
rhetoric is required. A thematic EDA, which identifies, contextualises and interprets 
emotion, has been identified as the most appropriate approach. Analysing the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric with a thematic EDA will forge a better understanding of ecological 
civilisation by providing a critical analysis of the CPC’s rhetoric, highlighting new 
interpretations of the discursive messages deployed via emotion; the details of why and 
how will be discussed below. 
Koschut (2017b) claims the study of emotion in IR is an emerging field with gaps 
to be filled and explains how IR scholars have begun to theorise how the socially 
embedded and discursive nature of emotions intersects with political power; there is an 
increasing number of constructivists focusing on the social contextualisation of emotion 
and language within IR (see, e.g., Bially Mattern, 2011; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; 
Crawford, 2000; Fattah and Fierke, 2009; Fierke, 2013; Hall, 2015, 2017; Hutchison and 
Bleiker, 2017; Koschut, 2017; Ross, 2006 and 2014; Solomon, 2017; and Wolf, 2017). 
As this thesis is concerned with how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric, focusing on the inter-subjective and sociocultural construction of 
emotion in and through speech acts, via a social constructivist lens, provides the most 
appropriate methodology for such an analysis; and simultaneously works towards 
bridging the gap between EDA and emotion research in IR. 
This thesis does not attempt to make claims on the phenomenological expression 
and biological experience of emotions via rhetoric by the CPC or their audience(s). The 
phenomenological and biological experiences of the individual do not need to be 
considered; this instead would answer questions of how individuals react to and interact 
with the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric. By identifying, contextualising and 
interpreting emotion in the ecological civilisation rhetoric this thesis will demonstrate how 
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the inclusion of a socio-emotional analysis will further our understanding of ecological 
civilisation; the framework constructed will provide an intuitive and interdisciplinary 
approach for analysing emotion in speech acts. 
 The primary aim of this thesis is to further our understanding of the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation concept, via the study of emotion within their rhetoric; furthering 
empirical emotion research within the field of IR becomes a natural secondary aim. A 
comprehensive overview will now be provided of where the theoretical conceptualisation 
of emotion currently stands within IR, before specifying how this research is relevant for 
EDA specifically within IR, and then particularly within this thesis. The chapter then ends 
with an outline of how the methodology was put into practice to answer the research 




Social Constructivism and Emotion In Discourse 
 
Social constructivism allows this thesis to investigate the socio-emotional 
foundations in the CPC’s current political ecology, providing alternative interpretations 
and understandings of ecological civilisation (Koschut, 2017b). By working with what 
Diez (2001) called the discourse analytical variant of constructivism, this thesis looks at 
different interpretations of the CPC’s intended political governance throughout their 
rhetoric. This thesis approaches political rhetoric and the social effects (i.e. the 
expression of identity, power and status) from the understanding that emotion can 
amplify and even make possible the effects. As highlighted by Koschut (2017b:1), 
“emotions contribute significantly to the discursive construction of social identities and 
power relations in international relations.” Social constructivism has predominantly 
worked ontologically on the emotional foundations of status and identity in politics, 
especially with regards to the link between language and power. However, Koschut 
(2017b) states how the theoretical conceptualisation of emotional foundations in IR has 
received comparatively little attention. The social constructivist conceptualisation of 
emotion can be predominantly found in the works of Foucault and Laclau, who argue 
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that discourse constitutes emotions and vice versa; their ideas have heavily influenced 
the social constructivist perspectives of emotion in IR.  
Foucault (1977) argued that political rhetoric does not emerge from nothingness: 
cultural, historical and social factors shape politics through the discourse transmitting 
them. Hall (2001), in developing Foucault’s ideas, argues that discourse can be 
considered as an “invisible hand” influencing the thoughts, speech and behaviour of an 
audience. Foucault (1980:194) described this process by defining discourse as a 
“technology of power” (a means of exercising power). Alongside this, Foucault (1985) 
identified emotions as “strategic formations” (linguistic categories), where emotions 
define a set way of interpreting discourse. For example, Foucault (1985) identified the 
emotions of ‘honour’ and ‘shame’ as “strategic formations” in discourse on patriotism and 
nationalism. Ascribing the emotions of honour and shame to nationalist discourse, 
directs the audience as to what they ought to feel positively about and what they are to 
feel negatively towards. Thus creating social parameters through speech acts and 
exercising a means of power by directing how people interpret linguistic categories.  
For Foucault (1980) the social perception of discourse enables a discursive 
exertion of power. Therefore emotion can be understood as an inter-subjective means of 
codifying and transmitting our perceptions in a way that draws upon shared categories 
and understandings (Koschut, 2017b). Hall (1997) summarised Foucault’s work on 
discourse as a system of representation, shaping and constraining the production of 
knowledge on power relations. An example of this can be seen in the Introduction 
chapter, where the use of emotion in the CPC’s rhetoric regarding the U.S. Embassy’s 
publication of PM2.5 readings was discussed: the CPC shaped their power relationship 
by dismissing the U.S. Embassy’s understanding and rigour, and bolstered their own 
approach as valid, asserting the CPC’s authority. 
Laclau (2004:326) furthers the analytical distinction between discursive and 
affective processes of emotion and distinguishes discursive structures as a “form” of 
emotion and affective structures as a “force” of emotion. For Laclau (2004), the affective 
“force” of emotion through discourse is how power can be exercised through language. 
According to Laclau (2018) emotion is an anchor that provides categories and 
differentiation through discourse that allows for identity formation; without the prescribed 
emotional categories identity would not be fully explained or understood. “Without this 
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intensity or force (that is without (affective) investment) there would be no discursive 
structure in the first place... The complexes which we call “discursive or hegemonic 
formations”... would be unintelligible without the affective component” (Laclau, 
2018:111). Laclau argues emotion as a “form” can create a discursive power structure 
through the “force” of emotional stimulation: emotion becomes an exercise of power, 
because emotion can prescribe value and action to discourse amplifying and enabling 
affective acts (Koschut, 2017b). Hielscher (2003) argues that the emotional foundations 
of discourse can help identify why certain discourses resonate with, or are understood 
by, an audience, whilst others fail. 
Foucault’s (1977, 1980 and 1985) and Laclau’s (2004 and 2018) theoretical 
considerations project emotion as the interpretive link between discursively constructed 
identities and the power and status differentiations enacted through discourse (Koschut, 
2017b). Following on from this interrelated conception of emotion and language – where 
emotion can communicate knowledge (via categories) about the world and our 
conception of the world – emotion has been seen to contribute to identity, power and 
status formation in political rhetoric and will be discussed in greater detail next. 
Accordingly, this thesis understands emotion in rhetoric to be discursively created 
“strategic formations” that produce socially shared understandings and categories of the 
world, thus disseminating messages of identity, power and status through discourse. 
 
 
Social Constructivism and Emotion Studies in International Relations 
 
Emotion studies within IR distinguish discourse as a social construct of a 
perceived reality, carrying structures of meaning for understanding social relationships, 
such as whether a State is dominant or marginal (Milliken, 1999). From a constructivist 
perspective, emotion in IR involves value judgments, which allow people to participate in 
politics, via access to socially created and accepted meaning structures, and from here 
the ontological links between emotion and identity, power and status have been 
predominately discussed (Koschut, 2017b). There is a wide application within the IR 
literature of the social constructivist conceptualisation of emotion on at least one aspect 
of this nexus between socially constructed understandings and their affective dynamics. 
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With regards to socially constructing an identity through the use of emotion, 
Hutchison (2010) argues how, events that destroy a community may later create social 
cohesion again. Representing a traumatic event discursively invites the audience to 
access shared memories and experiences, thus creating a space for people to 
reconnect and to re-define their identity. Likewise, Bially Mattern (2005:32) highlights 
how social identity includes emotional bonds, arguing that through language social 
“suffering” (such as the loss of social status) can be inflicted upon an agent, where this 
agent may become a “victim”, maintaining this social identity via a non-physical power 
mechanism. Bially Mattern (2005) argues that this discursive identity construction 
suggests an affective dimension for emotion through language. 
Risse and Ropp (2013) examine verbally shaming pariah States, thus look into 
how power-relationships are created (through categories of “Us” and “Them” or in-
groups and out-groups) to reaffirm particular State identities (i.e. developed-developing, 
Western-Eastern, civilised-barbaric or even decadent-barbaric and sustainable 
development-ecological civilisation). Elias (1985) similarly considered how established 
powers create a positive self-image in their discourses by using emotion to reflect a 
“charisma” that defines them against a non-established power, or those powers on the 
“global periphery” (first world-third world, developed-developing). Members of a 
“superior” group with established attributes “tend to view their identity as morally ‘better’ 
whereas outsiders or marginalized groups are classified as inferior because they are 
missing similar group attributes and standards [sic]” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Koschut, 
2017b:13; and Tajfel, 1978).  
The creation of a status-based sense of identity within a group has been linked to 
the emotions of pride and confidence in self-esteem. Leep (2010:335) refers to these 
emotions as the “proud Self” versus the “disgusting Other”, where feelings of inferiority, 
failure and contempt are discursively created against outsiders. A prominent example is 
the social construction of an Arian identity in Nazi Germany (Koschut, 2017b). Nazi 
discourse both institutionalised and ritualised the emotions of confidence and pride in the 
German Herrenvolk alongside the emotional projections of disgust and contempt 
towards the Other: the Jewish, the Roma, the Disabled (Kertzer, 1988:122; and Koschut, 
2017b). Belonging to an established group – and sharing their identity – evokes 
emotions of satisfaction, glory and, as Ahmed (2015:6-12) argued, they “invest” feelings 
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of pride within the group, but externally, emotions of disapproval and contempt are 
placed onto the Other(s). Mitzen (2006) and Steele (2008) argue emotion categories of 
pride and shame are rooted within a group’s ontological security and in-turn ontological 
security is linked with an actor’s self-identity and status (Koschut, 2017b).  
Koschut (2017b:19) argues that emotional discourse that looks to threaten 
ontological security creates a conflict with identity, which may arouse a “very strong 
emotional reaction.” The loss or reduction of status may elicit a loss of confidence 
amongst an audience about the group’s future (Barbalet 2001; and Hymans 2006:). 
According to De Rivera (1992) a fear of losing status or the general threat to ontological 
security promotes isolation and the deterioration of trust in the world; ultimately it can 
lead to the denial of an alternative perception of the world, the denial of rights to an out-
group, a disproportionate display of pride and an arrogance through contempt (Elias, 
1985; and Koschut, 2017b).  
Another layer of social constructivism in emotion research within IR is the 
discursive use of group-specific symbols, expressions and narratives in discourse 
(Kaufman, 2001; and Koschut, 2017b). Discussed in the literature review was the 
importance of the Taoist expression of harmony between man and nature and the 
specific Chinese identity this has come to symbolise within the Chinese constructions 
and definition of ecological civilisation. The phrase incites a superiority (cultural 
chauvinism) of Chinese wisdom and culture in environmental awareness and protection, 
thus carrying categories of positive emotion towards the ‘in-group’ of the PRC. The 
limitations, or complexities, that arise through Taoism and the cultural chauvinism it 
carries will be expanded upon at the end of this chapter. Koschut (2017b:16-17) argues 
the use of symbols, expressions and narratives in discourse can also be used to 
highlight the “injustice of the status quo and, via collective acknowledgement, enable 
marginalized groups to transform passive emotions like shame and humiliation into 
anger and resentment to sustain active resistance against the established group [sic]” 
(see also, Barbalet, 2001; Fierke, 2013; and Summers-Effler, 2002).  
Thus, emotion, as a socially constructed concept, is a prevailing tool for the 
construction of identity, power and status in discourse. Emotion has been seen to create: 
active engagement through shared experiences and categories of being; social bonds 
reinforcing social categories; status differentiation and the notion of an “Us’ versus 
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“Them”; charisma and the expression of superiority; and, ontological security for who 
and how an audience perceive themselves to be. Emotion in discourse can be 
understood as a categorising system, simplifying the complexity of world and providing 
an identity through which to engage with politics (Koschut, 2017b).  
Further work by Bially Mattern (2005), Diez (2001), Epstein (2008), Hansen 
(2006), Weldes and Saco (1996) and Zehfuss (2002) have also produced convincing 
accounts of a discursive nature in the identity-power-status nexus within IR. However, 
Koschut (2017b) argues how this emotion research tacitly implies emotion, rather than 
empirically demonstrating it. Despite this critique, the ontological developments on the 
links between emotion and the creation of identity, power and status found within this IR 
literature will be fundamental in contextualising and interpreting the empirical data soon 
to be analysed within this thesis. Koschut (2017b) asks for further studies making use of 
this empirical potential in the study of emotion in IR.	  This thesis builds this bridge by 
constructing an original and intuitive EDA to analyse empirical data in the form of the 
CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric. Social constructivism highlights the importance of 
emotion in discourse in IR, thus this thesis will add an analytical facet in creating a 
thematic EDA for empirically analysing this relationship within the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric.  
 
 
Social Constructivism and Emotion Discourse Analysis 
 
Emotion in discourse has been defined as a lens through which the world is 
perceived as meaningful and comprehensive, creating a platform for engagement within 
politics; as well as a tool for identity, power and status construction (Hutchison and 
Bleiker, 2017). For Foucault (1991), discourse specifically determines limitations to what 
can be thought, written and spoken and emotions frame what can be thought, written 
and spoken about in socially understood ways. Discourse captures our practises of 
knowing and perceiving; emotion is one of the ways in which this is expressed, 
categorised and understood. Each society may control their production, selection, 
organisation and dissemination of discourse; political groups (including States) are able 
to control discourse for their own political means (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). 
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Discourse can help individuals comprehend what is valid, questionable or false (Bleiker, 
2003). There are clear and compelling links between the concept of rhetoric and the use 
of emotions in rhetoric with affect as forces that are able to frame actions and thoughts 
for a political purpose (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; and Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017).  
Understanding political discourse thus requires an analysis of the emotion in 
order to identify, contextualise and interpret how emotion in rhetoric may carry potential 
intentions for governance. By doing so the underlying and potentially concealed affective 
politics can be identified and an understanding developed of the ways in which emotion 
in discourse is affecting political thinking and policy (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). This 
relationship between emotional language and the exercise of power, identity and status 
creation means the CPC’s rhetoric can be considered critical and therefore a strand of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is needed that specifically focuses on emotion in text: 
EDA can be understood as the most appropriate method for accessing these socially 
constructed elements of emotion within the CPC’s rhetoric. 
EDA, as a strand of CDA, is equipped as an interdisciplinary approach to 
highlight the use of emotion via words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and 
narratives as implicating power asymmetries, exploitation, manipulation or inequalities, 
and presents the best approach for conducting such an analysis (Fairclough, 2013). 
Fairclough’s (1995) CDA framework combines a social analysis with a linguistic analysis 
in order to uncover the “interpersonal” functions of discourse. That is to say Fairclough’s 
(1995) CDA analyses the knowledge construction, beliefs and ideologies, identities, 
cultural values and social relationships embedded within a text. EDA loosely follows 
Fairclough’s (1995) CDA framework, but focuses on the emotional structures within a 
text. 
By far the most detailed account of an EDA designed for the analysis of 
discourse within IR is that developed by Koschut, et al. (2017). Having briefly introduced 
their EDA in the Introduction chapter, the next three sections will now outline Koschut, et 
al.’s (2017) theoretical considerations, with regards to the theory, expression and effects 
of emotion, in the construction of their three-tiered EDA framework. How their framework 
is adapted to conduct the thematic analysis used in this thesis will be discussed in the 
following section on Research Design. 
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Theory: What is Emotion? 
 
Koschut (2017a and 2017b) has repeatedly argued that the theoretical 
conception and empirical evidence of emotion research in IR remains lacking. Therefore 
it is unsurprising that the first stage in Koschut, et al.’s (2017) theoretical 
conceptualisation of their EDA tackles the theory of emotion in IR. Koschut, et al. (2017) 
first ask “What is an emotion?” and argue the answers are usually riddled with 
ontological assumptions; stating again how in IR emotion is often referred to without 
acknowledging or exploring what is meant by emotion, leading to theoretical and 
ontological confusion. When a definition is provided emotion is often defined as a 
conscious manifestation of a physical feeling (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). Yet, this 
micro-level focus of physiological responses applies overwhelmingly to emotion as an 
individual’s phenomenological experience (rather than describing emotion as a group 
experience, or category, as understood from a social constructivist perspective).  
In Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA, they discuss Matsumoto’s (2009:179) definition: 
emotion is “a transient, neurophysiological response to a stimulus that excites a 
coordinated system of bodily and mental responses that inform us about our relationship 
to the stimulus and prepare us to deal with it in some way.” Apart from the obvious 
individual focus, defining emotion in this way implies a somatic experience involving 
cognition, which informs the individual about their surrounding environment and 
situation. That emotions prepare an individual to react implies an action tendency, which 
Koschut, et al. (2017) argue distinguishes emotion from other forms of cognition. Yet, as 
with other forms of cognition, emotions are intrinsically embedded within an individual’s 
and group’s social environment and the social, cultural and political context thus 
rendering this definition constrained within it’s own biological boundaries (Crawford, 
2014). 
Nonetheless, following Matsumoto’s (2009) definition many scholars have drawn 
a distinction between emotions and affect. Massumi (2002) argues that affective 
dynamics connect and transcend individuals, where emotion(s) frame our thoughts and 
actions in ways that go beyond our cognitive ability to assess them. These arguments 
are linked to Damasio’s (2008) Somatic Marker Hypothesis. Damasio (2008) defines 
emotion more broadly as changes in the body and brain in response to stimuli. Damasio 
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(2008) argues, over time, physiological reactions and the corresponding emotions 
become associated with particular situations and past outcomes, which he refers to as 
“somatic markers”; this process bypasses conscious cognitive processing the more 
embedded the somatic marker becomes.  
Damasio (2008) further argues that somatic markers, and the corresponding 
emotional response, can consciously and unconsciously influence decision-making 
behaviour through past experiences and learned reactions, as well as increase the 
normality or expectations of such decisions with the audience on which the decision 
impacts. Such an argument relies on the notion that emotions are not always an 
individual experience. Social emotions relate less to a specific individual and their 
individual experiences and rather to a shared identity within a group (Smith and Mackie, 
2008). In this way, emotions are socio-cultural phenomena that transcend individuals 
and groups to foster support for specific understandings and categories of values and 
ideals, whilst concealing and degrading others (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2017). Emotions 
thus not only permeate politics, but impact how the politics is received (Hutchison and 
Bleiker, 2017). Consequently, a group (including a State or political Party) may intend 
certain words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives to arouse commonly 
shared emotions – that have been constructed with a commonly understood identity, 
power and status – and provide a shared understanding and categorisation of a 
stimulus.  
Koschut, et al. (2017), take their theoretical conceptualisation of emotion further 
in considering how Damasio’s “somatic markers” may become embedded within 
discourse. For example, the slogans and concepts within the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric (such as the “Beautiful China” trope or “green”) could be considered 
as somatic markers: the CPC repeat their slogans so fervently, embedded within the 
same phrasing, same reasoning and outcomes, that their audience(s) are in a position to 
potentially become primed to the broader understanding intended (Lu, 1999).  
Matsumoto’s (2009) restrained physiological approach presents IR researchers 
with a greater number of “ontological illusions” whereby certainty is required with regards 
to an action tendency within the individuals and the emotions they are experiencing to 
ascertain the causal relationship between the affect and effect of emotion in discourse. 
Whereas, with social constructivism, discourse is instead approached systematically, 
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where themes and patterns are sought in the emotional features of a text (i.e. words, 
phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives). Empirical examples of the 
themes and patterns can be collected to ascertain links between potential effects from 
the affect of emotion in the discourse, regardless of action or inaction. The specific 
emotions felt by an individual (e.g. happiness, sadness, glory or shame) are not 
necessary to identify the presence of emotion within the discourse, nor to empirically 
highlight theoretical effect from emotion, thereby reducing the number of ontological 
assumptions placed on the research by the researcher.  
Social constructivism can therefore help to resolve the issue of subjective 
ontology. Needless to say, a positive emotion, such as pride in a political result, may be 
experienced by an individual who supports such a result, whilst simultaneously causing 
a negative emotion in an individual who is not a supporter; the use of a word, phrase, 
metaphor, analogy, saying or narrative to convey pride in the political result is still 
present within the discourse, regardless of emotion(s) individually experienced by the 
audience.  
What is important for this thesis is the understanding that emotion(s) in rhetoric 
represents an understanding or categorisation of politics regardless of the intricate 
cognitive and physiological reactions of an individual that may follow. The social 
constructivist perspective of emotion therefore argues that emotion in discourse exists 
as certain words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives, which are 
purposefully constructed and written into the discourse, to achieve certain 
understandings and categorisations. Whether a physiological reaction accompanies the 
CPC’s rhetoric is beyond the remit of this thesis in analysing how the CPC uses emotion 
within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. The focus therefore remains on understanding 
what words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives are written into the 
rhetoric and what socially constructed – and presumably shared – categories of meaning 





Expression: How is Emotion Communicated? 
 
Koschut, et al.’s (2017) second element of theoretical conceptualisation 
considers the expression of emotion, which deliberates how emotions are 
communicated. As this thesis is focused on rhetoric in the form of speech acts, the 
following section will concentrate on Koschut, et al.’s (2017) discussion of expression in 
transcribed speech acts only.  
Koschut, et al. (2017) argue that an EDA requires a framework that operates on 
at least two dimensions of textual features to fully comprehend how emotion is 
communicated or expressed. Their first dimension refers to the development of what 
they call interpretative approaches (but can be understood as the identification of 
emotion and will be discussed as such throughout this thesis). Koschut, et al. (2017) 
contend that identification should first be centered on the microstructures of a text. By 
microstructures Koschut, et al. (2017) refer to the linguistic features of: words, phrases, 
metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives (see also; Milliken, 1991). Their second 
dimension is contextualising, where contextualising aims to uncover the reoccurring 
themes (or patterns) at the macro-level of a text: where the micro-level features are 
found to repeat within and across numerous texts. Koschut, et al.’s (2017) reasoning 
behind having an identifying (micro) and contextualising (macro) approach to emotion in 
discourse is to find what emotional meanings are linked to, or expressed through, which 
textual structure(s) (Koschut, et al., 2017).  
The micro-macro identification and contextualisation provides a systemic 
approach for the analysis of emotion in rhetoric, removing ontological assumptions over 
which features of emotion should be analysed. Rather than ascribing importance to only 
the “eye-catching” micro-features, the macro-level contextualisation realigns the focus of 
analysis on the most frequently reoccurring micro-features of emotion within the rhetoric 
(Clément and Sangar, 2018). This thesis will not ignore “eye-catching” features per se, 
however, the reoccurring themes and patterns of emotion will provide the basis of the 
interpretations of the emotion used within the CPC’s rhetoric. If applicable, “eye-
catching” features will be used to support analytical claims.  
Koschut, et al. (2017) further discuss that how emotions are perceived, and how 
discourse is intended to be perceived, has a major impact on the expression of emotion 
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in discourse. Despite the work of Jervis (2017) on perception and misperception, and the 
potential for both constructivism (and post-structuralism) to develop ideas on perception 
within IR, there is (as of yet) no solid foundation for how emotion is perceived within IR. 
Koschut, et al. (2017) thus look to the work of Gibson (1986), an environmental 
psychologist, to further extrapolate on how emotion may be perceived. Gibson’s (1986) 
work considers how a person’s experience within the natural environmental impacts how 
they perceive the environment. Gibson (1986) labels a person’s unique experience 
within the environment as an “affordance”. For example, the ocean provides a different 
affordance to fish than to humans, whereas the ocean provides a place for fish to swim 
and breathe, for humans it affords the experience of swimming. Gibson (1986:127) 
writes that affordances are what the environment “provides or furnishes, either for good 
or ill”, furthering that although it can be hard to determine which affordances are good 
and which are ill that “if their meanings are pinned down to biological and behavioral 
facts the danger of confusion can be minimized [sic]” (Gibson, 1986:137).  
Although Gibson’s (1986) work is more closely related to the physiological 
understanding of emotion, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) consider affordance from a 
non-physiological perspective and argue that how the environment and affordances are 
perceived is culturally mediated. The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric has a role to 
play in how their audience(s) perceive their environment and its’ affordances. During 
personal visits to Beijing, a number of Chinese friends communicated that PM2.5 at an 
AQI of 150 was “okay” or even “good”. This rests on their previous affordances, such as 
Airpocalypse, with an AQI beyond 750. Similarly, the MEP’s (now the Ministry of Ecology 
and Environment (MEE)) AQI labeling system, where 51-100 is “good” and 101-150 is 
only “lightly polluted”, helps frame an AQI reading of 150 as “okay”. This is further 
supported by the CPC’s rhetoric, such as when the MEP claims to be the authority 
(standing on valid legal principles) over the PRC’s environment culturally, socially and 
politically, mediating positive reactions to what physiologically ought to be perceived as 
an ill affordance.  
 This comparative nature of environmental perceptions ought not to be limited to 
physiological nor phenomenological experience of moving through the environment. We 
constantly receive information and images about the environment that extends far 
beyond our immediate experience of the environment around us, impacting our 
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perceptions of the world both near and far. The World Bank (2014) data, presented at 
the very beginning of this thesis, is an example of data received; in comparison to the 
most extreme examples of environmental degradation currently suffered across the 
planet, the immediate environment around us may be perceived as okay.  
This thesis maintains that environmental perceptions are built not only from 
physiological and phenomenological comparisons of our experiences of the 
environmental affordances around us, but also from rhetoric that can culturally guide our 
evaluations of affordances. Duranti (2015) claimed that Gibson’s (1986) affordances are 
culturally disseminated and different symbols (words, metaphors or themes) “afford” us 
different meanings. Emotive features within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric may 
be used to create and control such framings and perceptions of the CPC, PRC and their 
environment.  
The CPC’s phrase “beautiful China” can be analysed in this way (especially as an 
emotion-phrase that exists at the macro-level throughout the CPC’s broader discourse): 
The CPC repeatedly argue ecological civilisation will create a beautiful China; “beautiful” 
is an emotion-word and carries culturally embedded understandings and categories on 
what a “beautiful” China will be. “Beautiful China” is also designed to create a positive 
vision of the future environment of the PRC. However, if we consider the Blue Lagoon, a 
pool formed at Harpur Hill quarry near Buxton in the UK, the local government had to 
take action to dye the water black to discourage the public from swimming there. The 
water had looked aesthetically beautiful; the affordance of bright blue water was very 
inviting for a swim. However, the blue colour was due to the pool having a pH of 11.3 
from caustic chemicals in the quarry stone (bleach has a pH around 12.3). Despite 
warning signs cautioning that entering the water would likely lead to skin and stomach 
complains many people still entered the water (BBC, 2013). There is no distinction with 
“beautiful China” whether a beautiful environment will afford a safe and ecologically 
sound environment: beautiful in whose affordance, beautiful in whose perception?  
For the purpose of this thesis the most important aspects of Koschut, et al.’s 
(2017) theoretical conceptualisation of expression is the understanding that emotions 
can be expressed in texts, highlighting the most commonly occurring instances of 
emotion, so as to avoid ontological assumptions in identifying only the “eye-catching” 
examples of emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric.  
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Effects: What Does Emotion Do? 
	  
So far, the theory and expression elements of Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA has 
looked to theoretically conceptualise emotion and its existence in political rhetoric. 
Effects, their third element, is designed to interpret the socially shared understandings, 
categories and the culturally embedded affordance(s) found within discursive emotion in 
empirical data (Hall, 2017). This element is not intended to imply a causal relationship, 
but instead it considers what the implications of analysing emotions in discourse may 
reveal and/or what significance the emotion may carry beyond its existence (Koschut, 
2017). The effects of emotional expressions within discourse can arguably represent the 
connections between the discursively constructed identity or status and the intentions 
behind the power exerted through discourse (Foucault, 1985; and Laclau, 2004). 
However, at this stage this is merely a theoretical assumption and requires empirical 
data to support Koschut et al.’s (2017) claims.  
Koschut, et al.’s (2017) element of effects is heavily based on actions despite 
their assertion that their EDA does not make causal claims. This brings us back to the 
physiological understanding of emotion and the ontological assumptions based in not 
knowing individuals’ feelings. Koschut, et al. (2017) describe their notion of action 
tendency as based within the work of Giddens (1979). Giddens (1979) defined an action 
as “a stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the on 
going process of events-in-the-world”. A criticism of Giddens’ (1979) work is how he 
places undue emphasis on the intentionality of actions. However, Giddens (1979) does 
also refer to a contemplation of action, which does not necessarily assume an action will 
be made; Geall and Ely (2018) make similar assertions regarding the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation discourse; action may not be intended. 
However, the crux of the problem is actually in the assumption that an action, be 
it contemplated or acted upon, will be a result of emotion within discourse. In trying to 
capture the perceptions and actions of an audience - and trying to distinctly separate 
them as direct causal effects from certain elements of emotion within discourse - echoes 
the issue of making ontological assumptions about the unknown experience of an 
individual. Therefore to avoid this ontological assumption this thesis sees intention of 
action by an individual, as a response to emotion within rhetoric, as an unnecessary 
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consideration. Interpreting the emotion identified and contextualised in the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric to provide alternative understandings of the CPC’s latest 
concept in environmental governance does not require a discussion of any individual 
phenomenological experiences of emotion. Any physical response is redundant to the 
research question under examination within this thesis.  
 
 
Summary of Koschut et al.’s (2017) Three-Tiered EDA 
 
Koschut et al.’s (2017) three tiers of theory, expression and effect have been 
used to theoretically inform the EDA designed within this thesis. This thesis also allows 
for a three-tiered approach to an EDA, however the tiers are instead: 1) the identification 
of micro-level features of emotion (understood as words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, 
sayings and narratives); 2) the contextualisation of macro-level features of emotion, 
which is understood as the themes and patterns across texts of the micro-level features; 
and, 3) the interpretation of emotion found at both the micro and macro level of the texts, 
via a social constructivist lens on emotion.  
Having considered the theoretical conceptions behind Koschut, et al.’s (2017) 
EDA, the next section considers Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex and 
discusses the theoretical conceptualisation behind the three themes of CGT that inform 
the thematic approach to be utilised. 
 
 
Galtung’s CMT-Complex: The Themes of Chosenness, Glory and 
Trauma 
 
 A thematic analysis is “a method for systematically identifying, organizing, and 
offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a data set [sic]” (Braun and 
Clarke, 2012:57). The themes informing the thematic analysis in this thesis draw upon 
Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) Chosenness-Myth-Trauma (CMT) Complex. This section 
will consider the theoretical underpinnings of Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex 
to help define the three themes of Chosenness, Glory and Trauma (CGT) embedded 
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within Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) theory and explain why and how utilising the themes 
of CGT compliments and improves the three-tiered EDA for the analysis within this 
thesis.  
 Whereas Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA was specifically designed to analyse 
emotion in political rhetoric, Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex arose from his 
work debunking political narrative to demonstrate how the foreign policy decision-making 
(FPDM) process can be irrational (where irrationality assumes that decisions guided by 
emotion are irrational, regardless of how rational the response may be to the emotion 
expressed and experienced). The discussion above highlighted the greatest flaw in EDA 
research is researcher bias through making emotion explicit. Therefore, Galtung’s 
(1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex will be adapted to provide a thematic approach to 
identifying emotion.  
Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex was borne out of an application of 
psychoanalytical theory of the personal level at the State level: the theory is designed to 
take psychoanalytical theory considering how individuals understand categories and are 
influenced emotionally in their decision-making, especially with regards to group identity, 
status and power, and applies this work at the level of the State. For instance, Galtung 
(1996a) argues that where narcissism, paranoia or machismos are recognised at an 
individual level these are categorised as patriotism at the level of the State. Galtung 
(1996a:3) reasoned that States, as well as people, have “histories of trauma, glory, and 
plain routine, deposited in the memory, available to the conscious level or sedimented in 
the subconscious.” Galtung (1996a and 2001) argues how memories impact decision-
making by individuals and also decision-making at the State level through a shared 
collective State memory. Galtung (1996b) posits that these mechanisms impact 
decision-making through the construction, dissemination and consumption of emotive 
narratives constructed from socially shared myths and memories.  
Galtung (1996a and 2001) argues that political narratives, when designed to 
incite change, contain the emotions of chosenness, glory and trauma. Ecological 
civilisation, as a continuation of the CPC’s development narrative, may also be designed 
to incite change. Therefore, Galtung’s three themes of CGT, provides a suitable thematic 
approach in conducting the EDA to ascertain if, and if so how, the CPC uses emotion in 
their ecological civilisation rhetoric.  
94 
 Galtung (1996a and 2001) describes chosenness as something in a State’s 
history or religion (transpersonal forces) that makes the State feel especially selected. 
Myths refer to stories of a past or future grandeur, with an apprehension of glory to be 
imminently (re)-realised. Trauma refers to horrors experienced in the past that continue 
to cast shadows onto the present and future. Galtung (1996a and 2001) furthers that the 
CMT-Complex can only impact decision-making when there is synergy between the 
three elements and that the CMT-Complex impacts decision-making by becoming an 
ideology accepted and reinforced by the collective group’s subconscious, in turn 
informing that group’s identity. According to Galtung (1996b) CMT becomes a framework 
of accepted emotions and volitions held within the State. This notion of a shared 
collective memory stems from the idea that all parties are familiar with the chosen myths 
of grandeur and are savvy to the chosen traumas experienced by themselves and their 
ancestors (Galtung, 1996b).  
Within the IR literature, Volkan’s (1997) work, on “chosen trauma” and “chosen 
glory” as forces behind group violence, argues they bond a group together through a 
shared understanding and a shared cause, thus supporting Galtung’s (1996a) claims. 
Van der Dennen’s (2000:39) work, on in-group and out-group differentiation, analyses 
Galtung’s CMT-Complex labeling it a “collective megalomania-paranoia syndrome.” Van 
der Dennen (2000:39) elaborates on Galtung’s (1996a and 1996b) definitions of his 
CMT-Complex, describing: chosenness as when a group feels chosen by 
“transcendental forces (the gods), above all others, endowed, even anointed, to be a 
light unto others, with the right and even duty to govern them”; myths specifically refers 
to a glorious past, which is to be recreated and thus suspends the present between 
glorious visions of the past and future; and traumas represent “the idea of people being 
hit and hurt by others, possibly out of their envy, by enemies lurking anywhere, intent on 
hitting again” (Van der Dennen, 2000:36).  
Both Van der Dennen (2000) and Volkan (1997) express the importance of group 
narratives as being constructed through chosen myths and memories, of glory and 
trauma, which are socio-culturally constructed and socially shared. Van der Dennen 
(2000) stresses the importance of a self-fulfilling cycle of each element: the group 
continues to be chosen, a glorious future is unremittingly expected from a glorious past, 
and traumas are continually expected to be committed against the group. This cyclical 
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element again supports Galtung’s (1996a, 1996b and 2001) claims. Van der Dennen 
(2000) further supports Galtung’s (1996a) argument claiming that groups incorporate a 
mental representation of their chosenness, glories and traumas into their shared identity. 
Van der Dennen (2000:40) calls this the “intergenerational transmission of historical 
enmity” and stresses how the historical truth of a chosen trauma or glory does not matter 
once it has been transmitted as a shared identity (see also Volkan, 1997).  
Van der Dennen (2000) also argues that when a group meets all three aspects of 
the CMT-Complex they regard their group as superior over other groups. Galtung (2001) 
and Wang (2012 and 2014) have considered this assumed superiority within the CMT-
Complex as linked to the emotions of pride and confidence creating a positive self-
image, as was discussed above by Elias (1985); thus demonstrating compatibility 
between the theoretical understandings of emotion in Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA and 
Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex.  
Applying his theory to the U.S., Galtung (1996a) suggests that the CMT-Complex 
is able to govern the collective conscious of the State. That is to say, a reinforcement of 
a myth will induce happiness, similarly so will the weakening of a trauma. In contrast, 
negative feelings are present if a myth is weakened and instead a trauma is reinforced. 
Galtung (1996a) goes on to add that these negative feelings can stir a sense of 
responsibility in upholding the “rights” and “duties” of the chosen. However, Galtung 
(1996a:10) is ardent that the CMT-Complex “does not engender violence” citing 
examples from history, such as Ghandi or the Quakers, whom he believes met all three 
elements of the CMT-Complex. Galtung (1996a and 2001) argues in these cases the 
CMT-Complex incited great things although still there were incidents of megalomania 
and paranoia.  
This thesis does not claim that ecological civilisation is a narrative constructed as 
a CMT-Complex, but intends to use the themes of CGT to systematically guide the 
analysis of emotion demonstrated to be embedded within political discourse inciting 
change (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; and Wang, 2014). However, of significant importance 
is the understanding that the emotions of CGT are constructed through chosen myths 
and memories; the use of any historical metaphors, analogies or narratives by the CPC 
within their ecological civilisation rhetoric are specifically chosen to convey an 
emotionally shared and socially constructed message (similar arguments are made in 
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the work of Wang, 2007). At times this may come across within the analysis as a 
monolithic or unchanging notion of Chineseness; this may be the CPC’s intended 
purpose to construct and disseminate – what can be understood as – an essentialist 
discourse, or – what could be alternatively considered as – a message of a strong and 
united PRC (which brings us back to the concept of Wenming guojia). By utilising the 
methodological approach of social constructivism the importance of how the CPC use 
chosen emotional myths and memories to construct their ecological civilisation concept 
can be acknowledged. 
However, the primary reason for adapting Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-
Complex is to find suitable themes to conduct the EDA as a thematic analysis. The 
thematic element of this analysis has been utilised as a means of avoiding further 
ontological bias in making meaning implicit in the emotion injected throughout the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric. The themes of CGT will be used to thematically organise 
the data collated, as they represent categories of emotion already identified and 
analysed as common within political discourse (Galtung, 2001). The number of instances 
of emotion throughout the CPC’s ecological civilisation is currently unknown. However, 
this thematic EDA allows for an unbiased and systematic organisation of the data for 
interpretation and analysis, thus avoiding researcher bias in relation to which emotional 
elements are analysed. 
Galtung (1996a) ends his distinctive chapter introducing his CMT-Complex by 
urging for scholars to apply the framework to other States and to debunk other national 
narratives. The most notable application of the CMT-Complex to an alternative State, for 
this thesis, is that by Wang (2014) and his use of CMT to analyse the narrative of 
“national humiliation” in CPC politics, which will now be discussed.  
 
 
Wang’s (2014) Use of CMT on the CPC’s Rejuvenation from Humiliation Narrative 
 
The following section looks at Wang’s (2014) application of the CMT-Complex to 
the CPC’s rejuvenation from humiliation narrative, to consider how the three themes of 
CGT may be present within the CPC rhetoric’s and see what can be learned for the 
thematic EDA within this thesis. By briefly highlighting the key elements of China and the 
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PRC’s CMT-Complex, Wang (2014) begins to provide a contextualisation of the 
emotions of CGT used in the humiliation narrative at the centre of his analysis. For 
Wang, the CMT-Complex helps to build shared identity through the emotions of powerful 
large-group markers captured by the categories of glories and traumas. Wang (2014) 
writes how when a group has experienced defeat, losses and severe humiliations that 
these can become part of the group’s identity, binding the members closer together 
(Bially Mattern, 2005; and Hutchison, 2010). Success and triumph can bring a group 
together, playing an important part in creating a group’s identity (Volkan, 1997). Callahan 
(2012:14) similarly argues: “Exploring the discourse of national pride and humiliation… is 
a good way of answering the question “Who is China?,” especially since this 
pessoptimist dynamic continues to frame how Chinese people understand their role in 
the world.”  
Wang (2014) argues that the Century of Humiliation (1839-1949) has heavily 
shaped contemporary Chinese thinking and politics (see also, Callahan, 2012; and 
Gries, 2004). However, as Wang (2014:41) writes: “It is impossible to fully understand 
the Chinese people’s chosen traumas without a thorough understanding of their chosen 
glories.” The CPC’s traumas tie together the pre-revolutionary events of foreign invasion, 
massacres, military occupations, economic extractions and unequal treaties, whilst 
ignoring such events as the famine during the Great Leap Forward and the “ten lost 
years” during the Cultural Revolution (Callahan, 2012). The three elements of CGT 
socially reinforce one another (Callahan, 2012; and Galtung, 1996b). The successes of 
the PRC appear grander when reminded of the humiliations also suffered, specifically at 
the hands of others. As Callahan (2012 and 2013) explores, there is a duality in 
contemporary CPC politics, a pessoptimism, which he argues to be utilised in 
constructing a “structure of feeling” in PRC politics.  
Wang (2014) argues that by understanding the PRC’s CMT-Complex a more 
comprehensive perspective can be achieved of how the CPC perceives the PRC and 
their status within the world. In the words of Callahan (2012:14), the CPC’s national 
humiliation narrative continually informs “China’s [perceived] rightful place on the world 
stage”, which in turn impacts their analysis and deployment of foreign policy. The most 
pertinent point Wang (2014:41) raises is that in considering the CMT-Complex of the 
PRC, it is not “recounting history”, but instead it highlights how the Chinese are 
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remembering and (re)creating their own history, identity and status through chosen 
myths and memories. The CPC’s decision to implement memories of trauma from the 
Century of Humiliation ought not be considered as an emotional, irrational and illogical 
stance, but rather as an emotional, logical and rational choice influencing the PRC’s 
politics via the political, cultural and historical narratives that these emotions are 
embedded within (Callahan, 2012; and Galtung, 1996a). 
Wang’s (2014) analysis of China and the PRC’s CMT-Complex was limited to the 
CPC’s rejuvenation from humiliation narrative. This is but one of the CPC’s political 
narratives, however, it is one where all three elements of Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) 
CMT-Complex are present and has been recognised as a meta-narrative of 
contemporary CPC politics (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014). Wang’s (2014) analysis 
provides an example of how the three emotional themes of CGT have already been 
presented in one of the CPC’s principal development narratives. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, ecological civilisation appears to be a CPC strategy to further the 
PRC’s development and therefore rejuvenation through environmental governance. 
Thus, the CGT themes in the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative highlighted by 
Wang (2014) are expected to be useful in the contextualisation and interpretation of 
emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric.  
 According to Wang (2014) the Chinese category of chosenness is ingrained 
within their language and names for their country. For example, “Middle Kingdom” 
(Zhongguo, 中国), demonstrates the belief that the Chinese lived at the middle of the 
world. “Realm under heaven” (tianxia, 天下), describes the Middle Kingdom as the 
heavenly protected, or guided, realm. According to Chiang Kai-shek, the name Middle 
Kingdom is not merely describing the geographical location of China, but rather it is 
loaded with cultural and political meaning as central to everything and everyone 
(Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 2014). Moreover, it was understood that whoever 
controlled the Middle Kingdom was also the legitimate ruler of tianxia or “heaven” 
(Chiang, cited in Wang, 2014). China has also been known as Zhonghua, where hua 
meant “splendid” or “prosperous”; the ancient Chinese would refer to themselves as hua. 
Whereas outsiders, ethnically and geographically, were referred to as yi “barbarians” 
(Liu, 2006; Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 2014). 
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All of these names create an identity of centrality, importance, decadence and 
deity; the Kingdom appointed by heaven (Wang, 2014). Ancient Chinese culture placed 
the Chinese as those living on a sacred land, at the centre of the world, geographically 
and culturally: proud of their achievements aesthetically, architecturally and 
philosophically (Wang, 2014). However, one of the most interesting elements of the 
PRC’s identity of chosenness is found in their belief that the yi, the “barbarians” or 
outsiders, could embrace Chinese culture and become civilised (Callahan, 2012; and 
Wang, 2014); their culture and wisdom could save anyone who assimilated into it. China 
was universal and superior and would appeal to anyone who wished to be civilised. 
Overall what can be seen is a long-standing tradition in China and the PRC to consider 
the Chinese as a special or chosen group. The Chinese consider themselves to be 
distinctive and have elements of perceived superiority. Even the fossilised remains of the 
“Peking Man” have been used to forge unique beginnings of the “Yellow” or Han race 
being debated as an entirely different species from that of Homo Sapiens (Callahan, 
2013). It is therefore possible that chosenness may be present and an important element 
in the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric where Chinese identity is useful to the CPC 
in the creation or interpretation of their ecological civilisation concept.  
 The pride the Chinese have in their artistic, philosophical and technical 
accomplishments also feature strongly in the chosen myths of glory (Wang, 2014). 
According to Wade (2005) the importance of shared glories, regardless of whether they 
are real, recent or mythologised is that they bind a group together. The PRC is no 
exception when it comes to myths of glory forming their shared identity; from school 
textbooks, to popular arts and films the PRC has countless narratives about their 
“glamorous past and recent achievements” (Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 
2014:43). In particular, Wang (2014) highlights five four-character “idioms” (Chengyu, 成
语) that are frequently used to showcase China’s myths of glory: “a civilized ancient 
nation” (Wenming gu guo, 文明古国); “a nation of ritual and etiquette” (Li yi zhi bang, 礼
仪之邦); “the vast land and bountiful goods” (Di da wu bo, 地大物博);  “the four great 
inventions of ancient China”  (Si da fa ming, 四大发明) and “a splendid civilisation” (Can 
lan Wenming, 灿烂文明). 
Wang (2014) argues that these idioms are key to the PRC’s identity to the extent 
that they were specifically showcased during the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony in 
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2008. Wang (2014:44) stated that the opening ceremony “portrayed an official narrative 
of China’s myths and glories.” For the Chinese, the ceremony demonstrated how the Silk 
Road, Voyages by Zheng He and Chinese culture had been open-minded and all 
embracing. However, Zheng He’s voyages for example were extremely violent to local 
populations at times and highlight how the CMT-Complex is engaged with “selective 
remembering” and “selective forgetting”, creating a carefully constructed identity 
(Callahan, 2012 and 2013; and Wang, 2014). The PRC as a “peace loving country” is a 
glorified myth often portrayed in political rhetoric, frequently appearing in school 
textbooks and official documents (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014). Wang (2014) 
argues that the CPC predominantly relies on myths of glory that focus on the PRC’s 
superiority as a more culturally advanced and civilised nation.  
 Finally, with regards to traumas, many scholars have identified the importance of 
the humiliation discourse in Chinese identity politics (Wang, 2014). Callahan (2012 and 
2015) argues humiliation to be a key element of modern subjectivity in CPC politics and 
refers to humiliation as the “master narrative” of contemporary Chinese history. Gries 
(2004) argues that the legacy of the Century of Humiliation has left the Chinese sensitive 
to perceived slights against Chinese dignity. The Century of Humiliation refers to the 
period of 1839-1949 and included the following wars: First Opium War (1839-1842); 
Second Opium War (1856-1860); Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895); Invasion of Allied 
Forces of Eight Countries (1900); Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931); and the anti-
Japanese War (1937-1945). As this list demonstrates China suffered great losses 
through numerous invasions. However, perhaps more importantly is how China had to 
admit that they were now “backwards” compared to the barbaric yi from their repeated 
invasions: their ontological security, their identity and sense of chosenness, their myths 
of glory, were all under threat and being questioned (Wang, 2014:40). 
 A group’s chosen traumas consists of experiences that “symbolise the group’s 
deepest threats and fears through feelings of hopelessness and victimisation” (Volkan, 
1997:48). As with the glories, there are also idioms for traumas suffered: “to lose every 
battle” (Lü zhan lü bai, 屡战屡败); “to cede territory and pay indemnities” (Ge di pie kuan, 
割地赔款), and “to surrender sovereign rights and bring humiliation to the country” (Sang 
quan ru guo, 丧权辱国) (Wang, 2014:48). Despite these idioms heavily reflecting China’s 
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Summary of Galtung’s CMT-Complex 
 
 Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex has been identified as a means of 
thematically guiding an EDA through the themes of CGT. Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) 
CMT-Complex was theoretically designed as an analytical tool for identifying decision-
making and narrative building by groups that wish to pursue change through the use of 
emotion in discourse (see also, Van der Dennen, 2000; and Volkan, 1997). Wang (2014) 
has contextualised the elements of Chosenness, Myth (Glory) and Trauma in the CPC’s 
meta-narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation. Ecological civilisation, as a means of 
furthering development and rejuvenating the PRC, may also therefore utilise emotional 
elements built into the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative. Wang’s (2014) application 
of the CMT-Complex to the context of the PRC demonstrated how the three themes of 
CGT are heavily emotional, feeding into what Callahan (2012) refers to as the PRC’s 
“structure of feeling”, and have been involved in the construction of identity, power and 





Thus far this chapter has introduced the methodological, ontological and 
theoretical conceptualisations within IR on emotion and emotion within rhetoric. Of 
particular importance was Koschut, et al.’s (2017) EDA and Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) 
CMT-Complex. To mitigate researcher bias and arbitrariness in unpacking the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, the thesis is structured as a thematic EDA. The thematic 
EDA consists of three stages of analysis, the identification, contextualisation and 
interpretation of emotion adapted from Koschut, et al.’s (2017) three-tiered EDA. 
Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex has been adapted to identify the three 
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themes of CGT, to direct a thematic approach to the EDA. How the thematic EDA will be 







Micro-level Analysis:  
Looks at how emotion is communicated within a speech, 














Looks at how emotion is communicated across speeches, 
by identifying where textual features of emotion repeat, 
including: 
• Patterns and categories of words, phrases, 
metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives; 








Looks at how social-cultural-historical interpretations of 
the emotion in and through rhetoric may result in: 
• Constructions of identity, power and status; 
• A reflection of governance motives; 
• Recognition of needs; 
• Categorisations of the environment and 
environmental governance. 
Table 2: Thematic Emotion Discourse Analysis Framework 
Stage 1, the identification of emotion, adapts Koschut, et al.’s (2017) 
“Expression” of emotion to identify micro-structures of emotion: words, phrases, 
metaphors, analogies, sayings and narratives. Stage 2 continues to adapt the 
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“Expression” of emotion and looks to contextualise the emotion by finding the macro-
structures of emotion expressed across speeches as patterns, and is guided by the 
themes of CGT. Stage 3 adapts Koschut, et al.’s (2017) “Effects” and looks to interpret 
the emotion, guided by social constructivism. This stage will consider the extent to which 
the CPC are developing identity, power or status through emotion, as well as 
considering the extent to which the CPC have used emotion to: disseminate their 
governance motives; show recognition of the audience’s needs; construct a power 
relationship; or to stimulate a certain categorisation of the CPC, PRC or environment. 
The thematic EDA will analyse how the CPC frames their ecological civilisation rhetoric 
via emotion to disseminate certain perceptions, understandings and expectations of the 
CPC’s environmental governance. 
The dataset analysed within this thesis consists of elite political speeches given 
by the CPC leaders and key ministers on environmental governance, from October 2007 
to May 2018. Chairman Hu Jintao and Chairman Xi Jinping, the Premier Li Keqiang and 
inaugural Minister of the MEP, Zhou Shengxian, gave most of the speeches included 
within the dataset. The speeches were delivered to both domestic and international 
audiences. A complete list of speeches analysed can be found in Appendix 1.  
Koschut, et al. (2017) argued that verbal instances of emotion provide an 
empirically accessible platform for emotion research in IR. Thus the selection of elite 
political speeches by the CPC on environmental governance provides an empirical data 
set to conduct a thematic EDA. In collecting the speeches that form the dataset, five 
standards of qualitative sampling were applied (Miles and Huberman, 1994):  
 
1. The texts (speeches) had to be archived on one of the CPC’s government 
websites.  
2. The texts have been translated by the CPC. 
3. The texts had to specifically be a speech: not a written report, newspaper article, 
press conference or interview (as the EDA has been built on previous research 
working with speech acts only and has therefore not theoretically considered the 
extent to which the discursive tools of emotion in discourse may differ in other 
forms of “text”). 
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4. The speech had to contain at least two of the following search terms linked to the 
CPC’s environmental governance: “eco”, “ecological”, “civilisation”, “civilization”, 
“ecological civilisation”, “ecological civilization”, “green”, “environment”, “ecology”, 
“environmental”, “environmental protection”, “sustainable”, “sustainable 
development”, “conservation culture” and “scientific development”.  
5. The speeches had to have been given between the initial introduction of 
ecological civilisation by Hu Jintao in his 17th National Congress Report in 
October 2007 and May 2018, as the data collection took place in the week 
commencing the 4th of June 2018.  
 
In total 67 speeches have been analysed. Many more texts were initially downloaded, 
but on closer inspection they did not meet the five standards for qualitative sampling 
outlined above. These texts were therefore not included in the final dataset. 
Excerpts from the CPC leaders’ speeches are frequently embedded within the 
narrative of the thesis’ analysis chapters. This has been important to the researcher 
throughout the three stages of analysis outlined above, in order to identify, contextualise 
and interpret the use of emotion by the CPC within their rhetoric. It is equally important 
to allow the reader to also become immersed so that they are able to form their own 
understandings on the CPC’s use of emotion. Therefore, the chapters that follow include 
the frequent presentation of data, in form of quotations from the CPC leaders’ speeches. 
For this reason, this thesis has been granted a word count increase to 90,000 words, to 




Limitations and Future Research 
 
The thematic EDA is designed to look for consistencies in the patterns and 
themes – that is the overall message delivered by the CPC – that emerge in the use of 
emotion throughout the CPC’s rhetoric. Highlighting differences and inconsistencies in 
the use of emotion by individual members of the CPC, although interesting in 
understanding the broader use of the concept between individuals, would not answer the 
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research question under examination. This thesis aims to unpack consistencies in the 
CPC’s messages, through the use of emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, 
to disseminate their political intentions and endeavours captured within the capacity of 
environmental governance. An obvious space for future research is to conduct the 
thematic EDA to explore divergences and alternative themes and patterns that emerge 
within CPC ecological civilisation discourse. 
Emotion research is riddled with limitations that cannot go ignored. Although 
emotion research in IR has begun to address the methodological concerns more 
systematically, overall there is still a lack of consolidated discussion on the ontological, 
epistemological and theoretical debates (Clément and Sangar, 2017). Clément and 
Sangar (2017:4) argue the lack of clarity is due to emotions having been denied “the 
status of a legitimate research object in IR.” However, this is mostly due to the inherent 
risk carried within emotion as an analytical concept; definitions of emotion are contested 
and remain “fuzzy at times” (Clément and Sangar, 2017:5). Generally agreed is how 
emotions are socially, culturally and historically contingent, however, the selection or 
design of research method still largely remains a choice of “personal preference” rather 
than it being based on specifically agreed conceptualisations of emotion within the 
discipline of IR (Hutchison and Blieker, 2014). Theoretical work on the concept of 
emotion is also needed. 
This has led to the original design of a thematic EDA within this thesis. Although 
this has clear advantages in being designed specifically to answer the research question 
under investigation, it can at times be subject to the following limitations: 1) the risk of 
systematically generating knowledge on emotions rather than producing an authentic 
account; 2) relying on borrowing and repurposing the method of EDA, which originally 
originated outside the discipline of IR; 3) not being able to capture all uses of emotion 
within a political discourse, therefore potentially losing depth of analyses on emotional 
phenomena that exist over a defined period, and across social and cultural space; 4) 
imposing Anglo-European perspectives on the Chinese conceptualisation, production 
and communication of emotions; and, 5) homogenising understandings, categorisations 
and interpretations of emotions throughout the CPC and PRC (Clément and Sangar, 
2017). The discussion above has tried to outline as clearly as possible the 
methodological, ontological and theoretical conceptualisations guiding this thesis to 
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acknowledge and alleviate where possible these limitations. With regards to further 
research, there is huge scope to apply the thematic EDA designed within this thesis to a 
variety of other political discourses, as well as the scope to apply other forms of 
emotionally informed methods, such as an emotion content analysis, on the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric to ascertain what further knowledge can be produced on 
their use of emotion. 
 A further limitation faced by an Anglophone researcher studying CPC rhetoric is 
that this thesis has relied on the CPC’s publication, and archiving, of speeches 
translated into English. However, on the one hand, these English-language texts under 
analysis can be assumed as having been constructed with both domestic and global 
audiences intended. On the other hand, since translations of leaders’ speeches emerge 
through a process of careful selection and meticulous labour, the translated speeches 
are likely to be among the most politically important. The CPC’s English language 
rhetoric can therefore still be expected to convey important messages, which a thematic 
EDA will help unpack. However, again, this leaves further research opportunities 
whereby the use of the thematic EDA on the CPC’s Chinese language rhetoric could be 
conducted, with any differences that arise compared and discussed. 
The contested case of the translation of Tianren heyi (天人合一) demonstrates 
some of the considerations that should be borne in mind when using CPC translations. 
The individual characters translate as “heaven”, “man”, “combined”, “as one”. The 
phrase has two generally understood meanings, the first being “heaven and man are the 
same” or “heaven-human-oneness”, which is attributed as being an older understanding 
of the phrase (Wang, 2007). The second, and a more recent understanding, is the idea 
of “man is an integral part of nature” and it is this second meaning the CPC choose to 
carry forward into their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Heurtebise (2017:9) discusses how 
Tian (天) can be translated and understood in English as either “heaven”, “nature”, “sky” 
or “destiny”, arguing that attributing an environmentalist meaning may actually be an 
over-interpretation of ancient philosophical texts.  
Zhang and Barr (2013:6), highlight how in the popular translation of “unity of man 
and nature” that there is a contemporary shift away from a focus on “heaven” to a focus 
on “nature”. Yet, and quite importantly, the CPC’s choice of translation found in their 
ecological civilisation rhetoric differs from that of both Heurtebise (2017) and Zhang and 
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Barr (2013); the CPC specifically use the phrase “harmony between man and nature”. 
The CPC’s reinterpretation, or choice, of “harmony” over “unity” is explicitly relevant to 
interactions between nature and humanity: harmony is not unity, perhaps suggesting 
coexistence rather than “oneness” between humanity and nature (see Callahan, 2013; 
and Nordin, 2016 for further discussions on the CPC’s use of “harmony”).  
Although the same general message can be understood between each of the 
three translations into English, the slight word play of CPC’s “harmony between man and 
nature” also allows ecological civilisation to flow on from Hu’s leadership slogans on 
harmony, harmonious development and harmonious society, thus demonstrating an 
intended level of continuity between the CPC’s slogan developments and theoretical 
approaches from Hu to Xi. Furthermore, as ecological civilisation can be understood as 
one of the CPC’s recent moves towards slogans purposefully developed for both a 
Chinese and non-Chinese audience, the concept of an ecological civilisation is not 
merely intended to exist within the borders of the PRC or therefore solely in Mandarin. 
Thus, slight nuanced changes in their translations, and therefore also the connotations 
understood in the concepts used by the CPC, are increasingly important. The CPC 
wants (or needs) their rhetorical messages to be as clear in English (and other 
languages) as in Mandarin. Hence using CPC translations of speeches is not 
necessarily always a disadvantage. 
Finally, the CPC’s use of Tianren heyi, embeds Taoism as a unique, culturally 
chauvinistic, indicator of Chinese identity. However, there are a number of interesting 
elements to be unpacked that would need to be carried out as further research. Taoism 
can be understood as one of the more complicated Chinese philosophies, especially 
with regards to implementing top-down objectives; the belief in a balance between 
natural contradictions found within Taoism raises questions over how far the CPC will be 
able to manipulate Taoist concepts to serve their characteristically monolithic rhetoric in 
constructing ecological civilisation. The implementation of Taoism, especially via the 
concept of Tianren heyi becomes even more complicated with the CPC’s chosen 
translation of “harmony between man and nature”. Unpacking harmony, within the 
context of ecological civilisation, could draw interesting parallels, or add further to the 
debate, surrounding the CPC’s use of (and the PRC’s interaction with) the concept. For 
instance, the cynicism found with regards to repression in harmonious coexistence, the 
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irony of censorship in harmonious Internet forums and the unscientific harmony of mono-
crop reforestation. Taosim, especially Tianren heyi, although used and stipulated by the 
CPC as a culturally chauvanistic signifier of Chineseness, is indeed much more and 





 This chapter has outlined the methodological stance of this thesis, which is 
founded within the social constructivist understanding of emotion. This methodological 
approach has been used to intuitively design a thematic EDA broadly based on the work 
of Koschut, et al. (2017) and Galtung (1996a and 2001). This framework inherits the 
ideas of Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985) and Laclau (2004 and 2018) on emotion and 
how emotion within discourse can construct understandings and categories of identity, 
power and status. Wang’s (2014) application of the CMT-Complex to the CPC’s 
rejuvenation from humiliation narrative further highlighted the importance of CGT 
emotions within CPC’s rhetoric, as well as the compatibility between Koschut, et al.’s 
(2017) EDA and Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) CMT-Complex. 
Further research into emotion within ecological civilisation has been identified as 
a clear niche, especially research that can empirically analyse the CPC’s claims. The 
unique (re)interpretation of the CPC’s ecological civilisation by conducting the thematic 
EDA outlined above will introduce new and interesting interpretations for the CPC’s 
environmental governance. Despite doubts over the CPC’s current ability to become an 
ecological civilisation there can be no doubt that the political rhetoric and importance of 
creating new environmental regulations across the PRC means the ecological civilisation 
slogan holds great significance within IR. The following chapters will identify, 
contextualise and interpret the empirical findings of emotion within the CPC’s ecological 




Chapter 3: Identifying and Contextualising Emotion in the 
CPC’s Ecological Civilisation Rhetoric 
 
This chapter presents the key findings that have emerged from the data having 
conducted stages 1 and 2 of the thematic EDA; that is the identification and 
contextualisation of the themes and patterns of emotion (understood as emotion words, 
phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings or narratives) within the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. The aim of this chapter is to organise the data in a systematic and 
meaningful way, using the three themes of CGT. The chapter is organised so the 
contextualisation of emotions linked to chosenness are discussed first, then those of 
glory and finally trauma. Within each section the discussion is ordered so that emotion 
from speeches given by Hu Jintao are discussed first, then Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhou 
Shengxian and finally the MEP and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The aim of 
contextualising the data within this chapter is to present to the reader how and where the 





 As outlined in the previous chapter, chosenness emotions within the CPC’s 
rhetoric are understood as the words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and 
narratives, which refer symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) linked to a collective group’s 
sharing of social and historical experiences. Having systematically identified emotions of 
chosenness in the rhetoric, this section contextualises the main patterns in chosenness 
emotions across the dataset. 
 
 
Chosenness Emotions in Hu Jintao’s Rhetoric  
 
The most significant use of chosenness emotions across Hu’s rhetoric is the 
notion of a shared spirit across the PRC and within the CPC. What will be shown 
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throughout these sections is that how the CPC uses chosenness emotions in their 
ecological civilisation rhetoric touches upon the notion of constructing a singular civilised 
State, as well as Ahearne’s (2013) adaptation of Gramsci’s shared conception of the 
world. Both of these concepts are being utilised to construct an idea of having a shared 
identity throughout the PRC and are captured by the word “spirit”. This is predominantly 
constructed through the careful selection of historical analogies (Wang, 2007), similar to 
Galtung’s (1996a and 2001) notions of chosen myths and chosen memories. 
As Hu Jintao (2007) renewed his leadership for a second term he first introduced 
the concept of an ecological civilisation during his report to the 17th National Congress of 
the CPC. Ironically, within the same year the PRC became globally recognised as the 
world’s second-largest greenhouse gas emitter (Albert and Xu, 2016). Whilst introducing 
ecological civilisation, Hu (2007:6), also within his report to the 17th National Congress, 
referred to an “indomitable enterprising spirit”. Hu describes this enterprising and 
indomitable spirit of the Chinese as a product of their Chinese wisdom and culture.  
Similarly, Hu (2011b:7) described a “pioneering spirit” at the 90th Anniversary of 
the founding of the CPC. Interestingly, Hu’s 90th Anniversary speech, which took place in 
2011, coincided with the PRC formally overtaking Japan to become officially recognised 
as the world’s second-largest economy; this offered an ideal backdrop for Hu’s request 
for an increased “indomitable enterprising spirit” (BBC, 2019; and Hu, 2011b:7). Spirit, 
therefore, can be seen as a chosenness emotion-term, symbolising “something 
important” (Kaufman, 2001), that something being Chinese traditions, wisdom and 
culture. How Hu used emotions of chosenness to conceive the notion of a shared spirit 
is aligned with an identity of constant innovation and overcoming trials through hard 
work; Hu uses the emotions embedded within shared references to historical memories 
and myths to highlight the importance of utilising this Chinese spirit to his Chinese 
audience.  
In his report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC, as Hu began to step-down 
as the General Secretary, Hu (2012:6) continued to build upon this sense of identity, 
repeatedly referring to how CPC policy embodies the “superiority and vitality of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics [and] has enhanced the pride and cohesiveness of the 
Chinese people and nation.” Ahmed (2015) discussed how emotion words, like 
superiority, are used to create an in-group’s identity through rhetoric; Hu is cementing 
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his construction of a Chinese in-group, using emotion to direct the group towards 
feelings of pride and superiority, and to encourage cohesion. Leep’s (2010) work on 
constructing a “proud-Self” category is also relevant.  
Hu’s (2007:6) construction of a “proud-Self” identity of superiority was also 
present in his report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC, in referring to the Chinese 
nation as “spectacular”. Thus, notions from Elias’ (1985) work on constructing a 
“Charisma” can be seen: Hu is creating charisma through positive self-imagery. These 
provide examples of what Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985) described as emotions that 
categorise a group and direct their emotions through a discursive exertion of power. 
Similarly, Laclau’s (2004) argument of emotion through form and force, where the form 
of spirit as an ideal of superiority can affect, through force, the feelings, understandings 
or engagement of the in-group in feeling proud towards actions made by the group: in 
this case, towards ecological civilisation.  
Ahmed’s (2015) work on creating an “Us” in political rhetoric as an investment is 
also especially relevant. Hu’s rhetoric calls for cohesive cooperation to support the 
CPC’s environmental governance policies by evoking pride in their ancient philosophical 
thoughts on nature and the relationship between humanity and nature, claiming 
ecological civilisation is a Chinese approach to the Chinese situation. How Hu uses the 
chosenness emotions embedded within the historical analogies, chosen memories and 
chosen myths built into the dictum of Tianren heyi furthers the identity being constructed 
of superior Chinese wisdom and culture.  
Despite the complexities highlighted in Chapter 2 regarding the hidden and 
multifaceted meanings within concepts such as Tianren heyi and harmony, the CPC still 
use the dictum to construct notions of togetherness and unity. Hu’s rhetoric starts a 
process of investing emotion words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and 
narratives to construct a new identity: an identity of Chinese environmental governance, 
and is a constant theme in the CPC’s State-led ecological civilisation rhetoric. This 
identity through spirit is categorising and directing what it means to be environmentally 
friendly as a Chinese citizen, creating pathways for categorising and understanding the 
CPC’s environmental governance as unique, new (albeit developed from the ancient/old) 
and Chinese (Koschut, 2017b).  
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In his 18th National Congress report, Hu (2012:7-8) claimed the CPC needs the 
“whole of society”, to support and pursue ecological civilisation. If the “Chinese nation is 
to become a “beautiful country” then the “whole of society” is needed to rally behind the 
CPC (Hu, 2012:7-8). Not only does “beautiful” entice people by creating strong 
emotional imagery, but it creates an identity, a sense and image of who the Chinese are 
becoming through re-engaging with their wisdom and culture: it is Chinese wisdom and 
culture that, collectively as a spectacular and cohesive group, will lead to successes in 
environmental governance.  
At the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Hu also constructs this 
shared identity through complimenting the Chinese people. For instance, Hu (2011b:21) 
states the “people are the real heroes.” An EDA is unable to verify such considerations, 
however, the irony in whether this speech was intending to point towards the PRC 
officially overtaking Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy would not be 
lost on a number of Chinese citizens or China scholars. Hero mythology is widely 
embedded in all societies and carries distinct notions and understandings of what it 
means to be heroic (Campbell, 2008). Calling the Chinese people heroes overtly 
reminds them of the humiliations and resulting trials and tribulations their nation has 
collectively faced – especially at the hands of the Imperial Japanese – from which the 
PRC has returned triumphant (see similar discussions by Campbell, 2008; Galtung, 
1996a and 2001, van der Denner, 2001; Volkan, 1997; and Wang, 2014). Constructing 
spirit through utilising hero mythology also implicitly indicates that the CPC expect future 
trials and tribulations on their journey towards ecological civilisation, whereby the 
cohesive wisdom and hard work of the Chinese people will again be required in order to 
be triumphant. Hu’s rhetoric suggests that the Chinese people will need to utilise their 
identity, their wisdom and culture, to overcome the trials and tribulations of becoming a 
Beautiful China and an ecological civilisation. 
 
 
Chosenness Emotions in Xi Jinping’s Rhetoric 
 
Xi’s ecological civilisation rhetoric continues to create an identity captured 
through the word spirit; providing further examples of how the emotion research (from 
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Ahmed (2015), Elias (1985), Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985), Koschut (2017b), Laclau 
(2004 and 2018) and Leep (2010)) is applicable and helps to unpack the use of emotion 
within CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric.  
At the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit, Xi talked about the Chinese “spirit 
of partnership” (Xi, 2016b:1), and “the spirit of driving the nail” (Xi, 2016a:2); at the 
United Nations Office in 2017, Xi discussed the Chinese “spirit of humanity” (Xi, 
2017b:4); at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation, Xi suggested that the PRC works with a “spirit of peace and cooperation” 
and a “spirit of mutual respect” (Xi, 2017c:2); and finally at the Closing Meeting of the 
13th National People’s Congress in 2018, Xi stated that “The Chinese people are people 
with great spirit of pursuing dreams” (Xi, 2018b:3-4), “The Chinese people are people 
with great spirit of struggle” (Xi, 2018b:2) and that the Chinese people work with the 
“great spirit of cherishing unity” (Xi, 2018b:3). Xi builds on the identity initiated in Hu’s 
rhetoric which focused on hard work (through form of emotion, Laclau, 2004 and 2018); 
Xi requests that the Chinese draw upon their talent and ability again (as force of 
emotion; Laclau, 2004 and 2018), which is captured through words and phrases, such 
as, “struggle”, “driving the nail” and “pursuing dreams”. The global political background 
regarding environmental governance throughout these speeches given by Xi, began in 
2016 with cooperation between the PRC and the U.S. in jointly agreeing to ratify the 
Paris agreement (BBC, 2016), and by the end of 2017, President Donald Trump had 
announced his intentions to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (Trump, 2017). 
Xi’s use of unity, in speeches both within the PRC and internationally, carry intentions of 
leadership beyond the boarders of the PRC, thus how the CPC uses emotion seems to 
be elevating the identity of the Chinese to one of increasing global leadership within 
environmental governance. 
In combining the prevalence of spirit across both Hu’s and Xi’s speeches, it 
becomes increasingly apparent that spirit represents a collective in-group and their 
sharing of social and historical experiences. That is to say, how Xi also uses chosenness 
emotions within his ecological civilisation rhetoric is also supporting the notion of a 
singular civilised State through the ideals of superior Chinese wisdom and culture 
creating ecological civilisation; it also furthers the notions of chosen memories and 
chosen myths – or chosen historical analogies – helping to construct a singular shared 
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conception of the world being disseminated through the identity embedded throughout 
the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric (see Ahearne, 2013; Cartier, 2013; and Wang 
2007 on discussion over how the CPC use ecological civilisation to construct a shared 
conception of the world, and the importance of historical analogy).  
There is a great array in the uses of spirit within Xi’s rhetoric. For example, the 
term spirit consistently symbolises Chinese identity, through their wisdom and culture, 
and is described by Xi as being respectful, peaceful and cooperative. Xi associates 
Chinese wisdom and culture with a variety of character traits that are flexibly adapted, 
depending on how the CPC wish the Chinese to engage with this identity. Xi’s 
presentation of this identity, and how the Chinese are to engage and perceive the 
environment, has vastly changed from Mao’s “fourth enlightenment”; whereby Chinese 
culture was decimated along with the environment. The CPC are now proactively 
directing the Chinese people to once again embrace their past and to re-engage with 
ancient philosophical thought, such as variations of Tianren heyi (Wang, 2007).  
Xi presents Tianren heyi as the “status quo” of Chinese environmentalism (see 
Kaufman, 2001; and Koschut, 2017b, on discussion of creating identity through a status 
quo). Xi’s variations in his use of the dictum included: “to seek harmony and coexistence 
is in the genes of the Chinese nation”, which Xi stated during the Opening Ceremony of 
the B20 Summit (Xi, 2016a:9); as well as, “Man and nature form a community of life” and 
“harmonious coexistence between man and nature”, which were important statements 
regarding ecological civilisation in his report to the 19th National Congress (Xi, 
2017e:48). Xi is presenting harmony between man and nature not only as the status quo 
of Chinese wisdom, but also that it is inevitable; Tianren heyi is their Chinese identity: it 
is culturally, socially and biologically shared amongst the Chinese people. Tianren heyi 
embodies the spirit of ecological civilisation and symbolically represents the Chinese 
superior wisdom and culture of environmental governance; again Tianren heyi is Xi’s 
chosen dictum, adapted alongside chosen memories and chosen myths, and historical 
analogies to construct the shared identity of superior Chinese wisdom and culture. 
Xi’s spirit also fosters an identity of togetherness, which can be seen through 
words like “unity” and “partnership”. Xi uses form of emotion through words such as 
“unity” to apply the symbol of spirit, as a force of emotion, where Chinese wisdom and 
culture becomes about actions and understandings of togetherness (Laclau, 2004). A 
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sense of shared togetherness appears frequently in Xi’s (2017e:48) rhetoric, for 
example, in his report to the 19th National Congress, Xi states: “we will get everyone 
involved in improving the environment”. Xi uses the emotions within the notions of 
coexistence and harmony being in the genes of the Chinese people, to create an 
understanding of why everyone must be involved; not due to the dire conditions of the 
environment, but because it is quintessentially Chinese to create conditions of harmony 
and coexistence: it is the predisposed Chinese way, their mandate under heaven.  
The identity being constructed by Xi incorporates togetherness and unity, 
alongside the idea of there being a quintessentially way of being Chinese, fostering 
notions of a singular civilised State, supported by a shared conception of how to be 
Chinese within their constructed shared conception of the world. Togetherness is also 
present in Xi’s (2017a:8) keynote speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic 
Forum, where in his use of “victory” he elucidates how victory will only come when 
everyone unites together; this speech followed Xi’s announcement of developing a cap-
and-trade system (See Appendix 2). During the Closing Meeting of the 13th National 
People’s Congress, Xi (2018b:3) recounts how the “great spirit of cherishing unity” has 
allowed the Chinese to have “stuck together through thick and thin” in order to now be 
“striving with one heart” (Xi, 2018b:31). These discursive techniques in identity making 
have been discussed by: Ahmed (2015), Elias (1985), Foucault (1977, 1980 and 1985), 
Koschut (2017b), Laclau, (2004 and 2018), Leep (2010), Mitzen (2006) and Steele 
(2008). How Xi uses chosenness emotions, via these previously discussed techniques, 
further cements how the ecological civilisation rhetoric is being utilised to foster, or 
create, a singular civilised State with a shared conception of Chineseness, and of the 
world, via Chinese superiority in wisdom and culture. Xi’s use of “striving with one heart” 
also came at the time where Xi Jinping Thought was enshrined within the constitution 
and his second term of leadership as the General Secretary of the CPC began (see 
Appendix 2); his use of chosenness emotion incites strong support to continue rallying 
behind his ideals and thoughts, as a singular unified nation. 
Xi’s rhetoric also includes examples of chosenness emotions that exemplify the 
works of Bially Mattern (2005), De Rivera (1992) and Hutchison (2010), whereby the use 
of emotion utilises shared traumatic experience(s) of an in-group, creating a heightened 
sense of pride in who they are, where they are from and who they are becoming. For 
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example, through force of emotion, Xi (2017e:49), in his report to the 19th National 
Congress, states that unity “will get everyone involved...to make our skies blue again” 
and “It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, to strive 
with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation [sic]” (2017e:10). 
Xi’s chosenness emotions are constructing a spirit of togetherness to create an 
ecological civilisation, a Beautiful China, and bring harmony and coexistence between 
humanity and nature through proudly utilising Chinese wisdom and culture, rejuvenating 
the PRC and improving environmental governance globally. At the Closing Meeting of 
the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi (2018b:1) utilises the narrative of how “together 
we have stood up, grown rich and become strong”. Here the meta-narrative of 
rejuvenation from humiliation, built upon historical analogies using chosen memories and 
chosen myths, is embedded within Xi’s ecological civilisation rhetoric (Bially Mattern 
2005; Callahan, 2012; Hutchison, 2010; and Wang, 2014); imploring such strong 
emotions, through the use of the “stood up, grown rich and become strong” narrative, 
coincided with Xi’s momentous changes to CPC legislature to remove the two-term limit 
on Presidency, alongside the major reorganisation of the CPC’s ministries, perhaps 
signifying the level of control Xi Jinping appears to have over realising his leadership 
intentions and the rhetoric produced to disseminate them (see Appendix 2). 
Finally, Xi’s identity construction of a shared spirit also works by complimenting 
the Chinese on their wisdom and culture. In his report to the 19th National Congress of 
the CPC, Xi (2017e:10) also calls the Chinese people “heroes”, creating a narrative 
whereby “ecological civilization offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to 
solving the problems facing mankind [sic].” At the Closing Meeting of the 13th National 
People’s Congress, Xi takes this narrative further, complimenting their tenacity, in being 
“hard working”, “brave” and coming together (Xi, 2018b:4). Xi (2018b:4) claims that 
Chinese “wisdom” offers a solution to solve the problems of mankind furthering the “in-
group”, strengthening the ontological security of who the Chinese are and the “proud-
Self” identity (Ahmed, 2015; Leep, 2010; Mitzen, 2006; and Steele, 2008). The CPC’s 
rhetoric encourages the Chinese people to utilise this identity, to come together, to work 
hard and support the concept of ecological civilisation. Hence, Xi’s use of chosenness 
emotions can also be seen to be attempting to create a sense of superiority, or a 
charisma, of the PRC in-group (Elias, 1985). 
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Xi (2017h:2), at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties meeting, refers 
to ecological civilisation as their “destiny”, and as a “magnificent epic” at the 13th National 
People’s Congress (Xi, 2018b:3). Xi’s rhetoric defines ecological civilisation as a journey 
to be embarked upon together, directed by their Chinese wisdom and culture, now that 
the PRC’s identity is returning to that of a united, rich and strong country (both culturally 
and economically). Xi (2017e:10) labels ecological civilisation as a part of the PRC’s 
“new era” during the 19th National Congress and furthers how it will be a movement 




Chosenness Emotions in Li Keqiang’s Rhetoric  
 
Li’s use of chosenness emotions differed slightly from Hu and Xi in that the word 
“spirit” was not present. Instead, Li used words, such as: “wisdom” (Li, 2014a:8) and 
“power” (Li, 2014a:8) in his 12th National People’s Congress delivery; as well as 
“creativity” (Li, 2015a:2); and “passion” (Li, 2015a:2) at the OECD Headquarters. These 
emotion-words further construct a Chinese identity of hard work and innovation, as well 
as an identity of Chinese wisdom as an identity to be proud of, and one of togetherness. 
This identity construction is seen throughout Li Keqiang’s rhetoric (Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 
1985; Koschut, 2017b; Mitzen, 2006; and Steele, 2008).  
During his 12th National People’s Congress speech, Li  (2014a:22) claims, “The 
people are the foundation of a nation, and a nation can enjoy peace only when its 
foundation is strong. The fundamental goal of a government’s work is to ensure that 
everyone lives a good life.” Li (2014a:8) also said: “As the saying goes, great vision that 
makes a country prosper is but the result of collective wisdom. In other words, wisdom 
comes from the people. In the same line, the massive entrepreneurship and innovation 
by all, as I emphasized earlier, will generate enormous power… To use a Chinese idiom, 
the fire will burn higher when everyone adds wood to it [sic]”; and that the “People’s 
creativity and entrepreneurial passion has given us confidence to overcome the 
challenges” (Li, 2014a:2). At the 18th China-ASEAN Summit, Li (2015c:2) stated, “China 
is a huge country. It has a long history, a splendid culture and enchanting natural 
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scenery.” Li’s rhetoric uses emotion that is supportive of the Chinese people sharing a 
strong charisma as an in-group, working together, jointly using their wisdom and culture, 
to confidently overcome future challenges when working towards building a society 
based within the CPC’s notion of an ecological civilisation. Again, Li’s use of emotion 
within his rhetoric supports the insinuation of constructing a singular civilised state, it 
suggests the Chinese people are working towards having a shared conception of the 
world and there is, again, a selectiveness in the character traits being emphasised. 
 
 
Chosenness Emotions in Zhou Shengxian’s Rhetoric 
 
Zhou Shengxian, the inaugural Minister of Environmental Protection (March 2008 
– February 2015), repeats and embellishes the rhetoric of Hu and Xi. In his ministerial 
position, Zhou was entirely focused on environmental protection; thus, the amount of 
speeches dedicated explicitly to ecological civilisation far surpasses that of Hu Jintao, Xi 
Jinping and Li Keqiang. It is unsurprising that the same patterns in contextualising 
chosenness also emerge within Zhou’s rhetoric; “spirit” represents a superiority of 
Chinese wisdom and culture, as well as togetherness and victory through unity. Zhou’s 
use of chosenness emotions constructs the notion of spirit as shared amongst the PRC 
– it is constructed through historical analogies (Wang, 2007), chosen memories and 
chosen myths (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; Volkan, 1997; van der Dennen, 2001; and 
Wang, 2014), disseminated by Zhou through the use of emotion within his ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. Again, this use of emotion paints a picture of working towards a 
singular civilised State (Cartier, 2013), one with a shared conception of the world 
(Ahearne, 2013), made possible through superior Chinese wisdom and culture. 
During Zhou’s (2014c:5) speech at the National On-Site Meeting on Building 
Ecological Civilisation, he stated: “The spirit in the important speeches made by General 
Secretary Xi Jinping charts the course for actively exploring a new path to environmental 
protection and enriches its contents” and that in being “[g]uided by the important 
instructions made by the top leaders, we should carry forward the spirit of local creativity 
and actively explore the new approaches and new models of building ecological 
civilization, which are compatible with national and provincial reality and have local 
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characteristics [sic]” (Zhou, 2014c:18). Here Zhou unambiguously links spirit to Chinese 
wisdom and creativity, down to the local level but guided by the CPC, in order to create 
an ecological civilisation. A further example is seen at the Fourth National Working 
Meeting on the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Regulation, where Zhou (2011a:1) states 
that the CPC and PRC “will keep pace with times with pioneering spirit and strive for a 
new situation of environmental protection”. 
 However, during Zhou’s (2011b:28) speech at the 2011 National Conference on 
Environmental Protection, ecological civilisation itself also creates spirit: “We will equip 
ourselves with the latest Party theory and cultivate a strong spirit powered by building 
ecological civilization and exploration to a new path to environmental protection [sic]”. 
Thus, spirit becomes a feedback loop, where spirit will create ecological civilisation, but 
ecological civilisation will also improve the spirit of the Chinese.  
For Zhou (2009b:2), at the Thirteenth World Lake Conference, the spirit of 
ecological civilisation is a “higher-level” of environmental governance, stipulating at the 
National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection 2013, that it is adapted to the PRC’s 
unique situation and bears “distinct characteristics” (Zhou, 2013c:1-2). This can be 
understood as an echo of Hu’s rhetoric, where a charisma through positive self-imagery 
and a distinction between an “Us” and “Them” was discursively created (Elias, 1985; and 
Risse and Ropp, 2013).  
An important phrase found in Zhou’s (2007:3) rhetoric is “splendid Chinese 
culture”, which appears as early as 2007 – in Zhou’s first speech within the data set – at 
the Annual General Meeting of the MEP, and throughout to his final speech at the 
closing the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation in 2014. As 
discussed by Wang (2014), hua or splendid, creates a specific identity of superiority in 
Chinese culture, distinguishing civilised from barbarian, and is discursively constructed 
through carefully selected historical analogies, chosen memories and chosen myths 
(Callahan, 2012; Leep, 2010; and Risse and Ropp, 2013). The use if splendid echoes 
notions of superiority within the in-group, and disapproval for anything non-Chinese, 
creating a category of understanding for how the Chinese are to critique the 
environmental approaches of yi, the out-group(s) (Ahmed, 2015).  
Examples of splendid Chinese culture within Zhou’s rhetoric also focus heavily on 
the adapted dictum of harmony between man and nature, or Tianren heyi. For example, 
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in Zhou’s (2009a:1-2) Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with 
Chinese Characteristics under the Guidance of Ecological Civilization, he states that 
ecological civilisation will help to: “realize harmonious co-existence between man and 
nature, among human beings, and between man and society based on the carrying 
capacity of environment [sic]”; “seek balance and harmony between man and 
nature…true harmony between man and nature” (Zhou, 2009a:5); and that “Active effort 
to promote ecological civilization and harmony between man and nature is a historic duty 
of utmost importance bestowed upon environmental workers [sic]” (Zhou, 2009a:2).  
Zhou’s use of Tianren heyi is represented as a matter of fact, they are a 
discursive exertion of power, categorising what to feel positively about, and are adapted 
to fit the element of environmental protection Zhou is undertaking, such as “harmony 
between man and water environment” (Zhou, 2009b:5; at the Thirteenth World Lake 
Conference). In Zhou’s (2014d:3) A Major Strategy to Open up a New Situation for 
Harmonious Development of Man and Nature – Thoroughly Learning and Implementing 
the Important Statement of Comrade Xi Jinping on Building Ecological Civilization 
speech, he lists historic examples of the Chinese living the principles and responsibilities 
of harmony between man and nature, to demonstrate how it is possible to create 
ecological civilisation. Having experienced “Airpocalypse” and 7500 dead pigs being 
found in the Huangpu River in 2013 (Albert and Xu, 2016; Jin, Anderson and Zhang, 
2016; and Zuo, 2013; see Appendix 2), historical analogies and ancient dictums shifts 
the focus away from current environmental disasters. Zhou seemingly attempts to 
redirect the audience to consider instead carefully selected historical analogies and 
chosen memories, regardless of the fact that the historical analogies are almost 
unverifiable and are a product of a very different China to the PRC of today. 
For Zhou, Tianren heyi is not just a symbol of Chinese wisdom and culture; it is a 
practical means of delivering CPC policy, the emotion embedded within the concept 
“codifies” ecological civilisation (see Geall and Ely, 2018 for discussion on ecological 
civilisation becoming codified; and Koschut, 2017b). This is seen in Zhou’s (2013c:1-2) 
speech at the National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, where he claims that, 
“Ecological civilization represents the material, spiritual and institutional achievements of 
[the] human race in protecting and developing a good environment and a kind of social 
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form where man and nature, environment and economic development and man and 
society coexist harmoniously [sic].”  
Zhou’s (2010d:1) 2010 World Environment Day speech refers to how the non-
Chinese civilisation(s) (the out-group(s)), create “hostilities between man and nature”. 
This was also seen earlier in Zhou’s (2009b:2) Thirteenth World Lake Conference 
speech, where he stated; “Traditional civilization leads to the conflicts between man and 
nature [sic].” Zhou implicitly suggests that bad environmental conditions are a result of 
straying away from Chinese wisdom and culture, or “blindly following” the West. Zhou 
establishes a deeper contrast between the in-group of “Us” versus the out-group of 
“Them”, creating a strong identity of Chinese superiority in their approach to 
environmental governance (understood as a discursive technique of emotion in the 
works of Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 1985; Koschut, 2917b; Leep, 2010; Mitzen, 2008; Risse 
and Ropp, 2013; and Steele, 2008).  
Zhou Shengxian also frequently uses the concept of a “beautiful China”, for 
example, in his Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation Zhou states (2012d:1), “A 
beautiful China reflects the beauty of the times, our society, people's life, the masses 
and our environment. This beautiful China is a harmonious society offering equal 
opportunity for people and a sound, liveable environment. Building a beautiful China is a 
systematic project which requires top-down design, clear direction, objectives and tasks 
and effective measures to advance the work step by step.” The environment is not 
becoming beautiful per se; the concept represents everything that is already beautiful, 
has been beautiful in the PRC, and is becoming increasingly beautiful with the CPC 
directing the restoration of identity, power and status; Zhou’s beautiful China trope also 
works towards codifying ecological civilisation. Tianren heyi is utilised as the directions 
of how to become beautiful whilst creating a strong charisma of Chinese superiority 
(similar arguments are found in the works of Ahmed, 2015; and Elias, 1985). 
Finally, Zhou also creates togetherness throughout the rhetoric in phrases, such 
as: “unified thought” at the National Conference on Environmental Protection 2010 
(Zhou, 2010b:12); “stand together through storm and stress, share in weal or woe”, 
which he stated at the Meeting in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of China National 
Environment Centre (Zhou, 2010e:1); and “with participation of the whole nation”, which 
was stated at the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and 
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Promotion Association (Zhou, 2011g:1); and signifies notions of a singular civilised state, 
as well as sharing a united conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013). 
The increased use of togetherness emotion-words in 2010 sits alongside the PRC 
hosting the 2010 Global UN Climate Talks, perhaps influencing the greater uptake in 
these emotive ideals (CNN, 2010; see Appendix 2). Similar is how Zhou (2012d:2), in 
Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation, uses metaphor to highlight the importance of 
togetherness: “Once all the masses grasp the strategic thought of building a beautiful 
China, the idea will spawn tremendous material and spiritual force. As the seeds of 
ecological civilization have been planted across the nation, the seeds of building a 
beautiful China are being sowed in every corner of our motherland, bearing rich fruits in 
the near future [sic].” Zhou’s use of chosenness emotions portray ecological civilisation 
as something everyone must be involved in, through their Chinese wisdom and culture, 
which will create a splendid beautiful future for all Chinese people. The idea of 
inevitability is also represented; fruits are expected to grow following the sowing of 
seeds, so long as the plants are tended to: now the CPC have sown the seeds of an 
ecological civilisation it is up to the Chinese to tend to these ideas in order for a beautiful 
PRC to bloom, again demonstrating the discursive exertion of power and showing the 
form and force of emotions in Zhou’s rhetoric (Foucault, 1977, 1980 and 1985; and 
Laclau, 2004 and 2018).  
 
 
Chosenness Emotions in the Rhetoric of the MEP and MFA  
 
Chosenness emotions were rarely present or utilised in speeches by the MEP. 
However, Wu Xiaoqing (2013:6), in his Building of Better Party Conduct and Cleaner 
Government in the National Environmental Protection System speech, requested the 
MEP to spread the spirit of creating an ecological civilisation. Wu Xiaoqing’s speech 
followed on from the internationally acknowledged environmental catastrophe of 
“Airpocalypse” at the start of 2013; it is therefore unsurprising that in addressing the 
MEP that he would request the staff to work together on preventing future catastrophes 
and global embarrassments. 
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Whereas, chosenness emotions within the MFA rhetoric carried a strong 
message about how the PRC – having grown rich and strong, and drawing upon their 
own wisdom and culture – is now becoming a beautiful ecological civilisation. These 
emotions again represent the findings from the works of Ahmed (2015), De Rivera 
(1992), Elias (1985), Koschut (2017b), Leep (2010), Mitzen (2006) and Steele (2008). 
The MFA’s chosenness rhetoric invites the world to learn from the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation. For example, Liu Xiaoming (2017:7), Ambassador to the UK, in his New Era, 
New Opportunity, New Future speech, stated: “I think what this Congress brings to the 
world, including Britain, are China's wisdom, China's concepts and China's 
opportunities.” This confident identity of Chinese wisdom, culture and traditional 
environmental philosophies, is being presented to the world, furthering the charisma and 
positive self-imagery of the Chinese in-group versus an inferior out-group. Once again, 
this CPC rhetoric uses chosenness emotions to signify a superior singular civilised 
State, via Chinese splendid culture and wisdom, embedded within the shared conception 
of the world of striving together to become an ecological civilisation, versus the barbaric 
Other(s).  
Liu Jieyi (2017:2), the PRC’s then permanent representative to the UN, in his 
Climate Change and the Sustainable Development Agenda speech, stated how the 
Paris Agreement merely agreed with what the CPC had already set out to achieve prior 
to international cooperation: “The vision of global green and low-carbon development 
envisaged by the Paris Agreement corresponds with China's strategic choice of building 
an ecological civilization [sic].” Liu Jieyi and Liu Xiaoming’s rhetoric builds a narrative, 
which portrays ecological civilisation as a path led by the CPC, based on the Chinese 
situation, utilising Chinese wisdom and culture to provide solutions. Liu Jieyi (2017:7) 
also stipulates that to reach ecological civilisation constant exploration and innovation, 
collectively, is required.  
Liu Jieyi (2017:7) also stated how Ecological civilisation “with its own features” is 
“China’s wisdom and solution” to environmental degradation; “[o]ther countries are free 
to find out more about China's development experience and draw on strength or 
reference as they see fit. They should explore a development path and social system 
that suits their own history and culture. This is, in essence, the biggest contribution of 
China's path of socialism with Chinese characteristics to all humanity.” Thus 
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demonstrating how ecological civilisation embodies a new identity of Chinese unity, 




Summary of the Use of Chosenness Emotions  
 
Chosenness emotions were repeatedly used throughout the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric; creating an in-group identity of Chinese environmentalism, drawing 
upon the concept of harmony between man and nature, embedded within Chinese 
wisdom and culture. Numerous examples of emotion words, phrases, metaphors, 
analogies, sayings and narratives, which referred symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) 
linked to a the collective in-group’s sharing of social and historical experiences, drew 
upon ideas found in the works of Ahmed (2015), Bially Mattern (2005), De Rivera (1992), 
Elias (1985), Hutchison (2010), Koschut (2017b), Leep (2010), Mitzen (2006); Risse and 
Ropp (2013) and Steele (2008).  
The CPC’s rhetoric suggests the PRC should be proud of their identity, built 
through positive self-imagery and charisma, and are frequently told that everyone must 
harness this identity together. Through harnessing the spirit of ecological civilisation, the 
CPC proclaim that the PRC will be victorious in becoming an ecological civilisation and a 
beautiful China. To be victorious, the Chinese citizens are told to unite – with tenacity 
and hard work – to create ecological civilisation, which they can offer to the world as an 
improved form of environmental governance. The chosenness emotions could be seen 
to create a distinction between the civilised Chinese “Us” and a barbaric “Them” (this 
argument draws upon the work of Risse and Ropp, 2013). How the CPC use 
chosenness emotions within their ecological civilisation rhetoric have been seen to be 
constructing and disseminating a progression towards becoming a singular civilised 
State (Cartier, 2013). The use of chosenness emotions builds up a shared conception of 
the world, which professes the superiority of Chinese wisdom and culture, and is able to 
improve not just the PRC, but also the world. This is done through carefully selecting 
historical analogies – via the implementation of chosen myths and chosen memories – to 
construct a shared identity of unity, progression and hard work.  
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Emotions of Glory  
 
Glory emotions signify the words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and 
narratives, which refer symbolically to (a set of) emotion(s) linked to myths and 
memories of a glorious past, present and future. Glory emotions are overtly positive. This 
section will now highlight the main patterns in glory emotions throughout the dataset. 
 
 
Glory Emotions in Hu Jintao’s Rhetoric 
 
The most significant pattern in the use of glory emotions in Hu’s rhetoric can be 
understood as the glorifying of the CPC’s leadership and understanding of governance; 
a power relationship emerges, categorising the CPC as the leaders, or heroes, guiding 
the citizens of the PRC. It must be noted that this claim of strong leadership does not 
only apply to environmental governance within Hu’s rhetoric; it is a strong message 
repeatedly made, where Hu praises the achievements of the CPC and stipulates all 
achievements have been a result of the CPC’s thought-leadership and hard work. 
However, that ecological civilisation is a new idea of the CPC’s – one that will create a 
better life for the people and a sound ecological environment – is repeatedly made and 
glorified.  
During Hu’s 18th National Congress report, numerous glory words were used in 
the two sections of the speech on environmental governance, such as: “cherish” (Hu, 
2012:11); “enrich” (Hu, 2012:11); “treasure” (Hu, 2012:36); “unspoilt” and “beautiful” (Hu, 
2012:34). There is a positivity towards the environment where “cherish”, “enrich” and 
“treasure” direct the audience in how they should feel and behave towards the PRC’s 
environment; “unspoilt” and “beautiful” creates an ideal type of environment, which 
requires specific actions, or more specifically a lack of detrimental actions, to ensure the 
environment is unharmed, preventing further pollution. Hu is using glory emotions as a 
force to stipulate, or to lead, how the people should categorise and understand the 
environment to help create ecological civilisation. This is an example of what Foucault 
(1985) described as a strategic formation, where emotion words direct people to 
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interpret the object of the discourse in a specified way: the environment is being 
emotionally described as something fragile that needs to be looked after by the PRC. 
Hu creates a narrative of power with the CPC as the leader or hero; in his 17th National 
congress report, at the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, and concluding with 
his 18th National congress report, Hu claimed that “the CPC has bravely… sacrificed 
their lives” (Hu, 2007:49), to secure “Victory” (Hu, 2011b:14 and Hu, 2012:2) in 
environmental governance. Elias’s (1985) charisma building is again relevant; bravely 
securing victory glorifies the CPC as heroic leaders. Hu’s (2009:2) Opening Plenary 
Session of the United Nations Summit on Climate Change speech, also describes the 
CPC’s environmental governance as a responsibility they owe to their people and the 
world. Indeed, such a pledge to the people coincides with an international pledge made 
in the same year by Wen Jiabao, at The 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference (COP15); Wen proposed that the PRC would reduce 40 to 45 percent of 
their 2005 emissions by 2020 (Florcruz, 2009; see Appendix 2). As leaders the CPC 
accept the responsibility of creating a “beautiful homeland with green fields, clean water 
and a blue sky” (Hu Jintao, 2012:35; 18th National Congress report). This trilogy of green 
fields, clean water and blue sky creates a – carefully chosen – glorified image through 
categories, bursting with the colours of a healthy and beautiful environment; it utilises 
glory emotions based on the ideals of what people want, what they stipulate the PRC 
once knew, and asserts the CPC as the leaders who can deliver this, through selected 
analogies, chosen memories and chosen myths.  
In his 17th National Congress report, Hu (2007:7) stated the CPC’s new 
environmental governance will be “a great new revolution carried on by the people under 
the Party's leadership in a new era… and [the CPC will] ensure that it is always in the 
forefront of the times.” The glory emotions provide a direction and instruction of how to 
become an ecological civilisation; most important is how the CPC will be the leaders. 
Glorifying the CPC’s leadership in this way distracts from the PRC having just become 
the largest emitter of greenhouse gasses globally, or that the Food and Drug Agency 
Chief was executed for taking bribes following international fears that these bribes had 
made Chinese exports unsafe for consumption (Albert and Xu, 2016; and BBC, 2019; 
see Appendix 2). 
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This advances the construction of a power relationship by utilising glorified 
emotion-words embedded within the idea of a new revolution, where the people have the 
most to gain in being supportive, or perhaps, subservient (Koschut, 2017b). Hu (2007:2) 
furthers this power relationship between the CPC and the people when making 
statements such as: “The great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the 
banner guiding development and progress in contemporary China and rallying the whole 
Party and the people of all ethnic groups in the country in our common endeavour.” Hu 
(2007:18) promotes the achievements of building a moderately prosperous society, and 
insinuates the CPC will accomplish this, stating: “It will be a country whose people are 
better off and enjoy markedly improved quality of life and a good environment.” 
Hu’s use of glory is present in a number of metaphors that imply a journey 
towards betterment. During his speech at the 90th Anniversary of the founding of the 
CPC, Hu (2011b:7) describes how ecological civilisation is an idea, which will “blaze new 
trails” and how the CPC will “forge ahead in a pioneering spirit”. Similarly, in his 18th 
National Congress report, Hu (2012:2) goes on to say “we have marched boldly” 
showing a speed and confidence in their direction during his leadership, as the CPC 
continues to “launch a revolution”. Each metaphor demonstrates how the CPC are 
leading the PRC in a new direction, with a pioneering spirit, which sounds overtly 
positive and promising (Ahmed, 2015; Elias, 1985 and Leep, 2010). The glorifying 
myths, memories, or perhaps wishes, of the Chinese citizens for a clean and green 
future environment, are utilised by the CPC to present ecological civilisation as a 




Glory Emotions in Xi Jinping’s Rhetoric 
 
 Glory emotion-words in Xi’s (2017e:10) 19th National Congress report, in the 
sections on environmental governance, created ecological civilisation as a concept, 
which “embraces the brilliant”, is “full of vitality” and is “flying high and proud for all to 
see”. As in Hu’s rhetoric, Xi uses emotion-words to show the glory, strength and 
correctness of the CPC, such as: the CPC have “devoted serious energy”. Xi (2017e:5) 
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glorifies the CPC’s approach to environmental governance through their “high intensity” 
and the “encouraging” of “accelerated” policies, making “smooth progress” that has 
“significantly strengthened” the PRC. During his Keynote Address at the APEC CEO 
Summit, Xi (2017f:9-10) describes the CPC’s leadership approach, stating: “Once we set 
a target, we will not stop our efforts until it is met!”. This claim, utilising glory emotions, 
also came after President Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the 
Paris Agreement. Although EDA cannot verify such claims, it is feasible to think that Xi 
Jinping’s statement here is claiming to the world that the PRC is reliable and will 
continue to observe the agreed international standards, unlike the U.S. (see Appendix 
2). Xi describes the CPC as having an unremitting effort, working towards a positive end 
goal, highlighting the strength and virtuousness of the CPC. Thus also creating a 
charisma of strong and successful leadership, and an in-group with a “proud-Self” (Elias, 
1985; and Leep, 2010). 
 Xi’s glory emotions portray the CPC as leaders, with the responsibility of 
developing a better approach to all-around development; thus ecological civilisation is 
created as a symbolic, real and ideal pathway to a place of betterment. Xi states how the 
PRC, under the CPC’s direction, is doing “miraculous” things: through using Chinese 
wisdom, to help the world. Within his 19th National Congress report, Xi (2017e:49) stated 
“We [the CPC] will establish an environmental governance system in which government 
takes the lead, enterprises assume main responsibility, and social organizations and the 
public also participate [sic]”. Xi thus depicts a clear hierarchy of leadership and 
responsibilities, with the CPC as the leaders, echoing Ahearne’s (2013) application of 
Gramsci’s hegemony, conception of the world and war of position.  
Xi furthers this power relationship by adding an international dynamic, again in 
his Keynote Address at the APEC CEO Summit, Xi (2017f:3) stated: “This initiative is 
from China, but it belongs to the world. It is rooted in history, but it is oriented toward the 
future.” Xi’s (2017b) 2017 speech to the United Nations Office, insists all Chinese people 
must first come together to support the endeavour, to then share this approach with 
mankind. Xi thus elevates the PRC, aggrandising their ecological civilisation initiative; in 
doing so, Xi creates an identity of openness, inclusivity and a country that shares with 
others their developments.  
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This glorification of CPC leadership can be seen when Xi (2017b:5) stated, again, 
within his speech to the United Nations Office, how the CPC are: “Guided by the 
principle of peace, sovereignty, inclusiveness and shared governance”, going on to add 
“we should turn the deep sea, the polar regions, the outer space and the Internet into 
new frontiers for cooperation rather than a wrestling ground for competition.” Xi suggests 
the Chinese way, via the Chinese wisdom and culture of ecological civilisation, is 
different from the current conventions, such as the UN’s sustainable development 
concept – guided by the principles of capitalism – that has led to wrestling rather than 
cooperation. The use of this metaphor glorifies the CPC as civilised, describing 
developed states as barbaric in their wrestling with one-another, creating another 
dualism of in-group civility versus out-group barbarity. Moreover, the CPC can be seen 
as leading the way to a place of global betterment (Ahmed, 2015; Callahan, 2012; Elias, 
1985; Koschut, 2017b; Leep, 2010; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; and Wang, 2014).  
As with Hu’s rhetoric, Xi uses glory emotions creating ecological civilisation as a 
destination or a place of betterment. During the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit, 
Xi (2016a:4) stated, “green mountains and clear water are as good as mountains of gold 
and silver.” Xi’s use of this analogy in 2016 coincided with what had been the PRC’s 
slowest year of economic growth (only 6.7%) since 1990, thus perhaps Xi’s use of 
glorifying the value of nature could be seen to minimise any criticism over the lack of 
economic growth (BBC, 2019; see Appendix 2). Similarly, during his Work Together to 
Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind speech, delivered to the UN in 2017, 
Xi (2017b:21) claimed, “[w]e [the world] must realize that lucid waters and lush 
mountains are invaluable assets and act on this understanding, implement our 
fundamental national policy of conserving resources and protecting the environment, 
and cherish the environment as we cherish our own lives [sic].” These examples 
describe ecological civilisation as a desirable destination with physical and real 
elements. Colours are repeatedly used to create positive images, such as through blue 
skies and green mountains (a discursive technique discussed by Koschut, 2017b).  
Xi (2017a:10) also uses journey metaphors, for example, during his Keynote 
Speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, where 
he said: “We [the PRC] will open our arms to the people of other countries and welcome 
them aboard the express train of China’s development”. In 2017 during his Work 
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Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind speech, delivered at the 
UN, Xi (2017b:2) claimed: “We [the world’s governments] need to respond to the 
people’s call, take up the baton of history and forge ahead on the marathon track toward 
peace and development.” Moreover, in his 19th National Congress report, Xi (2017e:5) 
claimed the PRC are “[t]aking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to 
Climate Change”, because “China has become… [a] torchbearer in the global endeavour 
for ecological civilisation.” Once again, this remark made by Xi Jinping followed Trump’s 
announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (Trump, 2017; see 
Appendix 2). These journey metaphors glorify how the CPC’s leadership is fast paced 
and interesting, leading global environmental governance, sharing their concept of 
ecological civilisation with the world.  
During the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi (2018b:8) stated: “China will 
contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese strength to the world, 
to push for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting 
peace, universal security, and common prosperity. Let the sunshine on a community 
with a shared future for humanity [and] illuminate the world! [sic]” The emotion here 
carries the message that sharing the Chinese wisdom and culture, built up through 
emotions of chosenness, and correctly directed by the CPC, will bring the world into a 
state of shared light and shared prosperity benefiting all.  
Xi’s glory emotions depict a journey to betterment, under the CPC’s firm 
leadership, benefiting mankind in creating a better life through a clean, green and 
beautiful environment. Xi’s glory emotions place Xi as the ultimate charismatic leader 
creating a platform to exercise power through his rhetoric (Elias, 1985; Foucault, 1977, 
1980 and 1985; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018). 
 
 
Glory Emotions in Li Keqiang’s Rhetoric 
 
Li Keqiang’s glory emotion-words also positively describe the CPC’s 
environmental governance and leadership style, for example, during his 12th National 
People’s Congress report, Li used: “strengthen” (Li, 2014a:16); “sped up” (Li, 2014a:16); 
“increase” (Li, 2014a:16); “work harder” (Li, 2014a:16); “improve” (Li, 2014a:16); 
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“vigorously” (Li, 2014a:17), (Li, 2014a:3); “strong” (Li, 2014a:25); “beautiful” (Li, 
2014a:25); “reform” (Li, 2014a:25); “sound” (Li, 2014a:25); “launch” (Li, 2014a:25); 
“speed up” (Li, 2014a:25); “dynamic” (Li, 2014a:25)’ “move forward” (Li, 2014a:25); 
“endeavor [sic]” (Li, 2014a:29); and “harmonious” (Li, 2014a:29). Similarly, Li’s glory 
emotion-phrases include: “we will strengthen” and “we will push forward” (Li, 2014a:17). 
These emotion words and phrases demonstrate how Li positively represented the CPC 
as strong leaders confidently, quickly and convincingly leading the way (further Elias’ 
(1985) concept of charisma).  
A sense of excitement, or even pride, is found in Li’s (2016a:3) rhetoric, in his 
speech at the First World Conference on Tourism for Development Li manages to glorify 
the CPC’s environmental governance leadership through statements, such as: “We will 
champion the vision of green development for the country and the people”. Similar 
glorifying remarks were made during his speech at the 71st session of UN General 
Assembly, where Li (2016c:1-2) stated: “The UN Sustainable Development Summit held 
last year adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, opening a new vision 
for global development. At the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech 
entitled “Toward Win-win Partnership for Sustainable Development” to expound on 
China’s principles and position as well as its readiness to advance the agenda for 
sustainable development”. At the 20th ASEAN Plus China, Japan and the Republic Of 
Korea Summit, Li (2017e:3) also remarked how “China is ready” for greater global 
environmental governance; as noted above, this speech by Li followed President Donald 
Trump’s announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris agreement, thus creating 
space politically for the PRC to appear more environmentally committed globally, whilst 
not taking on any new responsibilities (Trump, 2017; see Appendix 2). 
Li’s glory emotions create an identity of the PRC cooperating with the world. For 
instance: “China will join hands with other countries to achieve enduring peace, common 
development and prosperity of the human race” (Li, 2014a:29). In his 12th National 
People’s Congress speech, Li (2014a:7) stated that: “The world needs China, China 
needs the world”. Li is investing in creating a strong sense of self, where CPC leadership 
is ready to deliver this new environmental governance to the world (Ahmed, 2015; and 
Elias, 1985). But, to do so, Li (2014a:29) also uses glory emotions to describe how the 
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citizens of the PRC trust the CPC, thus furthering the power relationship between the 
Party and the people:  
 
The people have placed great trust in us, and we will work hard to create 
the future. Let us rally closely around the Party Central Committee with 
Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary, hold high the great banner of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics and work together as one. Let us 
endeavor to break new ground and make solid progress, and strive to 
finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and a 
modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced and harmonious. With all these efforts, we can 
surely realize the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation [sic]!  
 
During the 12th China-EU Business Summit, Li (2017b:6) presented the CPC as 
trustworthy to the international community in saying, “China always stands by its words”, 
arguing that environmental governance “is also our unshirkable duty as a responsible 
major country [sic]”; and in stipulating how the strong CPC leadership looks to “work with 
other countries to effectively address global climate change” (Li, 2014a:6-7). A final 
similarity in Li’s (2014a:2) rhetoric is seen in his 12th National People’s Congress report, 
in how he uses glory emotion, through journey metaphors, describing the CPC’s strong 
leadership in their new environmental governance approach: “We have stayed the 
course and pursued a proactive approach”. Li’s rhetoric can thus be seen to further 
support a glorification of CPC leadership; especially with regards to presenting the PRC 
as a reliable and friendly nation.  
 
 
Glory Emotions in Zhou Shengxian’s Rhetoric 
 
Zhou Shengxian uses glory emotion-words to describe ecological civilisation as a 
positive aspiration, demonstrating how the CPC’s leadership has been, is and will be, 
inherently good. For instance, at the Forum on World Environment Day, Zhou (3009a:1) 
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described the CPC and their ecological civilisation as “outstanding” (Zhou, 2009a:1), and 
at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2010b:1 and 10) 
called the CPC’s environmental governance “remarkable” and ecological civilisation a 
“major breakthrough”. Zhou (2010d:3), during his 2010 speech for World Environment 
Day, described this environmental leadership role shouldered by the CPC as a 
“herculean task”. In particular, Zhou (2011a:1) repeated the glorifying word “uplifting”, 
used during his New Year Speech 2011 and is repeated in his 2011 National 
Conference on Environmental Protection speech as “uplifting ecological civilisation” 
(Zhou, 2011b:17). Uplifting ecological civilisation suggests that the wisdom and culture 
behind ecological civilisation already existed; it is CPC’s correct thoughts and leadership 
that are revitalising these ideals.  
 The greatest use of glory emotions by Zhou is also in creating a power 
relationship, with the CPC as great leaders or heroes. During his speech at the 30th 
Anniversary of China National Environment Centre, Zhou (2010e:6) claimed: “Our cause 
is noble and sacred, our vision is bright and beautiful, and our responsibility is significant 
and glorious.” Emotion-words such as “noble” and “sacred” creates the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation as a divine concept; a “bright” and “beautiful” vision creates the notion of a 
celestial understanding of the world and future; and “significant” and “glorious” 
responsibility suggests deific levels of obligation and accountability. Zhou’s use of 
emotion describes the CPC as leaders, creating a distinct power relationship with the 
CPC as ubiquitous, above and beyond everyone else in environmental governance 
(Foucault, 1977, 1980 and 1985; Koschut, 2017b; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018).  
Zhou (2013b:2, 3 and then 20) furthers this creation of a power relationship 
through glorifying statements, such as in his speech at the MEP’s 2013 Spring Festival 
Gathering and Recognition Meeting, where he clamed: “We will be a brave leader, 
promoter and enforcer of ecological civilization and make greater contributions to 
building a modern China with ecological progress [sic]”; the CPC are “brave to be the 
leader, promoter and enforcer to promote the building of ecological civilization [sic]”; and 
the CPC will “be the leader, promoter and enforcer promoting the building of ecological 
civilization and a beautiful China [sic]”. Being the “leader”, “promoter” and “enforcer” 
creates an understanding that the CPC are everything when it comes to becoming an 
ecological civilisation, they know everything, understand everything and will direct 
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everything; and they have the courage to be brave enough to lead everyone there. Such 
arguments had already been disseminated in Zhou’s rhetoric from the 2011 National 
Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2011f:1) claimed: “The set of major 
strategic thoughts and tasks on ecological civilization is a testament to our rational 
understanding of the trend of human civilization, our correct adherence to the rule of 
social development, a distillation of the concept of scientific development and major 
advance in the theory of building a socialist society with Chinese characteristics. It is of 
great significance for furthering the basic state policy of environmental protection and 
moving toward a path featuring booming production, comfortable life and sound eco 
environment for everyone [sic].” Zhou’s use of emotion stresses how the CPC 
understand and have a solution to give everyone a better life through a sound 
environment (Koschut, 2017b).  
In his 2011 New Year’s address, Zhou (2011a:2) stated how the CPC will 
“bravely innovate, bravely solve difficult problems with good practice. Innovation is the 
gene of development”. As mentioned above, requests and statements furthering 
innovation coincide internationally with the PRC officially overtaking Japan to become 
the world’s second-largest economy (BBC, 2019; see Appendix 2). Zhou brings in the 
notion of unity and shared ability amongst the Chinese citizens, to help support the CPC 
in their quest to reach ecological civilisation, as another quality that is inherently, 
culturally and biologically, Chinese. Zhou’s (2009a:9) glory emotions repeatedly make 
direct requests to the people, such as at the 2009 World Environment Day Forum, where 
he stated, “let’s stay firm and join hands to make constant exploration of the new path to 
environmental protection with Chinese characteristics under the guidance of ecological 
civilization [sic]”. Again, at the 2010 World Environment Day Forum, Zhou (2010d:3) 
stated how, a “joint effort will promise a beautiful landscape with blue sky, clear water 
and green mountains”. Zhou’s messages imply that the CPC cannot make ecological 
civilisation a reality on their own, no matter how brilliant it is: they need the support of the 
people and use glory emotions to ask for this support (Koschut, 2017b). How the CPC 
are using glory emotion within their rhetoric suggests they are reliant on the notion of 
everybody working towards building a singular civilised state, and having a shared 
conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013).  
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Zhou can also be seen using glory emotion to stipulate that the CPC are taking 
the PRC on a journey towards betterment. There are references to this throughout 
Zhou’s speeches, such as the phrases: “new path” (Zhou, 2010c:1 and Zhou, 2013c:13); 
“new era” (Zhou, 2014c:1-2) and “historical position” (Zhou, 2010a:3 and Zhou, 
2012a:2). Zhou (2011g:2) described ecological civilisation as a place with “positive and 
benign development”. Zhou (2009a:2) stated: “Ecological civilization is an ideal state as 
well as a realistic objective [sic].”  
Zhou injects journey metaphors consistently throughout his rhetoric, which are 
used to further this notion of being on a journey to betterment. In his Prepared for the 
Deciding Battle: Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to 
Environmental Protection speech, Zhou (2010b:13) claims: “a great voyage beckons for 
enhanced effort of building ecological civilization [sic]”. During his 2011 Spring Festival 
address, Zhou (2011c:2) similarly stated: “Now the wind direction is appropriate, we 
should set sail. There is [an] onerous task before us, we should accelerate our speed!” 
Likewise, in his speech at the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation 
Research and Promotion Association, Zhou (Zhou, 2011g:2) asserted, “we need to ride 
on the tides, make great efforts and see the effects as soon as possible.” A final 
example is from his 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, where 
Zhou (2013c:20) stipulated the CPC have been “[f]ormulating the road map and 
timetable for reform and innovation in environmental protection”. All of these metaphors 
imply everyone should make haste, for the direction and destination is known by the 
CPC; thus supporting the use of glorified rhetoric to portray the CPC as leaders, taking 
the PRC and the world, to a place of environmental betterment. 
 
 
Glory Emotions in the Rhetoric of the MEP and MFA 
 
The use of glory emotion by the MEP was greater than with chosenness 
emotions. Wu Xiaoqing (2009:14), in his Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based 
on Scientific Development speech, used both the emotion-word “beautiful” and emotion- 
phrase “Blue sky, clean water, green land" in emotionally categorising the state of 
rejuvenated environment to be achieved. The idea of the PRC sharing their success and 
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knowledge on environmental protection with the world was also present (Wu Xiaoqing, 
2009:6). Wu Xiaoqing (2009:1) also glorified the CPC, in claiming how the CPC had 
“always attached great importance to environmental protection work”. Finally, the notion 
of a “new era” was also mentioned (Wu, 2009:1). Similarly, in his 2013 Building of Better 
Party Conduct and Cleaner Government in the National Environmental Protection 
System speech, Wu Xiaoqing (2013:4) glorifies the correctness of the CPC’s approach 
to environmental governance in claiming how: “A number of issues were identified and 
set right and the role of environmental protection optimizing economic growth was well 
exerted [sic]”. 
The glory emotions present across the MFA’s rhetoric also created a strong level 
of support for Xi Jinping, particularly as a leader with big and new ideas for a better 
future. For example, Liu Xiaoming’s (2017:4) New Era, New Opportunity, New Future 
speech, given to UK’s Business Community, claimed that: “Now, the new CPC 
leadership is closely rallied around General Secretary Xi Jinping. This new central 
leadership is giving the Chinese people great confidence. They are committed to leading 
the Chinese people into a new era. They are uniting the whole nation in a concerted 
effort to realise the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Liu 
Xiaoming (2017:4) went on to say: “A great cause calls for strong and firm guidance. 
History tells us that in a massive country like China, development and progress would be 
impossible without a strong leadership. Over the past five years, the achievements we 
made and the changes taking place in China have been phenomenal. These must be 
attributed to the strong and firm leadership of the Party. At the first session of the 19th 
Central Committee, Xi Jinping was once again elected General Secretary. This reflects 
the common aspiration of the people”.  
Liu Xiaoming (2017:4) also specifically glorifies the importance of ecological 
civilisation and Xi’s understanding of its importance, by highlighting, in Xi’s Congress 
report from the 19th National Congress how, “"ecological civilization" appeared twelve 
times, "beautiful China" eight times and "green" fifteen times [sic].” Moreover, that “China 
will strive for green growth” and that “Eco-environmental conservation was given 
considerable priority at the Congress” are both distinguished as evidence of the CPC’s 
good environmental leadership. Liu Xiaoming’s (2017:8) speech identifies that: “A great 
modern socialist country should be prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, 
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harmonious, and beautiful” and directs how “For the first time, building a "beautiful 
China" becomes a key dimension of a great modern socialist country. And for the first 
time, "ensuring harmony between man and nature" becomes a basic policy that 
underpins socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era.” Liu echoes ideals of 
the CPC’s good governance, correct leadership and understanding of how to solve the 
world’s environmental problems via the CPC’s concept of ecological civilisation. Thus 
presenting the PRC as a strong and successful country under the firm leadership of Xi 
Jinping and the CPC. 
Finally, reproductions of the glory emotion through emotion-analogies are also 
deployed by Liu Xiaoming (2017:5), for example, “General Secretary Xi says, "Clear 
waters and green mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver." These 
plain words carry profound ideas. Ecological civilization is vital to sustain the 
development of the Chinese nation. Environment will be protected the same way as we 
cherish life [sic]”. Liu glorifies Xi’s ideas by calling them profound, adding an extra layer 
of glory emotion supporting Xi Jinping and his leadership of the PRC, and beyond.  
 
 
Summary of the Use of Glory Emotions 
 
The use of glory emotions throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric can be 
seen to have created understandings of and categorises ecological civilisation as a 
place of betterment that the CPC are (heroically) leading the PRC, and at times the 
world, towards (Koschut, 2017b). This sense of a shared destination furthers the notion 
of working to become a singular civilised state, with a shared conception of the world 
(Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 2013). Glory emotions specifically created a charisma of 
the CPC as strong leaders, or brave heroes, and in particular demonstrated support for 
Xi Jinping. This leadership position created a power relationship between the 
government and the people. Glorified versions of an ideal environment have been used 
in what Foucault (1985) called “strategic formations”, to exert power through rhetoric, 
and are similar to Laclau’s (2004 and 2018) notions of form and force of emotion 
(Koschut, 2017b). The CPC offers the Chinese citizens the promise of an environment 
they want, in return for their support, on the journey towards (a global) ecological 
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civilisation. Glory emotions were also present in speeches by Hu, Li, Xi and Zhou where 
major global events bolstered the CPC’s previous decisions and future pathways for 
global environmental governance; the main two examples were that of the PRC 
overtaking Japan as the world second-largest economy, and President Donald Trump 






Trauma emotions signify the words, phrases, metaphors, analogies, sayings and 
narratives, which refer to shared historical memories of traumatic or negative 
experiences, which in turn bring people together and support the myth-building of shared 




Trauma Emotions in Hu Jintao’s Rhetoric 
 
 In many of Hu’s speeches glory was followed by trauma (reminiscent of 
Callahan’s (2012) pessoptimism). Hu’s most common use of trauma emotion was in 
discussing how difficult the route to become an ecological civilisation will be. In his 18th 
National Congress report, Hu described the work necessary as “arduous” (Hu, 2012:5) 
or as an “arduous struggle” that lies ahead (Hu, 2012:11). Hu directs his audience to 
brace themselves (Hu, 2012:21) for the “severe tests” that wait (Hu, 2012:6). The 
arduous struggle to be faced can also be seen in the following excerpt (Hu, 2012:5):  
 
We must be keenly aware that there is still much room for improvement 
in our work and there are a lot of difficulties and problems on our road 
ahead. They include the following: Unbalanced, uncoordinated and 
unsustainable development remains a big problem. The capacity for 
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scientific and technological innovation is weak. The industrial structure is 
unbalanced. Agricultural infrastructure remains weak. Resource and 
environmental constraints have become more serious. Many systemic 
barriers stand in the way of promoting development in a scientific way. 
The tasks of deepening reform and opening up and changing the growth 
model remain arduous. The development gap between urban and rural 
areas and between regions is still large, and so are income disparities. 
Social problems have increased markedly. 
 
Hu’s message is strong and clear: the current situation is not good enough; the 
environmental conditions create a status of the PRC as a failing and weak State (see De 
Rivera (1992), for the use of emotion and perceived failures). Hu (2011a:4-5), despite 
having made many “remarkable achievements”, which he presented in his speech at the 
Opening Plenary of Boao Forum for the Asia Annual Conference, still repeatedly states: 
“China has a long way to go”. Hu argued that the road to ecological civilisation is “vital” 
(Hu, 2012:34), due to the “deteriorating” condition of the environment (Hu, 2012:34). The 
PRC must “vigorously push forward” (Hu, 2007:18-19) and “follow a path with Chinese 
characteristics” (Hu, 2012:18) for “survival” (Hu, 2012:21).  
One of the strongest uses of traumas found in Hu’s rhetoric utilises the meta-
narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation. During his speech, commemorating the 90th 
Anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Hu (2011b:21) stated: “China was a poor and 
backward country and its people were leading a miserable life”; the memories Hu is 
drawing upon from the PRC’s past, as a weakened nation, provides a base line for 
understanding how far the CPC has already helped the PRC on their pathway to 
rejuvenation. The contrast, between the humiliations of having been a weak and failing 
country and the glorified successes under CPC’s leadership, creates social parameters 
of what the PRC once was and what the CPC are leading the PRC to become (Foucault, 
1985). The notion of the CPC as a strong and noble leader promising a good quality life, 
in the green, clean and beautiful environment of their ecological civilisation, is supported 
by both emotions of glory and trauma. How Hu uses both glory emotion and trauma 
emotion is reliant on the careful selection of historical analogies, of chosen memories 
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and chosen myths to construct the CPC’s vision of a singular civilised state, via the 
notion of an ecological civilisation.  
 
 
Trauma Emotions in Xi Jinping’s Rhetoric 
 
Xi Jinping’s rhetoric is, on the whole, far more positively framed than that of Hu 
Jintao’s. However, there are still trauma emotions present. In his 19th National Congress 
report, Xi (2017e:48) used trauma emotion to justify the necessity of striving to become 
an ecological civilisation: “Man and nature form a community of life; we, as human 
beings, must respect nature, follow its ways, and protect it. Only by observing the laws of 
nature can mankind avoid costly blunders in its exploitation. Any harm we inflict on 
nature will eventually return to haunt us. This is a reality we have to face.” Interestingly, 
Xi never uses trauma emotions to blame the current environmental conditions on the 
poor decisions of previous CPC leaders; instead he uses trauma emotion to consider 
how bad the future could be if the collective do not act now and follow his leadership to 
become a united ecological civilisation (see Hutchison’s (2010) work on the use of 
negative emotion in rhetoric). This directs the focus away from the PRC and towards the 
larger collective of mankind and can clearly be seen in Xi’s (2017h:4) Working Together 
to Build a Better Future speech: “We should protect the earth, our irreplaceable home, 
heal wounds inflicted on the ecosystem and environment, and build a harmonious and 
liveable home for mankind. This will enable the natural ecosystem to recover and 
regenerate itself and everyone to live in a good environment with lucid waters and lush 
mountains”. Once again, both of these speeches follow on from President Donald 
Trump’s announcement that he would withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement 
(Trump, 2017; see Appendix 2). 
Xi also uses trauma emotion in recognition of the hard work and suffering of the 
CPC and the Chinese people. In Xi’s (2018a:3-4) 2018 New Year Speech, he reassures 
the Chinese citizens that: “You have reaped the harvest from your hard work. You have 
also encountered quite some frustrations. There is still much room for improvement with 
regard to our work in relation to the people’s livelihood. So we should strengthen our 
sense of mission and responsibility, and do practical and fruitful work for the sake of the 
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people’s welfare…and create conditions for them to live a better and happier life.” 
However, the use of emotion here makes it very apparent that Xi expects far more to be 
done by the CPC, regardless of achievements attained thus far. There is a lack of 
sympathy, rather this hard work is expected, as their “mission of responsibility”. 
With regards to the people, Xi (2018b:3), at the 13th National People’s Congress, 
also claimed: “What the Chinese people have achieved stems from ingenuity and 
expertise, hard work, and enormous sacrifices. I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion 
Chinese people uphold the great struggling spirit, we will definitely fulfill the great goal of 
creating a better life [sic].” Xi (2018b:2) directs the people to remain united behind the 
CPC, he draws upon the notion of the “great spirit of struggle” shared between the CPC 
and the Chinese people to try and unite everyone behind his vision for an improved 
future, drawing upon shared memories within the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative 
(such uses of emotion in rhetoric are discussed by Ahmed, 2015; Bially Mattern, 2005; 
and Hutchison, 2010). Indeed, a third example of trauma emotion in Xi’s rhetoric relates 
to the narrative of rejuvenation from humiliation; it distinguishes the PRC as existing in a 
special and unique situation, but that Chinese wisdom and culture – guided by the CPC 
– will come to solve all problems.  
Metaphors in particular help craft this emotional message, for example, within his 
19th National Congress report, Xi (2017e:9) stated how, “The Chinese nation, with an 
entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East”. Xi incorporates these chosen 
memories of trauma, which contrast with the glories achieved within this first leadership 
period; as Xi begins his second period as General Secretary how he uses emotion within 
his speeches exemplifies what he deems as successes within this first term (see 
Appendix 2). Similarly, during his Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit speech, Xi 
(2016a:1) described the PRC’s nation building by saying: “China must pursue its own 
path of development. What we have done is, as a Chinese saying puts it, "crossing the 
river by feeling for stones." Another metaphor suggestive of trauma was used during Xi’s 
(2017c:6) Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 
speech, where he claimed that, “For a country, opening up is like the struggle of a 
chrysalis breaking free from its cocoon. There will be short-term pains, but such pains 
will create a new life.” A final example was given during Xi’s (2018b:9) 13th National 
People’s Congress report, where he described how “[a]fter nearly seven decades of hard 
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work under the leadership of the CPC, our people's republic has been growing 
vigorously, and with an entirely new posture, it now stands tall and firm in the East” (see 
Appendix 2). 
These metaphors all refer to a difficult past, but suggest hope for an improved 
future, a new era, perhaps, with regards to the cocoon metaphor, even a fresh start. 
There is a subtle reference to health, and that the PRC as a country now has improved 
health, which again contrasts with the sometimes very unhealthy condition of the 
environment. The ‘Sick man of Asia’ phrase, referring to the PRC now standing tall and 
firm, also utilised selected memories and selected myths of how China and the PRC 
have suffered at the hands of others, but have risen, much like a phoenix, to become a 
newly rejuvenated and unified State. However, compared to the suffering remembered 
from the Century of Humiliation, the current environmental conditions that the CPC have 
allowed (and have often created) are preferred for continued nation building (reminiscent 
of Gibson’s (1986) affordances; and Huan, 2008 and 2009). Moreover, Hutchison’s 
(2010) work on shared traumatic experiences creating social cohesion and identity is 
clearly apparent in Xi’s use of trauma emotions. 
This combination of metaphors across Xi’s speeches creates the picture that the 
PRC is recovering, or has recovered, from a weakness; but more importantly is the idea 
that the CPC’s leadership is what united the PRC and allowed the country to break free 
from their past memories of humiliations, by rebuilding the nation to be strong, tall and 
firm (see De Rivera (1992) on the use of emotion for nation building). Ecological 
civilisation is the next stage on this journey. That ecological civilisation will be carried out 
in a “Chinese way” is of great importance to the rhetoric. All of Xi’s metaphors that 
deploy trauma emotions act as a reminder that the PRC still has a long way to go, to 
reach Xiaokang or rejuvenation. The force of emotion present encourages the people to 
continue to support and “rally” behind the latest environmental governance of ecological 
civilisation, by utilising their Chinese wisdom and culture, and through calling ecological 





Trauma Emotions in Li Keqiang’s Rhetoric 
 
 Li’s use of trauma emotions revealed a similar pattern in negative emotion-words 
and emotion-phrases, in describing the necessity of hard work ahead to become an 
ecological civilisation. Examples, from his speech at the Second Session of the Twelfth 
National People’s Congress, included: “arduous” (Li, 2014a:1), (Li, 2014a:7); “more 
difficult” (Li, 2014a:7); “severe” (Li, 2014a:7); “vital” (Li, 2014a:24); “natures red-light 
warning” (Li, 2014a:24); “forceful measures” (Li, 2014a:24); and “challenging” (Li, 
2014a:24). However, Li’s use of trauma emotions can be understood as presenting a 
different priority; there is a great focus in Li’s (2014a:7) rhetoric on the necessity of 
continuing economic growth: “we must be keenly aware of the many difficulties and 
problems on our road ahead. The main ones are: The foundation for sustaining steady 
economic growth is not yet firm, and the internal impetus driving growth needs to be 
increased. Risks and hidden dangers still exist in public finance and banking; some 
industries are heavily burdened by excess production capacity; and the exercise of 
macro-controls has become more difficult. Increasing agricultural output and rural 
incomes is becoming more difficult. Air, water and soil pollution is severe in some places, 
and the task of conserving energy and reducing emissions remains arduous.”  
Interestingly, 2014 had seen the PRC’s economic growth fall to the lowest levels 
for twenty years (7.4 percent), leading the CPC to revise and reduce growth targets 
(BBC, 2019; see Appendix 2); despite this, although noticeable in Li’s references to the 
need to pursue economic growth within his speeches, Li did still identify declaring war on 
pollution as one of his nine key tasks when he opened the annual meeting of parliament 
that year. This marked a clear change in the way that environmental protection was 
being elevated whilst growth targets were being reduced (Albert and Xu, 2016; BBC 
2019; and Reuters, 2014; see Appendix 2). 
In addressing the negatives of the current environmental conditions throughout 
the PRC, Li (2014a:8) argued how: “Some of these problems have arisen in the course 
of development and others have occurred because we have not done our work well 
enough. The government must first examine itself to identify the causes of these 
problems and work out ways to resolve them. It must follow people’s wishes in 
exercising governance. We must firmly bear in mind our duties and mission, increase our 
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sense of vigilance against potential dangers, be eager to take on challenges, work 
tirelessly and effectively to solve problems, and truly live up to people’s expectations.” 
Statements that place the blame for the PRC’s poor environmental conditions on the 
CPC’s leadership and governance are incredibly rare within their rhetoric. Of importance 
is to highlight how, alongside the rhetoric creating space to criticise the CPC’s 
leadership, Li also uses negatively framed, or trauma, emotion-words and emotion-
phrases to support the CPC’s rightful claim as leaders. Despite some errors, Li argues 
that in supporting ecological civilisation as their mission – despite it being a mission that 
is wrought with future trials and tribulations – the CPC exhibit their rightful claim to 
leadership. 
 However, blame and responsibility is not limited to the CPC, Li (2014a:26) in his 
speech at the Second Session of the Twelfth National People’s Congress, stated: 
“Ecological conservation and environmental protection benefit future generations. 
Governments at all levels and the whole society should act more vigorously to protect 
the land our lives depend on.” Li clearly states it is the responsibility of everyone, 
regardless of position, to work towards protecting the environment. This statement is 
notable, because it clearly contradicts a plethora of statements made, not only by Li, but 
also throughout the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric as a whole. A very strong 
argument is made, using trauma emotions, to support the PRC as currently existing 
within the status of a developing nation. This is in contrast to the chosenness and glory 
emotions elsewhere within the rhetoric, which purports positive images of a singular 
civilised State, coming together via their superior wisdom and culture, and shared 
conception of the world, disseminated via ecological civilisation. 
 Li’s (2014a:9) statements, that claim developing nation status, range from: 
“China is still a developing country in the primary stage of socialism, and development 
remains the key to solving all our country’s problems.”; to “China is still a developing 
country. We must give top priority to economic development. Only development will 
deliver progress. Ultimately, it is only development that will resolve all the problems in 
China. We cannot advance without changing the growth model, nor can we advance 
without adequate development” (Li, 2014a:4-5); and “China remains the biggest 
developing country in the world. Development is of overriding importance. It holds the 
key to resolving all issues in China. What we aim for is development that is scientific, 
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quality-based, efficient and sustainable”, which was stated by Li (2015b:4) at the 9th 
Annual Meeting of the New Champions. All of these statements made by Li follow on 
from the international recognition that the PRC had overtaken Japan to become the 
second-largest economy in the world (BBC 2019; see Appendix 2). 
 Li’s rhetoric also used trauma-based emotion-metaphors to describe how the 
CPC are tackling their environmental governance domestically. For example, Li 
(2014a:25) stated: “We will declare war against pollution and fight it with the same 
determination we battled poverty.” Li elevates the fight against pollution to the previous 
war on poverty, which is also seen in Zhou’s rhetoric. Overall, Li’s statements vary from 
harnessing glory emotion in describing the PRC’s achievements, to trauma emotions to 
defend the claim of developing country status; both of which are utilised to support the 




Trauma Emotions in Zhou Shengxian’s Rhetoric 
 
Zhou’s rhetoric used trauma emotions to depict the dreadful state of 
environmental conditions within the PRC, for example, Zhou used the word “grave” 
during the Thirteenth World Lake Conference (Zhou, 2009:1 and 9), within his Prepared 
for the Deciding Battle, Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path 
to Environmental Protection speech, at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental 
Protection (Zhou, 2011b:11-12 and 19), in his Strive for Innovation and Actively Explore 
New Path to Environmental Protection speech, for the 2011 New Year Address (Zhou, 
2011a:1), and during the 2011 National Conference on environmental Protection (Zhou, 
2011b:16). Other frequently utilised trauma emotion-words and emotion-phrases 
included: “daunting” (Zhou, 2010b:19 and 2012c:3); “onerous” (Zhou, 2011b:15); “thorny 
problems” (Zhou, 2011b:20); and “arduous” (Zhou, 2009a:3 and 2009b:3).  
Zhou (2011g:3), during his Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological 
Civilisation Research and Promotion Association speech, implored how, “The prospect 
for developing ecological civilization is colorful, but the process towards it is full of 
hardship. I hope that we could be tenacious, full of passion and sense of responsibility, 
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guide the awareness and behaviors of the society with your wisdom and painstaking 
efforts, and make new and greater contributions to the balanced economic and social 
development and the harmonious co-existence between man and nature [sic]”. Similar is 
when Zhou (2014c:17) stated that “[t]here is no end for development, and neither is the 
building of ecological civilization [sic]” straightforward during his speech at the National 
On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation. 
In a number of speeches Zhou devoted considerable attention to listing the 
negative reality of the PRC’s current environmental situation. For example, from the 
2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2010b:11-12) lists: 
 
While recognizing our achievements, we should also be clearly aware of 
the grave situation of environmental protection beset by many difficulties 
and challenges. First, environmental pollution remains serious. In spite 
of improvement of environmental quality in some areas, the overall trend 
of worsening environment has not been fundamentally contained. 
Second, the pressure of pollution reduction keeps mounting rather than 
easing. As the economy shows stronger momentum of recovery, more 
production capacity will be released, generating more pollution and even 
leading to a comeback of eliminated production capacity, equipment and 
companies. Third, potential environmental problems keep on emerging. 
The long-standing pollution from heavy metal and persistent organic 
pollutants loomed large and new pollution like haze in big cities and city 
clusters begin to stand out. Environmental accidents shoot up with 
higher occurrence of major environmental events. Fourth, environmental 
capacity building lagged behind. Improvement is needed in the 
development and implementation of the three systems for pollution 
reduction, so it is with capacity building in environmental supervision 
which still can not meet the need of the environmental tasks. Fifth, we 
should enhance the implementing capacity of staff. Some colleagues are 
flippant and lack sense of responsibility, creativity and pushingness. We 
must pay high attention to these problems and solve them through 
careful study [sic].  
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The overall effect of this section is one of no hope without serious dedication and hard 
work. It is hard to see a solution to such a negative outlook on the PRC’s environmental 
future. The contrast between the negatives of the environmental situation and glorified 
promises of what the CPC claim to be able to deliver through their ecological civilisation 
is stark. 
Zhou also uses trauma emotions to appease the public by addressing the 
concerns in their health as a top priority, for instance, Zhou (2014a:4), during the 2014 
National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, directed the MEP to consider how: 
“The top priority of our environmental work should be focused on solving prominent 
problems harmful to people’s health, such as air, water and soil pollution.” Recognising 
the trilogy of pollution concerns – air, water and soil – can be considered especially 
poignant due to the PRC’s internationally acknowledged environmental disasters in the 
previous year, such as the “Airpocalypse” and the 7500 pig carcasses found within the 
Huangpu River (Albert and Xu, 2016; Jin, Anderson and Zhang, 2016; and Zuo, 2013; 
see Appendix 2). At times, in Zhou’s (2014c:1-2) rhetoric, the sole basis for working 
towards ecological civilisation is a means of showing respect to the Chinese citizens, to 
try and meet their needs, as can be seen in the following excerpt from his speech at the 
National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation: “Building ecological 
civilization concerns the well-being of the people and the future of the nation… We must 
keep sober-minded in recognizing the importance and necessity of strengthening the 
building of ecological civilization and make up our mind to control pollution and create a 
better environment with a great sense of responsibility for the people and our future 
generations [sic].” 
Zhou, similar to Li Keqiang, also used trauma emotions to create a status 
differentiation between the PRC and developed countries. Zhou (2011b:18-19) at the 
2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection, argued the CPC must follow a 
uniquely Chinese way to achieve their future environmental governance: “China cannot 
follow and cannot afford following the old development path of western countries 
featuring "treatment after pollution", "economic growth at the cost of the environment" 
and "focusing on end-of the-pipe treatment". In his 2012 speech for World Environment 
Day, Zhou (2012c:1) also stated: “We will definitely not take the old path of developed 
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countries by giving priority to economic development and remedying the environment 
afterwards, instead, we will actively explore new path for environmental protection in 
China which is characterized by optimizing the economic development through the 
protection of the environment [sic]”. Making statements about not following the approach 
of others seems especially cogent on World Environment Day. 
Finally, Zhou uses an extensive number of war metaphors, both within the text of 
his speeches, but also within his titles too. The extent of war metaphors used strongly 
implicated how seriously Zhou considered the levels of pollution and the kind of 
response necessary to appease the situation. Of interest is how the CPC’s use of 
emotion through references to war within the dataset was never to incite glory; the use of 
war metaphors, as can be seen in Table 3 below, are embedded within trauma emotions 
to highlight how much hard work will be needed for the PRC to become an ecological 
civilisation. 
 
War Metaphor Source 
“Instead of being sluggish, we are gearing up for a 
fight.”  
Zhou (2007:3) Focusing on Pollution 
Reduction and Rehabilitating Rivers and 
Lakes. Speech at the 2007 Annual General 
Meeting. 
“Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New 
Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to 
Environmental Protection” [Speech Title]. 
Zhou (2010b:1) Prepared for the Deciding 
Battle, Devising New Development and 
Actively Exploring a New Path to 
Environmental Protection. Speech at the 
2010 National Conference on 
Environmental Protection. 
“The building of ecological civilization is the soul 
and orientation of environmental protection, which 
in turn serves as the major battlefield and 
fundamental step [sic].”  
Zhou  (2010b:13) Prepared for the Deciding 
Battle, Devising New Development and 
Actively Exploring a New Path to 
Environmental Protection. Speech at the 
2010 National Conference on 
Environmental Protection. 
“Only with perseverance can we win the battle. 
Therefore, we must make more effort in pollution 
reduction this year, offsetting the newly generated 
emissions and strive for a complete victory.”  
Zhou (2010b:21) Prepared for the Deciding 
Battle, Devising New Development and 
Actively Exploring a New Path to 
Environmental Protection. Speech at the 
2010 National Conference on 
Environmental Protection. 
“First, we must fight bravely in the deciding battle of 
pollution reduction and facilitate economic 
restructuring through counterforce mechanism.”  
Zhou (2010d:2) Explore a New Path to 
Environmental Protection and Promote 
Green Development. Speech for World 
Environment Day. 
“We are also soberly aware that China's Zhou (2013c:12) Speech at 2013 National 
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environment is still in serious conditions. We should 
have not only the sense of urgency to fight a 
tenacious battle, but also the full mental 
preparation for a protracted war.”  
Work Meeting on Environmental Protection. 
“We should get prepared for a tenacious battle as 
well as a protracted war. To fight a tenacious battle 
is to follow the three-step requirements and do a 
good job in monitoring and releasing information of 
PM2.5. To fight a protracted war is to promote the 
air pollution control and effectively improve the 
quality of the environment by focusing on PM2.5. 
The control of PM2.5 is a systematic project which 
requires the coordination of relevant departments 
and the whole society to act together to form a 
broad “green united front”.” 
Zhou (2013c:12) Speech at 2013 National 
Work Meeting on Environmental Protection. 
“Get Prepared for Three Battles While Declaring 
War against Pollution.” [Speech title]. 
Zhou (2014b:1) Get Prepared for Three 
Battles While Declaring War Against 
Pollution. Public Address on Environmental 
Protection Work. 
“This year’s work report of the government states 
that we will declare war against pollution as what 
we did to poverty.”  
Zhou (2014b:1) Get Prepared for Three 
Battles While Declaring War Against 
Pollution. Public Address on Environmental 
Protection Work. 
 “To resolutely declare war against pollution is an 
inevitable choice if we are to overcome the 
environmental problems in China.” 
Zhou (2014b:1) Get Prepared for Three 
Battles While Declaring War Against 
Pollution. Public Address on Environmental 
Protection Work. 
“All the staff of the national environmental system 
are the main force of the war against pollution. We 
must fight each battle with tough spirit and show 
the people the resolution of the government so they 
will raise their hope for the settlement of 
environmental problems.”  
Zhou (2014b:1) Get Prepared for Three 
Battles While Declaring War Against 
Pollution. Public Address on Environmental 
Protection Work. 
“To resolutely declare war against pollution is a 
forceful demonstration of China’s image as a big 
and responsible country.” 
Zhou (2014b:1) Get Prepared for Three 
Battles While Declaring War Against 
Pollution. Public Address on Environmental 
Protection Work. 
“The fourth is to create a work system to improve 
environmental quality by taking the three 
Zhou (2014c:10) Open up a New Situation 
for Demonstration Zone of Building 
Ecological Civilization under the Guidance 
of Important Instructions of Central 
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successful battles against air, water and soil 
pollution as the priorities. This is the main 
battlefield of promoting ecological civilization 
progress… We should get prepared for a tough 
battle as well as a protracted war… we should 
adopt “iron discipline” and “iron hand” [sic].”  
Leaders. Speech at National On-Site 
Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation. 
“The above said four systems also serve as the 
guide to action, powerful weapon, organizational 
guarantee and important measures for fighting 
pollution. Our declaration of war on pollution 
reflects the wills of our Party, our State and our 
People. The promotion of ecological civilization 
building and the declaration of war on pollution are 
intrinsically consistent with each other and unite in 
the great practice of building a beautiful China and 
ushering in a new era of socialist ecological 
progress… In order to promote ecological progress 
and create a sound working and living environment 
for the people, we must declare war on pollution; 
only by declaring war on pollution can we 
overcome resource and environmental bottlenecks 
in our economic and social development, and 
thereby effectively promote the process of 
ecological civilization building [sic]” (2014c:11-12). 
Zhou (2014c:10) Open up a New Situation 
for Demonstration Zone of Building 
Ecological Civilization under the Guidance 
of Important Instructions of Central 
Leaders. Speech at National On-Site 
Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation. 
Table 3: Table of examples of war metaphors in Zhou Shengxian’s ecological civilisation 
rhetoric 
Zhou’s use of trauma emotion through war metaphors echoes the humiliation 
idioms discussed by Wang (2014); they draw upon memories of war and suffering 
throughout the Century of Humiliation (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; Volkan, 1997; van der 
Dennen, 2001; and Wang, 2007). However, this time, the CPC are the ones to be 
declaring war, war on pollution and environmental degradation. The CPC are calling the 
shots and taking the lead, the shared traumas of war can be used to harness a strong 
emotional response to support the CPC and their ecological civilisation concept (Elias, 
1985). Again, war metaphors utilise the emotion categories of unity and fighting together 
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for a just cause. For Zhou (2012d:1), throughout his ecological civilisation rhetoric, and 
as seen here in his Creating a Big Picture of Full Participation speech, there is a strong 
sense of urgency; it is now or never, for the sake of survival: “It is the right time to roll up 
our sleeves to build a beautiful China.” 
 
 
Trauma Emotions in the Rhetoric of the MEP and MFA 
 
The use of trauma emotions by ministers within the MEP occurred more 
frequently than did chosenness emotions or a glorifying of the CPC. Perhaps as a ripple 
effect from the overt use of negative emotion by Zhou Shengxian and his manifestation 
of war metaphors, the MEP’s Vice Ministers also repeated the word “grave” (Wu 
Xiaoqing, 2009; and Zhou Jian, 2018). For example, Zhou Jian (2018:2), in his speech at 
the 2018 National Working Conference on Environmental Protection, stated “we are 
sober-minded that the overall situation still remains grave”.  
Other statements by the MEP that captured this inherently negative mood 
included Wu Xiaoqing’s (2009:1 and 3) Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on 
Scientific Development speech, where he said: “At present, human beings are facing 
increasingly severe environmental problems with the deepening of industrialization and 
urbanization. Global climate change profoundly influences the survival and development 
of human beings and is a grave challenge confronting all countries in the world [sic]”; 
going on to add, “It can be seen that the resource and environment cost we have paid is 
huge and heavy… If the consumption amount of resources and energy as well as 
pollution emissions double, the consequences will be very serious and not tolerable”.  
 Contextualising the MFA’s rhetoric showed little overall use of trauma emotions. 
Liu Xiaoming (2017:6), Chinese ambassador to the UK, referred to the environmental 
conditions as being “daunting” and also argued in favour of the PRC needing to develop 
their own approach to environmental protection rather than following the status quo. The 
MFA also addressed status differentiation. Li Baodong (2016:1) labelled the PRC the 
“Largest developing country” and also favoured “The principle of "common but 
differentiated responsibilities" established by the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement”, 
arguing that they “must be upheld. All parties must step up efforts to fulfil their 
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commitments, and developed countries need to make good their pledge of annual 
contribution of USD100 billion by 2020, thus laying a solid foundation of mutual trust for 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement” (Liu Jieyi, 2017:1).  
 
 
Summary of Trauma Emotions 
 
 Contextualising the trauma emotions throughout the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric revealed a pattern of negative emotion being used to create a (flexible) status 
differentiation for the PRC. Memories of trauma from the Century of Humiliation were 
utilised to create a contrast, or social parameters, between the humiliation of traumas 
suffered in the past, as a weak and failing State, to the glories promised under continued 
supported CPC rule and their ecological civilisation concept set to further rejuvenate the 
PRC (similar uses of rhetoric are discussed by; Bially Mattern (2005); De Rivera (1992); 
Hutchison (2010); and Milliken (1999)). Trauma emotions were also used to highlight the 
severity of the PRC’s current environmental conditions, to show sympathy, 
acknowledgement and understanding by the CPC. Trauma emotions also helped to 
create a contrast between the traumas of following the “status quo” of environmentalism 
and the inherently superior approach of ecological civilisation, as well as highlighting the 





This chapter has presented the identification and contextualisation of the most 
frequently reoccurring themes and patterns of chosenness, glory and trauma emotions in 
the ecological civilisation rhetoric. In doing so, the consistencies in emotionally 
constructed messages throughout the CPC’s rhetoric have begun to emerge. A number 
of interesting interpretations of ecological civilisation are beginning to develop that 
warrant further examination. Contextualising chosenness highlighted the frequent use of 
the concept of a shared spirit, creating a shared identity through Chinese wisdom and 
culture. The use of glory emotions evoke ideas of the CPC as heroic leaders, creating a 
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power relationship between the government and the people; as well as depicting 
ecological civilisation as a miracle and a place of betterment. Finally, trauma emotions 
created a contrast between the memories of humiliations and weakness and the strength 
and glory the CPC’s promise in their improved global status via ecological civilisation.  
Overall, how the CPC is using emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric 
appears to furthering their concept of constructing a singular civilised State, especially 
through the use of carefully selected historical analogies, built upon chosen memories 
and chosen myths. The following three chapters will now explore these emerging 




Chapter 4: The Spirit of Ecological Civilisation: Constructing 
National Identity 
 
This chapter provides the first of three interpretations on how the CPC uses 
emotion within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. The interpretation is based on the 
contextualised themes and patterns highlighted within the previous chapter. This first 
interpretation considers how the CPC are discursively creating a national identity. 
Chapter 2 highlighted how identity creation via discursive emotion has been observed in 
a range of contexts, in particular how discursive emotion creates a shared identity within 
an in-group, an “Us” versus “Them” (Ahmed, 2015; Bially Mattern, 2005; De Rivera, 
1992; Elias, 1985; Hutchison, 2010; Koschut, 2017b; Leep, 2010; Milliken, 1999; Mitzen, 
2006; Risse and Ropp, 2013; and Steele, 2008). The contextualisation in Chapter 3 
identified the term “spirit” as intrinsically linked to ideas of tenacious hard-work, superior 
Chinese wisdom and shared uniquely-Chinese experiences; constructing a Chinese in-
group or national identity, formed through the CPC’s discursive construction of their 
latest take on environmental governance. 
With regards to identity and the PRC, there are many scholars within IR 
discussing how the CPC are constructing and grappling with new, confused or 
contradictory identities (Gries, 2004; Joniak-Lüthi, 2015; Liu, 2012; Lu and Gao, 2018; 
and Perry, 2015). The interpretation in this chapter draws upon the work of Wu (2012), 
who has argued that globalisation is a process whereby States vie for positions of 
recognised power; and with this recognition of power comes the ability to exert influence, 
economically, politically and militarily (or indeed, environmentally) on underdeveloped 
countries. Wu (2012) furthers that globalisation is thus a process of power and 
manipulation where the dominant cultural practises of the most powerfully recognised 
State forms a template that others strive towards. Wu (2012:2) argues this process has 
had a momentous impact on “identifying with the self” in the PRC and CPC’s politics: 
“The nexus between the self and the other has accompanied the entire process of 
constructing modern Chinese national-cultural identity.” This chapter, in considering the 
spirit of ecological civilisation, touches upon the notion of a “strong sense of self” in the 
PRC’s culture and politics, and the idea of a “strong sense of self” in other CPC political 
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narratives has received abundant attention within the literature (see; Callahan, 2012; 
Huang and Liu, 2018; Pye, 1967; and Wang, 2014). 
This chapter begins to consider how the CPC’s use of emotion in their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric discursively creates national identity through “identifying with the self” 
by focusing on Chinese wisdom, culture and shared experiences. This national identity is 
being designed in such a way that a new approach and understanding of environmental 
governance allows for further nation building and pride in the PRC as a State that is 
strong, progressive and singular; again, the rhetoric here is inferring notions of Wenming 
Guojia and Gramsci’s shared conception of the world (Ahearne, 2013; and Cartier, 
2013). It will be seen how the term “spirit” is intertwined with feelings of pride and 
charisma to support the CPC’s latest approach for domestic and global environmental 
governance. As with Callahan’s (2012:10) “structure of feeling”, (which acknowledges 
the interdependence of emotion with knowledge, personal experiences and institutional 
structures) a nexus of wisdom and Chinese philosophy, culture and character traits, as 
well as shared experiences of, and the institutions within, the PRC (and China), are also 
important in this new national identity construction within the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric and will be discussed below.  
This chapter follows Wu’s (2012) definition of identity as a process of recognition, 
distinction or comparison between an “Us” and “Them”. Wang’s (2014) application of the 
CMT-Complex to the PRC highlighted the importance of “Us” versus “Them” in the 
construction of Chinese identity in the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative: the 
selective choosing in the “Us” of hua, the splendid Han Chinese, versus the “Them” of yi, 
the barbarian “Others” (see also, Callahan, 2012 and 2013). The recognition of an “Us” 
provides a sense of self (Wu, 2012). Hegel’s (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit similarly 
argues the emergence of an “Other” is intertwined with the formation of the “Self”. The 
CPC’s notion of “spirit” was contextualised as being embedded within chosenness 
emotions as a symbol of identity, built on Chinese wisdom and culture, an innate and 
inevitable form of Chinese environmentalism and a product of the Chinese philosophies, 
in particular the Taoist dictum of Tianren heyi; implicitly highlighting the importance of 
the collective “Us” in the CPC’s rhetoric. 
This chapter is dedicated to exploring how the CPC’s use of emotion, in 
constructing the notion of a shared “spirit”, creates a national identity of 
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environmentalism to further their nation building process and distinguish ecological 
civilisation as uniquely Chinese; and in doing so considers how sustainable 
development, at times, has come to represent the “Other” of environmental governance. 
 
 
Identifying with the Self 
 
This section demonstrates how the spirit of ecological civilisation creates an 
identity for Chinese environmentalism with a global outlook. The CPC emotionally 
constructs spirit through references to shared Chinese wisdom, character traits and 
experiences. Hutchison (2010) argues identity construction provides a government with 
a tool for public engagement, so in constructing a desired identity the CPC can attempt 
to discursively “force” power to control and direct the creation and dissemination of their 
ecological civilisation (Foucault, 1980 and 1985; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018). Hansen, 
Li and Svarverud (2018:196) have argued that the CPC’s ecological civilisation 
“constitutes the most significant Chinese state-initiated imaginary of our global future”: 
emotion, as a tool in the CPC’s language-based social construction, draws attention to 
their intentions for future global environmental governance and what role they perceive 
the PRC and Chinese citizens playing in creating ecological civilisation. The importance 
of national identity to the CPC’s imagined future – based on the implementation of 
carefully chosen examples and analogies – of Chinese wisdom, culture and experiences, 
becomes apparent. How the shared spirit of ecological civilisation comes to embody a 
national identity through environmental governance can be seen throughout the 
following extracts.  
 
 
The Spirit of Chinese Wisdom For a New Environmental Governance 
 
Xi (2017e:10), in his speech closing the 19th National Congress, stated, 
“ecological civilization offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the 
problems facing mankind [sic].” In this short extract we see Xi implying three emotive 
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propositions: Chinese wisdom is good and should be shared; a Chinese approach to 
solving problems is necessary and is being developed; and Chinese wisdom developing 
a Chinese approach will help mankind. This not only suggests that the CPC’s 
environmental governance is intended for global outreach and that ecological civilisation 
is embedded within an identity of Chinese wisdom and culture, but also there is a sense 
of pride to be had in being Chinese, in Chinese wisdom and Chinese culture. The 
message is that everyone Chinese – through simply being Chinese and sharing Chinese 
wisdom and culture – is to be engaged with becoming an ecological civilisation. This is 
the underlying message carried throughout the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric in 
constructing a new national identity of Chinese competence in providing a better 
alternative environmental governance. 
The most frequently reoccurring example of Chinese wisdom chosen in 
constructing both ecological civilisation and national identity is Tianren heyi. Hu Jintao 
(2007:6) in his closing speech at the 17th National Congress describes this Chinese 
wisdom as “spectacular”. Similarly, Xi Jinping (2018b:4), at the closing meeting of the 
13th National People’s Congress; Li Keqiang (2014a:8) during the 12th National People’s 
Congress; and Zhou Shengxian (2007:3), at the Annual General Meeting of the MEP, 
each refer to Tianren heyi as an example of the “splendid Chinese culture” and the 
general “wisdom” of the Chinese. Again, the CPC are drawing attention to Chinese 
wisdom and directing feelings of pride towards this specifically chosen example of 
ancient Chinese philosophical understandings of environmental governance. 
Zhou Shengxian (2009b:2), at the 13th World Lake Conference, described 
ecological civilisation as a “higher-level” of environmental protection due to their 
understanding of “harmony between man and nature”. Furthermore, during his speech at 
the 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2013c:1-2) implies 
Tianren heyi embodies the “distinct characteristics” that distinguishes the Chinese 
approach to environmentalism from the approaches of developed States, “Them”, the 
Other(s). Tianren heyi is woven throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric to create a 
structure of feeling in being proud of Chinese wisdom and Chinese environmental 
understandings, distinguishing ecological civilisation as a Chinese alternative to 
environmental governance. Hansen, et al. (2018) argue Tianren heyi is used by the CPC 
to constitute a broader moral guide, a shared symbol, instilling the appropriate 
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understanding and acknowledgement of civil behaviour and attitudes towards being an 
environmentally friendly PRC in a “Chinese way”.  
Zhou Shengxian (2011f:1), at the 2011 National Work Meeting on Environmental 
Protection, stated: “To promote ecological civilization and harmony between man and 
nature is a great responsibility granted to environmental work by the overall situation of 
social and economic development in the new time and is the soul of environmental 
cause in this era [sic].” Zhou’s statement elevates Chinese wisdom as the means of 
promoting ecological civilisation through their understandings of harmony between man 
and nature. Zhou claims utilising this Chinese wisdom is to be seen as a “great 
responsibility” and is creating a new era of Chinese-led environmentalism. The identity 
construction takes Tianren heyi and promotes it as the soul of this new era based upon 
superior Chinese knowledge of environmental governance; the Chinese wisdom behind 
the CPC’s latest environmental initiative is the great responsibility of the PRC and is 
elevating the PRC in a new era of environmental governance. Tianren heyi is used to 
create the PRC’s national identity as an environmentally friendly and harmonious State 
(inciting notions of becoming Wenming Guojia via a singular shared conception of the 
world, in particular of environmental governance) leading a new era via environmental 
governance. 
Similarly, at the 2009 forum on World Environment Day, Zhou (2009a:1) had 
stated: “As a form of human civilization, ecological civilization is established under the 
premise of our knowledge of the rule of nature, respect and conservation of nature. It 
aims to realize harmonious co-existence between man and nature, among human 
beings, and between man and society based on the carrying capacity of environment 
[sic].” Zhou’s rhetoric makes explicit how the Chinese wisdom of harmony between man 
and nature is the foundation of the identity within the CPC’s ecological civilisation 
rhetoric and that now is the right time to redeploy this knowledge, understanding and 
approach to governance. Zhou Shengxian, as the inaugural minister of the MEP (under 
both Hu Jintao’s and Xi Jinping’s leadership), demonstrates a consistency in the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, especially in his 2009 and 2013 speeches quoted above; 
the CPC’s message is clear and consistent, ecological civilisation is based on Chinese 
wisdom, and Chinese wisdom is helping to construct a national identity of superior 
environmental governance, which will help mankind.  
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Implicitly embedded throughout the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, such as 
within the former extracts from Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian, are insinuations that 
bring to mind the traditional thought of Huaxia (华夏), the belief that “foreigners have 
different minds” (Wu, 2012:3). This is inferred through the repeated references to an 
“Us” versus “Them” relationship where the Chinese wisdom, such as that of Tianren 
heyi, of ecological civilisation constitutes a new Chinese alternative to environmental 
understanding and governance. Although Sino-centric in creation, especially with 
regards to Chinese wisdom, as Xi’s extract above demonstrated, ecological civilisation is 
outward-focused in implementation. Ecological civilisation is a means of presenting and 
disseminating to the global stage this Chinese alternative to environmental governance. 
The “Chineseness” of ecological civilisation, as opposed to “Otherness” in the origin of 
sustainable development, is frequently embedded within the CPC’s rhetoric and will be 
discussed later within this chapter.  
This is distinctly included within Xi Jinping’s (2018b:8) closing speech, at the 13th 
National People’s Congress, where he stated: “China will contribute more Chinese 
wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese strength to the world, to push for building an 
open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, 
and common prosperity.” Similarly, during Zhou Shengxian’s (2013c:1) 2013 speech, 
from the National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection, he stated: “Ecological 
civilization is a great contribution of the Party in promoting the progress of human 
civilization. This is accomplished by fully absorbing the traditional culture and wisdom of 
the Chinese nation and reflecting on the defects of industrial industrialization and current 
development model. It is the distillation and expansion of sustainable development as a 
result of the Party’s deep understanding toward the new global trend of going green and 
low carbon [sic].” Both of these extracts distinguish ecological civilisation as a new 
alternative, especially due to the foundation of the concept in Chinese wisdom. Xi and 
Zhou both continue to express a sense of pride in Chinese wisdom providing an 
alternative understanding and approach to environmental governance. Moreover, Zhou’s 
extract highlights how the approach of the “Other”, sustainable development and the 
defective industrialisation circulated by developed nations, is inferior: claiming that the 
CPC’s ecological civilisation distils and expands upon the concept. Therefore furthering 
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the national identity of Chinese superiority in environmental understanding and future 
governance. 
The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric is harnessing the spirit of Chinese 
wisdom to pursue continued nation building by claiming that ecological civilisation, as a 
global approach, will improve environmental governance. Li Keqiang (2014a:8) also 
conveys this argument, at the 12th National People’s Congress, when stating: “As the 
saying goes, great vision that makes a country prosper is but the result of collective 
wisdom. In other words, wisdom comes from the people. In the same line, the massive 
entrepreneurship and innovation by all, as I emphasized earlier, will generate enormous 
power… To use a Chinese idiom, the fire will burn higher when everyone adds wood to it 
[sic].” Li Keqiang suggests that when the CPC’s direction utilising shared Chinese 
wisdom (entrepreneurship and innovation) is collectively supported and followed by the 
people, it will amass in great power. The metaphor of a fire suggests the PRC’s future 
will be bright, hot, ferocious, all-encompassing, unstoppable, intense and a blazing force, 
if: the PRC comes together; follows the CPC leadership in constructing ecological 
civilisation; and utilises their shared Chinese wisdom and culture for strength, progress 
and unity.  
 
 
The Spirit of Chinese Culture and the Chinese Characteristics of Unity and Tenacity 
 
The CPC’s discursive construction of spirit creates an identity of an integrated 
unit through shared experiences working towards a common goal. This approach is 
reminiscent of Hall’s (2001) discussion of the invisible hand in Foucault’s theories on 
emotion and discourse (see Chapter 2) and has been used by the CPC for decades 
(Perry, 2015). As early as Mao’s Mass Line, unity amongst the people through selected 
shared experiences has been relied upon by the CPC as an organisational method 
(Dickson, 2016; and Perry, 2015). Elements of unity and shared experience continued to 
be used throughout the CPC’s rhetoric, and Dickson (2016) argues, in particular, that Xi 
Jinping is reviving the Mass Line within the concept of ecological civilisation. For 
example, during the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping (2018b:1-2) spoke of 
“national spirit”; and at the 2016 APEC CEO Summit (Xi, 2016b:1) a “spirit of 
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partnership”. These embody an identity (or structure of feeling) of tenacity through 
working together as a single united collective, reminiscent of previous Mass Line 
discourse (Callahan, 2012 and 2013).  
However, before Xi Jinping’s leadership, Hu Jintao (2007:6) also harnessed a 
spirit of unity and hard work; in Hu’s speech, closing the 17th National Congress, he 
compounds the ideas of Chinese unity, superiority and pride in stating how: “the Chinese 
Communists and the Chinese people have, in an indomitable enterprising spirit and with 
their spectacular practice of innovation, composed a new epic recounting the Chinese 
nation's ceaseless efforts to make progress and become stronger, and historic changes 
have taken place in the visages of the Chinese people, socialist China and the CPC.” Hu 
is utilising the spirit of Chinese wisdom and culture to warrant the CPC’s desire to further 
progress and strengthen the nation building process; a national identity of ceaseless 
progress, through collective wisdom and enterprising hard work. 
Xi Jinping expounds what chosen elements of Chinese wisdom and culture 
informs the spirit of ecological civilisation. Xi describes the Chinese spirit as peaceful, 
cooperative and respectful. He describes the shared spirit of the Chinese as hard 
working, talented and able, through emotive phrases, such as: “the spirit of driving the 
nail” at the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit (Xi, 2016a:2), as well as a  “spirit of 
struggle” (Xi, 2018b:2) and “spirit of pursuing dreams” (Xi, 2018b:3-4) at the 13th National 
People’s Congress. With regards to furthering unity and togetherness, Xi also uses 
phrases, such as: the “spirit of humanity” in a 2017 speech at the United Nations Office 
(Xi, 2017b:4); the “spirit of peace and cooperation” and the “spirit of mutual respect” at 
the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (Xi, 
2017c:2); and “I believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the 
great spirit of unity, we will definitely forge an unstoppable and invincible force”, which Xi 
stated at the 13th National People’s Congress (Xi, 2018b:3). How Xi describes the 
Chinese spirit is appropriate to the audience (be that domestic or international) that the 
speech is being delivered to; domestically Xi describes the spirit of struggle and dreams; 
two distinctively Chinese concepts or tropes, whereas internationally Xi describes the 
Chinese spirit as peaceful, cooperative and respectful, which is a more appropriate 
choice of spirit to present internationally. 
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Xi’s use of spirit repeatedly tells the Chinese citizens that they are hard working, 
innovative and implies a necessity of unity. Xi discursively directs the Chinese to be 
proud of their long history and culture (of environmental protection practises), to harness 
a new identity of pro-environmentalism, to support the CPC’s environmental governance 
for domestic development and improved reputation on the world stage. For instance, at 
the B20 summit in Hangzhou, Xi (2016a:9) claimed: “To seek harmony and coexistence 
is in the genes of the Chinese nation throughout history. It represents the very essence 
of Eastern civilization. China is committed to the path of peaceful development”; this not 
only furthers the collective identity through the shared “ancient civilization [sic]” (also 
referred to by Hu Jintao (2007:18) at the 17th National Congress), but also expresses the 
innate inevitability of furthering peaceful development through their shared culture and 
genetic heritage. Li Keqiang (2014a:21), at the 12th National People’s Congress, had 
also discursively embedded how this shared symbol of appropriate Chinese 
environmentalism is an example of how “Culture is the lifeblood of a nation.” The CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, by carefully choosing memories and analogies of the 
Chinese past, can be seen to be telling the PRC what it means to be “Us”, Chinese.  
Callahan (2012:195) argued that the National Patriotic Education Campaign was 
not just an “act of State censorship… [it] productively generates a particular type of 
patriotism by outlining, in detail, who Chinese can be – and who they can not be.” The 
CPC appear to be utilising the same discursive methods within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. For example, Xi Jinping (2018b:1-2), at the 13th National People’s 
Congress, stated: “The character and talent of the Chinese people have fostered the 
Chinese civilization with a history of thousands of years. It has also exerted a far 
reaching influence on the development of China and on the ethos of the Chinese people 
nowadays. The great national spirit, fostered, passed down and developed by the 
Chinese people during their long-term struggle, has offered a strong impetus for the 
development of China and the human civilization [sic].” Xi’s rhetoric embraces how 
Chinese history and culture over thousands of years has created the PRC of today; he is 
embedding this identity firmly within Chinese culture and within the sense of place that 
has become the PRC. Moreover, Xi explicitly includes that the Chinese people have 
triumphed over a long-term struggle, a chosen trauma to solidify and unify the people 
together against thousands of years of hardship. Thus tying the PRC to their Chinese 
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heritage, their geographical place and their historical culture to create unity and 
togetherness, a strong collective, able to begin exerting their ideas globally, to help 
human civilisation.  
Xi (2018b:2-3) goes on to add:  
 
The Chinese people are people with great spirit of struggle. Over the 
past thousands of years, the Chinese people have been discarding the 
old and introducing the new. Our pursuit of progress has never paused. 
We have developed and built an immense and beautiful country, and 
explored vast expanse of territorial seas. We have opened up extensive 
and productive cropland, reined in numerous rampant rivers, and 
overcome countless natural disasters. We have constructed towns and 
villages scattered all over the country and developed a complete range 
of industries. Varied and colorful lives have taken shape. The Chinese 
people have been aware since ancient times that we cannot sit idle and 
enjoy the fruits of others' work, and happiness can only be achieved 
through great endeavor. What the Chinese people have achieved stems 
from ingenuity and expertise, hard work, and enormous sacrifices. I 
believe as long as more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great 
struggling spirit, we will definitely fulfill the great goal of creating a better 
life [sic]. 
 
Xi refers to a strong impetus for: development, innovation, ingenuity and tenacious hard 
work; in overcoming struggles and sacrifice as the national characteristics of the 
Chinese in their pursuit of nation building. Xi utilises these carefully chosen character 
traits in creating this national identity of a united, strong and progressing country; the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric builds on and furthers this national identity as the CPC’s 
intended approach for furthering nation building and creating a better life.  
This national identity can be understood as a set of instructions from the CPC on 
how to be Chinese in the “new era” of CPC led (environmental) governance (Hu Baolin, 
2011; Hansen, et al., 2018; and Xi Jinping, 2017e:10 in his 19th National Congress 
report). When Xi (2017c:2) describes, at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road 
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Forum for International Cooperation, the Chinese character traits as “peaceful,” 
“cooperative” and “respectful”, as well as “hard working” and “brave”, at the 13th National 
People’s Congress (Xi, 2018b:4), these words are loaded compliments, they are a force 
of emotion, and come with expectations of how to be Chinese to enable ecological 
civilisation to become reality. Regardless of how his international audience engages with 
this description, it is also how Xi wishes the PRC to be perceived, especially ahead of 
any associated contracts connected to the Belt and Road Initiative.  
These instructions vary from the form of emotion, found in Hu Jintao’s conception 
of spirit as aligned with an identity of constant innovation, and “creativity” described by Li 
Keqiang (2015a:2) in his speech at the OECD Headquarters in 2015, as well as the 
overcoming of trials through hard work; to the force of emotion seen in the MFA’s claims 
for specific actions, such as working towards “global green and low carbon development” 
by Liu Jieyi (2017:2) speaking as the Chinese Mission to the UN in 2015. Zhou 
Shengxian (2013c:1-2) combines form and force, when, at the 2013 National Work 
Meeting on Environmental Protection, he stated: “The way to achieve ecological 
civilization relies on our effort to promote green development, low carbon technology and 
circular economy. It is a long-term and arduous process aiming at building a beautiful 
country [sic].” Zhou suggests the Chinese character traits of tenacity, hard work, 
ingenuity and innovation will provide the necessary strength, wisdom and unrelenting 
hard work needed to undergo the long-term and arduous process of transforming the 
PRC into an ecological civilisation; a State built on a social-cultural identity, driving the 
CPC’s desire for their Chinese State-led global future (Hansen, et al., 2018). 
  Similarly, in his National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation 
speech, Zhou (2014c:18) stated: “Guided by the important instructions made by the top 
leaders, we should carry forward the spirit of local creativity and actively explore the new 
approaches and new models of building ecological civilization, which are compatible with 
national and provincial reality and have local characteristics [sic].” Zhou’s statement 
demonstrates how the CPC’s rhetoric is designed to guide the people’s engagement 
with the CPC’s environmental governance, which in turn is uniquely embedded within 
local Chinese creativity, wisdom and culture. The emotional language of togetherness, 
unity and creativity, this chosenness within spirit, discursively constructs an identity to 
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provide an image of who the Chinese are and carries the message that the CPC will be 
offering important instruction on what is to be done all-over the PRC, and beyond. 
This identity of superior togetherness is an important aspect of how the PRC will 
become an ecological civilisation; Hu Jintao (2012:7-8) in his 18th National Congress 
report, claimed that the CPC need cohesive co-operation from the people to support 
their “powerful theoretical weapon” for future environmental governance. Xi Jinping 
(2017e:48), at the 19th National Congress, adds: “With this [the CPC’s theoretical 
understanding], we can restore the serenity, harmony, and beauty of nature.” At the 13th 
National People’s Congress, Xi (2018b:3) claimed: “I believe as long as more than 1.3 
billion Chinese people uphold the great spirit of unity, we will definitely forge an 
unstoppable and invincible force” and that “Today, the creativity of the Chinese people is 
being unleashed to an extent like never before, which has been enabling our country to 
develop rapidly and stride forward at the forefront of the world. I am confident that as 
long as the over 1.3 billion Chinese people keep on developing such great creativity, we 
will definitely create miracles one after another!” (Xi, 2018b:2). Finally, in his 19th 
National Congress Report, Xi (2017e:10) stated, “It will be an era that sees China 
moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind”. These 
extracts clearly disseminate that together, with shared characteristics of innovation and 
hard work, combined with their wisdom and culture, is creating a national identity of 
superior environmental governance and the CPC intends to deploy this Chinese wisdom 
to “better mankind”.  
 
 
The Spirit of Shared Experiences Through Chinese History 
 
The CPC’s rhetoric incorporates numerous references from a back-catalogue of 
chosen shared experiences through Chinese wisdom and culture over the millennia. 
These actions are linked to the physical place of China and Chinese history of 
environmental awareness. This lengthy example is from Zhou Shengxian, closing the 
National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation (2014d:3), where he used a 
number of historical analogies: 
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The Chinese civilization has been passed down for more than 5000 
years and accumulated rich ecological wisdom. In ancient China, there 
was strict seasonal limit on such activities as fishing fish and turtles and 
logging trees and reeds and offenders were subject to punishment (The 
Rites of Zhou). In The Huainanzi, there was the warning against draining 
the pond to catch fish and burning forest to hunt animals… As a result, 
there were flocks of cows and horses in the grassland, grains were sold 
at low price, no one picked up the lost articles on the street and the 
society was in peace and prosperity. From applying rehabilitation for 
economic purpose to using it for environmental protection, the strategy 
has been gradually evolved and enriched. Since reform and opening up, 
China has practiced a lot of measures to conserve nature such as 
converting farmland to forest, controlling grazing for rangeland 
restoration, fishing closure and prohibition and restricted logging of 
forests. These measures have produced good results... It will usher new 
development opportunities for China’s environmental protection [sic].  
 
As well as listing a number of chosen historical analogies to exemplify the CPC’s chosen 
understanding of shared Chinese wisdom and practice, there are a number of further 
emotional messages to be considered in Zhou’s extract. Zhou argues these good 
environmental protection practises show that Chinese innovation was not used to 
exhaust the environment, but rather to regulate and monitor human use of resources 
implying the good nature of the Chinese. This is another example of Laclau’s (2004) 
form and force of emotion, as it provides a good example, or prompt, for the importance 
of innovation in the CPC’s imagined pathway to the PRC’s future. Zhou is also arguing 
that good governance, when followed by the people (through a unity of agreed shared 
experience; a shared conception of the world leading on to create Wenming Guojia), 
even in times of austerity, created a flourishing and healthy environment where the 
Chinese people lived in harmony and eventual prosperity.  
Zhou not only suggests an identity of obedience, but also provides images of a 
peaceful and good quality life through Chinese environmental practise. Zhou finishes by 
arguing that the CPC is equally trying to promote good environmental governance and 
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has been, since the beginning of the reform and opening up period, subtly suggesting 
that the Chinese should again unite, agree with and support the CPC’s environmental 
governance now. Through Zhou’s use of chosen historical analogies, the excerpt fosters 
an identity of creativity, unity and pride in Chinese environmentalism, which over the 
millennia has founded a successful China. In harnessing this identity of Chinese wisdom 
and culture the CPC’s spirit of ecological civilisation is promoting a pathway to a 
rejuvenated and successful PRC in the future. 
Zhou Shengxian’s (2012d:1) focus on how national identity through ecological 
civilisation is rejuvenating the PRC is also seen in his earlier speech Creating a Big 
Picture of Full Participation. Zhou (2012d:1) uses emotive language that is based on 
praising the PRC as a physical place, such as: “A beautiful China reflects the beauty of 
the times, our society, people's life, the masses and our environment. This beautiful 
China is a harmonious society offering equal opportunity for people and sound and 
livable environment. Building a beautiful China is a systematic project which requires 
top-down design, clear direction, objectives and tasks and effective measures to 
advance the work step by step [sic].” “Beautiful China” embeds the PRC’s national 
identity into the history, culture and physical place of the PRC. Zhou’s rhetoric is again 
seen to direct the PRC on how to be Chinese in the twenty-first century, complimenting 
the Chinese people, Chinese culture and wisdom and describes the place that the PRC 
is set to become in following the CPC’s top-down nation building guidance.  
Xi Jinping’s (2016b:6) B20 Summit speech and his closing report at the 19th 
National Congress (2017e:6, 7, 10 and 21); Li Keqiang’s (2016a:3) speech at the First 
World Conference on Tourism for Development; Zhou Shengxian’s (2012d:1-2) Creating 
a Big Picture of Full Participation speech and his 2013 National Work Meeting statement 
(2013c4:20); and Liu Xioaming’s (2017:5) New Era, New Opportunity, New Future 
speech to the UK Business Community, all focus on how the creation of a “beautiful 
China”, through ecological civilisation, is based on Chinese wisdom and culture. The 
phrase “beautiful China” furthers the structure of feeling in being proud not only of being 
Chinese but also of the locality that is the PRC and its lengthy history as an ancient 
civilisation. In Wang’s (2014) construction of the PRC’s CMT-Complex, the idioms of 
glory and historic names for the PRC (Middle Kingdom, Kingdom Under Heaven) 
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demonstrated how important the physical geography of China is to the CPC’s broader 
discursive creation of identity.  
The PRC’s natural environment has been a crucial element of the CPC’s identity 
making within their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Li Keqiang (2016a:2), at the First 
World Conference on Tourism for Development, for example, stated: “China is a huge 
country. It has a long history, a splendid culture and enchanting natural scenery”. It is, 
therefore, unsurprising that the shared spirit of ecological civilisation is also reuniting and 
recreating a Chinese identity that is linked back to the physical landscape, geographical 
environment and cultural history of the PRC. It is the Chinese wisdom and culture, 
embedded within the physical place that is the PRC, or the Kingdom Under Heaven, that 
distinguishes ecological civilisation from sustainable development; ecological civilisation 
“is a path based on China’s realities” (Xi 2017:9:8, speech at the Opening Session of the 
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017), because “China is quite different from 
developed countries in national conditions, development stages, development objectives 
and tasks and problems to be solved. Therefore, it cannot repeat the denounced 
environmental history of the West” (Zhou, 2010b:13, 2010 National Conference on 
Environmental Protection speech). The “Othering” of sustainable development and 
developed countries can be seen to strengthen the national identity of ecological 
civilisation as a Chinese approach to Chinese realities. 
An alternative use of the shared experiences throughout the PRC touches upon 
the work of Hutchison (2010), who writes about how shared traumas can be utilised to 
create an identity for political cohesiveness and unity and this appears to be what Xi is 
doing in his rhetoric. Xi Jinping, throughout his rhetoric, creates a separation between 
“Us” the strong and united Chinese and “Them”, the foreign aggressors. The importance 
and necessity of constructing spirit as a shared identity for continued nation building 
draws upon the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative, which in turn carries countless 
emotive connotations (Callahan, 2012; and Wang, 2014). Within Xi Jinping’s (2018b:3) 
keynote speech at the 13th National People’s Congress, he makes direct appeals to the 
PRC for their support in the CPC’s nation building by using emotion focused on 
describing the PRC’s shared experiences, for example: 
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The Chinese people are people with great spirit of cherishing unity. Over 
the past thousands of years, the Chinese people have been united and 
stuck together through thick and thin. We have built a united country 
with various nationalities, developed harmonious relationships between 
56 diverse, interwoven ethnic groups, formed a big Chinese family 
where they keep watch for and help defend each other. Especially since 
modern times, in face of critical and grave foreign invasion, all ethnic 
groups stood hand in hand and fought heroically and painfully to defeat 
all extremely vicious invaders and safeguard the national independence 
and freedom, jointly drawing a magnificent epic of defending the 
Chinese nation against foreign aggression. Today, China, with all ethnic 
groups striving with one heart, has achieved extraordinary 
accomplishments. The Chinese people have learned from our own 
experience that only when we are united can we be strong and march 
forward, and a divided country will not progress. I believe as long as 
more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great spirit of unity, we 
will definitely forge an unstoppable and invincible force! 
 
How the CPC exploits an identity through creating the “Us” versus “Them”, which draws 
upon carefully chosen myths and memories from the narrative of rejuvenation from 
humiliation, in constructing ecological civilisation, for a new environmental governance 
will be discussed in the next section in greater detail. However, what is seen here is how 
the spirit of unity, through shared glories and traumas, captures the CPC’s intent on 
domestic development, in their rejuvenation from humiliation, but also begins to position 
the PRC for global (environmental) governance. National identity of unity, hard work and 
shared glories and traumas are unsurprisingly also embedded within the CPC’s latest 





Summary of the CPC’s Discursive National Identity Construction 
 
Agnew (2012) and Marinelli (2018) highlighted how there is a complexity in trying 
to understand the PRC as a single entity with a single identity: the diversity in 
geography, culture, ethnicity, economics and a vast array of social differences clearly 
creates a multiplicity of identities competing at any given time within the PRC (Nordin, 
2016). Regardless of this reality, what is predominantly seen in the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric is an attempt to portray the PRC as a singular civilised State 
(Wenming Guojia, 文名郭家); a State with a shared, timeless and uniquely Chinese 
understanding of environmentalism (Marinelli, 2018), and a State whose wisdom will 
help mankind. This thesis recognises that there is no single reality, identity or history of 
China or the PRC; however, this is not what the CPC attempt to reflect within their 
ecological civilisation rhetoric. Instead, the CPC are self-positioning the PRC, via their 
choice of (re)writing history in order to (re)create an imagined identity of pro-
environmentalism, an identity through the “Chinese Self” (Wu, 2012), of strength, 
progression and unity in the construction of a shared Chinese spirit for ecological 
civilisation. 
Hansen, et al. (2018:197) argue that the CPC’s ecological civilisation is a “means 
of social control combined with the populations heightened environmental 
consciousness” necessary for the CPC to reach their imagined future of greater global 
environmental governance, thus creating a new identity as to who the Chinese are in the 
twenty-first century. As Callahan (2012:208) argued, the PRC’s future is a future based 
upon Chinese knowledge production and sharing this knowledge to influence the world.  
We have seen how the identity of a spirit of ecological civilisation is heavily 
studded with Laclau’s (2004 and 2018) form of emotion and Foucault’s (1977, 1980 and 
1985) “invisible hand” through strategic formations as a discursive exertion of power 
(Hall, 2001), to disseminate the CPC’s chosen construction of Chinese wisdom and 
culture throughout their ecological civilisation rhetoric. Force of emotion is also present 
where Chinese character traits are highlighted for how the Chinese ought to act, in 
sharing the spirit of ecological civilisation that is in their genes (Foucault, 1977, 1980 and 
1985; and Laclau, 2004 and 2018).  
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Hutchison (2010) argues how ecological civilisation is not only a message to the 
PRC, but also a message to the world. The basic tenant of the CPC’s spirit of ecological 
civilisation is that Chinese traditions, wisdom and culture – Chinese characteristics of 
tenacity, innovation and hard work – makes ecological civilisation different and able to 
help mankind. The CPC’s use of emotion, in harnessing the notion of a spirit of 
ecological civilisation, begins to self-position the PRC as heroic savours: their Chinese 
wisdom and culture will help mankind. The next section will consider how this national 
identity, in particular the construction of an “Us” versus “Them” of ecological civilisation 
and sustainable development, dismisses what Agnew (2012) has called a “timespace” 
identity crisis in the CPC’s environmental politics. 
 
 
Negotiating The “Us” of Ecological Civilisation Versus The “Them” of 
Sustainable Development 
 
How the CPC discursively represent ecological civilisation and sustainable 
development plays an important role within their national identity construction throughout 
the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Agnew (2012) suggests the CPC are drawing upon 
ideas from abroad in their latest environmental governance, which has raised questions 
over whether ecological civilisation and sustainable development are two concepts of 
differing political ecologies, or whether ecological civilisation is just the Chinese label for 
sustainable development, or sustainable development with “Chinese characteristics” 
(Goron, 2018). However, what the remainder of this chapter demonstrates is that, 
regardless of any similarities within practical environmental policy implementation, the 
ability for the CPC to discursively highlight and foster “Chineseness” within their own 
environmental governance concept is of great importance. The strategic importance of 
the CPC referring to both ecological civilisation and sustainable development throughout 
their rhetoric affords the CPC to “Other” sustainable development, which in turn allows 
the CPC to further their national identity of superiority in strength, progression and unity 
through the Chinese wisdom and culture of ecological civilisation. 
Agnew (2012:302) argued that the CPC faces an uncertain position, which 
“erase[s] the significance of China’s past for the country’s leaders and population as they 
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come to terms with their new place in the world.” Furthering, that the CPC’s 
(aforementioned) metaphorical crossroad is a product of the reform and opening up 
policies, suggesting “China’s opening to the world represents a “timespace crisis” in the 
sense that China can no longer be set in an eternally present and geographically 
contained world but must be increasingly externally oriented and dynamic, drawing ideas 
both from abroad but also from what had been “lost” with the official disavowal of the 
past China from before the 1949 Revolution” (Agnew, 2012:302). However, what the 
chosenness emotions contextualised and analysed above highlight is the continued 
importance of not only Chinese wisdom, culture and geographical place, but especially 
Chinese history in the in CPC’s careful selecting of glories and traumas within their 
discursive construction of national identity.  
Agnew (2012) suggested that the PRC currently exists in a situation of unknown, 
uncertain and changing identity, with no clear understanding of what future the PRC is 
heading towards. This line of argument is often applied to ecological civilisation, 
dismissing the concept as “purely face. It’s talk” (Goron, 2018; and Vanderklippe, 
2017:1). Although the PRC is transitioning, the CPC addresses uncertainty in identity 
through emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric, expressing the importance of 
history, traditional thought and the geographical space of the PRC to the CPC. Although 
the PRC does currently exist within a place of global political uncertainty, this has 
created an opportunity for the CPC to undergo “a fundamental redefinition” of who the 
PRC is, what their position in the world is and therefore what it also means to be 
Chinese (Agnew, 2012). With regards to (global) environmental governance, this 
increasingly means to follow the CPC’s concept of ecological civilisation rather than 
“blindly following” the internationally constructed concept of sustainable development. 
This section considers how the CPC’s rhetoric uses emotion to deal with the 
apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the idea of a uniquely Chinese 
ecological civilisation, and on the other hand, the broader international discourse of 
sustainable development. This argument is founded on the notion that ecological 
civilisation represents the in-group or the “Us” of the Chinese approach to environmental 
governance, whereas sustainable development represents the out-group of “Them” the 
developed nations.  
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Wu (2012) argued China’s self-superiority and self-proclaimed hierarchy, where 
the Middle Kingdom was pinnacle, came to an abrupt end at the start of the Century of 
Humiliation. China was forced to become part of the worldwide modernisation drive, and 
as part of this process, was presented with a much stronger “Other”: the Imperial powers 
(Callahan, 2012; Gries, 2014; Wang, 2014; and Wu, 2012). This stronger “Other” has 
continued to exert influence over the PRC through international treaties, organisations 
and tariffs throughout the twentieth and now early twenty-first centuries (Wu, 2012). 
Sustainable development is the Western initiated, imposed and led approach to global 
environmental governance, and is discursively used by the CPC, at times, to represent 
the unfair environmental traumas faced by the PRC that have helped create their 
reduced status on the world stage. Ecological civilisation is a statement of the PRC’s 
environmental rejuvenation and method of recovering status, the CPC are constructing a 
Chinese response that reflects the PRC’s “realities” rather than utilising the approach of 
the West. Although sustainable development exists within the rhetoric in a number of 
ways, this flexibility in approach to, and the use of, sustainable development ought not 
be considered as an example of the CPC facing an “identity crisis” in their approach to 
environmental governance (Agnew, 2012; and Marinelli, 2018). There are five key 
reasons for this.  
Firstly, ecological civilisation is a relatively new concept of environmental 
governance having only been introduced by Hu Jintao in 2007; it builds on earlier CPC 
leaders’ efforts to embed sustainable development in China’s environmental discourse: 
ecological civilisation only became the CPC’s leading political ecology in 2012. 
Secondly, Jiang Zemin introduced his political ecology – Sustainable Development 
Strategy – having borrowed and built upon the concept of sustainable development as a 
pre-existing internationally accepted term and approach to environmental governance. 
The phrase “sustainable development” has therefore existed within the CPC’s 
environmental governance discourse since 1992. Thirdly, both ecological civilisation and 
sustainable development coexist within the CPC’s rhetoric, but as two distinctly different 
political ecologies and approaches; ecological civilisation is a new and uniquely Chinese 
approach whereas sustainable development is utilised as an approach with 
internationally agreed standards and targets. Fourth, sustainable development is 
deployed within the ecological civilisation rhetoric as an approach that is denounced, 
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which further glorifies and supports ecological civilisation as a Chinese approach to 
environmental governance. Finally, sustainable development is also, at times, glorified 
as a means of developing “friendship” and cooperation on the world stage in 
environmental governance.  
The use of both ecological civilisation and sustainable development within the 
CPC’s rhetoric can be seen to have a number of strategic uses and does not represent 
an identity crisis. How the CPC negates ecological civilisation and sustainable 
development in their national identity construction will now be discussed further. 
 
 
Sustainable Development: The “Denounced” Approach of “Them” 
 
Contextualising the use of emotion throughout the CPC’s ecological civilisation 
rhetoric highlighted patterns where sustainable development is considered unsuitable for 
the PRC’s unique modernisation experiences, “denounced” as an inferior approach and 
does not speak to the national identity under construction as it does not utilise Chinese 
culture, wisdom or experiences. Presenting sustainable development in this way draws 
upon the argument of “destructive Western industrial civilisation” (Gongye Wenming, 工
业文明) and presents ecological civilisation as a utopian, but achievable, alternative 
(Hansen, et al., 2018; and Pan, 2003). 
The process of “Othering” sustainable development, as an approach that has 
fallen short in addressing the environmental issues across the PRC, was initiated by Hu 
Jintao in the earliest speech within the dataset: his 17th National Congress Report. Hu, 
starts the CPC’s transition away from sustainable development, as a borrowed 
international approach, and argues a move towards an ideologically and ethically 
different approach is required. Ideological and ethical are captured within the CPC’s 
construction of ecological civilisation through being a Chinese alternative to 
environmental governance discursively based on Chinese wisdom and culture. Hu Jintao 
(2007:5-6) uses negative emotion terms to describe how the environmental approach 
taken thus far by the CPC, the approaches of the Sustainable Development Strategy 
and Scientific Development, which were guided by the internationally agreed principles 
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of sustainable development, are implicitly said to have caused a high-cost to the 
environment and created imbalances in development: 
 
While recognizing our achievements, we must be well aware that they 
still fall short of the expectations of the people and that there are still 
quite a few difficulties and problems on our way forward. The 
outstanding ones include the following: Our economic growth is realized 
at an excessively high cost of resources and the environment. There 
remains an imbalance in development between urban and rural areas, 
among regions, and between the economy and society. It has become 
more difficult to bring about a steady growth of agriculture and continued 
increase in farmers' incomes… More efforts are needed to promote 
ideological and ethical progress [sic]. 
 
Hu’s rhetoric not only sympathises with the Chinese people by recognising the degraded 
state of, and inequality faced through, the PRC’s environment, but also admits that there 
are difficulties and problems left unanswered with regards to the PRC’s environmental 
conditions. Regardless of how ineffective the CPC’s attempts of environmental 
governance had been, rather than admit poor effort, the CPC are utilising the traumas of 
shared environmental experience to create a platform of national identity construction 
through ecological civilisation. One way this is achieved is by blaming environmental 
failures on the pre-existing approaches, those linked to sustainable development. Hu 
does this by explicitly directing the PRC to recognise the achievements made thus far by 
the CPC. Hu then lists the shared environmental difficulties and traumas experienced, 
and finally Hu suggests the CPC’s intentions of developing ecological civilisation as an 
alternative approach, one that promotes more ethical and ideological progress.  
The phrase “ecological civilisation” is not explicitly used within this extract; 
however, it is presented later within the 17th National Congress Report, where the 
concept of an ecological civilisation is first officially introduced within CPC rhetoric. Hu 
Jintao goes on to present ecological civilisation as the new ethical and ideological 
approach to environmental governance, initiating the national identity construction seen 
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through the Chinese spirit of culture and wisdom, referring to the superior ideology and 
morals of the chosen historical dictum of harmony between man and nature.  
Hu Jintao first distinguishes ecological civilisation as an ethical and ideological 
alternative to sustainable development, the construction of “Us” versus “Them”; 
however, it is in Zhou’s rhetoric where sustainable development comes to be denounced 
as unsuitable for the PRC. Perhaps the clearest example of this can be seen in the 
following extract from Zhou Shengxian’s Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New 
Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection speech, 
given at the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection. Zhou (2010b:13) 
claims: “China is quite different from developed countries in national conditions, 
development stages, development objectives and tasks and problems to be solved. 
Therefore, it cannot repeat the denounced environmental history of the West that 
redressing the environment after pollution and seeking economic growth at the expense 
of environment. What we need to do is to find a new way out and keep on making 
innovations in a bid to explore a new path that combines environmental protection with 
economic development [emphasis added].” Zhou Shengxian denounces sustainable 
development, the environmental governance produced from the West’s environmental 
history, and argues an alternative approach must be sought. 
 In the following year, at the 2011 National Conference on Environmental 
Protection, Zhou Shengxian (2011b:18-19) further extrapolated how: “China cannot 
follow and cannot afford following the old development path of western countries 
featuring "treatment after pollution", "economic growth at the cost of the environment" 
and "focusing on end-of the-pipe treatment” [emphasis added]”, which draws upon his 
2010 speech Explore a New Path to Environmental Protection and Promote Green 
Development for world Environment Day, where he stated how the: “Escalating 
hostilities between man and nature imposes unprecedented obstacle[s] to development, 
which provokes human awareness of environmental issues and explorations to a new 
path to development” (Zhou, 2010d:1). Zhou’s rhetoric implies that the denounced 
environmental history of the West, in following their concept of sustainable development, 
has led to escalating hostilities between man and nature in the PRC; Zhou argues these 
hostilities have provoked the CPC’s awareness of the unsuitability of sustainable 
development for continued nation building, thus, to improve environmental conditions the 
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CPC’s quest of exploring for a new path for future development has led them to develop 
ecological civilisation. 
In Zhou’s (2012c:1) 2012 World Environment Day speech, he maintains: “We [the 
PRC] will definitely not take the old path of developed countries by giving priority to 
economic development and remedying the environment afterwards, instead, we will 
actively explore new path for environmental protection in China which is characterized 
by optimizing the economic development through the protection of the environment [sic] 
[emphasis added].” In Zhou’s 2012 speech, the new path of environmental protection, 
that of ecological civilisation, is explicitly outlined to be a nation building objective for 
furthering development of the PRC. Although clearly dismissing the “old path of 
developed countries”, Zhou’s attempt to define the PRC’s “new path” as optimising 
economic growth through protecting the environment is barely distinguishable from the 
official Brundtland Report’s (1987) definition of sustainable development. Zhou’s rhetoric 
does little to instil confidence in the CPC’s alternative approach, however, what it does 
create is a discursive space to distinguish the “Us” of ecological civilisation as a “new 
path” from the “Other” of sustainable development as the “old path”. Sustainable 
development, as the old pathway, is distinguished as a pre-existing concept, developed 
outside of the PRC, and is blamed for the current experiences of environmental 
degradation. The rhetoric highlights this new path, their path of ecological civilisation, 
which builds on sustainable development, as a superior approach, suitable to the PRC’s 
unique experience of development. 
By 2013, Zhou (2013c:1), at the 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental 
Protection, stated: “Ecological civilization is a great contribution of the Party in promoting 
the progress of human civilization. This is accomplished by fully absorbing the traditional 
culture and wisdom of the Chinese nation and reflecting on the defects of industrial 
industrialization and current development model. It is the distillation and expansion of 
sustainable development as a result of the Party’s deep understanding toward the new 
global trend of going green and low carbon [sic].” Zhou begins to claim explicitly that 
ecological civilisation has distilled and expanded upon the defects of the current 
development model and sustainable development, thus creating a great contribution of 
understanding environmentalism through Chinese culture and wisdom. Sustainable 
development represents the international norms of environmental governance, whereas 
178 
ecological civilisation represents the CPC’s search for environmental governance that 
goes beyond the distorted and corrupted images of (neoliberal) capitalism; it is an 
ethically and ideologically superior approach. The CPC’s ecological civilisation is 
presented as providing a blueprint for a new image of environmental governance, one 
that is uniquely Chinese (Ahearne, 2013; and Gramsci, 1971). 
The CPC’s rhetoric can thus be understood as developing an argument whereby 
labelling their own style of environmental governance with the same name of the 
approach “blindly followed” by developed nations is not appropriate. Sustainable 
development as a concept does not carry the national identity built into ecological 
civilisation by the CPC of Chinese strength, wisdom, progression and unity. This was 
explicitly seen in Zhou’s (2009b:2) speech at the 13th World Lake Conference, where he 
argues that: “Adhering to the idea of sustainable development, ecological civilization 
seeks for coordinated environment and socio-economic development and higher-level 
harmony between man and nature, environment and economy, individual and society. 
Industrial civilization leads to the conflicts between man and nature. Ecological 
civilization firstly will redevelop the harmony between man and nature, which is 
voluntary, scientific, long-term and at higher level, different from that of agricultural 
civilization [sic].” Similar is how Xi Jinping refers to sustainable development as the 
“status quo” of environmentalism. Xi (2018b:5), at the 13th National People’s Congress, 
proclaimed: “We must not be satisfied with the status quo, indulge ourselves in ease and 
comfort, or let delight dispel worries. We must stay true to our original aspiration, hold on 
to our mission, strive to accomplish, so as to make outstanding achievement in the new 
era.” Both Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian are furthering the process of “Othering”. 
However, Zhou does not entirely discredit sustainable development; he openly 
admits that ecological civilisation adheres to the initial ideas of sustainable development 
regarding coordinating the environment and socio-economic growth. However, he also 
argues that where sustainable development leads to conflict, ecological civilisation aims 
to redevelop harmony between man and nature. Using eye-catching words and phrases, 
such as, harmony between man and nature – with their roots in Chinese philosophies – 
distinguishes and promotes ecological civilisation as a better approach whilst furthering 
the identity of a Chinese environmentalism (Gare, 2010, 2012 and 2017; and Hu, 2011). 
Xi dismisses the status quo as unsatisfactory, directing the PRC to remain focused on 
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pursuing their new Chinese approach of environmental governance, guided by the spirit 
of ecological civilisation. 
Pan Yue’s (2003 and 2006c) scholarly works also explicitly make these 
arguments, in advocating that ecological civilisation, which is embedded within Chinese 
wisdom and culture, is eco-centric by endorsing harmony between man and nature. 
Whereas, according to Pan (2003 and 2006c), sustainable development, as the Western 
understanding of environmentalism, is “black” and anthropocentric. Pan (2006c) claims 
the Western approach of sustainable development is the root cause of the environmental 
crises faced globally today. Thus what this section has begun to show is how the 
coexistence of sustainable development and ecological civilisation within the CPC’s 
rhetoric creates a platform for the CPC to discursively distinguish ecological civilisation 
as the new path for Chinese development, and to dismiss sustainable development as 
the old path of the West. What will be discussed in the next section is (what initially 
appears to be) a contradiction in how sustainable development is also labelled an 
experience with “sobering lessons” from which to learn. What this rhetoric does is inform 
the PRC that ecological civilisation will be different from the “Western black 
modernisation”; sustainable development can teach the CPC and PRC what not to be.  
 
 
Simultaneously Learning From whilst “Othering” Sustainable Development 
 
The above section highlighted a negative framing of sustainable development, 
where Zhou Shengxian referred to the concept as the “denounced” product of the 
environmental history of the West. Despite this, there is also a positive framing of 
sustainable development. What is supported through this positive framing is a means of 
cooperating internationally; the CPC purport how the ideas from “Them” on 
development, with the CPC’s guidance, can help the PRC tackle their unique 
development situation. What is important, however, is the frequent reassurance that the 
CPC’s State-led initiative of ecological civilisation is an improvement and distillation of 
the thoughts from developed nations. Sustainable development is embraced alongside 
Chinese wisdom and culture to suit the PRC’s unique experience of the environment and 
development; and that cooperation with international norms provides a platform to 
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increase global status (Chapter 6 will consider the role of global status and responsibility 
in more depth). 
Callahan (2012), drawing upon the work of Shambaugh (2008a and 2008b), 
argues how the PRC is not “a land of contradictions” that suffers from “national 
schizophrenia”, but instead, is a State where the CPC balances glories and traumas, 
rejuvenations and humiliations, and interweaves them as a structure of feeling, which is 
constructing the PRC’s national aesthetic. The CPC, as dialectical materialists, manage 
these contradictions, whereby sustainable development is both negatively and positively 
framed. These framings are weaved through the ecological civilisation rhetoric, aiding 
the construction of a national identity of superiority through Chinese wisdom, culture and 
experiences. 
One of the ways in which sustainable development is positively framed echoes 
ideas from the New Culture Movement. Hu Shi (1981:345), a promoter of the “New 
Culture Movement”, counselled, "If we still want to rectify this state [China], if we still 
hope that this nation take a stand in the world - there is only one way out, that is, we 
admit of our own faults: we must confess that we are inferior to others in every aspect, 
namely, we are inferior on material machineries and political systems, and, what's more, 
we are inferior on morality, literature, music, art and physical health". Similarly, Chen 
Xujing (2004:8) argues: "(1) European modern culture is really more advanced than 
ours. (2) Whether we like it or not, Western modern culture is where contemporary world 
is heading toward". These statements, made during China’s Century of Humiliation, 
highlight how China faced a brutal re-positioning on the world stage. These ideas 
founded within the New Culture Movement provide a stronger claim for Agnew’s (2012) 
concept of a “timespace” identity crisis. 
As Callahan (2012) and Wang (2014) have highlighted, the CPC often refers to 
traumas suffered at the hands of the Imperial powers as a method of justifying and 
legitimising their development pathway and offer an explanation as to why the PRC may 
feel weak or backwards. Within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, these traumas 
are present and there are extracts that propose learning from the developed nations in 
such a way that subtly links back to thoughts from the New Culture Movement, thus 
placing the blame on “Us”, the CPC, as opposed to on “Them”, the Others. For instance, 
Hu Jintao (2012:18), at the 18th National Congress, stated: “We should follow a path of 
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making innovation with Chinese features and take steps to promote innovation to catch 
up with global advances.” Although Hu remains true to developing an environmentalism 
with Chinese features, he still purports that the PRC are in a position of trying to catch 
up to “Them”, the Others.  
Zhou Shengxian (2009a:5), in his 2009 World Environment Day speech Actively 
Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under 
the Guidance of Ecological Civilization, similarly promotes the approach of developed 
countries in stating: “Proved experience of developed countries tells us that full-fledged 
policies and standards, complete infrastructures and optimized industrial structure 
constitute the three pillars for environmental improvement. Hence, it is of paramount 
importance for us to set up and improve environmental policies, legislations and 
standards that conform to current stage of social economic development and 
environmental decisions [sic].” Although Zhou also initially suggests the PRC have 
lessons to be learned from the developed nations, he likewise goes on to state that the 
improvements the CPC make must be aligned with the “current stage” of development 
and environmental conditions in the PRC. Thus, although approaching the western 
concept of environmentalism in a more friendly tone, the message of an “Us” versus 
“Them” in experience and approach still remains. There is no confession of inferiority; 
the opposite is present, where the CPC highlight explicitly the inferiority of sustainable 
development instead. 
Zhou Jian (2018:4), the director of the Department of Policy Planning of Foreign 
Affairs, in his speech at the 2018 National Working Conference on Environmental 
Protection, claimed: “As a developing country, China needs to enhance international 
cooperation to learn from other countries of their top-notch concepts, experience and 
technologies. At the same time, China is also willing to jointly promote the realization of 
the biodiversity conservation goals based on international cooperation and exchange to 
exert its constructive role of a big and responsible nation [sic].” Zhou Jian echoes the 
New Culture movement in referencing the advanced technologies and concepts of 
developed States, however, his following sentence doubles back to contradict this 
approach through complimenting the PRC as constructive and responsible. Again, this 
does not support Agnew’s (2012) “timespace” identity crisis theory. Although Hu Jintao, 
Zhou Shengxian and Zhou Jian positively frame the approach of the “Other” as an 
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approach the PRC can learn from, at no point is there a negative framing of the “Us” of 
ecological civilisation. A statement that bolsters and reaffirms the CPC’s approach 
follows each example of positive framing of sustainable development. The CPC present 
learning from sustainable development as an example of the CPC’s openness and 
forward thinking; through applying their Chinese wisdom, they improve on sustainable 
development thus forging ecological civilisation. 
Potential confusion arises where it becomes unclear as to which approach is 
being endorsed and pursued by the CPC. Geall and Ely (2018) claimed that 2016 
marked a change in ecological civilisation whereby Xi had “coded” the concept for 
implementation. Yet, despite this change in CPC rhetoric, where ecological civilisation is 
increasingly present, the CPC simultaneously pursue the implementation for the UN’s 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which positively frames sustainable 
development. In his 2016 Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development speech, Li Baodong (2016:1) endorses 
sustainable development as the PRC’s basic national policy: “China is the largest 
developing country in the world, with development as its top priority and sustainable 
development as a basic national policy.” Xi (2017a:8), at the World Economic Forum 
Annual Meeting 2017, also claims: “It is important to protect the environment while 
pursuing economic and social progress so as to achieve harmony between man and 
nature and between man and society. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
should be implemented to realize balanced development across the world [sic].”  
Xi, in implicitly referring to harmony between man and nature, draws upon the 
national identity construction based on Chinese wisdom, culture and experiences. 
However, Xi then directly names the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as the 
approach to be implemented to reach this balanced development. Although speaking at 
an international Summit, where the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
was a key concept under discussion, Xi weakens their national identity under 
construction by directly linking harmony between man and nature as something 
achievable through the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. However, Xi’s speech 
followed the announcement by President Donald Trump to withdraw the U.S. from the 
Paris Agreement; it is therefore easy to assume Xi’s speech has been carefully 
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constructed to present the PRC as reliable, cooperative and peaceful in upholding 
international standards and agreements (Trump, 2017).  
During the APEC CEO Summit in 2016, Xi (2016b:6) stated “As a Chinese saying 
goes, clear rivers and green mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver. 
We will continue to pursue the strategy of sustainable development, promote green, low-
carbon and circular development, and build a beautiful China with blue skies, green land 
and clear rivers so that our people can live in a sound environment created by 
development.” As with Li Baodong above, Xi refers to the strategy of sustainable 
development to achieve the forces of emotion elsewhere explicitly expressed as 
elements of the spirit of ecological civilisation. Sustainable development and ecological 
civilisation appear therefore to exist in tandem within the rhetoric, both being 
implemented to achieve the same goals of environmental development. 
However, rather than embracing sustainable development per se, perhaps what 
is seen here is instead a warmth towards other countries. This works in two ways; it is a 
practical and discursive continuation of Deng’s reform and opening up, but it is also a 
step towards the formation of “friendships” through which to project their own concept of 
ecological civilisation. This more positively framed rhetoric supports the notion of the 
PRC coming together with other global leaders to formulate a new approach for global 
environmental governance and reflects Zhou Jian’s remarks above that the CPC need to 
enhance their international cooperation. Sustainable development, as an internationally 
agreed term, is different to the concept of developing sustainably (as was identified at 
the start of this chapter page 172). 
Xi Jinping (2017h:7-8), in his Working Together to Build a Better Future keynote 
address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting, stated: 
“We [the CPC] are eager to draw on the achievements of other cultures and apply them 
in the Chinese context. Indeed, Marxism is the scientific truth we have learned from 
other countries”, going on to add: “The CPC will embrace and approach the 
achievements of other cultures with an open mind and a broad perspective. We stay 
committed to engaging in dialogue, exchanges and cooperation with the people and 
political parties of other countries and supporting cultural and people-to-people 
exchanges between countries.” During his Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, 
Promote Global Growth keynote speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic 
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Forum Annual Meeting, Xi (2017a:10) again professed the CPC would “open our arms” 
to the exchange of foreign ideas and practise. Xi positively frames engaging in the 
approach(s) of the “Other(s)” as a means of fostering international cooperation. A final 
example includes Xi’s (2017f:2) speech, at the APEC CEO Summit, where he said: “The 
vision of innovative, coordinated, green and open development for all is gaining 
increasing public support. To achieve more comprehensive, higher quality and more 
sustainable development has become the shared goal of the international community. 
To implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and adapt to climate 
change and other challenges of a global nature has become an important international 
consensus.” All of Xi’s international speeches, within this dataset, given since President 
Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris agreement have 
utilised this space to present the cooperative, reliable and trustworthy spirit of the 
Chinese on the international stage in upholding and pursuing environmental 
agreements. 
International cooperation, via global environmental governance is also seen in 
Li’s (2016c:2-3) statement, at the General Debate of 71st session of UN General 
Assembly: “Difficult moments call for stronger confidence. I believe mankind has the 
wisdom and capability to find a way out of difficulty. For that to happen, there must be 
cooperation and a spirit of working together to tide over difficulties. It is time that the 
international community take on a new perspective. It should see itself as a community 
of shared future in which all are stakeholders, and should make concerted efforts to 
jointly tackle global challenges.” However, reasons behind cooperation were explicitly 
given by Li (2016c:1-2) earlier in the same speech, when he claimed: “The UN 
Sustainable Development Summit held last year adopted the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, opening a new vision for global development. At the summit, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech entitled “Toward Win-win Partnership for 
Sustainable Development” to expound on China’s principles and position as well as its 
readiness to advance the agenda for sustainable development.”  
Before the CPC can consider projecting ecological civilisation as the future of 
global environmental governance, they first have to demonstrate their understanding of 
environmental governance and the ability to cooperate on the global stage. This positive 
framing, of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, allows the CPC to embrace 
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sustainable development as a means of recognising and supporting the international 
trend for environmental governance. For instance, in Wu Xiaoqiang’s (2009:1) 
Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development speech for the 
MEP, he claimed: “Sustainable development is the eternal theme of the development of 
human society.” Accepted as an eternal theme on the world stage, the CPC have 
strategically embraced the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, as Xi 
(2017d:4) stated: “China sets great store by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. We have developed a national program to implement the Agenda and set 
up innovation demonstration zones on sustainable development. Thanks to these efforts, 
we have attained early harvests on economic, social, environmental and many other 
fronts.” However, it is important to highlight how integral to the CPC’s national 
programme for implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda is their 
environmental governance concept of ecological civilisation. Sustainable development is 
only positively framed when it allows for the CPC to construct the national identify of the 
PRC as friendly, cooperative and progressive on the international stage. 
Internationally, sustainable development provides an accessible platform to the 
current practises of global environmental governance. Domestically, ecological 
civilisation creates a national identity designed to create pride in the Chinese sense-of-
self in becoming a strong, progressive and a united PRC. Whereas some scholars see 
the CPC’s mixed messages as linked to the PRC’s transition from a developing nation to 
a developed State, or from being a revolutionary power to becoming a responsible status 
quo power (Carlson, 2005; and Johnston, 2008), Callahan (2012:12) instead argues that 
the supposed contradictions in CPC political discourse are linked to the positive and 
negative duality in CPC politics.  
Callahan (2012) goes on to argue that being aware of the emotion (or structure of 
feeling) discursively embedded within the CPC’s discourse highlights how at the heart of 
the PRC’s foreign policy is an identity dilemma. However, as this chapter has shown, the 
seemingly interchangeability between sustainable development and ecological 
civilisation ignores the strategic differences, found within the CPC’s use of emotion, to 
“Other” sustainable development, which creates a strong national identity: one that 
draws upon Chinese wisdom, culture and shared experiences to create pride in 
becoming a strong, progressive and singular civilised State. Within the interchangeability 
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between sustainable development and ecological civilisation, which appear to exist as 
competing approaches to environmental governance, is instead a leadership dilemma, 
one tied to the PRC’s vying for increased global status as thought leaders in 
environmental governance. How the ecological civilisation rhetoric considers the CPC’s 
leadership and status will be explored in Chapters 5 and 6 respectfully. The supposed 
contradiction and uncertainty in the CPC’s use of both ecological civilisation and 
sustainable development, rather than existing as a “timespace” identity crisis, appears to 
be more closely aligned with a crisis in leadership with the CPC being uncertain of how 
to approach projecting their intentions of becoming thought leaders for global 
environmental governance. However, what is consistent is the use of emotions, 
chosenness, glories and traumas, to bolster ecological civilisation as a new, superior 





This Chapter has shown how the CPC’s use of emotion within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric constructs a national identity of Chinese wisdom and culture for 
superior environmental governance. The use of emotion creates rhetoric where 
ecological civilisation represents the new approach of “Us” of the PRC versus the old 
“denounced” approach of “Them”, the developed nations. The CPC are discursively 
constructing a national identity of a strong, progressive and united PRC through Chinese 
wisdom and culture on environmental understandings and practise. Whereas scholars 
such as Agnew (2012) and Callahan (2012) have suggested that the PRC are 
undergoing an identity crisis, especially through what appears to be contradictions that 
Shambaugh (2008a) described as a “national schizophrenia”, which could be seen in the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric as a potential site of inconsistency within the “Us” versus 
“Them” of sustainable development in the CPC’s current environmental governance. 
This chapter has argued instead that this inter-changeability and adaptability is crucial in 
furthering the CPC’s discursive national identity construction and instead refutes this 
argument of an identity crisis. If a crisis is present, however, then it is a crisis of 
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leadership through the CPC’s evolving aspirations to become more globally involved in 
governance, which will be explored in greater detail in the following two chapters.  
This chapter has provided the first interpretation of how the CPC uses emotion 
and it has been seen to utilise what Agnew (2012) described as the PRC being caught at 
a crossroad, a time of rapid transition between developing and developed (see also, 
Huan, 2008). This period of transition is creating two competing narratives, one narrative 
is focused on China’s past, and the second is focused on the PRC’s present and future; 
thus creating a site of a juxtaposition where competing identities may arise (see also, 
Huan, 2008). Wang’s (2014) discussion of the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative 
also presented this same duality, where humiliation represents incidences from China’s 
past and rejuvenation captures the future orientated glories to be achieved. Agnew 
(2012), Huan (2008) and Wang (2014) all suggest the PRC are going through a period of 
transition. However, this chapter has demonstrated that there is no juxtaposition of 
competing identities, no identity crisis, within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. The 
CPC’s State-led identity creation is very consistent, with ecological civilisation 
representing a new national identity based upon Chinese wisdom, culture and 
experiences, of strength, progression and unity, for environmental governance.  
The notion of the PRC needing a uniquely Chinese approach for their uniquely 
Chinese problems was ever-present throughout the rhetoric: ecological civilisation has 
become a trope synonymous with this need. Sustainable development, however, was 
seen to exist in tandem with the development of ecological civilisation. Ecological 
civilisation is inherently good, based on Chinese wisdom and culture. Sustainable 
development, although sometimes an approach that the Chinese can learn from – 
through cooperation and knowledge exchange – is more often discussed as a 
denounced approach, albeit something necessary through existing as the current global 
status quo. This negative framing of sustainable development is used to elevate the 
CPC’s intended environmental governance of an ecological civilisation.  
Sustainable development is becoming symbolic of Western mistakes, the reason 
for the PRC’s current environmental degradation and creating the imbalances 
experienced in development. The CPC argue that they recognise how an 
environmentalism that ignores the intricate balance of harmony between man and nature 
and separates economic growth from ecological value, is an environmentalism destined 
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to fail. Ecological civilisation, albeit discursively for now, theoretically represents a 
reinvigoration of the understanding of humanities’ place in nature, via Chinese wisdom 
and culture, in particular Tianren heyi: a move away from the European Enlightenment of 
individualism at the foundation of the current environmental crises (Desai, 2020).  
This chapter has also supported the findings of Hansen, et al. (2018:201) who 
argue ecological civilisation has been “adopted by the highest political leadership as an 
ideology conveniently planted in a nationalist interpretation of the philosophical past.” 
The emotions used in creating the spirit of ecological civilisation utilises pride in Chinese 
wisdom and culture, creates a togetherness for engagement with the CPC’s latest 
political trope and begins to self-position the PRC through their spirit of increased 
strength, hard-work, cooperation and responsibility. This identity is constructed to 
support the CPC in their wider claim for global environmental governance internationally, 
and domestically it is designed to further nation building in pursuing further development 
of the PRC (Goron, 2018; Hansen et al., 2018; and Marinelli, 2018).  
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Chapter 5: Mythologising Ecological Civilisation: Glorifying 
CPC Leadership 
 
In interpreting the repeating patterns and themes presented in Chapter 3, a 
number of similarities are noticeable between the identified linguistic traits of emotion 
and mythology (see, Campbell, 2008; Kessler and Wong-Mingji, 2010; and Magoulick, 
2015). This chapter seeks to explore how the CPC’s use of emotion can be understood, 
at times, to be mythologising ecological civilisation. This interpretation highlights how the 
emotion themes of the CGT framework are also principal elements in mythology, 
especially the dichotomy of glories versus traumas (Magoulick, 2015). Ecological 
civilisation ought not to be considered as a new myth per se, but the interpretation in this 
chapter highlights how the CPC uses emotion in ways that shares the emotional 
connotations conveyed through mythology. Chapter 4 interpreted how the CPC’s use of 
emotive rhetoric is constructing a national identity; this chapter explores how the use of 
emotion addresses insecurities relating to party power and the CPC’s leadership. 
Guided by the themes of CGT, patterns were found whereby the use of emotion 
within the rhetoric: furthered national identity; verified that the PRC is facing a series of 
trials and tribulations; reassured the PRC that the CPC is leading the PRC through said 
trials and tribulations, and with glorified results; and justified the trials and tribulations 
faced as shared traumas caused by others. These features – unity, trials and 
tribulations, glorified outcomes and suffering at the hands of others – are common traits 
of mythology (Campbell, 2008; Kessler and Wong-Mingji, 2010; and Magoulick, 2015). 
There is a meeting between the emotion found through the themes of CGT and common 
features of myths. Myths are designed to speak to a common group of peoples; a group 
of peoples with shared geography, culture and struggles. Myths also very specifically 
glorify triumphs of knowledge or action. Finally, myths are also full of traumas either to 
justify the need for action or to explain why a group of peoples are facing specific 
struggles, trials and tribulations (Campbell, 2008; Kessler and Wong-Mingji, 2010; and 
Magoulick, 2015).  
Myth can be defined in the following three ways: 1) as a code with a certain set of 
symbols and signals, where the code provides some form of instruction for life; 2) as a 
story to erase anxieties, where the stories place people in accord with the inevitabilities 
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of their life, helping them to see the positive values of the negatives and vice versa; and, 
3) as the edge of what is known and what is unknown, creating a bridge between what is 
and what can be (Campbell, 2008). Emotions in myth reflect the struggles faced by a 
group and the policies, theories or ideologies developed to combat the impending 
struggle(s). Myths are culturally, temporally and spatially specific and therefore the social 
constructivist lens, directing the thematic EDA, is an appropriate tool to develop an 
understanding of the mythologised elements through the use of emotion within the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric.  
There are instances of all three definitions of myth within the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. Ecological civilisation provides instruction on how to become, for 
example, a “beautiful China”. The mythologised emotion tries to erase anxieties over the 
current struggles faced within the PRC’s environment and the CPC’s environmental 
governance. The rhetoric depicts how the CPC see what the PRC is and what it hopes 
the PRC will become when they reach their desired betterment. Finally, the emotion also 
placates the PRC through shared traumas by sometimes placing the blame unto others.  
This chapter will focus, more specifically, on the themes of glory and trauma. 
Glories will be seen through the CPC’s revelation for a place of betterment, and traumas 
will be seen through the sacrifices required. These overlapping features are most often 
associated with heroism and what Campbell (2008) identifies as the hero journey. 
Campbell (2008) describes the hero journey as a process where a hero undergoes a 
transformation, which inspires them to guide a group of people to make improvements to 
their society. Heroism within the ecological civilisation rhetoric symbolises the CPC, and 
at times specifically the General Secretary, as heroes. The hero journey refers to the 
CPC taking the PRC on a journey to betterment, where ecological civilisation 
simultaneously represents a symbolic, ideal and real place.  
This chapter will begin by delving deeper into this interpretation of the CPC as 
heroic leaders on their hero journey in creating ecological civilisation as a symbolic, ideal 





The CPC’s Hero Journey: Creating an Ecological Civilisation 
 
 A “hero journey” is where an individual or group try to deliver betterment for a 
group of people (Campbell, 2008). The process involves either a metaphorical or 
physical journey, with a departure, realisation, return and fulfilment. The hero goes 
through a period of being and then becoming, where a realisation provides them with the 
means or vision for betterment, which the hero then delivers to the people (Campbell, 
2008). Links here to a mythologising of the ecological civilisation rhetoric are 
straightforward: the CPC, as the government of the PRC, are responsible for the PRC’s 
betterment. Through their leadership they are intent on guiding the PRC to fulfil their 
vision of betterment, built on the collective wisdom over 60 years in government. The 
ecological civilisation rhetoric is “mythologised” by depicting the CPC (and General 
Secretary) as hero(es); ecological civilisation is their revelation for betterment. 
 Suggestions of the CPC’s heroic nature range from subtle hints, such as: “Ever 
since its founding in July 1921, the CPC has bravely dedicated itself to the historical 
mission of leading the Chinese people in striving for a happy life and for the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which Hu Jintao (2007:49) claimed in his 17th 
National Congress Report. The adverb “bravely” associates the CPC with the 
characteristics of heroes. Another subtle insinuation was seen during Hu’s (2011b:4) 90th 
Anniversary of the founding of the CPC speech, where he said: “History has also fully 
shown that the CPC truly deserves to be called a great, glorious and correct Marxist 
political party and the core force leading the Chinese people in breaking new ground in 
development.” Soliciting that the CPC is great, glorious and the correct core force 
demonstrates support for not only the strength of the CPC’s governance, but the ways in 
which they govern to deliver betterment to the PRC. Both of these statements also hint 
of a journey towards betterment, where it is the CPC guiding the PRC in striving for a 
happy life, great rejuvenation and breaking new ground in development.  
Hu Jintao (2011b:13) then went on to make a more direct claim of heroic 
leadership and the necessity of CPC governance to reach betterment, stating: “Since the 
very day of its founding, the CPC has heroically shouldered the historic mission of 
uniting with and leading the people in achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation.” Here it is hard to ignore the direct use of “heroically” and once again a journey 
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towards betterment is suggested in the leading towards, and achievement of, 
rejuvenation. Hu Jintao (2011b:7) also stated: “Looking back at China's development 
and progress over the past 90 years, we have naturally come to this basic conclusion: 
Success in China hinges on the Party.” This statement is not only very confident and 
forthright, but directly places the CPC as heroes, or leaders, that have delivered the 
PRC’s development progress thus far. 
Similar is Zhou Shengxian’s (2007:2) rhetoric, such as during the MEP’s 2007 
Annual General Meeting, Zhou bolsters the CPC as heroic, saying: “These 
achievements were hard earned and they also showed that the policies and measures of 
the Chinese government were absolutely right.” Zhou tends to refer to the correctness of 
the CPC in delivering environmental governance and describes the CPC in glorified 
ways. During his speech at the Meeting in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of China 
National Environment Centre, Zhou (2010e:6), when describing the CPC’s New Path for 
Environmental Protection, stated: “Our cause is noble and sacred, our vision is bright 
and beautiful, and our responsibility is significant and glorious". Both of Zhou’s 
statements instil ideas of the greatness, triumph and glory of the CPC, which are traits 
associated with heroism, and again the CPC’s revelation for and direction of leadership 
is resulting in a betterment of the PRC. Both Hu Jintao and Zhou Shengxian are creating 
a power relationship where the CPC are the strong and correct leaders, quelling any 
reason for insecurities over their (environmental) governance of the PRC. 
 In Liu Xiaoming’s (2017:4) speech, to the UK Business Community following the 
19th National Congress, he explicitly advocates strong support for Xi Jinping as the 
correct leader of the CPC:  
 
A great cause calls for strong and firm guidance. History tells us that in a 
massive country like China, development and progress would be 
impossible without a strong leadership. Over the past five years, the 
achievements we made and the changes taking place in China have 
been phenomenal. These must be attributed to the strong and firm 
leadership of the Party. At the first session of the 19th Central 
Committee, Xi Jinping was once again elected General Secretary. This 
reflects the common aspiration of the people. 
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Not only is Xi repeatedly described as offering strong, firm and successful leadership, 
driving the “phenomenal” results of the CPC, Ambassador Liu proclaims Xi has the 
support of the people and that the people commonly aspire to his vision of betterment. 
Campbell (2008) argued that a hero who understands the people and is supported by 
the people is the most powerful of heroes. Ambassador Liu (2017:4) further depicts Xi as 
a heroic leader of the CPC, by going on to say: “Now, the new CPC leadership is closely 
rallied around General Secretary Xi Jinping. This new central leadership is giving the 
Chinese people great confidence. They are committed to leading the Chinese people 
into a new era. They are uniting the whole nation in a concerted effort to realise the 
Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Both of Liu’s excerpts 
uses emotion in a way that mythologises Xi as the latest hero, guiding the CPC with 
strong, firm and successful leadership on a pathway to, seemingly unquestioned, 
betterment.  
Campbell’s (2008) seminal work The Hero With a Thousand Faces, argues that 
the hero figure evolves as the culture evolves, that the myth adapts to fit the times. The 
phrase “to keep with the times” or to keep with modern “trends” can be seen throughout 
the CPC’s speeches. We saw in the previous chapter exploring the spirit of ecological 
civilisation how it has been important for the CPC to demonstrate how ecological 
civilisation is uniquely Chinese and adapted to answer uniquely Chinese problems. 
Myths usually develop in response to a contemporary struggle faced by a group of 
peoples (Campbell, 2008); in this way, the idea of keeping with the times and trends 
highlight how the CPC’s leadership is up-to-date and aware of contemporary 
(environmental) issues facing the PRC. Suggesting again there should be no insecurities 
over their ability to deal with the PRC’s contemporary and unique struggles. Ecological 
civilisation is a revelation on how to deliver betterment regarding the PRC’s current 
environmental degradation and pollution, a contemporary struggle throughout the PRC 
that has seen ample civilian protest over the past decade (Lu and Chan, 2016).  
Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian, all claim ecological civilisation to be 
keeping up with modern trends and fitting in with the times. During his 17th National 
Congress Report, Hu Jintao (2007:9) argued “[k]eeping up with the times is the most 
prominent hallmark of the new period… and enabled the Chinese nation to catch up with 
the trend of the times in great strides and see the bright future of national rejuvenation.” 
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Xi Jinping (2017f:8), at the APEC CEO Summit, introduced ecological civilisation by 
saying, “this is a new journey of moving with the times and exploring new model of 
development.” Again, Xi not only stipulates how ecological civilisation is “moving with the 
times”, but is also a new journey. Zhou Shengxian’s excerpts are interspersed with a 
greater extent of emotion terms, especially metaphors, to rally the people behind the 
journey to be taken. For instance, in his Prepared for the Deciding Battle, Devising New 
Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection speech at 
the 2010 National Conference on Environmental Protection, Zhou (2010b:13) claimed: 
“Exploration of the new path to environmental protection proves to be a course of 
vigorous development loaded with boldness in reform and innovation and constantly 
seeking the truth. The baton is passed to one and another, which leads the new journey 
to advance with the times”.  
Zhou Shengxian’s closing statement of “to advance with the times” denies the 
audience an interpretation whereby the CPC are struggling to keep up with the times, to 
an understanding whereby the CPC are leading this advancement. Zhou glorifies the 
idea of change and the new journey; it is not a statement that argues that the old journey 
was wrong, but that the new journey is vigorous, bold and innovative to ensure the PRC 
advances. Zhou Shengxian’s (2011a:1) Strive for Innovation and Actively Explore New 
Path to Environmental Protection New Year Address, also draws upon the emotion 
embedded within the notion of a shared spirit of ecological civilisation, by stating: “we will 
keep pace with times with pioneering spirit and strive for a new situation of 
environmental protection.” These extracts demonstrate some of the ways in which the 
CPC claims a heroic position, creating a statement of power as the correct leaders of the 
PRC, appropriately leading the PRC’s journey towards betterment in accordance with 
their correct understanding of the PRC’s current situation.  
Glory emotion has been used within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric to 
construct a message of heroic leadership, by choosing to ignore the environmental 
failures of the CPC and instead focuses on the potential of improvements found in a 
revelation for betterment, which is adapted to the PRC’s current reality. This brings us to 
consider what this revelation of a place of betterment is: whether ecological civilisation 
represents symbolic, ideal or real betterment. Zhou Shengxian’s (2009a:2) Actively 
Exploring a New Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under 
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the Guidance of Ecological Civilization speech, conveyed that: “Ecological civilization is 
an ideal state as well as a realistic objective [sic].” Ecological civilisation is referred to in 
a number of ways that demonstrates the concept as a theoretical or idealistic state, a 
symbolic place as well as sometimes a real and intended destination of betterment for 
the PRC. This section has demonstrated how there is scope to deepen the analysis of 
the mythologising features of heroism and the hero journey within the rhetoric to provide 
an alternative interpretation of the ecological civilisation concept. The next section will 
now consider how ecological civilisation is mythologised as a place creating future 
spaces of the CPC’s imagined environmental governance. 
 
 
Symbolic, Ideal, Real: Ecological Civilisation as the Hero Journey’s 
Place of Betterment 
 
A common feature of hero mythology is where the hero mentions a place they 
have to find. For example, in Buddhist mythology the place is Nirvana, or in Christian 
mythology the place is Heaven (Campbell, 2008). One of China’s popular hero myths, 
Xiyou Ji “The Journey to the West”, the title alone stipulates that a journey to a place is 
the focus of the tale. Already discussed is how some scholars have disregarded 
ecological civilisation as merely rhetoric, whereby it represents a symbol or an ideal, but 
only as words (Bandurski, 2017; Economy, 2017; Geall and Hilton, 2014; Hilton, 2017; 
LaForgia, 2017; Su, Heshmati, Geng and Yu, 2013; and Vanderklippe, 2017). However, 
this section endeavours to demonstrate how within the CPC’s rhetoric there are a 
number of occasions where ecological civilisation is discursively created as a symbolic 
place, an ideal state and a real intended destination. There tends to be a conglomeration 
of all three. This section explores how ecological civilisation represents an extension of 
Xiaokang, rejuvenation and Socialism with Chinese characteristics as ideals and 
symbols of betterment, as well as intended destination(s) to further convey this message 
of heroic leadership towards the PRC’s betterment.  
Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric discusses ecological civilisation as a place of 
betterment most frequently. In his 2009 World Environment Day speech, Zhou (2009a:5) 
described ecological civilisation as a symbolic place with “balance and harmony between 
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man and nature.” At the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation 
Research and Promotion Association, Zhou (2011g:2) described ecological civilisation 
as an ideal place that fosters “positive and benign development.” And, during his speech 
at the National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation, Zhou (2014c:1-2) 
described ecological civilisation as a real place with “clear water and green mountains as 
well as economic development”.  
For Zhou Shengxian (2009a:1-2), ecological civilisation is a place with a 
“sustainable industrial structure, production and consumption mode and starts with the 
guidance toward a sustainable and harmonious development course. It highlights man's 
consciousness and self-discipline and the mutually dependent and complementary 
relationship between man and nature. This will be a long-standing and formidable 
process, neither accomplished overnight, nor guaranteed once and for all.” Zhou 
describes ecological civilisation as a place, which: 1) symbolises the PRC’s constant 
struggle for, and the journey towards, superior enlightenment and betterment; 2) 
embodies the ideals found within the Chinese wisdom and culture of harmony within 
Tianren heyi; and, 3) exists as a real place where the PRC exhibits sustainable and 
harmonious development, represented through changes to the PRC’s industry, 
production and consumption. Guidelines on how to become an ecological civilisation can 
be found in policy documents, such as the: Opinions of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China and the State Council Toward Development of Ecological 
Civilization, which was adopted on the 25th of April, 2015. 
Another way in which Zhou’s rhetoric constructs ecological civilisation as a place 
is through this emphasis on the notion of a journey; Zhou describes the CPC as 
progressing the PRC and rejuvenating the country through their concept of ecological 
civilisation. In his speech, at the Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation 
Research and Promotion Association, Zhou (2011g:2) argued that the PRC have gone 
from “the primitive civilization, agricultural civilization, and industrial civilization [sic]” and 
the CPC are now leading the “transitional period from the industrial civilization to 
ecological civilization [sic].” Here, ecological civilisation is dialectically presented as the 
natural next destination or state of existence for the PRC, following the CPC’s 
understanding of development. The previous civilisational states, listed by Zhou, each 
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represented previous symbolic, ideal, as well as real places, which existed through the 
enactment of the understood ideals of the time.  
To reach ecological civilisation, Zhou (2009a:5), again, within his 2009 World 
Environment Day speech, proclaimed that the PRC should “rely on technological 
advance and uphold independent innovation with a view to developing a high-tech, cost-
effective pattern for environmental treatment.” To further this, his speech at the 
Inauguration Meeting of Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and Promotion 
Association, Zhou (2011g:2) appeased that “abandoning the development and the 
pursuit of material life and going back to the primitive lifestyle” is not necessary, but what 
is necessary, is “improving the resource efficiency, changing the production mode and 
lifestyle, and achieving the harmony between man and nature, environment and 
economy, man and society at a higher level.” Thus, Zhou offers very real means by 
which the PRC can journey towards betterment under the guidance and leadership of 
the CPC. Ecological civilisation is described as a realistic objective with real policy 
directives to follow; as argued by Geall and Ely (2018), ecological civilisation is being 
codified for implementation. 
Finally, Zhou Shengxian (2013c:1), during his 2013 National Work Meeting on 
Environmental Protection speech, furthers that to reach ecological civilisation the PRC 
needs to fully absorb “the traditional culture and wisdom of the Chinese nation” and 
reflect “on the defects of industrial industrialization and current [Western/global] 
development model [sic]”. Zhou is stressing the need to understand and engage with the 
symbolic and ideal elements of the CPC’s heroic revelation of ecological civilisation to 
arrive at the place of betterment. Thus, we see that ecological civilisation is a place built 
on Chinese wisdom, using Chinese innovation and technological advancements: the 
spirit of ecological civilisation. Ecological civilisation is clear and green, with harmony 
between man and nature. Ecological civilisation is an ideal state, a symbolic place, but is 
also a realistic objective. Ecological civilisation is an alternative state of being from that 
of the traditional industrialisation, inflicted globally, by the developed Western nations 
and international institutions. The CPC wants everyone to believe ecological civilisation 
is achievable by supporting their heroic governance and following their alternative, 
Chinese, journey to betterment.  
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Journeying Towards Xiaokang, Rejuvenation and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
 
There are endless reference to, and metaphors of, a journey in the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. This is a pattern that has existed in the CPC rhetoric for decades; 
ecological civilisation is a new extension, a new destination. Xiaokang, rejuvenation and 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics are all implicated within this journey; ecological 
civilisation is the next destination of betterment. Xiaokang refers to a moderately 
prosperous society in all respects (Alvaro, 2013). Rejuvenation represents a return to the 
glories associated with the ancient Chinese civilisation, a return to the glories before the 
Century of Humiliation (Wang, 2012 and 2014). Socialism with Chinese characteristics is 
the latest theoretical approach endorsed by Xi and the CPC of superior political 
understanding (Peters, 2017). To keep these ideals and symbolic places relevant to 
current times and modern trends the CPC have added an environmental element: the 
symbolic, ideal and real place of a green, clean and beautiful China, their ecological 
civilisation.  
The following excerpts provide examples of certain set phrases repeated 
throughout the CPC’s speeches, demonstrating the continuation of the journey that the 
CPC have been leading the PRC on. This first example lists Xiaokang as the place being 
built by following Socialism with Chinese characteristics: “hold high the great banner of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, follow the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and 
the important thought of Three Represents, thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on 
Development, continue to emancipate the mind, persist in reform and opening up, 
pursue development in a scientific way, promote social harmony, and strive for new 
victories in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects” (Hu Jintao, 2007:1-
2, during his 17th National Congress Report). Xi Jinping’s speeches continue this theme 
in stating how: “The aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the 
focus of our efforts. We must keep on striving with endless energy toward the great goal 
of national rejuvenation” (Xi, 2017e:1, from his 19th National Congress Report).  
Hu Jintao’s set phrase is perforated with verbs, such as, follow, pursue and 
strive, which all suggest movement and can easily be related to the idea of being on a 
journey; a journey to Xiaokang, a destination in the CPC’s vision for betterment. Hu lists 
the CPC’s journey towards betterment via a chronology of the various CPC political 
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theories that have directed the PRC on the path to betterment since Deng’s leadership. 
Similarly, Xi Jinping, with his reference to “striving with endless energy” – another 
journey verb – explicitly states that the goal of rejuvenation is a place of betterment. The 
importance of ecological civilisation as something to be strived for is further 
strengthened by linking the concept to the cause of Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. With Xi Jinping, as the current protagonist of the hero journey, it is his 
“Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” that symbolise one 
of the current pathways for the journey to the PRC’s betterment.  
Zhou Shengxian (2011f:1) in his speech at the 2011 National Work Meeting on 
Environmental Protection, stated: “The set of major strategic thoughts and tasks on 
ecological civilization is a testament to our rational understanding of the trend of human 
civilization, our correct adherence to the rule of social development, a distillation of the 
concept of scientific development and major advance in the theory of building a socialist 
society with Chinese characteristics. It is of great significance for furthering the basic 
state policy of environmental protection and moving toward a path featuring booming 
production, comfortable life and sound eco environment [sic].” The CPC, in their 
mythologising process, attempt to provide a set of strategic thoughts, a roadmap, for the 
tasks to take the PRC towards ecological civilisation; the CPC eases anxieties by 
promising booming production, a comfortable life and a clean and beautiful China 
formed by a sound ecological environment. Zhou makes this point with a flourishing of 
emotion terms: “correct adherence” and “major advance”, which furthers the heroic 
achievements of the CPC, especially on their latest theoretical advancement of adding 
ecological civilisation as one of their current destinations of betterment. 
Zhou Shengxian’s (2013c:1) speech at the 2013 National Work Meeting on 
Environmental Protection, reinforced ecological civilisation “[a]s the latest theoretic result 
of the Party in providing innovative solution to the relationship among economic 
development, resources and environment, building ecological civilization charts the 
course for achieving harmonious development between man and nature [sic].” Whether 
this charted course is clear to follow, or will be completed, is yet to be seen. However, 
the CPC are clear in their rhetoric that ecological civilisation exists not only as this next 
place of betterment, which is symbolic, ideal and real, but also as a revelation on how to 
reach betterment. The CPC portray their chartered course as a demonstration that there 
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should be no insecurities over their ability to deliver on their revelations for 
environmental governance and place of betterment, no insecurities in their 
understanding of how the lead the PRC; no insecurities of their rightful place as the 
leaders of the PRC as seen in speeches by Hu, Zhou, Xi and Liu. 
As early as 2009 Zhou Shengxian (2009a:6), in his Actively Exploring a New 
Path to Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under the Guidance of 
Ecological Civilization speech, stated: “to explore a new path to environmental 
protection, we need to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, fully implement Scientific Outlook on Development, follow the guidance 
of ecological civilization and accelerate historic transformation of environmental 
protection [sic].” Thus, in Zhou’s rhetoric, we see how the CPC’s leadership towards 
ecological civilisation went from an exploration on the new path to ecological civilisation 
in 2009, to their chartered course on the new path to ecological civilisation in 2013.  
The CPC’s chartered course to reach this place of betterment, under the 
leadership of Xi Jinping, repeatedly lists two dates: 2035 and 2049. By 2035, Xi believes 
that the CPC will have built the foundations of Xiaokang; here the reference to building 
foundations creates an image of a real place to be built and achieved. By 2035 Xi 
(2017e:25-26), in his 19th National Congress Report, argues that there will be “a 
fundamental improvement in the environment; the goal of building a Beautiful China is 
basically attained.” Here, ecological civilisation is the ideal of betterment that will make 
the PRC beautiful and will be basically attained by 2035. Xi (2017e:26) furthers this by 
then stating by the second stage, 2049, the PRC will be “a great modern socialist 
country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and 
beautiful” where “[n]ew heights are reached in every dimension of material, political, 
cultural and ethical, social, and ecological advancement.” It is clear in these excerpts 
that ideals of beautiful and ecological advancement have been added to the end of set 
phrases to update and extend Socialism with Chinese characteristics, rejuvenation and 
Xiaokang to speak to the current trials and tribulations of environmental degradation.  
These extensions (which can also be understood as examples of Death and 
Resurrection events and will be discussed from page 207 onwards) bring the CPC’s 
ideals in line with current trends of needing improved environmental governance and 
outline the heroic revelation of the CPC to take the PRC towards this understanding of 
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betterment. Moreover, Xi Jinping explicitly states that this real place of betterment will be 
gradually reached over the next three decades, thus quelling concern over the CPC’s 
ability to lead and address the contemporary concerns of the Chinese people. 
Zhou Shengxian’s clarifications and expansions of Hu Jintao’s and Xi Jinping’s 
speeches provide the most in-depth understandings of ecological civilisation as an 
extension of rejuvenation and Xiaokang. Zhou (2014c:1), in his Open up a New Situation 
for Demonstration Zone of Building Ecological Civilization under the Guidance of 
Important Instructions of Central Leaders speech, stipulated: “As General Secretary Xi 
Jinping stated that to move towards a new era with ecological progress and build a 
beautiful China is an important part to realize the Dream of China with great rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation [sic].” Thus, Zhou identifies ecological civilisation as a new part of 
rejuvenation: taking the PRC towards a new era, the place of betterment.  
In his 2014 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection speech, Zhou 
(2014a:1) similarly highlights how “[u]shering in a new era of ecological progress and 
building a beautiful China are both the important manifestations of our Party’s improved 
governing capacity and crucial parts of achieving the Dream of China for a great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. To promote ecological progress, it is necessary to 
establish ecological awareness, develop ecological economy, maintain eco-safety, 
optimize eco-environment and improve the ecological civilization system [sic].” Zhou 
confirms that ecological civilisation is not only an extension, but is an improvement of the 
CPC’s governing capacity; ecological civilisation represents a new revelation, or 
“improved governing capacity”, on the PRC’s long journey towards betterment. Zhou 
suggests that the CPC expect to lead the PRC towards betterment, by developing the 
economy, safety measures, environmental conditions and Party systems, in an 
ecological way. These measures further the narrative of heroic, or correct leadership, by 
the CPC of the PRC on a journey to ecological betterment. 
 
 
Obstacles on the Journey to Ecological Betterment 
 
Zhou Shengxian describes ecological civilisation as crucial for rejuvenation to be 
met; ecological civilisation is keeping rejuvenation up with the times and modern trends. 
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In Zhou’s speeches he often takes the set phrase of either Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping and 
expounds them with a sentence of instruction on how to achieve it, or how it is already 
being achieved by the CPC; predominantly embedded with glory emotion words, 
phrases and metaphors. Ecological civilisation is discursively created as an 
improvement; it demonstrates the CPC’s continuous talent of improving the PRC and 
striving for something better. However, this very idea of ecological civilisation being an 
extension to betterment highlights areas for concern, creating insecurities over the 
CPC’s ability to ever deliver national rejuvenation. Both Xiaokang and rejuvenation, in 
their pre-ecological civilisation extension, are repeatedly discussed as ideal states and 
symbolic places in a way that rallies the PRC to work hard to get there. However, they 
are always somewhere off in the distance: 2035, 2049. As soon as the CPC meets one 
target of rejuvenation or Xiaokang, the concepts are extended and require further work 
(Callahan, 2012).  
The addition of ecological civilisation begs the question therefore of whether the 
PRC will ever reach their destination of betterment, whether ecological civilisation will 
ever come to be, or whether another diversion will be added in due course forever 
evolving and extending betterment: perhaps ecological civilisation will come to exist 
merely as rhetoric after all (Bandurski, 2017; Economy, 2017; Geall and Hilton, 2014; 
Hilton, 2017; LaForgia, 2017; and Su, et al., 2013). In some respects the following 
extract from Xi Jinping (2017f:7), at the APEC CEO Summit, offers his own thoughts on 
this dilemma: 
 
China's development is an evolving historical process. Last month, the 
19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was 
successfully convened in Beijing. Responding to our people's desire for 
a better life, the Congress formulated a guide to action and a 
development blueprint for China in the new era. It is envisaged that by 
2020, China will turn itself into a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects, and by 2035, China will basically realize socialist 
modernization. By the middle of this century, China will become a great 
modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally-advanced, harmonious and beautiful. Under the leadership of 
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the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people will embark on a new 
journey [sic]. 
 
Xi refers to ecological civilisation as a response to the people’s desire for a better life. As 
the PRC progresses towards betterment, the people demand yet better lives. The people 
currently demand better, safer, cleaner, greener environments (Lu and Chan, 2016). 
This also demonstrates the tendency for the CPC to have new “revelations” or to embark 
on a new journey to an alternative destination, in order to keep with the times.  
The CPC’s journey to betterment is said to deliver: prosperity, strength, 
democracy, advanced culture, harmony and beauty. Although the CPC’s focus on 
economic development can be argued to have helped create prosperity, especially along 
the Eastern coastlines of the PRC, this prosperity is far from universal throughout the 
PRC. Reports increasingly show that environmentally damaging industries have been 
domestically exported away from the wealthy Eastern Coastal cities to the western and 
central Provinces, creating disparities not only in wealth, but in the levels of pollution 
experienced (Zhang, Liu, Feng, Hubacek, Wang, Liu, Jiang, Jiang, Liu, Zhang, Zhou and 
Bi, 2018). With regards to strength, it can be argued that the PRC has certainly 
developed beyond the “Sick Man of Asia” that was a result of the Century of Humiliation 
(Wang, 2014). However, the extent to which the PRC are becoming democratic, 
culturally-advanced, harmonious or beautiful is much more open to debate. The outrage 
across international media regarding the emergence of internment camps for Muslims in 
Xinjiang province began en-masse in 2017 (Sudworth, 2018), raising questions over the 
CPC’s definition of harmony (Finley, 2019). The attention given to the emergence of 
“Ghost-cities”, leaving scars across the PRC’s landscape, question how beautiful the 
PRC’s future development really is (Sorace and Hurst, 2015; Woodworth and Wallace, 
2017; and Yu, 2014). The CPC’s use of emotion within their ecological civilisation 
rhetoric tries to divert attention away from these struggles in describing and justifying the 
CPC’s approach to, and understanding of, betterment, thus continuing to depict them as 
correct and heroic leaders. 
 Xi’s (2017f) APEC statement continues to place the CPC as leaders guiding the 
PRC on this journey to a simultaneously codified, and therefore questionably attainable, 
destination of betterment. However, it is also explicit in describing the PRC’s 
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development as an evolving historical process. Evolution is a constant process: there will 
be no end to the PRC’s development. Zhou Shengxian (2014c:17), at the National On-
Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation, also claimed: “There is no end for 
development, and neither is [there for] the building of ecological civilization [sic].” 
Whereas this can be positively framed to demonstrate how the CPC, as the heroes, will 
continuously fight for a better future for the PRC, it also carries the message that there is 
no certainty in the ideals of ecological civilisation ever being reached.  
Despite these obvious flaws in the CPC’s rhetoric that question the pragmatism 
in ecological civilisation, or the CPC’s track record and ability to enact their vision of 
betterment, the reassurances in Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric that ecological civilisation is 
a realistic objective are still there: ecological civilisation is still currently depicted within 
the rhetoric as a place that the PRC will reach, perhaps in 2035, or 2049. Wu Xiaoqing 
(2013:8), the MEP’s Vice Minister, in his speech Building of Better Party Conduct and 
Cleaner Government in the National Environmental Protection System, argued: “[t]he 
18th National Congress of the CPC highlighted the construction of ecological civilization, 
making it part of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and imposed 
concrete, comprehensive, higher requirements on environmental protection [sic].” The 
mythologising of ecological civilisation, by the CPC’s use of emotion within their 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, contends that there are clear guidelines on how to 
become and reach ecological civilisation and that it does not exist merely as rhetoric. 
The PRC intend on becoming an ecological civilisation, regardless of diversions, length 




Summary of the CPC’s Hero Journey to Betterment 
 
To the CPC, ecological civilisation is a realistic objective, something and 
somewhere to be achieved (and will be achieved if the heroes of the CPC are supported 
as discussed in chapter 3). Galtung (2001) argues that the emotions found in the CMT-
Complex build political narratives that inspire political mobilisation. Whereas, Campbell 
(2008) argues that a myth provides a notion of betterment, with instruction on how to get 
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to there, erasing the anxieties of the struggles faced. The thematic EDA identified and 
contextualised these repeating elements of mythology thus demonstrating how the CPC 
mythologise ecological civilisation through rhetoric, which depicts the CPC as heroic and 
worthy leaders, complete with revelations for a future of betterment. Their revelation is to 
become an ecological civilisation, which exists in the rhetoric as a symbolic, ideal and 
real place and speaks to contemporary environmental struggles faced across the PRC. 
The CPC also provide instruction on how to get there, such as through innovation and 
technological advancement. Thus the CPC try to erase anxieties, all in the hope that one 
day the PRC will reach this desired place of betterment. The CPC’s ecological civilisation 
rhetoric is designed to create confidence, through reflecting the people’s current needs, 
in their intentions of leading via environmental governance. Having identified and 
contextualised the CPC’s mythologising of their heroic leadership and the revelations of 
the place of betterment the remainder of this chapter will now consider how emotions of 




Glorifying the CPC’s Leadership 
 
 Glorified actions are integral within mythology (Campbell, 2008); they are also 
integral to the ecological civilisation rhetoric. A majority of the glorified rhetoric supports 
the notion of the CPC as leading heroic endeavours; each glorification represents 
success on their hero journey. The glories can be seen within the mythologising process 
as justifications for the CPC’s leadership and their “heroic revelations” and actions; 
intended as proof of the CPC being correct. With each glorification of their ecological 
civilisation the CPC aim to diminish the opportunity for insecurities to arise in their 
approach to, and understanding of, environmental governance. The CPC can be 
understood as using emotion to cement their claim of power via environmental 
governance.  
Zhou Shengxian is, unsurprisingly, responsible for the greatest number of 
glorifications within his speeches; as the inaugural minister of the MEP this was 
somewhat expected. In Zhou’s (2010b:13) 2010 National Conference on Environmental 
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Protection speech, he argued, “[a]ny achievement in environmental protection 
constitutes positive contributions to the development of ecological civilization [sic].” 
However, this is not strictly true; to argue that any achievement constitutes “positive 
contributions” is again a glorification over-exaggerating the progress made towards 
ecological civilisation and demonstrates how the rhetoric as a whole is positively framed. 
Although it would perhaps be unfair to criticise Zhou for his enthusiasm towards 
furthering environmental protection, ultimately if achievements were hard-won or 
lacklustre in outcome, then considering what more needs to be done or what can be 
learned to ensure furthering contributions is better than labelling all actions as positive 
contributions. For example, Zhou Shengxian discusses how a number of successful 
policies have been enacted, such as tree planting as part of reforestation plans, as 
positive contributions. However, the scientific community questions these policies as 
creating dangerous monocultures displacing natural forests (Hua, Wang, Fisher, Zheng, 
Wang, Yu, Zhu and Wilcove, 2018). 
In Zhou’s (2011a:1) 2011 New Year Address, he can be seen to list a number of 
achievements in environmental protection work, where each achievement is followed by 
a positive, such as, “promoted”, “ensured”, “strengthened” or “breakthrough”: 
 
The task of emission reduction has been finished ahead of schedule, 
prevention and control of pollution of key river basins has been further 
promoted; safety of drinking water has been ensured; rural 
environmental protection and ecological conservation have been 
strengthened; more efforts in supervision on environmental law 
enforcement have been made; nuclear and radiation safety is basically 
under control, environmental management system & institution and 
policy measures have been under continuous innovation; environmental 
quality has enjoyed steady improvement and environmental protection 
work has achieved breakthrough [sic]. 
 
Zhou’s list creates an idea of the CPC being in control on their journey towards 
betterment. However, again, each achievement can be found in scholarly debate 
regarding to what extent the CPC are doing enough, questioning the success and 
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implementation of their environmental governance (see Hua, et al., 2018 for 
reforestation; Wang, Li and Liu, 2018 regarding the water-energy-emission nexus; 
Economy, 2017; and Myllyvirta; and Shen, 2018 regarding the use of coal; and 
Narberhaus and von Mitschke-Collande, 2017; and Stanislaus, 2018 for circular 
economy). Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric clearly attempts to glorify the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation, reiterating the notion of the CPC as leaders, or heroes, correctly taking the 
PRC on a journey of ecological betterment. 
 Of importance, however, is how glory emotion throughout the CPC’s ecological 
civilisation rhetoric is not solely focused on the CPC’s environmental governance 
leadership domestically within the boarders of the PRC.  Zhou Shengxian and Xi Jinping, 
both stress within their speeches the importance of the CPC as prime contributors to 
international environmental governance. Zhou Shengxian (2011b:10), in his 2011 
speech at the National Conference on Environmental Protection, stated how the CPC 
have made “[r]emarkable achievements in international environmental cooperation”, 
whereas Xi Jinping’s (2017e:5) 19th National Congress Report, claimed how the CPC, in 
“[t]aking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, China 
has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor 
for ecological civilization [sic].” The glorification goes beyond the idea of the PRC taking 
a driving seat, to expound the notion that ecological civilisation, a Chinese approach to 
Chinese challenges, is globally accepted and pursued. Xi Jinping and Zhou Shengxian 
both glorify the CPC’s ecological civilisation approach, and depict the CPC and PRC as 
global leaders in environmental governance, expanding the CPC’s claim to power within 
the international field; with regards to Xi Jinping’s rhetoric, this is somewhat expected in 
the wake of President Donald Trump announcing his intended withdrawal of the U.S. 
from the Paris Agreement (Economy, 2018; Geall and Ely, 2018; and Trump, 2017). 
 Glorification is also present when Xi Jinping (2017b:10), in his Work Together to 
Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind speech at the United Nations Office in 
2017, presented that the PRC had “gained endorsement from the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature for over a dozen applications for world natural heritage sites as 
well as world cultural and natural heritage sites. All this has presented Chinese splendor 
to the world [sic].” Xi Jinping chooses to explain this achievement, not as a much-
needed step towards further global environmental protection, but as evidence of 
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showcasing Chinese splendour. A statement on showing the best of the PRC to the 
world, reiterating Chinese splendour, was chosen over details on the PRC’s actions 
towards these successful examples of conservation.  
Wu Xiaoqing (2009:1), Vice Minister of the MEP, in his Vigorously Develop 
Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development speech, also glorifies the CPC, in 
stating that: 
 
The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to 
environmental protection work. It takes environmental protection as one 
of basic national policies and sustainable development as a national 
strategy. The Chinese Government has taken a series of measures to 
make more efforts in preventing & controlling pollution and 
environmental protection with active achievements. In particular under 
the background of international financial crisis, China has taken the 
important measures for "enhancement of the development of ecological 
environment" as an important measure for expanding domestic need 
and maintain steady & fast economic growth and taken vigorous 
development of circular economy as an important means for energy 
saving and emission reduction in the new era [sic]. 
 
Again, it is a little farfetched to say the CPC have always taken environmental protection 
seriously: this is a glorification of the CPC’s prior approaches to environmental 
governance, as discussed in Chapters 1, 3 and 4. Vice Minister Wu Xiaoqing lists the 
CPC’s actions, such as the development of circular economy, as a glorified proof of 
achievement on the journey towards ecological civilisation. However, when considering 
how the principal contradiction – "the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the 
people versus backward social production” – a maxim that had stood for thirty-six years 
until 2017, had always placed economic growth as the priority, regardless of 
environmental conditions (Xinhua, 2017:1). This demonstrates clearly how the CPC 
have certainly not always taken environmental protection seriously. 
 If the CPC had always taken environmental protection seriously, then it raises the 
question of why the CPC are now proclaiming the necessity of ecological civilisation as a 
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new approach. A contradiction arises through the use of glory emotion: Vice Minister Wu 
glorifies the CPC as a government that has always attached great importance to 
ecological civilisation, whereas Zhou Shengxian glorifies ecological civilisation as a 
uniquely new revelation of the CPC. Ecological civilisation naturally highlights the 
shortcomings of the CPC’s prior approaches to environmental protection. Zhou 
Shengxian, when talking about Hu’s 18th National Congress Report, highlights the 
importance of how, for the first time, an entire chapter was devoted to environmental 
protection; it was within this chapter that ecological civilisation was first introduced by 
Hu.  
Although the CPC has never completely ignored environmental protection it is 
certainly a glorification to argue that the CPC have always taken environmental 
protection seriously. The CPC appear to at least be attempting to do so now, but as the 
interpretations within this thesis highlight, that is not necessarily with ecological 
soundness in mind. Whereas ecological civilisation does arguably represent a realistic 
objective with a clear roadmap to reach this real destination, simultaneously, the rhetoric 
not only speaks to national identity creation (as seen in chapter 4), but also mythologises 
the CPC as heroic leaders, with a revelation for betterment. The rhetoric is creating not 
only a new take on national identity, but also a power dynamic, attempting to build trust 
in, and support for, the CPC as leaders through environmental governance. 
The CPC are using glory emotion to address potential insecurities with the CPC’s 
leadership and their approach to environmental governance. Two traits characteristic of 
mythology will now be discussed to further exemplify the use of glory emotion to 
positively frame CPC leadership: death and resurrection and blame.  
 
 
Death and Resurrection: The CPC’s Constant Pursuit of Revelations for Betterment 
 
 With regards to hero mythology, “death” symbolises the ultimate sacrifice of the 
hero in their efforts to provide betterment; “resurrection” symbolises a new ability and 
hope to reach betterment (Campbell, 2008). The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric 
has extensive examples of “death and resurrection” (one of which was briefly mentioned 
as such on page 198). With each successor to the CPC’s General Secretary position 
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comes a symbolic death and resurrection. The old approaches of the predecessor give 
way to the revelations of new approaches of the successor: the symbolic “death” of Hu 
Jintao’s leadership, the sacrifices made during his premiership, are followed by a 
“resurrection”, the coming of Xi Jinping, with his revelations. With the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric there is no literal death or resurrection, merely the notion of old giving 
way to new. With each symbolic resurrection, there is a revelation, and the glorification 
of this new understanding and approach. However, the “death” of the old is never 
dismissed as too little, not good enough or wrong; the old is glorified too. The whole 
death and resurrection process is glorified, placing emphasis on the dedication devoted 
by the CPC: the correct and core leaders of the PRC. 
Two of the most frequently reoccurring examples of death and resurrection in the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric include: the rejuvenation from humiliation narrative and the 
chronological lists of the CPC’s theoretical approaches over the past seven decades. 
Rejuvenation represents the resurrection of the PRC following the death events of 
humiliation. Each new political theory, approach and slogan of a new successor to CPC 
leadership represents the resurrection of the Party following the death event of moving 
forwards from the predecessor’s old ideas: the Environmental Protection National Policy 
gave way to the Sustainable Development Strategy, which in turn gave way to Scientific 
Development, finally bringing us to the most recent resurrection, the revelation of 
Ecological Civilisation. Each death and resurrection becomes a landmark on the journey 
towards betterment; the new direction and instructions are portrayed as being where 
wisdom has been developed and where experiences were forged to “keep with the 
times”. Each death represents commitment and sacrifice where the CPC must now 
continue to complete what it has begun. Ecological civilisation, interpreted through death 
and resurrection, demonstrates the CPC’s sacrifices for betterment, their wisdom, 
progress and increased ability to deliver. Ecological civilisation embodies the glory of 
revelations for reaching rejuvenation. 
Thus, having considered above how ecological civilisation represents a symbolic, 
ideal and real place, keeping with the current modern trends on the heroes’ journey to 
betterment. Ecological civilisation is also understood as a resurrection, the revelation of 
how to reach betterment following on from the symbolic death of China after decades of 
humiliations at the hands of foreign aggressors. Again, ecological civilisation as a hero 
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journey can be understood as a tangible extension to the rejuvenation from humiliation 
narrative (see, Wang, 2014); the CPC’s heroic endeavours are helping the PRC to 
regain strength having been the “sick man of Asia”, to enter a “new era” of clean, green 
and beautiful: both are associated with positivity and glory. 
Xi Jinping (2018b:9), closing the 13th National People’s Congress, said: “As an 
old Chinese poem goes, "When I glance at the visage of vernal breeze, I know that a 
thousand flowers of purple and red set spring aglow." After nearly seven decades of 
hard work under the leadership of the CPC, our people's republic has been growing 
vigorously, and with an entirely new posture, it now stands tall and firm in the East.” 
Here, Xi devotes an emotion-stirring poem, focused on a beautiful landscape, to the 
PRC’s rejuvenation and reaching of betterment: no longer the “sick man of Asia”, the 
beauty of the natural landscape glorifies this resurrection of the PRC. Rather than a 
poem about economic prowess through unprecedented economic growth allowing the 
PRC to stand tall, Xi associates the wellbeing of the PRC with visions of ecological 
beauty. Despite the choked waterways, smoggy skies and toxic soils that many Chinese 
experience on a daily basis, Xi depicts a very pleasant, beautiful PRC. As highlighted in 
Chapter 4, the chosen memories of trauma, associated with the phrase “sick man of 
Asia”, also work to further enhance the glories captured within Xi’s phrase of “stands tall 
and firm in the East.” 
With regards to the political theorems, listed chronologically, each new political 
approach symbolises the resurrection of new ideas that have developed following the 
“death” of or building upon the previous approach. The “death” of a previous theory does 
not mean the CPC abandon or reject these earlier thoughts, but rather they are able to 
cherry-pick which elements of the prior theory should be preserved and thus merged 
with the new theory, now better adapted to current trends and modern times. This 
glorification process can be seen in the following extract from Zhou Shengxian 
(2013c:1), in his 2013 National Work Meeting on Environmental Protection speech:  
 
The 18th National Congress of the CPC took place at a critical moment 
when China was to enter a decisive stage of building an all-rounded 
moderately prosperous society. It held high the great banner of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, carried forward our cause and 
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lifted our spirits. A historic decision and contribution of the Congress was 
that it identified Scientific Outlook on Development, together with 
Ma[r]xism and Leninism, Mao Zedong Thoughts, Deng Xiaoping Theory 
and Three Represents, as the guidance the Party must follow for a long 
time to come, marking one more progress in the Party’s guiding 
principle. An attraction of the Congress was that it put ecological 
civilization at a strategic position as important as economic, political, 
cultural and social development and made it one of the five overall 
arrangements for pursuing the cause of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. A separate chapter was devoted to the topic for the first 
time, making it one more innovation the Party has made in the concept 
and practice of governance [sic]. 
 
Each symbolic resurrection event, of a new theoretical approach, signifies a resurgence 
of hope and strength through a reinvigoration in new understanding: each is a new 
revelation in approach to reach betterment. Zhou’s extract continues to place the CPC in 
a heroic position guiding the PRC to betterment through their innovations on guiding 
principles. Zhou Shengxian presents ecological civilisation as the latest revelation in the 
continued process of resurrection during the CPC’s progressive leadership. 
With each General Secretary there has been the rise of a new political slogan 
backed by their favoured political theory. With each new approach there is an element of 
“chest-thumping” (China Daily, 2007; or “breast-beating” Pye, 1967:169) where the 
theory is to be held high as a metaphorical banner, announcing to the world that there is 
a new and improved governing theory. As a resurrection, the CPC’s latest approach 
requires a level of glorification to disseminate the necessity of, and the improvements to 
be found through, the new approach; to rally support behind the latest direction in 
governance. What can be seen within the ecological civilisation rhetoric is a veneration 
of certain elements of the old theories, which are then added to and merged with new 
thoughts. The new theory must be held high, as ultimately it is there to guide the PRC on 




Blame: “Buck-Passing” Environmental Traumas onto the Developed West 
 
Blame is another key element of the hero journey, and centres on finding a 
reason or explanation for the struggle a group is facing. Campbell (2008) refers to this as 
“buck-passing” and provides the example of when the snake was blamed in the Garden 
of Eden in Christian mythology. For the CPC to justify ecological civilisation, as an 
important and heroic revelation for bettering their environmental governance, there must 
be an environmental struggle being faced by the PRC. What is more, to describe 
themselves as the heroes in this struggle, the struggle is most likely to be outlined as the 
result of an “Other”. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the CPC use blame as a shared 
trauma whereby the environmental degradation faced by the PRC has been the product 
of the mistakes of Western development, through their “denounced” approach of 
sustainable development, which the CPC had rapidly and blindly followed.  
The CPC are “buck-passing” the responsibility for the environmental degradation 
suffered throughout the PRC onto the developed nations. Pye (1967:72) observed how 
“[a]ccording to the political mythology that they have sought to build up, the Chinese 
have invariably suffered unjustly at the hands of all nations”. There are many emotions 
involved in the CPC’s blaming rhetoric, including: anger, disgust, shame and 
embarrassment. In the literature, a “victim mentality” is referred to (Callahan, 2015; 
Gries, 2004; Magnier, 2008; Wang, 2014; and Woo, 2012). However, through this 
mythologising of ecological civilisation, the CPC incorporate blame into the glorification 
of their understanding of and approach to environmental governance.  
For example, in Zhou Shengxian’s (2009a:1) Actively Exploring a New Path to 
Environmental Protection with Chinese Characteristics under the Guidance of Ecological 
Civilization speech, he argued how: “[p]romoting ecological civilization is a justification 
for implementing Scientific Outlook on Development, a crucial decision for avoiding the 
roundabout course of "pollution first, treatment afterwards", as taken by developed 
countries, and a necessity of benign development featuring robust economic growth, 
comfortable life and sound eco environment [sic].” This extract demonstrates a 
glorification of ecological civilisation as the means to avoid repeating the mistakes of 
developed nations. The blame for the struggle is passed onto the developed countries; 
“pollute now, treat later” is buck-passed onto the Developed West and they are blamed 
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for coining and spreading this approach. Ecological civilisation, as the answer for how to 
reach betterment, is entirely a result of the CPC’s glorious, heroic revelation for improved 
environmental governance. The CPC draw upon the emotions of hatred and disgust of 
the developed nations through their "treatment after pollution", "economic growth at the 
cost of the environment" and "focusing on end-of the-pipe treatment" mentality, which 
the CPC blame as responsible for creating the PRC’s current level of environmental 
degradation, claimed by Zhou (2011b:18-19) during his Meet New Requirements of the 
Theme and Main Line and Open a New Situation of Environmental Protection Work 
speech.  
The CPC build an argument for pursuing continued development, via ecological 
civilisation, whilst ignoring their own responsibilities in the destruction of the PRC’s 
environment. This is seen in the following excerpt from Zhou Shengxian (2011d:3) 
during his Uplifting Ecological Civilisation speech to the MEP: “Over the past 30 odd 
years, some regions of our country… follow the old path of "treatment after pollution" and 
pay too big environment cost. It is our way out to follow [the] new path to environmental 
protection that is small in cost, good in benefits, low in emission and sustainable in 
development based on basic national conditions and centering on the theme of scientific 
development, main line of shifting economic development mode and new requirement 
for uplifting ecological civilization [sic].” Zhou labels the approach taken by “some 
regions” of the PRC as the old path of “treatment after pollution”.  
Although not directly labelled this way within the extract, in Zhou’s speeches, the 
“old pathway” is that established by the developed nations; hence Zhou goes on to 
distinguish “our way” as a new path to environmental governance, meaning the way of 
the CPC. What this does is push the blame of bad environmental practices throughout 
the PRC onto having followed the approach of developed nations. The CPC are not 
accepting responsibility for allowing poor environmental practices to take place within the 
PRC; and in not stating in which regions these poor practices were followed the CPC 
further remove themselves from any environmental consequences. Once again, the 
argument for how ecological civilisation is better is glorified as being a Chinese 
response. 
Pye (1967:58) identified that “[i]n so identifying their collective problem the 
Chinese have translated their difficulties with modernization into a problem of authority 
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[sic].” In many ways this observation by Pye (1967) highlights why the elements of 
mythology found within the ecological civilisation rhetoric convey such a powerful 
message. The political culture in both China and the PRC has been to have one 
dominant omnipotent authority figure, from Emperors in China’s past to the single Party 
rule of the PRC’s present. This single authority setup has created an obvious route for 
tracing the root of any political difficulty back to the single authority figure (Pye, 1967). 
Currently, this is the CPC and such a collective mentality is somewhat expected in 
Chinese politics resulting in political slogans and ideologies built to carry answers of an 
alternative authority figure to blame. Just as in China’s past, the “barbarians” were to be 
blamed for their inferiority in approach (Callahan, 2012); now it is the “denounced” West 
with their inferior approach to environmental governance, who have much to gain from 
the CPC’s leadership sharing the Chinese wisdom of ecological civilisation with the 
world; reminiscent, again, of Huaxia where “foreigners have different minds” (Wu, 
2012:3). 
Blame is also built into the ecological civilisation rhetoric by playing on the PRC’s 
status as a “developing nation” as a result of the Century of Humiliation. Hu Jintao, 
reinforces the CPC’s credibility, not only by “buck-passing” the blame away to excuse 
the CPC’s own responsibility, but also differentiates the PRC as existing as a 
“developing nation”. Hu Jintao (2012:14) in his 18th National Congress Report, 
proclaimed: “China's international status as the largest developing country in the world 
has not changed. We must bear in mind under any circumstances the paramount reality 
that China remains in the primary stage of socialism and will long remain so and base 
ourselves on this reality in pursuing all of our endeavors of reform and development 
[sic].” Not only does this give the CPC leeway on the success of their ecological 
governance endeavours, but it suggests the CPC ought to be excused for as long as the 
PRC can be considered to be a developing nation: the rhetoric suggests that CPC can 
only do so much, so long as the PRC are still developing. The CPC distinguishes the 
PRC from the developed “Other” as a developing “Us”. 
During the 17th National Congress Report, Hu Jintao (2009:1) also argued how: 
“It is imperative to give full consideration to the development stage and basic needs of 
developing countries while we address climate change. The international community 
should pay close attention to the difficulties facing the developing countries, especially 
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the small island states, the least developed countries, landlocked countries and African 
countries.” Hu’s approach protects the PRC from harsh and devoted responsibilities, 
whilst appearing heroic. Hu considers the needs of others, as well as the PRC. Hu 
discursively takes on the role of a hero who stands-up for the small island states, African 
countries and those that are least developed.  
However, despite the emotional language written into the ecological civilisation 
speeches on the environmental traumas suffered at the hands of the polluting West, the 
West is still not seen as the only source of the CPC’s difficulties with modernisation. The 
attempt to glorify the CPC by blaming the developed nations only carries so far. Indeed, 
Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of presenting the CPC’s identity, which described 
the PRC as a forward-thinking, reliable and friendly State, and showed how ideals of 
harmony and friendship are important within the ecological civilisation rhetoric. Pye 
(1967:58) went on to write that “[i]n looking for the source of their difficulties the Chinese 
are quick to trace them to the political arena.” Despite Zhou Shengxian’s (2011b:18-19) 
efforts to place the blame squarely on developed nations, the following excerpt, from the 
2011 National Conference on Environmental Protection, highlights how the failed 
attempts of past CPC administrations cannot be ignored: 
 
China cannot follow and cannot afford following the old development 
path of western countries featuring "treatment after pollution", "economic 
growth at the cost of the environment" and "focusing on end-of the-pipe 
treatment"… [S]ome provinces or autonomous regions separate 
environmental protection with economic development; they had narrow 
vision on environmental protection and pollution control. Their path of 
environmental protection became narrower and narrower with no big 
achievements over the past 30 years since 1979. However, if we make 
overall consideration of environmental protection and economic & social 
development, the path of environmental protection becomes wider and 
wider [sic]. 
 
Although Zhou begins by placing the blame on the developed nations in the first 
sentence, he goes on to suggest that some provinces have been “narrow” in their 
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environmental policy vision, in “following” the denounced approach of the developed 
nations, they have made no big achievements.  
Although not completely negative in accusation, there is an element of inward 
blame present, an acknowledgement that some provinces chose to follow this erroneous 
pathway. However, this is comparatively rare across the rhetoric and completely ignorant 
of the pressures the CPC placed on these provinces through the “opening up and 
reform” policies (Ying, 2017). Overall, the ecological civilisation rhetoric continues the 
glorification process of the post-1978 reform narrative, where revolutionary ideologies of 
“only the CPC can save China” are developed into the pragmatic confidence of “only the 
CPC can develop China” (Ying, 2017). The social and development situation is again 
given as the reason for the CPC’s blind following of the denounced western approach, 
which buck-passes the blame away to account for the CPC not acting otherwise. This 
reinforces the glorification of the CPC, as the true leaders able to develop the PRC, 
through their constantly evolving and developing thoughts, which now offers as their 
latest conceptualisation of betterment, ecological civilisation. Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric 
suggests that the CPC have worked tirelessly on developing the PRC and have now 
reached a stage where the latest revelation allows for ecological improvements on their 
pathway towards betterment. 
Having considered some of the ways through which the CPC glorify their 
approach to, understanding of and actions towards ecological civilisation, the next 
section will move on to identify the negatives associated with shared traumas within the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric. 
  
 
Traumas of Trials and Tribulations Yet to Face 
 
 According to Campbell (2008), trials and tribulations lead to a period of 
enlightenment and recognition by the hero, followed by the hero’s return, to take the 
group on their enlightened journey to betterment. The hero journey recognises difficulties 
are collectively shared and that a hero with a revelation for betterment can turn these 
traumas into glories. However, shared traumas can also become new humiliations, and 
this gives rise to uncertainties of the heroes’ ability to deliver betterment. The CPC’s 
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rhetoric highlights environmental trials and tribulations suffered by the PRC, which justify 
the necessity in their revelation of betterment through delivering ecological civilisation. 
Their use of traumas highlights their enlightenment and recognition of environmental 
importance, thus also further justifying their leadership. The use of trauma emotions 
continues to place the blame of the developed nations, and exacerbates the necessity 
for the CPC to lead the PRC out of poverty, environmental destruction and a perceived 
position of inferiority (Gare, 2017; and Huan, 2008).  
Throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric the CPC repeatedly refer to three 
main trials and tribulations: the PRC’s developing nation status; the PRC’s position in 
reaching the beginning of becoming a Socialist country with Chinese characteristics; and 
that the PRC has a natural lack of resources compared to other nations. Below are two 
extracts, one by Zhou Shengxian, the second by by Wu Xiaoqing, which present each 
trial and tribulation respectfully. Zhou Shengxian (2011i:2), at the Fourth National 
Working Meeting on the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Regulation, discussed the 
predicament of being a developing nation in the early stages of Socialism: 
 
It has always been a difficult issue to correctly deal with the relation 
between environmental protection and economic development and to 
balance both. To protect the environment without considerations to 
economic development is something like climbing a tree to catch a fish, 
while to pursue economic development without protecting the 
environment is something like draining a pond to get the fish in it. To 
only pursue economic development is simple, so is to only protect the 
environment. The problem is that we need the both. On the one hand, 
China is a developing country where underdevelopment is still a 
prominent problem, so the first priority should always be given to 
development. On the other hand, there is also a transformation problem 
concerning development in China. The conflicts caused by unbalanced 
and unsustainable development remain very grave. So we need to 
protect the environment during the development course and seek 
development through environmental protection efforts. 
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Zhou stipulates that the dilemma between pursuing development and understanding 
what development is most needed, without further environmental degradation, is very 
complicated. Moreover, Zhou acknowledged that the CPC’s negation of this conflict has 
caused unbalanced and unsustainable development, and will remain grave for quite 
some time. 
Regarding the PRC’s natural lack of resources. Wu Xiaoqing (2009:2), in his 
Vigorously Develop Circular Economy Based on Scientific Development speech, 
explains how: 
	  
China still belongs to a developing country and is at the process of 
accelerated modernization, industrialization and urbanization, steady 
and fast economic growth will impose relatively big pressure on 
resources and environmental protection. In terms of resource 
endowment, the per capita fresh water resource of China is only one 
fourth of the world average, per capita arable land less than 40% of the 
world average, per capita forest one fifth of the world average and per 
capita of 45 kinds of main mineral resources less then the world 
average. From environmental status, the surface water pollution across 
China is still very serious. In 2008, the overall quality of 7 big river 
systems is under intermediate pollution with prominent eutrophication 
problems in lakes and reservoirs. The overall urban air quality is good, 
but air pollution of some cities is still very serious [sic]. 
 
In emphasising the trials and tribulations faced by the PRC, the CPC are able to 
acknowledge suffering, creating a visage of awareness and understanding. The victim 
mentality, embedded within the humiliations of the rejuvenation from humiliation 
narrative, is utilised to explain the PRC’s environmental suffering. The use of traumas in 
the ecological civilisation rhetoric, speaks to two further aspects commonly found in hero 
journey mythology: a sacrifice and a forbidden thing. The experience of shared traumas 
acts as a way of the CPC directing the people; specifically telling them how they will 
have to behave and what they will have to (not) do, what to sacrifice and what is 
forbidden, in order for the CPC to carry out their revelation for betterment. 
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Sacrifice: Environmental Protection or Economic Growth and the Tenacity of the 
Chinese People 
 
 In Campbell’s (2008) description of hero journey mythology, he describes the 
process of sacrifice. Sacrifice usually takes the form of either the hero sacrificing 
themselves for the sake of the betterment of the people, or as a sacrifice to be made by 
the people outlined by the hero in order to reach betterment. For example, in Christian 
mythology, Jesus sacrificed himself to save the people and the people must repent in 
order to reach Heaven (Campbell, 2008). Sacrifice is present within the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric, however, rather than the CPC as the hero being the sacrifice for 
betterment instead what we see is how the environment itself has been sacrificed 
through the prioritisation of economic growth. The ecological civilisation rhetoric 
highlights the sacrifice of the environment as a shared trauma.  
This argument is made by Zhou Shengxian (2012c:1) within his Optimizing the 
Economic Development through Protection of the Environment speech: “China has 
made world renowned achievements in economic and social dimensions since the 
reform and opening-up, but paid excessive resources and environment costs for them.” 
The environment was sacrificed for the PRC’s record-breaking economic growth. 
However, Zhou (2012c:1) goes on to say:  
 
The development mode that jeopardizes resources and environment has 
not only brought about all sorts of social conflicts including 
environmental problems, but also worked against the sustained 
economic growth. For example, water pollution cuts down the fishery 
efficiency, and soil salinization, desertification, and loss of soil fertility 
result in poor harvest. We must awaken to the voluntary protection of the 
resources and environment, being highly responsible for the survival and 
development of our future generations. We will definitely not take the old 
path of developed countries by giving priority to economic development 
and remedying the environment afterwards, instead, we will actively 
explore new path for environmental protection in China which is 
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characterized by optimizing the economic development through the 
protection of the environment [sic].  
 
Zhou Shengxian lists the shared traumas, of the trials and tribulations that have 
manifested through sacrificing the environment for economic development. The blame 
for these trials and tribulations is still placed on the “old path of developed countries”, as 
discussed above. Zhou Shengxian defends the CPC and glorifies their actions as they 
are “highly responsible for the survival and development” of future generations and will 
find a “new path”. However, Zhou’s excerpt shows the changing attitude that 
accompanies ecological civilisation as the CPC’s revelation for betterment: 
environmental governance ought to be prioritised; economic growth will continue, but in 
a more sustainable way. 
The second example of sacrifice within the ecological civilisation rhetoric is the 
sacrifice that the people must make to reach ecological civilisation. This sacrifice 
emerges in the frequent use of war metaphors and requires the spirit of ecological 
civilisation of the Chinese strength, hard work and unity. War metaphors repeat 
throughout the rhetoric and symbolise the sacrifice of the people in their dedication to 
the cause and requirement of relentless hard work to follow the CPC’s environmental 
governance and command (see Table 3 in Chapter 3). For example, Zhou Shengxian 
(2013c:12), in his National Working Meeting on Environmental Protection speech, 
stated: “We are also soberly aware that China's environment is still in serious conditions. 
We should have not only the sense of urgency to fight a tenacious battle, but also the full 
mental preparation for a protracted war.” The sacrifice expected is the hard work and 
willingness of the people of the PRC to follow the CPC’s orders to find an alternative 
means of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. The use of a war metaphor carries the 
serious nature of the extent of environmental damage and represents not only the length 
of time required to find an alternative pathway to development, but implies the citizens of 
the PRC will be conscripted to fight to bring about this change. 
 Xi Jinping (2017e:50), during the 19th National Congress, calls for commitment 
from the people when he contends: “What we are doing today to build an ecological 
civilization will benefit generations to come. We should have a strong commitment to 
socialist ecological civilization and work to develop a new model of modernization with 
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humans developing in harmony with nature. We must do our generation’s share to 
protect the environment [sic].” As did Hu Jintao (2012:12) before Xi, during the 18th 
National Congress, where he claimed: “Developing socialism with Chinese 
characteristics is a long-term arduous task of historic importance, and we must be 
prepared to carry out a great struggle with many new historical features. We must 
unswervingly adhere to socialism with Chinese characteristics, develop it as required by 
the times, constantly enrich it in both practice and theory and enhance its distinctive 
national features in keeping up with the times.” The Chinese people are told to expect a 
struggle, to offer strong commitment and to fight, they themselves are the sacrifice 
needed to reach ecological civilisation and to make the CPC’s vision of betterment a 
reality. 
The emotion term “arduous” captures these shared traumas of the struggle and 
hard work, the sacrifice the people must make, in order for the PRC to reach ecological 
civilisation. Zhou Shengxian’s (2011b:15) 2011 National Conference on Environmental 
Protection speech, claimed: “our task is very onerous”. The tone is negative; a change 
from the many glorifications found within the rhetoric when referring to the work done by 
the CPC; however this trauma emotion again works to enhance the glory of the 
leadership of the CPC to deliver this arduous and onerous betterment. When referring to 
the future work that will have to be done by the people there is no glamour or glory: the 
seriousness of the challenge to be faced is not abated. The spirit of ecological civilisation 
is built not only from Chinese wisdom and experience, but also from their hard work, 
“working tirelessly” and being “indomitable” (Hu, 2007:6 and 2011b:7).  
Xi Jinping (2018b:3-4), in his closing speech at the 13th National People’s 
Congress, argued: “With the spirit of fighting the enemy to the last minute, the resolve of 
recovering the lost on the basis of self-reliance, and the ability of rising up among the 
community of nations, the Chinese people have made continuous efforts for more than 
170 years to fulfil the great dreams.” The trauma of sacrifice is furthered with the 
reminder of the humiliations suffered throughout the Century of Humiliation thus 
rendering the hard work necessary and just. The Chinese have for too long been the 
victim, their hard work is now bringing them their rejuvenation and place of betterment: 
ecological civilisation. Ecological civilisation is a protracted war, not only against 
pollution, but also part of the PRC’s rejuvenation from humiliation(s). The identity 
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constructed by the CPC and carried through their rhetoric captured by the term spirit, is 
needed to bring the Chinese together, with their wisdom and culture, to face the future 
traumas before reaching the place of betterment and future glories. 
Xi Jinping (2018a:2), in his New Year Speech, emphasised this sacrifice of hard 
work expected by the people, in stating: “2018 marks the beginning of China putting into 
action the guiding principles of the 19th CPC National Congress, which designed a 
blueprint for the country’s development for the next three decades. "A nine-storey tower 
begins with a pile of earth." To translate the blueprint into reality, we must neither rush 
upon fantasy nor be guided by the sound of falsehood. We shall work steadily and in a 
down-to-earth manner.” Imagery created by the pile of earth as the start towards the 
nine-storey tower suggests how far the PRC has to go and how much the people have to 
give. No fantasy or falsehood justifies the necessity of hard work to be expected, there is 
no sugar coating the sacrifice that has to be made by the people to enact the guiding 
principles and reach ecological civilisation. Xi indicates there is a need to work steadily, 
but to remain down-to-earth and realistic in their objective for an ecological civilisation. 
The sacrifice expected to be made by everyone of the PRC is a new shared trauma, a 
new series of trials and tribulations to be faced before the glory of the CPC’s 
rejuvenation through betterment, ecological civilisation, can be reached. 
 
 
A Forbidden Thing or Action: Climbing a Tree or Draining the Pond to Catch a Fish 
 
Another common feature within the hero journey, present within the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric, is the notion of something forbidden. A well-known example from 
Christian myth is how the apple from the tree of knowledge was forbidden (Campbell, 
2008). Within the CPC’s early ecological civilisation speeches the forbidden action was 
to allow economic growth to slow down. On numerous occasions the CPC repeat that in 
order to become a socialist country, to be moderately prosperous in all respects and to 
reach rejuvenation, that economic growth must continue as the top priority. Hu Jintao’s 
(2011b:14), speech at the meeting commemorating the 90th Anniversary of the founding 
of the CPC, stated: “In the past 30 plus years of reform and opening up, we have 
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pursued economic development as the top priority and developed the productive forces 
at an unprecedented speed.”  
Similarly, Zhou Shengxian’s (2010b:18) Prepared for the Deciding Battle, 
Devising New Development and Actively Exploring a New Path to Environmental 
Protection speech, stated: “In the primary stage of socialism, it is impossible to stop the 
development of economy for the sake of the environment. However, this stage will 
definitely not tolerate pollution. Economic development has to proceed along with 
resource conservation and environmental protection.” The CPC are arguing that the 
PRC cannot have a safe and sound environment until a certain level of economic 
prowess is achieved. This justifies previous CPC policies, which harmed the 
environment, because economic growth must come first for a developing nation. Again, 
in his Optimizing the Economic Development through Protection of the Environment 
speech, Zhou (2012c:2) claimed, “China is and will be in the preliminary stage of 
socialism for a long period of time to come, and development is the skeleton key to all 
sorts of questions, so we can never afford to address environmental problems by putting 
a stop to economic development.”  
Thus the CPC can be seen to argue that the PRC need economic growth more 
than the clean and beautiful environment of ecological civilisation. These arguments 
were considered in the Literature Review where scholars such as Gare (2017), Huan 
(2008) and Wu Shaoxia (cited in Balchindorzhieva and Tsyrendorzhieva, 2016) argued a 
certain level of development must first be reached before progression towards an 
ecological civilisation can be achieved. In making economic decline the forbidden thing 
the CPC protect themselves from insecurities regarding their approach to environmental 
governance; economic growth “in this stage” had to be the priority.  
Zhou Shengxian tries to deal with this contradiction between economic growth 
and environmental protection in a number of speeches. At the Meeting in Memory of the 
30th Anniversary of China National Environment Centre, Zhou (2010e:2) prioritises 
economic growth, thus placing ecological civilisation second: 
 
Environmental problems are in nature problems concerning the 
economic structure, production mode, consumption mode, and 
development path. Correct economic policies lead to correct 
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environmental policies and vice versa. To discuss environmental 
protection without economic development is as much as climbing a tree 
to catch a fish, and to discuss economic development without 
environmental protection is as much as draining the pond to get the fish 
in it. China is and will be in the preliminary stage of socialism in the long 
run. To protect the environment during this stage is the hardest when 
most complicated problems will be met. We will by no means protect the 
environment by suspending development during this stage and will 
neither allow pollution. Development is the first priority while 
environment is an important support. 
 
Economic growth stopping, as the forbidden thing, highlights how ecological civilisation 
is perhaps, as some have argued, more likely just a symbol of betterment, merely 
rhetoric. Not the change in direction of supporting policies and action for environmental 
governance professed in much of the glorified rhetoric already discussed. The CPC’s 
revelation here is simply that economic growth, and therefore development, cannot 
continue if the environment is in disarray. Zhou Shengxian (2010b:15), at the 2010 
National Conference on Environmental Protection, said, “[t]he concept of historic 
transformation of environmental protection ushered us to a new stage in which 
environmental protection will optimize economic growth [sic].” 
The CPC have struggled in their governance of the environment given their 
preoccupation with economic growth (Huan, 2008). Zhou (2011h:4) at the 2011 AGM of 
the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 
stated, “To correctly deal with the relationship between environmental protection and 
economic development is always a hard nut to crack in the construction process of 
socialistic modernization in China. These two factors are mutually restrictive and 
supportive. To protect environment without economic development looks like to fish in 
the air, to develop economy without environmental protection looks like to drain the pond 
to catch all fish [sic].” His statement clearly explains why economic growth cannot 
continue without environmental protection; there will be no fish left. Whereas his 
statement on why environmental protection cannot go ahead without economic growth 
makes less sense; it suggests that this is something that is not possible and senseless in 
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trying. As an analogy it does not make sense; as long as the CPC continue to present 
economic decline, as the forbidden thing, ecological civilisation is clearly never to be.  
However, with the change in leadership direction as Xi Jinping took over as 
General Secretary, there has been a change in the forbidden thing found within the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric. Culminating in the change to the principal contradiction by 
Xi in October 2017, to, “What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and 
inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life”, this 
reduced emphasis on economic growth has been echoed within Zhou Shengxian’s 
rhetoric since Xi took over as Chairman in 2012 (Xinhua, 2017). For example, at the 
National On-Site Meeting on Building Ecological Civilisation, Zhou (2014c:2) explained: 
“General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that never should we sacrifice the environment for 
temporary economic growth.” The change in rhetoric is clear to see, although economic 
growth is not entirely forbidden, Zhou is now arguing against prioritising and praising 
economic growth: Zhou goes on to state “[n]o longer should we praise any places simply 
by GDP growth.” Zhou Shengxian began to argue more in favour of the environmental 
protection and the ecological modernisation expected from an Environment Minister.  
Environmental protection cannot be a support for economic growth; they have to 
be mutually supportive. In changing the principal contradiction, Xi began to change the 
priorities and potential of what can be achieved through ecological civilisation. Xi Jinping 
(2017e:11), during the 19th National Congress, said: 
 
We must recognize that the evolution of the principal contradiction facing 
Chinese society represents a historic shift that affects the whole 
landscape and that creates many new demands for the work of the Party 
and the country. Building on continued efforts to sustain development, 
we must devote great energy to addressing development’s imbalances 
and inadequacies, and push hard to improve the quality and effect of 
development. With this, we will be better placed to meet the ever-
growing economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological needs of our 




Xi’s decision to update the principal contradiction represented another crucial revelation 
made by the hero. Xi’s revelation to change the principal contradiction has started to 
give ecological civilisation the chance to become reality by diminishing the level of 
priority placed on economic growth. Arguably, updating the principal contradiction 
represents the most important revelation any Leader has had in creating a pathway for 
the PRC’s betterment through ecological civilisation. Economic growth was preventing 
environmental protection and ecological modernisation. The new principal contradiction 
provides more support to the notion of becoming an ecological civilisation; no longer 
must economic growth be the priority above all else. However, these new demands will 
require relentless war-like effort from the Chinese people in following their commander, 
their hero, Xi Jinping. Despite this update being one of the most important and powerful 
‘revelations’ had by the CPC to date, this alone will not help materialise their concept of 





This chapter has shown how the emotions contextualised through the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric glorifies the CPC as heroic leaders. Interpreting the use of emotion 
by the CPC within their ecological civilisation rhetoric has shown how the latest concept 
for environmental governance is the latest edition to CPC’s journey towards Xiaokang, 
rejuvenation and Socialism with Chinese characteristics. The use of emotion highlights 
how ecological civilisation is discursively created as a place of betterment, which is 
symbolic, ideal and real. Reaching this place is the fulfilment of the heroes’ journey and 
will bring the PRC one step closer to national rejuvenation. In mythologising ecological 
civilisation the CPC uses glory emotion to positively frame each new direction in their 
environmental governance as a resurrection: a revelation in good governance on how to 
take the PRC towards betterment. Glories also helped in “buck-passing” the blame of the 
PRC’s environmental sufferings onto the denounced approach of the West. This renders 
the CPC’s ecological civilisation as a heroic revelation to right the wrongs of the 
developed nations.  
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Interpreting the use of emotion through this perspective of mythology also 
highlighted how the CPC incorporated traumas into the ecological civilisation rhetoric; 
traumas were used to emphasise the sacrifices needed by the Chinese people to help 
the CPC to fight the protracted war against pollution and move towards ecological 
betterment. This furthered the CPC’s suggestion of the PRC having been victims of the 
pollution and bad environmental governance of the developed West. Traumas were also 
used to highlight a change in the forbidden thing typically found within a hero journey; 
Xi’s change to the principal contradiction sees a transformation away from solely 
prioritising economic growth. Xi’s heroic and strong leadership and his revelation of 
updating the principal contradiction has given more support and strength to their concept 
of an ecological civilisation, placing the concept, more than ever, as able to exist as a 
real future of environmental governance.  
This chapter also began to highlight how the CPC have intentions of 
environmental governance beyond the remit of the PRC; their thought-leadership on how 
ecological civilisation can produce ecological betterment, as a product of Chinese 
wisdom and culture, is a gift to be shared with mankind; a product of their heroic 
leadership. The next chapter will provide a third interpretation and considers the global 




Chapter 6: Responsibility and Ecological Civilisation: An 
Evolution in the PRC’s Global Status  
  
This chapter explores how the CPC’s use of emotion in the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric discursively constructs status with responding levels of responsibility (Zeren, 责
任 ) concerning environmental governance, both domestically and internationally. 
Responsibility, as a political concept, will broadly be discussed as concerning power, 
status and leadership. Chapter 3 noted how the CPC uses emotion to create and 
support status differentiations that suit the CPC’s perceived realities and imagined 
futures of the PRC’s position on the world stage. In particular were the two statuses 
“developing nation” and “big responsible country” (sometimes also given as: “responsible 
major country”, “responsible major power” and “responsible great power” (Yeophantong, 
2013)). This chapter explores how the CPC are pursuing different levels of status for the 
PRC in order to command their proposed levels of appropriate responsibility. Also 
demonstrated is how these differences allow for consistency within the PRC’s actions, 
highlighting the flexibility written into ecological civilisation; in order to continue domestic 
development, which is in line with earlier discussions regarding the transitioning from a 
growing economy into a growth economy (Huan, 2008).  
Traditional roots of responsibility in China will be considered first, before 
demonstrating how such thoughts are present within the CPC’s ecological civilisation 
rhetoric. The chapter then moves on to explore the duality between the statuses of 
developing nation and big responsible nation and considers why and how these two 
statuses appear throughout the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric and what this 
means regarding the CPC’s interpretation of responsible global (environmental) 
governance. 
The construction of preferred status is not unique to the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric. IR literature discusses how in the same way that an individual may be 
concerned with impression management, a State may also wish to manage their 
reputation and image (Galtung, 1996a and 2001; Jervis, 2017; and Wang, 2006). Wang 
(2006) argues the perceived reputation of a State may impact their working relationships 
and the political processes and outcomes. Ding (2011) has suggested that the CPC’s 
status creation is a means of impression management for the global arena via the 
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perceived expectations they create through the responsibilities they profess. The CPC, 
throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric and their broader political discourse, claim 
many statuses for the PRC, including: “peace-loving country, victim of foreign 
aggression, socialist country, bastion of revolution, anti-hegemonic force, developing 
country, major power, international cooperator, and autonomous actor” (Wang, 2003:52). 
However, this chapter predominantly focuses on the duality between that of “developing 
nation” versus “big responsible country” as they were the two most frequently 
reoccurring statuses within the data. 
Yeophantong’s (2013) detailed work on status and responsibility discusses how 
responsibility impacts, and is impacted by, Chinese statecraft. Yeophantong (2013) 
demonstrates how responsibility has influenced Chinese political thought throughout 
history, and argues that the CPC’s understanding of their responsibility provides 
significant insights into the CPC’s evolving engagement within global governance today. 
Yet, within the ecological civilisation literature there has been little discussion on how the 
CPC’s perceived responsibilities and status impacts their environmental governance. 
Yeophantong (2013) argued that how the CPC perceives their global responsibility has 
begun to change. The CPC no longer avert global responsibility; the CPC is increasingly 
announcing their intentions to shoulder more responsibility and manage world affairs, as 
would be expected with the status of a big responsible country (Ahearne, 2013; and 
Gare, 2017). This sits alongside earlier arguments explored by Huan (2008) of the 
transitioning from a growing economy to a growth economy and how this is important for 
the concept of an ecological civilisation (Gare, 2014). 
This chapter demonstrates how the debate on the status of “developing nation” 
versus “big responsible power” – and the ascribed responsibilities implied – is central to 
the ecological civilisation rhetoric and understanding the CPC’s intended environmental 
governance. Contrary to mainstream portrayals within IR literature whereby a certain 
GDP, for instance, attaches obligatory global duties (see Bull, 2002; Wight, 1949; 
Zimmern, 1939; Zoellick, 2005), the CPC are instead taking control and constructing 
their own identity, leadership and status as a(n environmentally) responsible country 
through their ecological civilisation concept. Thus, the CPC are favouring discourse 
power (Huayuquan, 话语权) as a means of carrying their diplomatic ambitions and 
pathways, to disseminate and propagate an increased Chinese influence globally, 
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through soft power strategy, and specifically through the non-traditional security threat of 
environmental governance as they insert the PRC into a position for potential global 
leadership (Al-Rodhan, 2007; Bandurski, 2015; Blanchard and Lu, 2012; Breslin, 2010; 
Cao, 2014; Chen, 2009; Cunningham, 2012; Deng, 2008 and 2009; Ding, 2006, 2008 
and 2011; Edney, 2012; Geall and Ely, 2018; Glaser and Murphy, 2009; Kurlantzick, 
2007; Li, 2009; Pang, 2009; Suzuki, 2009; and Zhao, 2009). 
The CPC uses emotion to control the knowledge production over whether the 
PRC is ready to take on the mantle of a big responsible country, what it means for the 
PRC to be a big responsible country and therefore what they should do as a big 
responsible country through their environmental governance. Rather than simply 
accepting or objecting to any externally imposed duties, the CPC is increasingly stepping 
up and taking control of how they wish to be perceived, as a global actor in 
environmental governance, and their ecological civilisation rhetoric frames the future 
they intend to create, spaces they intend to fill and how they intend to do this. 
Accordingly, the ecological civilisation rhetoric discursively presents the CPC’s self-
positioning, which interplays with the identity-power-status nexus the CPC construct.  
Thus an interpretation of ecological civilisation that allows us to better understand 
the CPC’s positioning of the PRC’s status and corresponding responsibilities is important 
for IR. This interpretation does not make normative claims on whether the CPC are 
fulfilling their proclaimed responsibilities or whether they are the most appropriate 
responsibilities for the CPC to uphold; in most cases it is unclear whether the claims 
made will be upheld and result in action (Geall and Ely, 2018). However, the chapter 
presents and discusses the CPC’s own framings of their status and perceived 
responsibilities to offer this third interpretation of their ecological civilisation concept, to 




Responsibility and Chinese Governance 
 
Economy (2017), Hilton (2017) and Vanderklippe (2017), have argued that the 
PRC is only becoming a “responsible power” through external infliction. Pressure from 
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international actors, such as through the U.S. Embassy’s AQI data publications, which 
has been argued as “reawakening” the PRC’s ecological civilisation, supports the 
argument that the CPC’s latest political ecology is a reaction to external expectations. 
However, Yeophantong (2013) argued instead, that the concept of responsibility and 
responsible governance has deep roots in Chinese culture, traditions of statecraft and 
their corresponding visions of the world order; producing a shared collective 
understanding, or chosenness, of responsibility.  
The PRC is both a subject in and an agent of global governance; although the 
PRC is subject to a number of global governance agendas advanced by other actors, 
the CPC can also be seen as actively pursuing their own style of responsible 
governance. For instance, the UN entreats the PRC to increasingly engage with the 
responsibilities of peacekeeping missions and follow their protocol on human rights. In 
2005, Robert Zoellick (2005:1) gave a speech imploring the PRC to become a 
“responsible stakeholder”, similarly the U.S.’s 2010 National Security Strategy Report 
emphasised how the PRC should follow “responsible leadership”, driven by President 
Obama’s calls for the PRC to be more proactive in international affairs (Yeophantong, 
2013). Simultaneously, however, the CPC were pushing for the International Monetary 
Fund to distribute voting rights amongst emerging States more equally thus redistributing 
responsibility amongst developing and developed nations (Yeophantong, 2013). The 
PRC is both a subject in and an agent of global governance.  
The CPC are placing high expectations for improved global governance via the 
responsibilities and status they claim for the PRC. In 1997 Jiang Zemin began to 
reintroduce the language of responsibility back into Chinese political discourse: during 
his speech to the Russian State Duma, Jiang described the PRC as a “big responsible 
country” (fuzeren de daguo, 负责任的大国) (cited in Yeophantong, 2013). Jiang stated: 
“Both being major powers of influence and permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, China and Russia shoulder an important responsibility for safeguarding world 
peace and stability” (Beijing Review, 1997:11). Yeophantong (2013) argued that 
strategically, Jiang adopted normative language, as tying the concept of responsibility to 
a State’s level of development enabled the CPC to distance themselves from traditional 
expectations whilst oratorically becoming involved in global affairs. As a developing 
nation the CPC could “cherry-pick” when the PRC would act as a bastion of 
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responsibility or when to take a backseat and demand special consideration; when to be 
a subject in, or when to be an agent of, global governance.  
Yeophantong (2013) further argues that the CPC were distancing the PRC from 
the China Threat theory popular at the time; identifying as a responsible, albeit limited, 
country the PRC illustrated commitment to the outstanding international order whilst 
maintaining an inability to carry out vigorous expectations. Yeophantong (2013) 
summarised that this development in the CPC’s political rhetoric suggested a 
convergence in both the PRC’s domestic and global interests and between Chinese and 
global values. In recognising how the PRC called for developed nations to apportion 
greater responsibility for global pollution by taking the initiative to cut carbon emissions 
and provide greater financial and technological assistance to developing nations in their 
mitigation efforts further demonstrate the CPC’s increased role as an agent of global 
governance (Chan, 2013; Gao, 2013; Harris, 2011; Honkonen, 2009; Hoo, 2013; 
Yeophantong, 2013; and Zhang, 2013). Indeed, in 2011, Xie Zhenhua, the Vice Chair of 
the National Development and Reform Commission, announced that the CPC would not 
allow for the PRC’s CO2 emissions, per person, to rise to the same levels as in the U.S., 
going on to assert this would be a “disaster for the world” (Black, 2011:1; Appendix 2). 
However, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the CPC’s concept of a spirit of 
ecological civilisation directly questions the CPC’s intentions to converge with current 
global environmental values. The effectiveness of previous non-Chinese approaches to 
global environmental governance were claimed to be failed Western approaches; 
instead, the spirit of Chinese wisdom and culture offers a Chinese alternative in 
constructing a national identity of superiority and difference. Similarly, Chapter 5 
considered how the CPC portray their ecological civilisation as a bastion of heroic CPC-
led leadership. Therefore, thus far, this thesis does not support Yeophantong’s (2013) 
arguments for a convergence with global values within the CPC’s intended 
environmental governance. 
As the PRC has been transitioning from a growing economy to a growth 
economy (Huan, 2008), there has been an increasing tendency for the CPC to forge 
their own identity of domestic and international responsibility with greater scrutiny upon 
its international decisions and actions. Yeophantong (2013:330) contends there is now 
an increasing amount of “value-laden imperatives framed in terms of a ‘moral duty’ or 
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‘special obligation’ to the global community” placed upon the PRC amongst the CPC’s 
calls for the PRC to become a big responsible country by taking on a constructive 
leading role in global governance; seen thus far is how the CPC are drawing upon the 
strength, progress and unity, of the PRC via their Chinese wisdom and culture. 
Yet, responsibility is an amorphous idea, with multiple or competing 
interpretations (Yeophantong, 2013). Trying to interpret how the CPC are defining 
responsibility is a subjective process, with variations through changing times, spaces 
and contexts. Given the frequency of emotion terms identified and contextualised 
showing patterns in constructing status and responsibility, the concept clearly has an 
important role to play in understanding the CPC’s ecological civilisation concept. The 
remainder of this section will explore responsibility as developed throughout Chinese 
history and will be explored with regards to how this has impacted the CPC’s worldview 
and thus ideals of responsible (environmental) statecraft (Yeophantong, 2013).  
 
 
Responsibility and Responsible Governance within Chinese Classics 
 
 Wang Gungwu (2007:65) argued the CPC “have always been keen to use 
historical analogies in their policy analyses… Chinese practice shows that their 
‘‘timeless’’ approach, which sought the most helpful and relevant examples to support 
their current cause or guide their choice of policy, has been used with care, and often 
with practiced skill.” This includes historical analogies of responsibility. During Xi 
Jinping’s (2017a:8) keynote speech, at the Opening Session of the World Economic 
Forum Annual Meeting, he said: “A Chinese adage reads, “Victory is ensured when 
people pool their strength; success is secured when people put their heads together.” As 
long as we keep to the goal of building a community of shared future for mankind and 
work hand in hand to fulfill our responsibilities and overcome difficulties, we will be able 
to create a better world and deliver better lives for our peoples [sic].” Here Xi, in referring 
to a Chinese adage, which stipulates the qualities of unity and wisdom create 
responsible governance; these were also utilised in the creation of the spirit of ecological 
civilisation and the mythologised heroic leadership by the CPC. To understand how the 
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CPC’s use of emotion utilises the Chinese conception of responsibility, consulting the 
socio-historical comprehensions of the concept is essential (Wang, 2007). 
 
 
The “Five Relationships” and the Ecological Civilisation Rhetoric 
 
Within the Chinese classics, five dominant, or official, sociocultural values form 
the basis of responsibility, these are: “benevolence” (ren, 仁), “righteousness” (yi, 义), 
“propriety” (li, 礼), “intelligence” (zhi, 智) and “trustfulness” (xin, 信); otherwise known as 
the “Five Relationships” (Wu chang, 五常 ), these form the core principals of 
Confucianism, still an important element within contemporary Chinese society (Feng, 
2016). How each is defined and present within the ecological civilisation rhetoric will now 
be discussed. 
 Benevolence was described, within the Chinese classics and translated by Legge 
(1861:4), as an “overflow in love to all… [to] cultivate the friendship of the good.” When 
applied to statecraft, benevolence represents a concern for not only the fate of the 
nation, but of the people too. Likewise benevolence requires that other countries and 
their people be treated equally through the understanding that a country’s interests are 
aligned with the interests of humankind as a whole. Benevolence can be found on 
numerous occasions throughout the ecological civilisation rhetoric. For example, Xi 
Jinping (2017b:2), in his Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for 
Mankind speech at the United Nations Office, stated:  
 
There is only one Earth in the universe and we mankind have only one 
homeland. Stephen Hawking has raised the proposition about “parallel 
universe”, hoping to find another place in the universe where mankind 
could live. We do not know when his wish will come true. Until today, 
Earth is still the only home to mankind, so to care for and cherish it is the 
only option for us mankind. There is a Latin motto inscribed in the dome 
of the Federal Palace of Switzerland which says “Unus pro omnibus, 
omnes pro uno” (One for all, and all for one). We should not only think 
about our own generation, but also take responsibility for future ones. 
236 
 
Similarly, Xi Jinping (2017h:2), during his Working Together to Build a Better Future 
keynote address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting, 
claimed: “The destiny and future of all of us across the world are increasingly 
intertwined… We must seize the historic opportunity and make the right choice so as to 
deliver an even brighter future for mankind.” Benevolence can be seen throughout the 
rhetoric due to the inherent intertwining, or convergence, of our futures; the nature of the 
global climate challenge requires us to come together, respect one another, work 
together, to show compassion and to cherish the Earth we live on. Despite the CPC’s 
efforts to avoid a convergence with global values in constructing their own environmental 
governance concept of ecological civilisation, the CPC do frequently discuss how 
domestic and international interests are converging. 
 Righteousness is found in the Chinese classics in two ways: first, as helpful and 
friendly, and second, as impartial and just (Legge, 1861). Mencius stated: “I like life, and 
I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go, and choose 
righteousness” (cited in Legge, 1861c:1). Applying this classical thought to the notion of 
statecraft, righteousness requires officials to help others (friends) despite cost to oneself 
(Legge, 1861c). Within the ecological civilisation rhetoric Hu Jintao (2007:18), at the 17th 
National Congress, claimed that the PRC “will be a country whose people are better off 
and enjoy markedly improved quality of life and a good environment… The country will 
be still more open and friendly to the outside world and make greater contributions to 
human civilization [sic].” Xi Jinping (2016a:2), at the 2016 B20 summit, likewise made 
claims of friendship with the international community by stating that ecological civilisation 
was “a course of China and the world embracing each other… we have friends all over 
the world.” Thus we can see how the CPC’s discursive construction of responsible global 
environmental governance places great emphasis on the idea of friendship and 
togetherness (Nordin and Smith, 2018). 
Justice, on the other hand, refers to the idea that values, ethics and morals 
should be universal with no preferential treatment. Within the Chinese classics, 
Confucius said: “A man in a superior situation, having valour without righteousness, will 
be guilty of insubordination; one of the lower people having valour without 
righteousness, will commit robbery” (cited in Legge, 1861:193). With regards to 
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statecraft this idea suggests that, regardless of position, everyone should obey and 
comply with shared values, ethics and morals. Confucius said: “righteousness is the 
accordance of actions with what is right” (Legge, 1861:269). A responsible State should 
always act in a way that is either helpful or impartial: domestically and internationally. Xi 
Jinping (2017e:55-56), during the 19th National Congress, insinuated righteousness 
when he called upon: 
 
[T]he people of all countries to work together to build a community with a 
shared future for mankind, to build an open, inclusive, clean, and 
beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and 
common prosperity. We should respect each other, discuss issues as 
equals, resolutely reject the Cold War mentality and power politics, and 
take a new approach to developing state-to-state relations with 
communication, not confrontation and partnership, not alliance. We 
should commit to settling disputes through dialogue and resolving 
differences through discussion, coordinate responses to traditional and 
non-traditional threats, and oppose terrorism in all its forms. We should 
stick together through thick and thin, promote trade and investment 
liberalization and facilitation, and make economic globalization more 
open, inclusive, and balanced so that its benefits are shared by all. We 
should respect the diversity of civilizations. In handling relations among 
civilizations, let us replace estrangement with exchange, clashes with 
mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence. We should be good 
friends to the environment, cooperate to tackle climate change, and 
protect our planet for the sake of human survival [sic]. 
 
Xi explicitly invites all States to work towards the CPC’s chosen shared values of: 
openness, inclusivity, cleanliness, beauty, peace, security and prosperity. Xi claims that 
through responsible behaviour guided by righteousness that all States should share 
open dialogue to progress together towards this future. Although Xi discursively 
recognises differences amongst States, the rhetoric still paints an understanding of 
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collectively journeying towards the same future, the righteous future that the CPC are 
propagating. 
Propriety refers to restraint from harmful movements, desires and sentiments. As 
with righteousness, propriety requires compliance with predefined values, morals and 
ethics, however, propriety requires a greater sense of confinement and control. In theory 
propriety enables responsible behaviours to create harmony within a State and between 
States (Legge, 1861). To the CPC, ecological civilisation, as the Chinese way of 
conducting environmental governance, is described as a set of predefined values, ethics 
and morals to be followed for better environmental governance. The “old path” of 
developed Western nations is the harmful movements that must be avoided; and States 
are told to refrain from copying such behaviour. The following excerpt from Zhou 
Shengxian’s (2012c:1) World Environment Day speech captures the essence of 
propriety, stating how: 
 
The development mode that jeopardizes resources and environment has 
not only brought about all sorts of social conflicts including 
environmental problems, but also worked against the sustained 
economic growth. For example, water pollution cuts down the fishery 
efficiency, and soil salinization, desertification, and loss of soil fertility 
result in poor harvest. We must awaken to the voluntary protection of the 
resources and environment, being highly responsible for the survival and 
development of our future generations. We will definitely not take the old 
path of developed countries by giving priority to economic development 
and remedying the environment afterwards, instead, we will actively 
explore new path for environmental protection in China which is 
characterized by optimizing the economic development through the 
protection of the environment [sic]. 
 
Propriety therefore impacts the CPC’s environmental governance through their 
construction of an alternative propitious approach; one they deem as not harmful, 
through (re)embracing Chinese wisdom and culture and the Chinese conceptualisations 
of responsibility. 
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With regards to intelligence, Confucius argued: “The wise are free from 
perplexities; the virtuous from anxiety; and the bold from fear” (cited in Legge, 1861:89). 
Mencius, in furthering the works of Confucius, wrote: “All men have a mind which cannot 
bear to see the sufferings of others. The ancient kings had this commiserating mind, and 
they, as a matter of course, had likewise a commiserating government”; here Mencius 
refers to intelligence as creating an innate goodwill as the foundation of statecraft (cited 
in Legge, 1861b:1). Together the classical thoughts of Confucius and Mencius are 
thought to mean that a responsible government must be intelligent, which is acquired 
through studying morals and ethics. Examples of the responsibility of intelligent 
governance are present in Xi Jinping’s (2018b:3) closing meeting speech at the 13th 
national People’s Congress, where he stated: “Today, China, with all ethnic groups 
striving with one heart, has achieved extraordinary accomplishments. The Chinese 
people have learned from our own experience that only when we are united can we be 
strong and march forward, and a divided country will not progress. I believe as long as 
more than 1.3 billion Chinese people uphold the great spirit of unity, we will definitely 
forge an unstoppable and invincible force.” Xi Jinping refers to the shared Chinese 
wisdom as the driving force behind the CPC’s intelligent governance, which has led the 
PRC to achieve extraordinary accomplishments together. 
Zhou Shengxian (2013c:20), in his speech at the National Work Meeting on 
Environmental Protection 2013, also bolsters ecological civilisation as representing 
intelligent responsible governance, by claiming that the MEP “will translate theories and 
methods learned into the wisdoms and capabilities of doing a good job. We shall 
broaden our horizon, obtain new knowledge, build wisdom, and deepen our strategic 
thinking of the overall, long term and fundamental nature of environmental protection.” 
Intelligent responsible governance is also seen in Vice Minister of the MEP, Wu 
Xiaoqing’s (2013:6) Building of Better Party Conduct and Cleaner Government in the 
National Environmental Protection System speech, where he stated: “The vast 
environmental cadres and workers spread and disseminated the spirit of Chinese 
environmental workers on their own initiatives, developed core values for all in 
environmental workers for the new age, and staged a wave of "learning from the best, 
committing to actions".” The CPC make great use of presenting ecological civilisation as 
a form of intelligent responsible governance, especially due to the inherent Chinese 
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wisdom and culture that has helped construct the spirit behind the concept and as a 
revelation through their correct heroic leadership. 
The last of the Five Relationships is trustfulness. Confucius considered 
trustfulness as a pillar of society, writing that: “I do not know how a man without 
truthfulness is to get on” (cited in Legge, 1861:17). Mencius furthered the notion by 
arguing that in order for a government to be responsible with their words and in their 
actions they should endeavour to complete tasks trustfully by undertaking the tasks 
themselves and through cooperation (Legge, 1861c). A responsible government must 
therefore be trustworthy and the people must be able to trust their government.  
The following excerpt from Xi Jinping demonstrates how, through their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric, the CPC intend to gain the trust of the Chinese people to back their 
intended future governance. Xi Jinping (2018b:4), at the 13th National People’s 
Congress, argued how the CPC “must base our efforts on the interests of the people, 
ensure the principal status of the people, humbly learn from the people, and heed to 
their needs and draw on their wisdom. We must ensure that it is the basic criterion of our 
work that whether we can gain people's backing, acceptance, satisfaction and approval. 
We must focus our efforts in addressing the most pressing, most immediate issues that 
concern the people the most. We must also ensure that all Chinese people could share 
the happiness and pride in the historic course of national rejuvenation.” The CPC’s 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, in “keeping with the times”, is specifically designed to 
discursively convey responsible governance in building trust through the innate 
Chineseness, as seen in Chapter 4, and through the CPC’s heroic leadership, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Thus the “Five Relationships” of responsibility are each present 
within the CPC’s rhetoric. 
 
 
Responsible Governance: School of Names and Legalism 
 
Ancient China was filled with a complicated nexus of responsibilities; successful 
statecraft was believed to originate through successful self-governance, guided by the 
five relationships (Wood, 1995). Alongside the five relationships is a series of 
hierarchical relationships defined as the “Three Bonds and Five Relationships” (San 
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gang wu chang, 三纲五常). The Three Bonds refers to the relationship between father 
and son, sovereigns and ministers and husband and wife; however, they expand to 
dictate also the relationships between elder siblings and younger siblings and also 
between friends (Yeophantong, 2013). Filial piety (Xiao, 孝顺), the relationship between 
father and son for instance, brought the concept of responsibility into all aspects of social 
and professional life and is often described as the root of virtue (Legge, 1959:2). Filial 
piety created a hierarchical social system whereby younger generations are required to 
respect older generations, and superior “gentlemen” are marked out as above all others 
(Yeophantong, 2013).  
The five relationships of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and 
trustfulness are embedded within traditional Chinese values, morals and ethics; in turn 
they dictate how the positioning of a person, within the nexus of relationships captured 
within the Three Bonds, impacts a person’s responsibilities. The level of responsibility 
and the ways in which responsibility should be enacted are understood through a 
person’s position, otherwise known as the traditional Confucian culture of “positioning” 
(Dingwei, 定位; Chan, 2013). Filial piety was one means of decoding what position a 
person has within the nexus of the Three Bonds within Chinese society. The dictum: “Let 
the ruler rule as he should and the minister be a minister as he should. Let the father act 
as a father should and the son act as a son should” echoes the principals of filial piety 
and the hierarchical relationships defined in the “Three Bonds and Five Relationships” 
(cited in Yeophantong, 2013:335). 
Positioning originated in the School of Names (Ming Jia, 名家), which was 
concerned with the relationships between actualities (shi, 实) and their labels, categories 
or names (ming, 名). Hence, the inherent importance within the CPC’s use of emotion to 
“position” the PRC through a variety of labels for status, such as: “developing country” or 
“big responsible country”. Applying the CPC’s labels to the dictum quoted above, we 
see: Let the developing nation act as a developing nation should and the developed 
nation act as a developed nation should. The “rectification of names”, meant “every 
‘name’ (i.e. social position) implied a certain responsibility that must be fulfilled” 
(Yeophantong, 2013:335). To the CPC, the difference in name, from “developing 
country” to “big responsible country” implies different rectification of appropriate 
actualities. Indeed, within The Analects, Confucius stated: “The relation between 
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superiors and inferiors, is like that between the wind and grass. The grass must bend, 
when the wind blows across it” (cited in Legge, 1861:123).  
The CPC’s rhetoric contains multiple instances of positioning and insinuating 
appropriate corresponding responsibility. Hu Jintao (2009:1), in his Opening Plenary 
Session of the United Nations Summit on Climate Change speech at the UN General 
Assembly, said: “I wish to highlight here a few principles that we need to follow in our 
common endeavor to tackle this issue of climate change. First, fulfilling our respective 
responsibilities should be at the core of our efforts. The principle of common, but 
differentiated responsibilities embodies the consensus of the international community. 
Adherence to this principle is critical to keeping international cooperation on climate 
change on the right track [sic].” Similarly, Zhou Shengxian (2007:4-5), in his 2007 Annual 
General Meeting of the MEP speech, supports Hu Jintao’s argument regarding the 
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) by stating how: 
“Developed countries should face up to their historical responsibilities and the lingering 
reality of high level emissions per capita, set stricter objectives in the long run and 
continue to cut emissions. Developing countries should take active measures and 
contribute to global fight against climate change according to their own capabilities. 
Without frank and pragmatic cooperation, we won’t make substantial headway in this 
regard.” The CPC apportions greater responsibility, in tackling climate change, onto the 
countries to which the CPC positions as, and ascribes the status of, developed. Within 
Hu’s quote we see how developed countries should face up to their responsibilities, 
whereas developing countries are expected to contribute based on their capabilities. 
The “School of Legalism” (Fajia, 法家) carried forward the concept of positioning 
and this became known as the doctrine of “holding actualities responsible to their 
names” (Xun ming ze shi, 循名责实) (Yeophantong, 2013:336). What is different within 
Legalism from Confucius’ School of Names can be found in the arguments of Han Fei Zi, 
who argued: a ruler’s duty is to deliberate duties onto others; the ruler is not responsible 
for how individuals perform, but they are responsible for distributing punishments and 
rewards accordingly (Fung, 1997). Responsible statecraft emanates from the ruler, who 
is perceived as leading on behalf of Heaven and to be acting according to divine will.  
The CPC’s rhetoric frequently takes on the Legalist position of responsible 
statecraft in deliberating and disseminating their perceptions of responsible (global 
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environmental) governance. Suggestions of CPC leadership, directing the world through 
their superior and responsible governance, can be seen in the extract below from Xi 
Jinping (2018b:8), who, at the 13th National People’s Congress, stated: “China will 
contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese strength to the world, 
to push for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting 
peace, universal security, and common prosperity. Let the sunshine of a community with 
a shared future for humanity illuminate the world!” Legalism saw responsibility as the 
means through which a ruler demonstrated their legitimacy. Hence, the ruler became 
responsible for dictating both material and spiritual welfare, for catering to the interests 
and wellbeing of the people; this became a tangible measure of a ruler’s legitimacy 
(Legge, 1875). This was discussed in Chapter 5, in the mythologising of the CPC as 
heroic and correct leaders having revelations for an ecological civilisation offering better 
(global) environmental governance.  
To some extent, this also brings us back to the importance of the CPC labeling 
their ecological civilisation as a Chinese approach, based within the values and virtues 
of Chinese wisdom and culture. Not only does this assign the important positioning 
associated with concepts such as hua over yi, but the name attached also carries 
notions of actualities and responsibilities to the Chinese people. Each name and position 
carries the CPC’s policy directions. For instance, big responsible country requires the 
benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness of responsibility, 
claimed to be embedded within Chinese wisdom and culture; the CPC cannot govern 
responsibly until the people also (re)engage responsibly.  
With regards to responsibility and historic environmental governance, there are 
instances where the rulers’ notion of responsibility did culminate in good environmental 
governance practice (Wang, 2007). For instance, the CPC can choose to refer to how 
the Confucian government of the early Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) can be argued as 
giving a great deal of attention to public approbation: water conservancy was introduced 
to try and control flood waters, hydro-engineering projects were also supported; and 
famine relief was enacted through producing grain loans (Yeophantong, 2013). 
Examples of chosen historical analogy, to support Chinese responsible environmental 
governance, are abundant within Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric. Many examples are 
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included within Zhou’s (2014d:3) speech closing the National On-Site Meeting on 
Building Ecological Civilisation: 
 
To rehabilitate ecosystem is rational cognition as a result of absorbing 
the traditional Chinese wisdom on nature and drawing upon lessons and 
experience of environmental management home and abroad. The 
Chinese civilization has been passed down for more than 5000 years 
and accumulated rich ecological wisdom. In ancient China, there was 
strict seasonal limit on such activities as fishing fish and turtles and 
logging trees and reeds and offenders were subject to punishment (The 
Rites of Zhou). In The Huainanzi, there was the warning against draining 
the pond to catch fish and burning forest to hunt animals. In the 
beginning of Han Dynasty, a set of measures were introduced to restore 
national strength such as light penalty, reducing tax burden, land grant 
by military merit, slaves and servants returning to civilians and giving 
assets back to the escaped, which paved way for Emperor Wudi to 
expand its territory. During the Zhenguan Period of Tang Dynasty, 
austerity was advocated. The government carried out land equalization 
system and Zu-Yong-Tiao system and reduced labor and tax burdens. 
As a result, there were flocks of cows and horses in the grassland, 
grains were sold at low price, no one picked up the lost articles on the 
street and the society was in peace and prosperity. From applying 
rehabilitation for economic purpose to using it for environmental 
protection, the strategy has been gradually evolved and enriched. Since 
reform and opening up, China has practiced a lot of measures to 
conserve nature such as converting farmland to forest, controlling 
grazing for rangeland restoration, fishing closure and prohibition and 
restricted logging of forests. These measures have produced good 
results. There are similar practices in foreign countries. With profound 
historical origin, rehabilitation of ecosystem has become the Party’s 
move to borrow and uplift the wisdom of human kind on ecological 
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conservation [civilisation] at the new start of history. It will usher new 
development opportunities for China’s environmental protection [sic]. 
 
Responsibility and responsible Chinese governance can be summarised as the 
CPC expecting the Chinese people to obey their superiors, according to their name(s); 
the leader(s), who in order to govern responsibly, should be guided by the principles of 
benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and trustfulness (Mei, n.d. (no date)). 
Fundamental to understanding whom to obey and how to act relies on the notion of 
hierarchical positioning to understand the complex nexus of social relations throughout 
society, thus confirming the importance of names. The importance of positioning and the 
impact this has on the CPC’s governance as a global actor is considered next.  
 
 
Chinese Classical Thought on Responsible International Governance  
 
 Opinions expressed throughout the ancient Chinese classics were predominantly 
“ethnocentric” with a “China-centred” philosophy (Têng and Fairbank, 1979:3). 
Discussed in Chapter 2 was the Sino-centric nature of concepts such as Tianren heyi, 
“all-under-heaven” (Tianxia, 天下) and “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo, 中国) and Huaxia 
(Mancall, 1963; Têng and Fairbank, 1979:3; and Wang, 2014). Ancient Chinese 
thoughts on the responsibilities of China, with regards to the territories beyond the 
Middle Kingdom, operated on similar modes of thought, whereby the Chinese elites 
became obliged through a social paradigm where they were “bound to the world beyond” 
through a “network of proper behaviour” (Schwartz, 1985a and 1985b:7).  
China, as the Middle Kingdom, was believed to possess material, architectural, 
aesthetical and moral superiority, and through this was considered central to the world’s 
order; thus China was responsible for the dissemination of Chinese civilisation, virtues 
and understanding to the barbaric foreigners (Yi) (Callahan, 2012 and 2013; Cranmer-
Byng, 1973; Mancall, 1963; Wang, 2014; and Yeophantong, 2013). This was seen in 
Chapter 4, where Chinese wisdom and culture is described as innately better, something 
to be proud of and a “gift to mankind”. To share this with the world became a heroic duty 
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and responsibility of CPC-led Chinese environmental governance, as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
Even in the wake of the Century of Humiliation, Chinese intellectuals and political 
elites unsurprisingly maintained their Sino-centric perceptions of world order, of their 
moral duties and responsibilities, believing that: “China possessed a universally valid 
system of beliefs which were ethically right and ought to be followed by all people; that 
China had a special role in the world as the guardian of these values, and that, although 
they could not be imposed on other peoples, China must herself live up to them and set 
an example by which others could learn how to follow the right path” (Cramer-Byng, 
1973:68). Governing the world thus became synonymous with sustaining harmony under 
heaven (Tianxia datong, 天下大同) by enhancing moral suasion and using Chinese 
morals as opposed to employing cohesion or force (Yeophantong, 2013). The ecological 
civilisation rhetoric continues on these themes; Xi claims the CPC to be “torchbearers”, 
in the “driving-seat” and invites others to join the PRC on their “express train” to 
development (Xi, 2017a:10 and  2017e:5).  
Xi Jinping (2017f:3), at the APEC CEO Summit, repeatedly makes statements 
regarding how the CPC will set the right example for others to follow: “This initiative is 
from China, but it belongs to the world. It is rooted in history, but it is oriented toward the 
future. It focuses on the Asian, European and African continents, but it is open to all 
partners.” A further example is seen in Xi’s (2017h:7) keynote address at the CPC in 
Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting:  
 
As envisaged by the CPC at its 19th National Congress, a moderately 
prosperous society in all respects will take shape in China by the year 
2020. Socialist modernization will be basically realized in China by the 
year 2035 and, by the mid-21st century, China will turn itself into a great 
modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful. This will deliver a better 
life not only to us Chinese, but also to the people of other countries. We 
call on the political parties in other countries to work with us to create 
more cooperation opportunities for the world and promote common 
development and prosperity for all… As a Chinese saying goes, a stone 
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taken from another mountain may serve as a tool to polish the local jade 
[sic]. 
 
Xi places the CPC’s conception of responsible governance, captured through the 
repeated set-phrase with their ideals of prosperity, harmony and beauty – synonymous 
with Tianxia datong – as their morally superior basis for this Chinese-led encouragement 
for enhanced international cooperation for furthering global development. Chinese 
wisdom (a stone from another mountain), when applied to the local situation, can assist 
with development  (provide polished results). 
Zhou Shengxian’s rhetoric, provides an example whereby the Chinese elites, 
here the MEP, are obliged through the social paradigm of Chinese superiority, to aid the 
“world beyond” through their knowledge and access to “proper behaviour” (Schwartz, 
1985a and 1985b:7). Zhou Shengxian (2011h:8), at the 2011 AGM of China Council for 
International Cooperation on Environment and Development, implores his staff to 
recognise the great responsibility of the CPC’s environmental governance, based on 
Chinese wisdom, saying: “We highly appreciate the efforts and wisdom that every 
council member and expert have contributed for the increasing development of China's 
environment protection and development. The green transformation of economic 
development mode is a great challenge for contemporary China. The realization of 
China's green transformation will be China's active contribution to the world development 
[sic].”  
Finally, another example of the CPC’s claim for responsible and righteousness 
global governance, is seen in the excerpt below from Liu Xiaoming’s (2017:7) speech to 
the UK Business community: 
 
China has made much progress in building socialism with its own 
features. This has expanded the horizon for developing countries 
seeking modernization. Countries and nations who want to speed up 
their development while preserving their independence are given a new 
option. And this is China's wisdom and solution. Confucius once said, 
"Do not do onto others what you don't want others do onto you." China 
believes that no one should sanctify its own development model or even 
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impose it upon others. China respects the right of all countries to choose 
their own development path. China will not export its own development 
path or model, or its own value. China is not interested in the 
competition of ideologies. Other countries are free to find out more about 
China's development experience and draw on strength or reference as 
they see fit. They should explore a development path and social system 
that suits their own history and culture. This is, in essence, the biggest 
contribution of China's path of socialism with Chinese characteristics to 
all humanity [sic].  
 
Liu clearly stipulates how the PRC must not only live up to their Chinese ideals and thus 
set an example for the international community, but that this is done so that the others 
can learn how to follow this path; echoing the argument of Huaxia, the hua educating the 
yi (Callahan, 2010; and Cramer-Byng, 1973). Liu’s speech professes the CPC to be a 
responsible government, enacting the five relationships of benevolence, righteousness, 
propriety, intelligence and trustfulness; even the positioning of names and actualities 
found within the School of Names and Legalism were also present.   
 
 
Changing Perceptions of Responsibility in the Twentieth Century 
 
Guided by these Sino-centric views of responsibility and responsible governance, 
Chinese culture and philosophy was considered to be unrivalled and thus came the 
perception that China had responsibility to govern and bring harmony to the world 
(Cranmer-Byng, 1973; Mancall, 1963; and Yeophantong, 2013). This idea is found in the 
works of Confucius: “Let the superior man never fail reverentially to order his own 
conduct, and let him be respectful to others and observant of propriety - then all within 
the four seas will be his brothers” (cited in Legge, 1861:117). However, as with most 
aspects of Chinese society, the Century of Humiliation put these classical Chinese views 
to the test and resulted (initially) in dramatic changes in Chinese philosophical thinking, 
especially with regards to China’s global position, and thus their name and actualities for 
responsibility (Ch’en, 1979; and Feng, 1979). With the Century of Humiliation, the 
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dominant themes of responsible governance shifted to focus on domestic development, 
the rejuvenation of China; lofty ideals of global governance were temporarily shelved.  
The responsibility of furthering domestic development became intertwined with 
adopting wisdom and culture from the West, most notably from the uptake of Marxism. 
One of the most notable reactions to these changed perceptions of China’s responsible 
governance was their participation in Wold War I (Yeophantong, 2013). Despite good 
political intentions, ultimately no change would be seen with regards to China’s political 
status due to the country’s continued weakness, especially of the Chinese government. 
1919 thus saw the beginning of the populist-based May Fourth Movement: a protest in 
particular against the mistreatment of China in the Treaty of Versailles. The May Fourth 
Movement captured a new responsibility: if a ruler has failed to govern responsibly, that 
the people have the “right of revolution” (Geming quanli, 革命权), hence the responsible 
behaviour of protesting against unjust political decisions, especially the unjust political 
decisions of the Imperial West, was borne (Yeophantong, 2013).  
 New responsibilities emerged linked to connecting with and learning from the 
West, as was discussed in chapter 4 with regards to the New Culture Movement. Ch’en 
(1979) called for China to put an end to isolationist ideologies and instead promoted 
cosmopolitan learning. Similarly, Feng (1979) argued that Western scholarship, in 
particular language, mathematics and sciences, should be learned along with Chinese 
thought. Yet, by far, the greatest level of support was for learning and building upon 
Western advanced technologies, for instance, in the 1860’s Feng contended:  “What we 
then have to learn from the barbarians is only the one thing, solid ships and effective 
guns” (Ch’en, 1979; Feng, 1979:53; and Têng and Fairbank, 1979). However, the 
generation of Chinese youth who constituted the New Culture Movement viewed 
revolution as a paramount responsibility: it was their duty to bring about social and 
political changes to rid China of the imperial shackles and thus put right the national 
humiliations suffered since the 1840’s (Têng and Fairbank, 1979). China, and the PRC, 
struggled with what to learn from the West, and how to understand their perceived 
change in status. 
Seeking to redefine China’s status away from the “Sick Man of Asia”, how people 
saw, understood and carried out their responsibilities was now focused on promoting a 
new conceptualisation of China’s place on the world stage. For instance, Zeng Guofan 
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and Li Hongzhang (two figures from the Self-Strengthening Movement) similarly 
identified that China could no longer afford to consider itself as segregated from the 
world beyond China’s geographical (or indeed cultural) borders: they argued that China’s 
statecraft was now outdated and needed to acclimatise to a more advanced external 
world; the CPC are beginning to achieve this, especially through the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric (Yeophantong, 2013). However, the alimony of a peaceful and secure 
international order is once again understood as essential for peaceful development 
domestically. This point went on to be raised in the PRC’s constitution and is iterated 
thus: “China’s future is the world’s future, both are closely linked together” (Pang, 
2009:1).  
Xi Jinping (2017a:8-9), at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum 
Annual Meeting in Davos, stated: “This is a path based on China’s realities. China has in 
the past years succeeded in embarking on a development path that suits itself by 
drawing on both the wisdom of its civilization and the practices of other countries in both 
East and West. In exploring this path, China refuses to stay insensitive to the changing 
times or to blindly follow in others’ footsteps. All roads lead to Rome. No country should 
view its own development path as the only viable one, still less should it impose its own 
development path on others [sic].” Similarly, Zhou Jian (2018:4), Vice Minister of the 
MEP, stated, in his speech at the 2018 National Working Conference on Environmental 
Protection, how: “As a developing country, China needs to enhance international 
cooperation to learn from other countries of their top-notch concepts, experience and 
technologies.” Yet, in the very next sentence Zhou (2018:4) goes on to add: “At the 
same time, China is also willing to jointly promote the realization of the biodiversity 
conservation goals set for 2020 based on international cooperation and exchange to 
exert its constructive role of a big and responsible nation [sic].” The rhetoric from both Xi 
Jinping and Zhou Jian is using the idea of learning from others, to present the PRC as a 
friendly and responsible nation, cooperating and sharing wisdom, as well as insinuating 





Responsibility Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China 
 
From 1949 onwards, following the founding of the PRC by the CPC, the 
conceptions of responsibility are best understood from the Leaders’ thoughts. The PRC’s 
first Premier, Zhou Enlai, proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the 
1950’s, which have remained a common thread throughout the CPC’s governance, but 
the changing demands of domestic development alongside the global positioning of the 
PRC have ensured fluidity in how responsible governance has been enacted 
(Yeophantong, 2013).  
Responsibility, under Mao Zedong, was primarily focused on bolstering 
Communism both domestically and internationally. For Mao, domestically, the main 
responsibilities, or “sacred duties” (sheng shen zhi ze, 神圣职责) were framed as: 
expulsing foreign influences; protecting the “motherland” (Zuguo, 祖国); working towards 
national rejuvenation; “self-reliance” (zi li geng sheng, 自力更生); and “working hard to 
strengthen the country” (Yeophantong, 2013:341). Mao’s CPC still held onto hostile 
sentiments towards certain Imperial Powers, especially the U.S., mostly due to the long 
experience of semi-colonisation (Lu, 2011). Changing the international system that was 
dominated by Western powers was still a priority, but self-protection, national 
sovereignty and independence – which resonated with the arguments made by Ch’en 
(1979) in the nineteenth century – were now the hallmarks of responsible governance. 
Kim (1979:82) stated: “if the traditional Chinese image of world order was an extension 
of the Confucian moral order, so was the Maoist image of world order an extension of 
revolutionary order and justice at home.” 
The main developments within the understanding of responsible governance 
from the Deng Xiaoping Leadership were increasingly concerned with cross-border 
collaborations (Lu, 2011). In particular was Deng’s support for mutual benefit and 
peaceful coexistence, which were two of Zhou Enlai’s Five Principals of Peaceful 
Coexistence. The CPC became increasingly interested in crafting responsibilities that 
were interest-driven and pragmatic rather than high-sounding and moralistic (Xu, 2005; 
and Ying, 2017). Having initially sought to re-join the international community in order to 
reinstate sovereign autonomy, the CPC increasingly presented ideational statuses that 
thrust the country onto the world stage (Xu, 2005). In presenting a higher status, with 
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increased responsibilities in tow, Xu (2005:83) argues that the PRC was already, once 
again, using responsibility to “inject its own ideas into shaping the new world order.” 
Thus also feeding back into the identity of heroic leadership guiding superior Chinese 
wisdom and culture (in Chapters 4 and 5), rejuvenating not only the PRC, but also 
improving the entire world system (Xu, 2005; Yeophantong, 2013; and Zhao, 1997). 
As the PRC’s economic status improved, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao continued to 
support international collaboration, especially with regards to trade for improved 
economic growth (Gao, 2013; Kong, 2007; Shi, 2007; and Zheng, 2010). For, Xi Jinping 
(2014:1), his thoughts on the PRC’s external responsibility can be found in his speech at 
the 60th Anniversary Of The Initiation Of The Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence: 
“the building of a new type of just and equitable international relations.” In particular, Xi 
Jinping’s responsible global governance favours the actions of mutual respect of 
territorial sovereignty and integrity, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs and 
mutual non-aggression (Xi, 2014). Hence the CPC can be seen to incorporate notions of 
responsibility, throughout their rhetoric, that draw upon both Chinese classical thought 
and the recent shared experiences of the Century of Humiliation. Ecological civilisation is 
a concept for demonstrating responsible governance domestically, and provides a 
means of also governing responsibly internationally. 
 
 
Summary of the Chinese Classical Thought and Responsible Governance 
 
The sociocultural understandings of responsibility and how these have changed 
through Chinese classical thought influencing contemporary politics can be divided into 
the two main themes: morality (the five relationships) and positioning (names and 
actualities). How the CPC interprets and applies status and associated responsibilities 
impacts their domestic and foreign policy, and is increasingly engraining the PRC in 
global governance (Yeophantong, 2013). The CPC have created a convergence 
between domestic responsibility and global responsibility: a Beautiful China will help 
create a Beautiful world and vice versa, where a peaceful world is necessary for a 
peaceful China. Responsibility has shifted from a predominantly domestic affair with 
natural spillover effect from the innately superior Chinese wisdom and culture, to a 
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balanced affair, where domestic development now also relies on a secure and healthy 
world.  
The CPC’s construction of responsible governance via ecological civilisation is 
socio-culturally rooted within ancient Chinese thought on responsibility, as well as 
impacted by more recent socio-historical experiences from the Century of Humiliation. 
Ecological civilisation brings superior Chinese wisdom and culture to the world, for 
States to apply it to their own development contexts: it is Jade from a Chinese mountain. 
Equally, ecological civilisation is concerned with creating a clean, peaceful and beautiful 
world to ensure continued development domestically within the PRC. 
Reflecting on these understandings, with regards to the contextualised ecological 
civilisation rhetoric, changing themes of status begin to hold a much deeper meaning. 
How the CPC have initially tended to position the PRC as a developing nation that 
prioritises domestic development will be considered first, before moving on to analyse 
how the CPC is starting to (re)position the PRC as a big responsible country, where 




The PRC as a Developing Nation: Perceived Responsibilities of 
Environmental Governance 
  
Having identified how the CPC use emotion, and contextualised this via the three 
themes of CGT, the CPC can be seen to advance a development narrative within their 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, which sometimes focuses on the PRC as a developing 
country. For instance, during the Opening Plenary of the Boao Forum of the Asia Annual 
Conference in 2011, Hu Jintao (2011a:4-5) stated: “China has made remarkable 
achievements in development, but it remains the largest developing country in the world. 
Population, resources and the environment have put great pressure on our economic 
and social development, and there is lack of adequate balance, coordination or 
sustainability in our development. China has a long way to go before it can achieve 
modernization and common prosperity for all its people [sic]”. Although Hu Jintao is 
quick to iterate that the PRC has made “remarkable achievements”, he is also quick to 
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assert that despite this, the PRC is still restricted, not through bad governance, but due 
to having a large population, limited resources and unique environmental conditions.   
Similarly, Li Keqiang (2014b:1), at the Annual Meeting of the New Champions 
2014, stipulated how: 
 
Over the years, in light of its own national conditions and drawing on the 
successes of other countries, China has made tremendous efforts to 
explore a way to development. Thanks to reform and opening-up, China 
has scored remarkable achievements in economic and social 
development. Today, some foreign friends may ask, "China has come 
such a long way. Isn't it time to stop calling China a developing country?" 
As a matter of fact, China remains the biggest developing country. True, 
China has become the world's second largest economy. But its per 
capita GDP is a mere 7,589 US dollars, ranking 80th in the world. To 
give it some context, China's per capita GDP is 65% of the global 
average, 1/7 that of the United States and 1/5 that of the European 
Union. When it comes to overall development level, especially in terms 
of innovation capacity, productivity and social welfare, China lags far 
behind developed countries. And in some areas, China even has lower 
rankings than some fellow developing countries. Take the United 
Nations' human development index (HDI) for example, China ranks 91st. 
Besides, development is uneven between China's urban and rural areas 
and between its various regions [sic].  
 
Although Li Keqiang, first clarifies that the PRC have made “remarkable achievements”, 
the remainder of his excerpt goes on to reiterate why and how the CPC wish for the PRC 
to be perceived as a developing country still. Both Hi Jintao and Li Keqiang specify that 
the PRC, as a developing country, needs to focus on pursuing greater levels of 
development; especially economic growth.  
Discussed above were the political articulations of “self-reliance” (zi li geng 
sheng) and “working hard to strengthen the country” (fa fen tu qiang) during Mao’s era, 
as well as “bide our time and build our capabilities” (tao guang yang hui) under Deng 
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Xiaoping (Yeophantong, 2013:346). Both Mao and Deng self-positioned the PRC as a 
conservative and humble developing nation; Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang’s rhetoric is also 
maintaining this argument. As did the PRC’s delegate at the 1972 UN Conference on the 
Human Environment, who stated: “we must not give up eating for fear of choking, nor 
refrain from building our own industry for fear of pollution and damage to the 
environment” (cited in Sternfeld, 2017:1). The same sentiment is carried within the status 
of developing nation; national development comes first, but CPC’s discursive inclusivity 
of responsibility within the ecological civilisation rhetoric changes the tone and focus. 
The ecological civilisation rhetoric continues to use emotion to comfort the PRC 
and to justify the country’s current levels of development, showing the desire and need 
to focus on continued development. Placing continued development as the CPC’s 
priority is constructed as responsible governance, both domestically and globally. In 
contrast, the earlier rhetoric from the 1972 UN Conference used emotion to instill a 
sense of desperation and need for continued development. Whereas Hu Jintao, Li 
Keqiang and Xi Jinping discursively construct their political ecology as a form of 
responsible environmental governance, using responsibility to focus on the PRC’s 
continued development first and foremost (especially by endorsing how the PRC 
embodies the five relationships of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence 
and trustfulness) and from here stipulate the PRC’s development will go on to benefit 
others too. 
Wen Jiabao explicitly commented on how the CPC’s responsibility, to both the 
PRC and the world, lay in managing their own domestic affairs effectively (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2009). Xi Jinping (2012a:1) emphasised this at the opening ceremony of the 
World Peace Forum, stating how “for China, the biggest developing country in the world, 
the most important way to be responsible to the world is to manage its own affairs well”. 
Likewise, Li Keqiang (2016c:6) in his speech at the General Debate of 71st session of 
UN General Assembly, explains how: “China is a major developing country with a 1.3 
billion population. Managing its own affairs well is its biggest contribution to peace and 
development in the world. Meanwhile, China also works in real earnest to fulfill its 
international obligations.”  
Domestically, Zhou Shengxian (2012b), in his speech to Interpret the National 
12th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection, elaborated on the measures expected 
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to be undertaken in order to carry out responsible governance at all levels, including: 
technological innovation, optimising industrial structures, administrative regulations, 
public participation and international cooperation. The CPC’s policy documents and 
speeches alike claim further responsibilities, of particular focus at the time was 
combating desertification (State Forestry Administration, 2014) and protecting animal 
biodiversity through compliance with the Convention on Biological Diversity (Zhou, 
2013a; at the National Conference on Environmental Protection 2013). Internationally, 
the CPC’s responsible global governance saw the PRC beginning to comply with 
international agreements, such as cooperating with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2016a; 
and UNFCCC, 2016b).  
The CPC continued to discursively further such responsible commitments, for 
example, Li Keqiang (2014b:1) during the 9th East Asia Summit, said:  “Based on its own 
needs and to honour its due responsibility as a major developing country, China will 
work hard to address climate change and deliver on its commitments in meeting the 
targets of energy conservation and emissions reduction”. The CPC’s repeated reference 
to the status of developing country positioned the PRC as being able to first and 
foremost focus on domestic development, whilst discursively representing these actions 
as both responsible domestic governance and responsible global governance.  
 This positioning of the PRC, as a developing country, is ostensible when 
considering the CPC’s use of the CBDR principle. CBDR is a core functioning of the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and was introduced by the Centre for International 
Sustainable Development Law in 2002. Succinctly, the principle of CBDR means that the 
individual circumstances of each State should be considered in how they are able to 
meet the commonly shared responsibilities in preventing, reducing and controlling 
environmental threats. However, CBDR exists with a vague definition, creating space for 
differing interpretations, by different States, at different times. CBDR produces for the 
CPC a hierarchy of responsibility according to name and thus position. 
 The CPC demonstrates their willingness to comply with the notion of common 
responsibilities, yet, there is a great deal more focus on defining and highlighting the 
notion of “differentiated”; understood as name and thus position (Information Office of 
the State Council, 2011; Jia, 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011; Wen, 2009; and 
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Wen, 2012). For example, the Information Office of the State Council’s China’s Policies 
and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2011:1) differentiated the levels of 
responsibility thus:  
 
China sticks to the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”. Developed countries should be responsible for their 
accumulative emissions during their 200 years of industrialisation, which 
is the main reason for the current global warming. Therefore, they 
should take the lead in shouldering the historical responsibilities to 
substantially reduce emissions. With regard to capabilities, developed 
countries have substantial economic strength and advanced low-carbon 
technologies. In contrast, developing countries lack the financial strength 
and technologies to address climate change, and face multiple arduous 
tasks of developing their economies, fighting poverty, and addressing 
climate change. Therefore, developed countries should, on the one 
hand, take the lead in reducing emissions substantially, and on the other 
hand, provide financial support and transfer technologies to developing 
countries. Developing countries, while developing their economies and 
fighting poverty, should actively adopt measures to adapt to and mitigate 
climate change in accordance with their actual situations.  
 
This excerpt immediately sets out what the name “developed” means, with regards to 
both position (200 years of industrialisation) and therefore responsibility (substantially 
reduce emissions). The CPC bluntly places the blame for the PRC’s environmental 
degradation on the “accumulative emissions during their 200 years of industrialisation” of 
the developed nations, as was seen in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 as an emotional 
construction of a national identity through superior Chinese wisdom and culture, and 
through “buck-passing” blame. Simultaneously, the Information Office report 
categorically highlights how the CPC’s responsible environmental governance, as a 
developing country, is focused on national development. The CPC argues developed 
countries, in possessing a higher status within the current world system, should bear 
greater responsibility in helping developing nations to reach higher levels of national 
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development. Endorsing the status of developing country therefore continues to “buck-
pass” responsibility onto the developed nations to provide greater levels of assistance to 
developing countries, thus creating space for the CPC to claim responsible governance 
whilst prioritising domestic development. 
Within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, from Zhou Shengxian (2007) at the 
2007 Annual General Meeting in Beijing, to Li Keqiang’s (2016c) Statement at General 
Debate of 71st session of UN General Assembly in Geneva, the CPC continues to 
support the CBDR principle as highlighted by the Information Office. Zhou Shengxian 
(2007:5) argued: “We urge developed countries to make more efforts in extension and 
application of technologies that are affordable and applicable for developing countries”; 
and, Li Keqiang (2016c:4) stated: “Countries need to stay committed to the principles of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, equity and respective capabilities, and need 
to jointly tackle climate change and work for the Paris Agreement to be universally 
accepted and take effect at an early date. Developed countries need to play a leading 
role, deliver on their emissions reduction pledges and help developing countries improve 
the capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change.”   
Ultimately, through engaging with developing country status, the CPC use 
emotion to: glorify their development achievements thus far; justify the PRC’s 
development status through the shared traumas suffered across developing countries, 
having been subjected to the “denounced” governance from developed countries; and to 
portray the PRC as a responsible country, furthering both domestic development and to 
push their international agenda to be perceived as a big responsible country through 
managing domestic affairs well.  
 
  
“Big Responsible Country”: Finding the Right Name for Preferred 
Position and Thus Responsibility 
 
Callahan’s (2012) “pessoptimism” highlights the inherent use of dualisms 
throughout the CPC’s political discourse. The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, 
regarding responsible governance, also presents through dualisms: for example, 
developing country and big responsible country. However, as previously discussed in 
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Chapter 4, this section aims to demonstrate how this dualism is, once again, not a form 
of “national schizophrenia” (Shambaugh, 2008a), nor an example of an “identity crisis” 
(Agnew, 2012); indeed, the CPC have carefully constructed this potential dualism in a 
way that is tangential from developing versus developed.  
As highlighted by Callahan (2012), the CPC repeatedly balances the PRC’s 
glories with traumas, their rejuvenations with humiliations, in constructing the PRC’s 
national aesthetic. The status of a developing country is woven through the CPC’s 
development narrative – focusing on the necessity for continued domestic development 
– highlighting the PRC’s inflicted development weaknesses (despite governance 
successes). The CPC simultaneously discursively constructs the status of “big 
responsible country”, which is used to reflect the CPC’s governance successes and 
moral superiority. However, despite the dualism in status name, the position the CPC 
assigns to both allows for a continuation in domestic development. The ecological 
civilisation rhetoric suggests that big responsible country is used instead of developed 
nation in order to allow for a continuation in level of responsibility, whilst allowing for the 
traumas within the status of developing country to be balanced by the glories within big 
responsible country. As the PRC has begun to enter a period of transition, from a 
growing economy to a growth economy (Gare, 2017; and Huan, 2008), how the CPC 
position the PRC, to allow for continued domestic development, has also transitioned, to 
“keep with the times”.  
The CPC cannot deny that the outside world perceives the PRC increasingly as a 
developed country. Xu (2009:11) stipulates this development and growth in economic 
and political influence is starting to mark the PRC a possessing “many of the special 
characteristics’ of a Great Power”. However, when it comes to considering how States 
possess the dual accountability of domestic as well as international responsibilities, the 
PRC as a major developing nation has acquired a rather unique position. The CPC’s 
national development goals, such as, pollution reduction - and before that poverty 
reduction - have predominantly presented with a domestic focus. However, poor 
domestic governance with either poverty eradication or pollution reduction would 
threaten not only the CPC’s leadership, but also the PRC’s credibility globally through 
“spill-over” effects beyond the PRC’s borders. For example, the Yellow Dust (or Asian 
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Dust) phenomena posed serious health risks not only for the PRC domestically, but 
internationally with the PRC’s neighbours of Korea and Japan (Yeophantong, 2013). 
The CPC’s rhetoric endorses this increased global status and they discursively 
make it their own by weaving through the rhetoric references to the thoughts from the 
School of Names and School of Legalism on “holding actualities responsible to their 
names” (Yeophantong, 2013:336). Han Fei Zi, a Legalist, argued it was the ruler’s duty 
is to deliberate duties, whilst not being responsible for how individuals perform (Fung, 
1997). The CPC’s big responsible country status augments this approach; the CPC’s 
responsible environmental governance emanates from the CPC, who lead on behalf of 
the PRC with the superior Chinese wisdom and culture, to bring betterment to the world. 
Thus, reflecting the ancient Chinese thoughts discussed above regarding how the 
Chinese became obliged through their superior wisdom and culture to be “bound to the 
world beyond” through their “network of proper behaviour” (Schwartz, 1985a and 
1985b:7).  
Within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, especially since Xi Jinping’s 
chairmanship of the CPC, the big responsible country status is inherently captured within 
the notion that the PRC, as a responsible State, has a duty to share the Chinese wisdom 
and culture with the world: Xi often refers to Chinese wisdom and culture as a gift to 
mankind. The CPC are the heroic leaders leading this dissemination. Ecological 
civilisation itself is a form of responsible environmental governance seen through their 
aversion to force and adherence to benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence 
and trustfulness in approach. Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong (2016:1), during his 
speech for the Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, praised Xi’s international approach in stating how: 
 
In September 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Summit, and joined other world 
leaders in adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This 
Agenda dovetails with China's efforts to complete the building of a 
moderately prosperous society, and to realize the "Chinese dream" of 
national rejuvenation. It resonates with China's vision of advancing 
sustainable development and ensuring that all people share the benefits 
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of development. It is also consistent with China's pursuit to play the role 
of a responsible big country and to promote common development of all 
countries. The implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals is 
China's commitment and its due international responsibility. It is also an 
effective way to advance China's reform, opening-up and socialism with 
Chinese characteristics [sic]. 
 
Li Baodong’s rhetoric makes it abundantly clear that, as a big responsible country, the 
PRC’s increased international cooperation provides a platform for the CPC to further 
domestic development, to showcase Chinese wisdom and culture via their 
environmental governance and that in helping global development, this will enhance the 
PRC’s domestic development and global status.  
Liu Jieyi’s (2017:2) Climate Change and the Sustainable Development Agenda 
speech, delivered to the United Nations, similarly implies changes are coming to the 
PRC’s international situation and that the CPC are committed and on-track to making 
these changes happen: “The vision of global green and low-carbon development 
envisaged by the Paris Agreement corresponds with China's strategic choice of building 
an ecological civilization. Whatever the vicissitudes of the international situation, China 
will remain committed to its development concepts of innovation, coordination, green, 
openness and sharing and actively respond to climate change. It is both the intrinsic 
requirement of sustainable development and part of our responsibility of building a 
community of shared future of mankind [sic].” Ecological civilisation is adapted to fit to 
the CPC’s construction of being a big responsible country, led through the CPC’s 
responsible governance, and is a discursive tool for enhancing the PRC’s position on the 
world stage and to enable continued development domestically.  
Lastly, the most compelling use of emotion identified and contextualised as 
supporting the CPC’s intentions to step up their global environmental governance, as a 
big responsible country, was found in the frequent use of metaphors. Xi (2017e:5), in his 
19th Congress Report, referred to the PRC: “Taking a driving seat in international 
cooperation to respond to Climate Change”  and that “China has become… [a] 
torchbearer in the global endeavour for ecological civilisation.” Moreover, Zhou 
Shengxian (2014b:2), during his Public Address on Environmental Protection Work, also 
262 
used metaphor to demonstrate the PRC’s changing status to that of a big and 
responsible country: “To resolutely declare war against pollution is a forceful 
demonstration of China’s image as a big and responsible country.” All three metaphors 
produce bold imagery of a fast victory through ecological civilisation with the CPC firmly 
and responsibly in charge. The metaphors highlight the global intentions within the 
concept of ecological civilisation, as a means of progressing the PRC’s global image and 
as a method for continued development, domestically and abroad. 
The focus within the CPC’s foreign policy on morality, justice and responsibility 
has sparked the emergence of the “China responsibility” thesis (Zhonggua zeren lun, 中
国责任论) and in many ways it is an alternative from the “China threat” or “China 
collapse” theses (Yeophantong, 2013). Throughout the 21st Century, political 
commentators have maintained that the PRC, as a UN Security Council (UNSC) 
member and nuclear power, must shoulder greater international responsibilities and 
realign their national interests accordingly (Buzan, 2010; Niu, 2009; Wang and Rosenau, 
2009; Yeophantong, 2013; Zhang, 2009; Zhang and Buzan, 2010; and Zheng, 2009). 
Chinese scholars, such as, Su, (2002), Wang (2002), Xiao (2003) and Zhu and Qiu 
(2002) argued the CPC began to showcase greater responsibilities in such fields as: 
cutting carbon emissions, safeguarding harmonious relations in the Asia-Pacific regions 
and conducting joint ocean explorations; and, that this showcasing of significant 
improvements in economic growth, political modernisation, as well as social and 
technological advancements were important steps in national image building for 
increased power on the world stage (such as Xie Zhenhua’s announcement in 2011; 
Black, 2011. See Appendix 2). 
 The CPC asserts that their unyielding regard towards sovereignty and territorial 
integrity demonstrates how the PRC is not only a responsible nation, but one that does 
not seek hegemony nor to dominate other peoples (Yeophantong, 2013). The legalist 
thoughts on responsibility regarding the pursuit of justice finds the CPC campaigning for 
differentiated responsibility and a more equitable environmental protection system by 
imposing requirements on the more able developed nations. However, what this comes 
to mean is that the CPC supports all progress and development being internally driven, 
rather than externally imposed (Lu, 1999; and Tang, 2000). This sentiment is captured in 
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the Chinese proverb, which advises that: “Each person should sweep the snow from his 
own doorsteps and should not fret about the frost on his neighbour’s roof”. 
 An increasingly global outlook in governance was seen during Hu’s leadership, 
primarily under the banner of “Harmonious World” (Hexie shijie, 和谐世界 ). The 
aforementioned ideals on “self-governance” and Confucian thought began to be 
reinserted into the CPC’s guiding principals. Harmonious World instigated a decade of 
forging a “new international and political order”, supposedly supporting the construction 
of a world order based upon democratic, multipolar, multilateral and inclusive 
governance focused on the common ground amongst nations (Hu Jintao, 2005:1). 
Harmonious World was coterminous with the CPC’s rhetoric on “peaceful development”; 
evidently based within the classical Chinese thought on preserving the “Great Harmony” 
(Datong, 大同) and “peace under Heaven” (tianxia Ping’an, 天下平安) (Nordin, 2016; 
and Yeophantong, 2013). The traditional elements captured within Hu Jintao’s guiding 
principles set the scene for an approach to global governance grounded within a 
pluralistic, albeit hierarchical, conception of the world where the PRC’s development 
directly serves the international community by fostering “peace, stability and common 
prosperity” first domestically, and then “in the world” (Ahearne, 2013; and Hu Jintao, 
2005:1). 
The identity, power and status presented throughout the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric continues this increasingly global outlook; whether to challenge the negative 
portrayals popularised by the China Threat and China Collapse theories or to positively 
impose impression management as a “big responsible country”, China scholars and 
practitioners alike support this increasingly globally-orientated outlook the CPC are 
fostering (Buzan, 2010; Niu, 2009; Wang and Rosenau, 2009; Yeophantong, 2013; 
Zhang, 2009; Zhang and Buzan, 2010; and Zheng, 2009). What can be understood from 
the CPC’s status construction and focus on responsibilities within the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric is how the CPC’s carrying out of responsibilities is increasingly 
related to “non-traditional” security concerns. Ren (2007:42; cited in Yeophantong, 
2013:357) explains, these are: “not merely a domestic affair, but also one of international 
significance. It is the greatest contribution that China makes to humankind by working 
out solutions to internal problems such as development and stability.” The CPC, through 
the use of emotion, discursively constructs ecological civilisation, as an example of 
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superior Chinese wisdom and culture to be shared with the world and is a journey 





This chapter has interpreted how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric to present two statuses: “developing nation” and “big responsible 
country”. Initially, the CPC’s use of emotion was tied to the self-positioning of the PRC 
as a developing country. The level of responsibility associated with this status was 
focused on justifying the CPC’s decision to prioritise national development domestically, 
and to oratorically meet international norms. The CPC’s environmental governance 
could thus be understood as using responsibility to facilitate national development. 
However, as the PRC’s economic strength has continued to grow and alongside the 
CPC increasing the self-positioning of the PRC as a big responsible country, the CPC’s 
use of emotion, with regards to the moralistic and legalist aspects of responsibility, 
depicted the PRC as a country fighting for justice, whilst simultaneously arguing for a 
better future for all, a more highly appreciated position for the PRC and furthering 
international environmental governance. This is being achieved through the new name, 
which, whilst not departing from the characteristics of being a developing country, 
ensures national development continues through sound domestic governance.  
Yeophantong (2013:347) described this as the “paradoxical duality of China’s 
identity”; the PRC is both rising in power whilst still being limited by their resources. 
However, this chapter has shown how these two statuses are not really as paradoxical 
as they first seem. Although they represent the natural transitioning from a growing 
economy to a growth economy, they are not dialectical. The CPC is not choosing to self-
position as a developing nation or a rising great power. The CPC are self-positioning the 
PRC as a developing country that is also big and responsible. What can be understood 
from the CPC’s rhetoric is how improved environmental conditions globally are actually a 
necessity for continued domestic development and is thus a national interest, regardless 
of developing or developed nation status. Similarly, that domestic development and 
improved environmental protection aids environmental conditions globally. 
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 The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric captures the emotions of status 
differentiation by injecting references to their sociocultural understanding of 
responsibility. The CPC discursively construct, through the use of emotion, sincerity, 
determination and resolution over their concepts of justice, fairness and equity, which 
they offer to deliver through their intended environmental governance captured within 
ecological civilisation. The environmental governance that the CPC claim is one with the 
responsibility of solving domestic environmental protection, of furthering the efforts in 
international environmental protection, specifically by calling for common but 
differentiated efforts globally. However, to ensure the continuation of their Chinese 
conception of responsible governance, the CPC have begun to reassert the importance 
of exerting Chinese influence and understanding to the broader global political field. 
From Imperial China to the PRC, responsibility has played an important role in 
Chinese governance. In imperial China, responsibility was linked to legitimacy and the 
Mandate from Heaven; during Mao’s leadership responsibility became concerned with 
revolutionary justice positioning the PRC as vanguard of the developing world; currently, 
under Xi’s leadership, responsibility includes constructing an ecological civilisation to 
create a Chinese-led shared future for mankind. As a big responsible country, the CPC’s 
ecological civilisation concept legitimises their rule by securing continued development, 
secures their long-term interests by bettering the PRC’s position on the world stage and 
intends to create a stable international environment, safeguarding the PRC’s ability to 
prosper.  
Responsibility in Chinese governance has always suggested obligations that 
extend beyond the immediate self; the futures and spaces of ecological civilisation 
suggest an increased involvement from the PRC in governing and (re)ordering the 
international community through global environmental governance. The CPC will 
continue to conflate their domestic responsibilities for development with international 
responsibility. Thus, the CPC’s future foreign policy projections are likely to continue 
self-positioning the PRC as a big responsible country, but one with limitations, only 
acting where this best suits domestic development, as a self-positioned developing 




Conclusion: Contributions and Recommendations 
 
 This thesis has considered how the CPC uses emotion within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. Having conducted a thematic EDA three new interpretations of 
ecological civilisation have been explored. This thesis has argued that the CPC uses 
emotion to: 1) construct and further national identity; 2) support and advocate for party 
power and CPC (global) leadership; and 3) vie for the global status of “big responsible 
country”. Politicians and scholars have struggled to understand whom the PRC are, 
where the CPC’s governance is headed, and therefore, what the CPC is likely to do next 
(for example, see the debates on the China Threat versus Peaceful Development 
theories; Al-Rodhan, 2007; Breslin, 2010, 2013; Broomfield, 2003; Chan, 2013; 
Cunningham, 2012; Ding, 2011; Gao, 2013; Hoo, 2013; Nye, 1997; Ren, 2015; Roy, 
1996; and Yeophantong, 2013). Yet, Wang (2014) argued, the CPC’s political narratives 
are a tool of language-based social construction, clearly outlining whom the PRC are 
and where the CPC’s governance is headed. This thesis has shown how the ecological 
civilisation rhetoric provides the CPC with a large platform for language-based social 
construction, to disseminate their ideas, not only on their future environmental 
governance, but also as a tool for constructing national identity, power relationships and 
status. The emotional use of language within the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric 
portrays a clear image of the identity, leadership and responsibilities the CPC wish to 
adorn through their ecological civilisation concept. 
Ecological civilisation has been shown to be a discursive tool, emotionally 
created by the CPC, to: encourage the citizens of the PRC to be proud of and engage 
with their environmental governance; justify their leadership and assert themselves as 
the authority of environmentalism within the PRC (and internationally); and to elevate the 
strategic importance of environmental governance as a means of projecting their big 
responsible country status to the world. The CPC are using emotion to acknowledge the 
needs and wants of an increasingly affluent populace, interested in a healthy 
environment more than ever since the founding of the PRC, in order to continue 
promoting the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. During this time of uncertainty, 
regarding the PRC’s place in the world, the CPC are looking to harbour a stronger sense 
of self, a stronger Chinese identity through their environmental governance. The CPC’s 
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ecological civilisation rhetoric is attempting to take back control of this knowledge 
production, creating Chinese identity, power relationships and status, via the CPC’s 
intended environmental governance.  
This thesis began in introducing the concept, and the importance, of ecological 
civilisation. The Introduction and Literature Review highlighted that ecological civilisation 
had come to the attention of politicians and scholars alike, not just as one of the CPC’s 
latest political slogans, but because how the CPC explores and deploys environmental 
governance has implications for environmental conditionals globally. Ecological 
civilisation was argued to be indicative and capable of influencing the way that the CPC 
interacts with the PRC and beyond, yet little empirical evidence had been presented or 
discussed. Ecological civilisation was seen to have global importance through implicitly 
being an intervention that engages with the UNFCCC protocols. Ecological civilisation 
has therefore, accordingly, attracted much attention and discussion worldwide. The 
introduction highlighted how the CPC’s receiving of, and reaction to, international 
attentions over their environmental governance – such as the U.S. Embassy’s AQI data 
publications – elicited an emotional response from the CPC. This instigated the 
exploration into how the CPC use emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric. 
In analysing the CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric, through constructing an 
intuitive thematic EDA, this thesis has contributed a deeper understanding of the CPC’s 
strategic intentions behind, and the likely consequences of, their ecological civilisation 
concept. In particular, the relationship behind the CPC’s use of emotion within their 
rhetoric and the constructing and disseminating of a new environmentally focused 
national identity, power relationships through thought-leadership and responsibilities 
through status were explored and discussed. These interpretations show how the 
emotion deployed by the CPC, within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, constructs 
ecological civilisation as an example of the PRC’s “discourse power” (Huayuquan, 话语
权). Ecological civilisation was seen to be carrying the CPC’s diplomatic ambitions and 
pathways to disseminate and propagate an increased Chinese influence globally, 
through soft power strategy and specifically through the non-traditional security threat of 
environmental governance (Geall and Ely, 2018). The key methodological contributions 
and further recommendations will now be summarised. 
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Methodological Contributions and Recommendations: Empirically 
Furthering Emotion Research in IR 
 
To examine how the CPC used emotion within their ecological civilisation 
rhetoric, this thesis intuitively designed a thematic EDA. The thematic EDA was built 
upon the works of Koschut, et al.’s, (2017) three-tiered EDA and Galtung’s (1996a and 
2001) CMT-Complex. The thematic EDA identified, contextualised and interpreted the 
CPC’s use of emotion, guided by three themes of chosenness, glory and trauma. Three 
interpretations emerged allowing the analysis to elucidate on the CPC’s strategic 
objectives in constructing a new form of environmental governance, as well as furthering 
understanding of their domestic political agenda and their wider international ambitions.  
The thematic EDA was based within a social constructivist methodology and 
offers IR an approach to develop the conceptual variety in language-based social 
knowledge construction, especially with regards to emotion and the impacts this has on 
identity creation, power relationships and changing statuses, domestically and 
internationally. The EDA demonstrated how emotion is an additional empirical tool for 
analysing inter-subjectivity on the world stage. The CPC’s use of emotion established a 
mechanism through the rhetoric with which their audience is able to interact and 
understand their constructed identity, intended exercises of power at the domestic and 
international level, and anticipated responsibilities through self-positioning within status 
hierarchies. The emotional foundations of language, as semantic structures of meaning, 
add strength to the CPC’s rhetoric and any intended social impacts. The thematic EDA 
allowed for these concepts to be analysed not in isolation, but through existing social 
constructivist concepts such as language, culture and norms, such as Tianren heyi, 
Huaxia and the Three Bonds and Five Relationships. The resulting analysis established 
new interpretations of ecological civilisation, which complement existing constructivist 
language-based explanations of identity, power and status within IR more broadly, and 
of the PRC more specifically.  
A secondary aim of this thesis was to develop the thematic EDA to further the 
analysis of empirical data examples of emotion within the CPC’s rhetoric. In doing so, 
this thesis has demonstrated why and how emotion can, and should, be further studied 
within the broader discipline of IR. The thematic EDA has drawn a comprehensive 
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picture of the CPC’s political thoughts, with regards to environmental governance, and 
their future intentions for increased impact on global governance more generally. 
Moreover, the analysis of emotion within the ecological civilisation also provides new 
explanations for the CPC’s behaviours and decision-making, a topic that is hotly debated 
across IR. The research findings have contributed original knowledge to the theory and 
methodology of emotion research in IR, as well as furthering the discipline’s 
understanding of the CPC’s use of rhetoric in constructing their ecological civilisation. 
Overall, it can be stated that this thesis provides a new thematic EDA able to identify, 
contextualise and interpret the use of emotion in political rhetoric and can be applied to 
any broader analysis of political rhetoric within IR, and beyond. 
The obvious space for future research, with regards to methodological 
recommendations, is to conduct the thematic EDA again, so as to explore divergences 
and alternative themes and patterns that emerge within CPC ecological civilisation 
discourse. Further applications would be to extend the data set and include other forms 
of “text” within the CPC’s broader political discourse on ecological civilisation, especially 
discourse beyond transcribed (and translated) speeches. There is also huge potential to 
apply the thematic EDA designed within this thesis to a variety of other political 
discourses both inside and outside of the PRC, as well as the scope to apply other forms 
of emotionally informed methods, such as an emotion content analysis, to ascertain what 
further knowledge can be produced on the use of emotion within IR.  
 
 
Analytical Contributions and Recommendations: The Spirit, Hero-
Journey and Responsibility of Ecological Civilisation 
 
This thesis has contributed to IR’s wider understanding of the CPC’s 
environmental governance by offering three new ways of interpreting their ecological 
civilisation slogan. Captured through the ideas of a shared “spirit”, the “hero-journey” and 
“responsibility” what was seen is how the CPC are: discursively constructing a socio-
historical cultural identity of Chinese environmentalism; mythologising ecological 
civilisation to portray themselves as thought leaders on a journey to betterment through 
environmental governance; and self-positioning the PRC as a responsible global actor.  
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The Spirit of Ecological Civilisation: Constructing National Identity through Environmental 
Governance  
 
 Chapter 4 deliberated how the CPC’s use of emotion is creating a new socio-
historical identity of Chinese environmental governance. The CPC claim that their latest 
approach to environmental protection is a new and uniquely Chinese approach. To what 
extent ecological civilisation is actually new or uniquely Chinese is, however, not 
important to the CPC. What is of importance is that their rhetoric creates an identity: an 
identity through Chinese wisdom and culture; an identity for the Chinese to be proud of; 
and an identity through which the Chinese can engage in supporting the CPC’s 
environmental governance.	  The CPC are purposefully revitalising elements of classical 
and “superior” Chinese thought, such as Tianren heyi, to validate ecological civilisation 
as uniquely Chinese. “Spirit” distinguishes ecological civilisation as a Chinese response 
to domestic and global environmental governance, creating a collective identity for the 
Chinese to engage with environmental protection, bringing increased competitiveness to 
the CPC’s global environmental governance via this form of discursive soft power.  
The CPC uses emotion to create a pathway for Chinese engagement and 
support of their latest political ecology by creating an identity of what it means to be 
Chinese with regards to environmental protection and ecological modernisation. 
Ecological civilisation comes to represent a returning pride and strength of the Chinese 
nation. This thesis therefore supports arguments that Xi Jinping is abandoning the “keep 
a low profile and bide your time” (taoguang yanghui, 韬光养晦) doctrine (Geall and Ely, 
2018). 
 One of the key contributions from Chapter 4, is the understanding that ecological 
civilisation must be considered as more than a set of codified policy directives; and that 
the emotional construction of national identity via the spirit of ecological civilisation 
demonstrates how the concept needs to be considered beyond the confines of the pre-
exiting structures of global environmental governance, namely, sustainable 
development. Debates have been held over whether ecological civilisation represents a 
paradigm shift away from the ideology of neoliberal capitalism and therefore sustainable 
development, and to what extent it would compete as an alternative hegemony; no 
consensus has been reached. This literature urged for more research to be conducted 
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that considered ecological civilisation, not as a concrete framework or model of 
environmental policy, but as political discourse. In analysing the how CPC uses emotion 
within their ecological civilisation rhetoric, this thesis has brought clarity to these 
previously debated and often misunderstood pathways to ecological civilisation. The 
analysis within this thesis, in focusing on the how the CPC use emotion, demonstrates 
how these pathways, both the continuation of sustainable development, as well as 
ecological civilisation as a Chinese alternative exist as part of the CPC’s soft power 
agenda. Ecological civilisation is designed to rhetorically support and create an increase 
in Chinese influence on the world stage, in particular through the Chinese wisdom and 
culture of ecological civilisation.  
The interpretation of the use of emotion within Chapter 4 has also contributed a 
new perspective on how sustainable development is able to exist alongside ecological 
civilisation within the CPC’s political discourse; rather than representing an identity crisis, 
sustainable development is used as a flexible discursive tool adapted to the CPC’s 
intended political objectives. Sustainable development simultaneously negates and 
supports the CPC’s construction of an ecological civilisation. Ahearne’s (2013) 
Gramscian critique initially considered how ecological civilisation and sustainable 
development exist as competing or alternative approaches to environmental 
governance. However, this thesis has instead highlighted how any contradiction between 
the two approaches in existing simultaneously within the rhetoric is also being utilised as 
a tool for identity creation, and adheres to Mao’s (1937) discussions in On Contradiction 
as opposed to being an identity crisis (Agnew, 2012; Callahan, 2010; and Shambaugh, 
2008a).  
Future research to explore broader questions on how the use of emotion 
coincides with the CPC’s understanding of contradictions and how to handle them, may 
bring to light practical implications from the use of emotion. This relationship whereby 
sustainable development simultaneously negates and supports ecological civilisation 
conforms to Mao’s (1937:36) following definition of competing ideologies in addressing 
contradiction: “It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are 
opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, 
interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity.” As Mao 
(1937:26) argued, “There are many contradictions in the process of development of a 
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complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose 
existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the 
other contradictions” (Mao, 1937:26). Given the CPC’s continued focus on development, 
or the national rejuvenation of the PRC, which is repeatedly referred to throughout the 
ecological civilisation rhetoric, development is a clear key theme and intention within the 
CPC’s concept of an ecological civilisation.  
Xi Jinping’s update to the principal contradiction, where “the contradiction 
between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs 
for a better life”, has placed environmental governance as the ‘place of antagonism’ in 
the CPC’s principal contradiction. Thus, we see ecological civilisation as the CPC’s new 
approach to their environment-development antagonism, as an attempt to correctly deal 
with the principal contradiction where environmental degradation is producing a lower 
quality of life in the CPC’s quest for continued national development of the PRC (Xinhua, 
2017a:1).  
The thematic EDA highlighted how ecological civilisation is frequently referred to 
as the “new path” to environmental protection, with sustainable development labelled as 
the “denounced” old path of the developed West. This was discussed in relation to an 
“Us” versus “Them” in identity creation. Mao (1937:31) argued “It is always so in the 
world, the new displacing the old, the old being superseded by the new, the old being 
eliminated to make way for the new, and the new emerging out of the old.” To what 
extent the emotionally constructed rhetoric answers to Mao’s understanding of 
contradiction and what this means with regards to the CPC’s construction of pathways to 
correctly deal with this new principal contradiction could build on the empirical findings of 
how, and therefore develop why, the CPC uses emotion within their ecological 
civilisation rhetoric. This would develop the research further in considering what impacts 
the use of emotion may have on concrete policy directives.  
The CPC can be seen to argue within their ecological civilisation rhetoric that 
sustainable development does not question the methods of development that have 
created the current contradiction between development and environmental degradation 
impacting on the quality of life experiences. Nor does sustainable development answer 
to the PRC’s unique experiences of environment and development. Future research 
here may provide a deeper consideration of how the CPC intend for ecological 
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civilisation, as a so-called socialist and Chinese alternative, to provide new tools that 
question the methods for development, may provide a greater understanding for how 
global governments can more appropriately, and successfully, tackle climate change and 
to what extent ecological civilisation is an appropriate tool for this. 
 
 
The Mythologising of Ecological Civilisation: Glorifying CPC Leadership  
 
Chapter 5 highlighted how the use of emotion within the ecological civilisation 
rhetoric communicated the CPC’s thoughts on environmental leadership. The ways in 
which ecological civilisation was communicated revealed how the CPC are trying to 
position themselves as thought leaders on environmental governance. The emotion 
within the ecological civilisation rhetoric frequently shared character traits with what 
Campbell (2008) calls the hero journey in mythology. The ways in which emotions of 
glory and trauma are woven through the rhetoric were shown to mirror the mythological 
traits of trials and tribulations, blame, sacrifice and forbidden behaviours.  
This use of emotion presented the CPC as heroic leaders, with ecological 
civilisation as their latest revelation in good environmental governance. Emotions of 
glory were used within trials and tribulations to remind the Chinese audience of the 
humiliations suffered and the achievements made thus far in rejuvenating the PRC by 
following, supporting and trusting the CPC’s leadership. Blame was seen to deflect 
questions over authority and approach on environmental governance onto their political 
competitors. Sacrifice and the forbidden thing(s) provided direction on how to support 
the CPC and why they need to be supported to deliver their revelation of betterment. 
These emotively discursive creations embedded ecological civilisation into the CPC’s 
on-going journey from humiliation to rejuvenation, where ecological civilisation became 
an extension to the concepts of Xiaokang, national rejuvenation and socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. This thesis has therefore furthered understandings of how 
emotion is constructing pathways supporting the CPC’s environmental governance 
leadership via ecological civilisation.  
The use of emotions within this mythologising of ecological civilisation can again 
be understood to indicate a change from the CPC’s norm of the “biding our time” 
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doctrine of taking a backseat in global governance in order to pursue national 
development. The CPC’s use of emotion was shown to create support of a new power 
dynamic where they portray the CPC as heroic leaders: the “torchbearers” taking the 
“driving seat” in the global endeavour for ecological civilisation.  
The CPC’s use of emotion was seen to be creating a power relationship; the 
CPC uses emotion to support their claims as the authority over the PRC’s environment. 
At times this position of leader is extended to also consider the international field of 
environmental governance. This interpretation of the ecological civilisation rhetoric 
creates very specific understandings of the CPC being thought leaders in environmental 
governance and that their vision and superior understanding of an ecological civilisation 
as a place of betterment will be a difficult journey, over a long period of time, but will 
provide better quality of life for all of mankind. Given the literary debate over the timely 
opportunity for the PRC to “step-up” as global environmental leaders versus the ability or 
appropriateness for the PRC to “step-up”, this thesis has highlighted how the CPC’s use 
of emotion disseminates their intentions for both domestic and global environmental 
governance leadership.	  
 Chapter 5 also discussed how the CPC attempt to portray ecological civilisation 
as a real, ideal and symbolic place of betterment, thus creating pathways for 
implementation, where momentum and concrete (rather than purely ideological) 
objectives were discursively created to strive towards. Future research could be 
conducted on unpacking each individual mythologising element to ascertain the broader 
impacts of discursively constructing ecological civilisation and the related elements on 
the CPC’s wider political discourse. For example, deliberating how the CPC portray 
themselves as heroic leaders and to what extent this portrayal differs within the rhetoric 
for a domestic audience versus the rhetoric for the international audience is likely to 
render interesting results regarding how far the CPC’s leadership intentions reach. 
Another example of potential future research could be to ascertain precisely when within 
the rhetoric the CPC used emotion to change how economic growth is to be perceived. 
Economic growth started out within the ecological civilisation as the “forbidden thing”; 
with Xi’s change to the principal contradiction, it would be interesting to understand how 
emotion is being used in the rhetoric, alongside such momentous changes in the CPC’s 
political direction, to change the way the PRC perceives economic growth. 
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Responsibility and Ecological Civilisation: An Evolution in the PRC’s Global Status  
 
Chapter 6 demonstrated how the CPC’s use of emotion highlighted how 
ecological civilisation is a concept designed with international consequences through 
perceived levels of responsible governance. The CPC’s use of emotion reveals how they 
perceive the PRC’s status and also how they wish the PRC to be perceived and 
accepted on the world stage. By actively alternating between the status of developing 
country and “big responsible country” (the latter increasingly existing within the more 
recent rhetoric, 2017 onwards), the CPC are attempting to control, through self-
positioning, their role in global environmental governance. By increasingly moving 
towards the ideal of being a big responsible country, the CPC are creating a space for 
increasing their influence on the world stage, providing a platform for disseminating how 
to perceive the PRC and therefore its effectiveness in distributing their thoughts on 
(environmental) governance. The ecological civilisation rhetoric exists, partly, as an 
index or proxy of how the CPC are trying to articulate, to the world, their intentions of a 
Chinese-led global environmental governance. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated how the CPC choose not to present the PRC as a rule-
taker or a rule-maker; they explicitly create the PRC as both. The CPC do not present 
the PRC as a developing nation or a big responsible country; these statuses are not 
dialectic. The CPC’s ecological civilisation rhetoric elects for drastic changes to the 
international system, but through a “gradualist” approach of maintaining the status quo, 
of pursuing national development first, and thus providing a more stable world order. The 
CPC’s use of emotion in their ecological civilisation rhetoric can be understood as 
amplifying their thoughts on dominance and resistance. The CPC intend to resist the 
failing ideals of, as well as increased responsibility under, the rubric of sustainable 
development; whilst simultaneously dominating environmental governance through 
disseminating instead the supposedly superior ideals of, and better responsibility 
through, ecological civilisation. 
The chapter built upon Yeophantong’s (2013) discussions on the importance of 
responsibility in Chinese statecraft, and demonstrated through empirical examples of 
emotion within the ecological civilisation rhetoric, that responsibility is being used to 
construct and support the CPC’s understanding of environmental governance. 
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Concealed within the CPC’s use of the term responsibility, is the classical Chinese 
understanding that the PRC’s responsibility includes obligations that extend beyond its 
borders. That is to say that the CPC have an obligation to (re)order and govern the 
world, through the Mandate from Heaven and superior Chinese wisdom and culture. The 
CPC are attempting to filter their thoughts on appropriate domestic environmental 
governance to the external sphere of global environmental governance by positioning 
themselves as a big responsible country. Ecological civilisation is therefore seen to map 
the CPC’s intended direction of global environmental leadership, especially through the 
process of “shutting down” the dominance of the developed West in supporting the 
CBDR principal and increasingly dismissing sustainable development as a failed 
approach endorsed by developed nations. President Donald Trump’s (2017) 
announcement to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement has made this 
increasingly easy for Xi Jinping; Trump has created an opening on the global stage for 
the CPC to present their alternative, reliable and responsible environmental governance. 
In February 2020 Antonio Guterres, the UN General Secretary, remarked at the 
Group of Friends on Climate meeting in New York, that the main focus for COP26 in 
Glasgow 2020 would be “enhanced ambition from all countries” (SDG Knowledge Hub, 
2020:1). Chapter 6 has highlighted how the CPC’s use of emotion is projecting their 
heightened ambitions on global environmental governance; how this is being received by 
other countries and how this rhetoric plays out at COP26 in November 2020 may provide 
an interesting example of how the findings from this chapter could be carried forward as 
the focus within future research.  
 
 
Summary of Analytical Contributions and Recommendations 
 
Overall, this thesis, in conducting a thematic EDA guided by the themes of 
chosenness, glory and trauma, has highlighted how the ecological civilisation rhetoric is 
part of a wider effort by the CPC to delineate alternative (environmental) governance to 
the current liberal intellectual-economic order. The CPC, through the use of emotion, 
attempts to assert: the PRC as a nation of superior environmental wisdom and culture; 
the CPC as leaders in contemporary moral and political thinking through focusing, 
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presently, on environmental governance; and as an increasingly responsible nation, not 
just domestically but also internationally now that the PRC is reaching higher levels of 
rejuvenation. Overall, this thesis has identified how ecological civilisation, as a concept, 
is central to the CPC’s ontological security, and is crucial in constructing: the PRC’s 
environmental identity through Chinese wisdom and culture; the CPC as thought leaders 
on the future of environmental governance, domestically and globally; and as a strong 
and returning global power, leading the PRC towards their best future as a big 
responsible country. Thus, the CPC’s use of emotion discursively disseminates the 
CPC’s messages pertaining to the PRC’s identity, power dynamics and status creation in 
the beginnings of a movement towards establishing global environmental governance. 
The CPC’s use of emotion creates ecological civilisation as a nation 
strengthening exercise, taking national development from being a predominantly inward 
looking process, to the global stage. The CPC creates the spirit of ecological civilisation, 
which carries and constructs a national identity, through superior wisdom and culture on 
one of the most pressing global challenges of the twenty-first century. The CPC 
discursively constructs, through emotive language, an offer to heroically lead, not only 
the PRC to the place of ecological betterment, but to share this knowledge of ecological 
civilisation to the world. Lastly, this thesis has also shown how the use of emotion 
bolsters the PRC’s transition away from relying on the status of developing nation, to the 
status of becoming a big responsible (developing) country. Ecological civilisation is a 
pathway to a rejuvenated PRC, domestically and globally; it is not just talk. There is a 
discursive shift through the use of emotion, which is supporting CPC led pathways for 
continued nation building, whilst pursuing a change in global environmental governance 
as a means to assert increased Chinese influence on one of the most pressing 
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Appendix 2: Timeline of Key Political and Environmental 
Events Leading up to, and following on from, the Introduction 













1970’s 1972: The PRC attends the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment.[1] 
Domestic Policy 
 
1973: The CPC establish the Environmental Protection 
Leadership Group (EPLG).[1] 
Institution 
Development 
1978: sees the Third Chinese Constitution issued, with the 
inclusion of an environmental commission, claiming that the 
CPC should supervise both natural resource protection and 
pollution abatement.[5][11] 
Domestic Policy 
1978: Also sees The CPC adopt its open door policy; this 
opens the country to foreign investment and encourages 
development of a market economy and private sector, 
which starts an era of outstanding growth of the Chinese 
economy. This rapid economic development would also 
lead to serious pollution problems.[1][11]  
Foreign Policy & 
Domestic Policy 
1978: The CPC issues the first Environmental Protection 
Law on a trial basis.[2][5][7] 
Law & Policy 
 
Economic reforms later in the decade encourage economic development, 
increasing pollution, which manifests as a serious problem.[1] Simultaneously, the 
CPC begin to introduce institutions, laws and environmental declarations within the 
constitution to combat pollution and protect the PRC’s natural environment.[2] 
 




1984: CPC legislature enacts the Water Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law; and establishes the Forest 
Law as measure of nature conservation.[2] 
Law 
1985: CPC legislature establishes the Grasslands Law as a 
further measure of nature conservation.[2] 
Law 
1986: The Fisheries Law is enacted.[12] Law 
1987: CPC legislature enacts the Air Pollution Prevention 
and Control Law.[2] 
Law 
1989: The CPC formally issues the Environmental 
Protection Law.[5] 
Law 
1989: PLA troops open fire on demonstrators who have 
camped for weeks in Tiananmen Square initially to demand 
the posthumous rehabilitation of former CPC General 
Secretary Hu Yaobang, who was forced to resign in 1987. 




1989 - Jiang Zemin takes over as General Secretary from 




The decade sees numerous environmental and health laws enacted as a response 
to significant health complications, including: respiratory, cardiovascular, and 
cerebrovascular diseases.[3] Levels of air pollution in the main Chinese cities at the 
beginning of the decade are almost exactly at the level of London at the height of 
the Industrial Revolution in 1890.[4] The decade ends in political turmoil, with a new 
era beginning under Jiang Zemin. 
 
1990’s The environmental regulatory framework in the country 
starts expanding rapidly.[7] 
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranks the PRC’s




1993: The 1984 Water Pollution and Prevention Law is 
deemed unsatisfactory. Rapid economic growth and 
resulting pollution makes the law an out-dated policy.[2] 
Law Reforms 
1993: Preliminary construction work on the Three Gorges 
dam begins. A lake almost 600 kilometres (375 miles) long 
is planned that will submerge dozens of cultural heritage 
sites by the time it is completed in 2009.[29]  
Infrastructure 
1994: The Regulation on Nature Reserves is 
introduced.[12] 
Domestic Policy 
1995: The Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law is enacted.[12] 
Law 
1996: The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law is 
amended. The amendment is part of a stricter and clearer 
legislation by lawmakers.[2] The Regulation on Wild Plant 
Conservation is also introduced.[12] 
Domestic Policy & 
Law Reform 
October 1998: The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution 
Victims is founded by Professor Wang Canfa.[13] 
Public Organisation 
1998: The PRC suffered a year of serious flooding; the 
CPC upgrade EPLG to a ministry-level agency, which 








Beijing is recognised as one of the world's most polluted cities.[6] High values of 
PM2.5 and O3 across the PRC continue to result in an alarming figure of premature 
deaths.[5] Significant infrastructure projects continue, despite environmental 
damage, whilst simultaneously reforming policy and law to introduce stricter and 
clearer legislation. 
 
2000’s 2000: The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law is 
enacted. The Seed Law is enacted.[2],[12] 
Law 
2001: China joins the World Trade Organization, leading to 
a quick expansion in manufacturing. As a consequence, 







2002: Vice-President Hu Jintao is named General 
Secretary of the CPC, replacing Jiang Zemin, the outgoing 
leader. Jiang is re-elected head of the influential Central 





2002: A new Environmental Impact Assessment Law is 
amended.[2] 
Law Reform 
2003: The pneumonia-like Sars virus, thought to have 
originated in Guangdong province in November 2002, hits 
the PRC and Hong Kong. Strict quarantine measures are 
enforced to stop the disease spreading.[29] 
Health Crisis 
2003: The Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law is enacted. The Environmental Impact Assessment 
Law is enacted.[12] 
Law 
2004: The SEPA reports 1,221 environmental accidents in 
the year, most of which are related to water. However, 
experts believe the figure is vastly underestimated.[7] 
Government 
Statistics 
2004: The PRC signs a landmark trade agreement with 10 
south-east Asian countries; the accord has the potential to 
unite 25% of the world's population in a free-trade zone.[29] 
Foreign Policy 
2005: An explosion at a chemical plant poisons the 
Songhua river, cutting off water supplies to millions of 
people.[29] 
Environmental Crisis 
2006: According to environmental authorities, on average, 
one water pollution accident takes place every two to three 
days throughout the PRC.[7] Work on the structure of the 





The CPC acknowledges pollution has degraded the PRC’s environment to a critical 
level, threatening health and social stability.[29] This is globally acknowledged as 
the PRC becomes recognised as the world’s biggest CO2 emitter: by 2008, 16 of 
the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in the PRC.[8] The PRC joins the WTO, 
however, despite the CPC acknowledging the extent of environmental damage 
















2007 China ranks the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases, overtaking the U.S. for the first time and being 
responsible for 27 percent of global emissions in the 
year.[1] 
Global Statistics 
2007 is known as the PRC’s “first year of climate change 
communication research.”[15] 
Research 
SEPA’s Official Report on the PRC’s Environment declares 
all seven major rivers in the PRC moderately polluted, and 
grades eleven out of the 28 major lakes with the lowest 
national standard for water quality, which means the water 
is essentially unusable for any purpose.[7] 
Government 
Research/Report 
The Food and Drug Agency chief is executed for taking 
bribes. Food and drug scandals have sparked international 
fears about the safety of Chinese exports.[29] 
Health Scandal 
 
Ecological Civilisation is first used by the CPC when Hu Jintao introduced the term 
in his report to conclude the 17th National Congress of the CPC. International 
statistics, government research and the national health scandal all highlight the 
importance in the CPC better acknowledging environmental degradation across the 
PRC. 
 
2008 Sichuan province earthquake.[29] Environmental crisis 
Beijing hosts the Olympic Games.[29] Foreign Policy. 
The PRC is recognised as the world’s biggest CO2 emitter. 




The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law is 
amended to reinforce control.[7] 
Law 
Nearly 53,000 Chinese children fall ill after drinking tainted 
milk, leading Premier Wen Jiabao to apologise for the 
scandal.[29] 
Health Crisis 
SEPA is promoted to become the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection. MEP research suggests that air pollution has 
begun to reduce by gathering reliable SO2 emissions data 
from continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS), at 
the prefecture level, and goes on to increase the number of 




Building on from the introduction of Ecological Civilisation at the 17th National 
Congress in 2007, 2008 sees the promotion of SEPA to become the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection. Funding is increased allowing for greater detail in 




2009 The PRC experiences a 17.7% rise in exports in December, 
suggesting it has overtaken Germany as the world's biggest 
exporter by the end of 2009. 
Foreign Policy 
Hu Jintao claims that the PRC will increase efforts to 
improve energy efficiency and curb the rise in CO2 
emissions whilst at the UN climate summit in New York.[34] 
Foreign Policy 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao attended Copenhagen 
climate summit (COP15), where the PRC proposed 
emissions cuts of 40 to 45 percent compared with 2005 
levels by 2020. The nonbinding deal, where the target of 




The CPC begin to make international statements on their environmental 
governance intentions to curb carbon emissions domestically, in particular are CO2 
emissions linked to the use of coal. 
 
2010 The Administration Regulations of Ozone Depleting 
Substances legislation is enacted. The Island Conservation 
Law is enacted.[12] 
Law 
The MEP estimate the cost of pollution at 1.5 trillion RMB, 
or 3.5 percent of the GDP.[1] 
Government 
Research 
Census data reveals nearly half of all households primarily 
use solid fuels for cooking, and four out of five of these 




Research by the Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD) 
estimates the ambient air pollution in the PRC led to 1.2 
million premature deaths in 2010 alone.[5] 
International 
Research 
Global UN Climate Talks are hosted by the PRC. Almost 
200 countries were represented at the weeklong 
discussions. The talks were the last to be had before the 
UN climate summit in Mexico at the end of the year. 
Activists requested for money to be made available to help 
developing countries whilst calling for tough emission cuts 
to be made by rich countries.[37] 
Foreign Policy 
Vice-President Xi Jinping named vice-chairman of powerful 
Central Military Commission, in a move widely seen as a 
step towards succeeding President Hu Jintao.[29] 
Leadership Change 
 
Research continued, introducing new laws and policy, linked to the reduction in 
CO2 emissions and the use of coal. Research also begins to focus on the 
economic burden on pollution on the PRC. The PRC continue to engage in the 
international agenda for combating climate change. 
  




Xie Zhenhua, vice chair of the National Development and 
Reform Commission, said that to let emissions rise to the 
same levels as the U.S., with regards to CO2 emissions per 
person, would be a "disaster for the world" claiming that the 




The PRC continue to develop economically, furthering domestic development, 
whilst making international statements regarding their environmental governance 
intentions. 
 
2012 CPC figures suggest the urban population outnumbers the 
PRC’s rural population for the first time.[29] 
Government 
Statistics 
The Qidong protest takes place as an environmental protest 
against a proposed waste water pipeline in the Chinese city 
of Qidong.[17][18] 
Citizen Protest 
The CPC holds the 18th NPC, which is expected to start a 
once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of 
leaders. Vice-President and heir-apparent Xi Jinping takes 




Xi Jinping takes over CPC leadership from Hu Jintao. With this change comes the 
acknowledgement that PRC is changing, especially with regards to the movement 
of people from the countryside into cities. There is also a notable increase in public 
awareness and dissent over environmental conditions nationally. 
 
2013 A severe haze covers many provinces and cities in the 
PRC. The haze, with its unprecedentedly high index of 
PM2.5 concentration and extremely low visibility, provokes 




The CPC declares “war on pollution”. Efforts to curb smog 
included closing down or moving heavily polluting factories 




Xi Jinping launches an efficiency and anti-corruption 
drive.[29] 
Policy 
The Fisheries Law is amended. The Solid Waste Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law is amended.[12] 
Policy Reform 
Politician Chen Jiping, the former leading member of the 
party’s Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs, states 
that environmental issues are a major reason for “mass 
incidents” in the country, estimating unofficial gatherings of 




More than 7,500 dead pigs are found in the Huangpu river. 
The news is spread rapidly online. An estimated 16,000 




The CPC’s National Development and Reform Commission 
issues its first nationwide blueprint for climate change, 
outlining an extensive list of objectives for 2020.[1] 
Domestic Policy 
 
Xi Jinping’s leadership brings a number of significant changes. The number of 
environmental crises acknowledged increases, as does the government’s 
awareness of environmental protest taking place nationally. Massive changes in 
policy are introduced in terms of environmental protection specifically, and 
regarding corruption more broadly. 
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2014 The CPC necessitates fifteen thousand factories, including 
large state-owned enterprises, to publicly report real-time 
figures on air emissions and water discharges.[1] 
Policy 
The Ministry of Finance reports that 21.1 billion yuan will be 
spent on energy conservation and environmental protection 
in 2014; this is up 7.1 percent from 2013. An amount of 
64.9 billion yuan was also allocated to agriculture, forestry 
and water conservation, up 8.6 percent.[21] 
Policy 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang opens the annual meeting of 
parliament and announces pollution as one of his nine 
"major tasks" for 2014.[1][21] 
Government Speech 
and Policy 
The CPC strengthens the Environmental Protection Law for 
the first time in twenty-five years.[1] 
Law Reform 
Asian air pollution, especially smog from the PRC, is seen 
to be having a far-reaching impact on global weather 





In a joint statement on climate change with the U.S., the 
PRC commits to hit peak carbon emissions by 2030 and to 
have renewables account for 20 percent of its energy 
source by 2030.[1] 
International Policy 
Groundwater supplies in more than 60 percent of major 
cities are categorised by the MEP as “bad to very bad,” and 
more than a quarter of the PRC’s key rivers are considered 
“unfit for human contact.”[1] 
Government 
Research 
The PRC becomes one of the biggest investors in 
renewables, investing nearly US$90 billion in 2014 as part 
of the CPC’s pledge to cut carbon intensity; an amount far 
outspending the U.S.’s US$51.8 billion.[1] 
Domestic Policy & 
U.S. Policy 
Approximately 4 billion tons of coal are consumed in the 




The PRC signs a 30-year deal, worth an estimated $400bn, 
for gas supplies from Russia's Gazprom.[29] 
Foreign Policy 
The PRC’s economic growth falls to its lowest level for more 
than 20 years - 7.4% percent in 2014. Government revises 
growth targets down.[29] 
Economic Policy 
 
The PRC is recognised as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and is 
responsible for 27 percent of global emissions in 2014.[1] However, further 
changes are initiated to suggest a real shift towards better monitoring and 
prevention of pollution. International research continue to paint a bad picture and 
international statements continue to portray a positive future outcome.  
 
2015 Coal power plants nationally have their capacity increased 
by 55 percent in the first six months: 155 new coal-fired 
plants are approved and the CPC admits that it has 
underreported annual coal consumption since 2000.[1] 
Government 
Statement & Policy 
An International team of researchers demonstrate how the 
global assumptions made for the PRC’s CO2 emissions has 
vastly over estimated the amount of carbon emitted by the 




types of coal burned in the PRC, they found it produced 
40% less carbon than had been erroneously assumed. The 
researchers say the discrepancy is significant. Over the 
period 2000-2013, they found that he PRC emitted almost 
three gigatonnes of carbon less than previous estimates, 
which is around 10% of the global total in any one year.[39] 
The CPC airs Under the Dome, an environmental 
documentary exposing Beijing's true pollution levels and the 
government corruption behind them. The film is watched by 
millions of people and goes viral, before being abruptly 






Beijing authorities took drastic action to ensure blue skies 
during the largest military parade held: a showcase marking 
the 70th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II. The 
day after the parade the familiar sight and smell of dour 
grey pollution returned.[31] 
Government 
Intervention 
The rate of deaths attributable to air pollution across the 
PRC is estimated at 115 deaths per 100,000 people. 
Comparisons include the estimated figures for India at 138 
deaths per 100,000 people, 49 in Japan, 43 in Western 
Europe and 31 in the U.S..[16] 
International 
Statistics 
The CPC issued the highest-level alert for air pollution for 
the second time, in December 2015. Particulate pollution at 
the end of November measured at almost 30 times WHO 
the recommended level; there was much criticism that not 
enough was being done.[32] 
Air Pollution Crisis 
3.78 billion cubic meters of untreated wastewater was 
discharged across the PRC in 2015. This is water that has 
been ruled unusable for agricultural, industrial and even 
decorative purposes dumped into rivers and lakes.[23] 
Research: 
Environmental Crisis 
Economic growth in 2015 falls to lowest rate in 25 years 
(6.9%, down from 7.3% in 2014), and IMF predicts further 




Despite attempts at governmental transparency, ultimately 2015 concluded with 
more negative instances of the CPC’s handling of environmental governance, 
alongside continued economic decline. 
 
2016 The State Council releases the “Soil Pollution Prevention 
and Control Action Plan” or “Soil Ten Plan”. It aims to 
"improve soil quality and ensure safe agricultural products 
resulting in a healthy living environment for China’s 
population". The plan consists of 231 specific actions, and 
deadlines are given.[24] 
Policy 
The Innovative Financing for Air Pollution Control in Jing-
Jin-Ji Region Programme is launched, with the goal to 
finance projects helping to reduce coal consumption.[22] 
Research and 
Design & Policy 
US and China formally join pact and ratify the Paris 
Agreement. This statement was made just before the B20 
Summit in Hangzhou.[40] 
Foreign Policy 
The slow economic growth continues, with the 2016 





The human-induced carbon dioxide emissions in the PRC account for 
approximately 30% of global emissions.[9] However, introduced policies start 
showing promising results. Coal use declines, and the declining trend continues to 
accelerate along the decade.[10] The CPC begin to provide more specific details of 
what actions need to be carried out. Importantly, Xi Jinping ratifies the Paris 
Agreement making taking a big step towards improved global environmental 
conditions. 
 
2017 A new team of environmental police are introduced to 
reduce hazardous levels of toxic smog engulfing Beijing. 
Cai Qi, the city's acting mayor said the police force will look 
for local sources of air pollution, including open-air 
barbecues and dusty roads.[33] 
Policy 
Xi Jinping, on a State visit to Washington, announces that 
the PRC will initiate a national cap-and-trade emissions 
program.[1] 
International Visit & 
Domestic Policy 
The MEP calculates an annual average PM2.5 
concentration of 43 µg/m3 for cities in 2017; this is more 




The CPC makes a second amendment to the Water 
Pollution Prevention Act. Based on the first regulation of 
Water Pollution Prevention Act in 1996, the amendment 
would increase the punishment for water pollution and the 
penalty ceiling may be raised to 1 million yuan.[25] 
Policy Amendment. 
More than 150 coal-fired power plants are halted after 
launching the first regional Environmental Protection 
Bureau to consolidate cuts in air pollution following the 19th 
NPC. The measures are a part of an aggressive action plan 
that aims to cut wintertime particulate pollution by 15% 
year-on-year over the next five months.[26] 
Policy 
President Donald Trump withdraws the U.S. from the Paris 
Climate Accord.[41] 
U.S. Foreign Policy 
The CPC votes at its 19th NPC to enshrine Xi Jinping's 
name and ideology in its constitution, elevating him to the 
level as founder Mao Zedong.[29] 
Leadership Change 
 
Xi Jinping continues to make more international statements regarding furthering the 
pollution control measures within the PRC, especially with regards to CO2. Coal-
fired power plants begin to be stopped. Donald Trump withdraws the U.S. from the 
Paris Agreement. 
 
2018 The National People's Congress annual legislative meeting 
votes to remove a two-term limit on the presidency from the 
constitution; allowing Xi Jinping to remain in office for longer 
than the conventional decade for recent Chinese 
leaders.[29] 
Leadership Change 
A revision of the Water Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law is approved by the 19th National People’s Congress 
and goes into effect.[27] 
Law Reform 
333 
Four years after declaring war on pollution, research gives 
promising results, and estimate longer life expectancy 
across the PRC. Cities have cut concentrations of fine 
particulates in the air by 32 percent on average, in only four 
years.[28] 
Research 
During major reorganisation of the CPC’s ministries, the 
MEP became the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. The 
MEE’s authority will expand to consolidate pollution-related 
responsibilities currently allocated among several other 
ministries, as well as assuming responsibility for climate 
change policy from the National Development and Reform 
Commission, a powerful economic planning agency which 
developed the national emissions trading system launched 
in late 2017. Specifically, the MEE will expand its authority 
with respect to supervision and prevention of groundwater 
pollution, wastewater emission control, protection of rivers, 
non-point source agricultural runoff, protection of oceanic 
environments, environmental oversight for China’s massive 
South-North Water Transfer Project, and responsibility for 




Xi Jinping’s leadership in increasingly cemented, both constitutionally and in terms 
of declared results by the MEE. The major reorganisation of CPC ministries 
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